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ABSTRACT
Public international lawmaking is a multipartite process of communication 
wherein only States as authoritative decision-makers produce international law. 
However, commercial entities have long been active within the international 
legal order and employ international law to curtail the right of States to 
regulate at national levels. Evidence suggests that the international legal 
personality of corporations is undergoing further qualitative transformations. 
Corporations influence the State practice constitutive of custom and affirm, 
add detail to or challenge prevailing normative rules. The corporate role in 
filling lacunae where States are unable or unwilling to discharge their 
regulatory responsibility is apparent in the context of intergovernmental codes 
of conduct and private voluntary initiatives. Although the procedural law 
common to Conferences of the Parties indicates that a ‘right of participation’ is 
yet to emerge, ECOSOC-accredited non-State actors enjoy a legitimate 
expectation of admission. Furthermore, the modalities for their participation 
include the formal opportunity to make oral and written statements and to 
undertake informal activity. Corporations occupy an important role in 
subsequent treaty implementation as illustrated by the legal regime for climate 
change. Finally, corporations develop procedural law and substantive norms 
through selective resort to different enforcement models including national 
courts, diplomatic protection (including the WTO) and direct arbitral action 
(including NAFTA). The challenges of business engagement include 
identifying majority opinion, discerning commercial intent and managing 
confrontations with developing States or other non-State actors. Diversity and
2
evolution characterise the practice of UN secretariats and a one-size-fits-all 
approach is not currently feasible or desirable. Acknowledging commercial 
contributions more accurately reflects the negotiating process inherent in 
lawmaking and the role of States in mediating contested policy questions. 
Corporate contributions through, in parallel with or collaboratively with States 
can be consistent with democratic theory by enriching intergovernmental 
deliberations. However, they can only ever augment the underlying basis of 
international law: State consent.
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Introduction
This thesis argues that transnational corporations participate within various 
international legal processes which become binding upon States as 
international law. For a considerable period corporations acting individually 
and collectively have contributed to the creation, implementation and 
enforcement o f orthodox as well as novel sources o f international law. 
Corporations act through, in joint collaboration with, in parallel, competitively 
and entirely independently o f intergovernmental mediums. The sources o f 
international law examined in this thesis are not assessed by reference to their 
principal author: States. The principal concern o f the thesis lies with the 
procedural issues associated with the participatory claims o f corporations 
rather than questions o f corporate responsibility or the substantive content o f 
international law. Corporations encourage regulatory competition between 
States since the particularity o f  national law can provide a competitive
/
advantage within the international marketplace. They also encourage
o '
harmonisation o f different national legal systems to facilitate cross-border
w y A ,  exchange, thereby furthering international law’s claim to universality. The
^  — —
thesis examines whether there has been a qualitative transformation o f the
AJLt  ^ Cvu\A^
corporate role within the international legal order and in what ways the I &
methods, motivations and regulatory demands o f corporations augments the 
notion o f State consent as the underlying foundation o f international law. This 
Chapter first outlines the content and methodology o f the thesis and clarifies 
the use o f terminology. It then situates the thesis within a broader theoretical 
landscape and identifies the principal themes highlighted by this work.
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1. Structure and Methodology of the Thesis
This thesis examines commercial contributions to international lawmaking. 
Lawmaking is a bargaining process involving communication between several 
parties. ‘Lawmakers’ are particular actors possessing universally recognisable 
authority and competence who formulate in accordance with pre-determined 
procedures a body of rules which are enforceable against all. ‘Law’ is the 
product of dynamic feedback loops where multiple and simultaneous 
interactions individually and collectively modify conditions for further 
interaction.1 The process-orientated approach utilised by this thesis principally 
focuses upon the procedures (both formal and informal) for producing 
international law, the identity of interested actors and their specific motivations. 
To avoid oversimplifying a complex and interactive process, the role and 
influence of other non-State actors will be noted where relevant.
The Introduction contextualises corporate participation within several 
interrelated theoretical paradigms: economics, regulation and international law. 
It considers the implications of corporate contributions to international 
lawmaking for the subject-object distinction and the position of corporations 
within the international legal order. The legal personality of corporations at 
the national and international level already contemplates the performance of 
activities which have legal consequences for others. Furthermore, 
contemporary efforts to improve European regulation may herald changes for
1 Teubner, G., Law as an Autopoietic System. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1993.
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the international lawmaking process. Examples familiar to international law 
illustrate how firms invoke international law to circumscribe the right of States 
to regulate at the national level. Although regulation ordinarily conflicts with 
market approaches, politically-organised business groups argue that one 
responsibility of States is to establish an enabling framework which facilitates 
market operations.
Chapter One presents an historical account of the corporate position within the 
international legal order. Particular reference is made to the role of chartered 
trading companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the 
evolutionary relationship between corporations and the United Nations system, 
the latter by resort to official UN documents. The Chapter draws upon the 
opinions of those seven secretariat officials from the UN, Specialised Agencies 
and other treaty-based institutions (66 officials solicited) who responded to a 
questionnaire or were interviewed by telephone (see Annex 8). These 
individuals were the designated NGO focal points, public relations officers or 
officials responsible for private sector relations and are particularly well-placed 
to observe the secretariat practices which have emerged as a consequence of 
engagement with the private sector. The organisational rules of procedure for 
intergovernmental organisations including the UN General Assembly, the 
Security Council, the Specialised Agencies and several human rights 
institutions are also examined (extracted in part in Annex 1).
Chapter Two examines the extent to which corporations influence the State 
practice constitutive of customary international law. It also considers the
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corporate role in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of 
intergovernmental codes of conduct and asks whether voluntary corporate 
initiatives represent novel sources of international law. Reference is made to 
the intentions of individual firms who participated in the Energy and 
Biodiversity Initiative to influence both regulatory development and market 
conditions. This material draws upon responses to a questionnaire which have 
been discussed by this author in previously published work.
Chapter Three analyses the impacts of commercial interests upon the formation 
and implementation of treaties. A case study examines international regulation 
with respect to ozone layer depletion and climate change. This subject matter 
illustrates the diversity of business interests, the evolution in commercial 
strategies and the respective merits of different modalities for corporate 
participation. Empirical data derives from the author’s attendance over a two- 
week period at the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Milan during December 2003. Interviews 
and discussions were conducted with corporate officers from individual firms, 
politically-organised business groups and trade associations (see Annex 7). 
Modalities for corporate participation during plenary meetings of the 
Conference of the whole and meetings of two subsidiary bodies (the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation) were observed and contact groups, roundtables, 
panel discussions, ‘side-events’, BINGO meetings and secretariat briefings 
attended. The Chapter also considers the extent to which NGOs shape the 
terms of their participation at international conferences convened under UN
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auspices, World Summits and Special Sessions o f the General Assembly and 
the relevant criteria for accreditation (see Annex 2). The possible existence 
and scope o f an emergent right o f NGO participation is discussed in light o f 
the procedural law common to several illustrative Conferences o f the Parties. 
The analysis includes both primary rules (the enabling treaty provision which 
contemplates a Conference o f the Parties) and secondary rules (the procedural 
rules adopted by States and decisions o f governing bodies with respect to NGO 
participation at the conference) (see Annexes 3 & 4).
(S \
Chapter Four evaluates the corporate role in enforcing international law against
States and other firms within the context o f different models including resort to
national courts, diplomatic protection before the International Court o f Justice
and the operational framework o f an international organisation. Two dispute
settlement mechanisms are o f particular interest. The North American Free
Trade Agreement illustrates resort to the direct arbitral model at the regional
level and commercial impacts upon the substantive content o f international law.
This is contrasted with the modalities for corporate participation before the
World Trade Organisation including the submission o f amicus curiae briefs.
Empirical information derives from the expressed intentions o f  a trade
association, the observations o f a secretariat official who responded to a
questionnaire, the response o f States as expressed in official documents and
academic commentary.
The Concluding Chapter assesses commercial contributions to international 
lawmaking, considers the implications for regulatory theory and the sources o f
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international law and considers whether there has been a qualitative 
transformation of the corporate role within the international legal order. It 
analyses the nature of the participatory right asserted by NGOs and how 
commercial contributions to international lawmaking may evidence greater 
participatory democracy within the international system. Contemporary 
developments at the European level may herald changes to our appreciation of 
how corporate contributions augment the notion of State consent as the 
foundation for international law.
2. Use of Terminology and Additional Sources.
Corporations together with public interest groups, trade unions, consumer 
groups and others collectively comprise ‘non-State actors’ and members of 
‘transnational civil society’. More commonly they are classified as non­
governmental organisations (NGOs). International law offers no settled 
definition of ‘NGO’ or indeed of ‘corporation’. NGOs may be defined as 
groups of individuals representing elements of public opinion, established 
under national law, having a permanent organisational or governance structure
(ideally democratic and transparent) and possessing specialist expertise or
0 • • • competence. Their most important attribute is that they are neither affiliated
with nor under the direction of any State notwithstanding that they are
established under national law and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of their
home State. Corporations are typically distinguished from NGOs on account
of their profit-making nature.
2 Eg Princen T. & Finger M. (Eds), Environmental NGOs in World Politics. Routledge 
Publishers, London, 1994, 6. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 also identifies the attributes of 
NGOs.
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The ‘private sector’ includes individual, for-profit commercial enterprises
(including small and medium sized enterprises and transnational corporations),
business associations and coalitions (chambers of commerce, employers
organisations, trade and industry associations), business-led groups promoting
 ^ #
corporate citizenship and corporate philanthropic foundations. To this list 
may be added corporate-funded research foundations, consultants, corporate 
law or accounting firms, bar associations and lobbying agencies. A 
‘transnational’ or ‘multinational’ corporation may be defined as ‘a cluster of 
corporations or unincorporated bodies of diverse nationality joined together by 
ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management 
strategy’.4 Subsidiaries are located within several host States subject to the 
direction of a parent enterprise located within a home State.5 Transnational 
corporations are not international or intergovernmental organisations whose 
proper law is international.6 To emphasize distinctions between commercial 
decision-making, lawmaking and governance, this thesis adopts the definition 
of corporations as decision-making centres located within one State and having 
operations in one or more others.7
3 UN Secretary-General, Cooperation between the UN and all relevant partners, in particular 
the private sector, UN Doc A/56/323 (2001), para 6 & Annex 1.
4 Joseph S., ‘Taming the Leviathan: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights’ (1999) 46 
Netherlands Int L R 171, 172.
5 Doremus P.N. et al, The Myth of the Global Corporation. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1998.
6 Higgins R., 'A Multinational Corporation or an International Organisation' in Morgan R. et al 
(Eds), New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Essays for Susan Strange. Macmillan 
Press, London, 1993, 182, 187.
7 Institute de Droit International, Resolution 3: Multinational Enterprises, para 1, (1978) 57(2) 
Annuaire de L ’Institut de Droit International Session d ’Oslo 1977, 339.
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This thesis uses the terms ‘firm’, ‘corporation’, ‘enterprise’, ‘business’ and 
‘industry’ interchangeably. ‘NGO’ is generally used in contradistinction to 
corporations to refer to public interest advocacy organisations unless the 
specific context indicates that the topic under consideration (particularly 
Chapter Three) applies to all non-State entities.
A distinction is made between formal sources of international law and other
o
evidentiary materials of a historical or explanatory value only. This pomt is 
relevant since the latter can emanate from a variety of authors irrespective of 
their formal status but are essential ingredients for the international lawmaking 
process. Contributions by non-State actors are indirect since they need final 
legitimation by States before becoming international law. 9 Corporate 
documents, for example statements, position papers, legal submissions and 
press releases must be treated with scepticism as primary materials since they 
state officially agreed positions and may not reflect minority opinions within 
the business community. Their content is also directed at a specific audience: 
statements to shareholders for example will differ from those distributed at 
intergovernmental workshops. They are therefore corroborated or contradicted 
with personal opinions, intergovernmental documents, NGO perspectives and 
academic commentary where possible. Such materials usefully state best 
commercial practice or the regulatory conditions preferred by firms. They are 
accordingly part of the cumulative process which may result in international 
law.
8 Eg Fitzmaurice G., ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’ 
(1958) Symbolae VerzijI 153.
9 Van Hoof G.J.H., Rethinking the Sources of International Law. Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer 1983, 63, 283.
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3. States. Non-State Actors and International Lawmaking.
Law classically derives from the will and command of sovereigns as 
implemented through the institution of government.10 Similarly, ‘the rules of 
law binding upon States...emanates from their own free will’.11 The classic 
departure point for a positivist approach to the sources of international law is 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. International 
conventions or treaties are expressly recognised by States, general practice is 
created and accepted as customary international law by them and general 
principles of law are those recognised by civilised nations. Article 38(1) says 
little about the actual process for creating international law: it could be a non- 
exhaustive list of international legal sources or a filtering mechanism through 
which any material must pass before it constitutes a source of international law.
Recognition by two States that certain rules are legally binding is insufficient
• 11 , , for those rules to constitute general international law which is telling given
that bilateral treaties are the very basis for foreign direct investment law. The
United Nations Charter as the closest approximation to a constitutional
■ * *instrument also assumes State-centrahty in lawmaking and non-State actors 
only enjoy consultative status in the economic and social field.14
10 Austin J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 
1965, 133-4.
11 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJSer A No 10, 18.
12 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v US) (1986) ICJRep 14, 97.
13 Kelsen H., Principles of International Law. Rinehart Publishers, Colorado, 2nd Ed, 1966, 437.
14 Art 71, UN Charter.
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International legal theory similarly isolates State activity and ignores the 
contributions of other actors. Corporations in particular are ‘invisible’.15 This 
need not be surprising: corporations are by definition creatures of national law, 
their commercial operations are territorially focused and formulating 
international policy is strictly beyond their profit-making remit. Furthermore, 
the permissibility and form by which capitalist actors transact with States turns 
upon the latter’s particular ideological position: the absence of
intergovernmental consensus is therefore an obstacle to the full development of 
corporate legal personality at the international level. However, the de jure 
status of corporations sits uneasily with their significant de facto impact. 
Corporations make many positive contributions such as improving living 
standards but also have malign impacts in terms of abusing market position, 
environmental pollution and undermining labour interests.16
As a State-centric discipline international law displays a ‘self-protecting
1 7myopia’ which keeps other entities at the periphery and risks obsolescence. 
Continued exclusion renders international law ‘amorphous and unhelpful’.18 
International law may become the ‘guardian of a museum which only a few 
will enter while the mainstream of life flows past outside its windows’.19 At
15 Johns F., ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International 
Law and Legal Theory’ (1994) 19 Melb Uni LR 893,902, 922.
16 The Economist, 'The World's View of Multinationals', 29 Jan-4 Feb 2000, 21.
17 Strange S., 'Big Business and the State' in Eden L. & Potter E.H. (Eds), Multinationals in the 
Global Political Economy. MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1993, 101, 102-3; Alston P., ‘The 
Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalisation’ (1997) 8 EJIL 435.
18 Jenks C.W., ‘Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations’ in Friedmann W., Henkin L. & 
Lissitzyn O. (Eds), Transnational Law in a Changing Society: Essays in Honour of Phillip C. 
Jessup. Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, 70, 76, 82.
19 Lachs M., ‘Law in the World o f Today’ in Bos A. & Siblesz H. (Eds), Realism in Law­
making: Essays on International Law in Honour of Willem Riphagen. Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986, 101, 110.
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90worst, international law will become ineffective and inconsequential , 
potentially substituted by a ‘transnational law’ which is more receptive to
91commercial interests. ‘International’ could therefore describe interactions 
between States whereas ‘transnational’ refers to cross-border transactions also 
involving non-State actors.22 The more social policy-orientated New Haven 
school accepts that corporations are independently powerful actors but
• 90considers that they lack the competence to make international law. 
Contemporary adherents are prepared to expand the category of ‘authoritative 
decision-makers’ such that the demands of other participants may be legally 
‘influential’. 24 International liberal theory, which posits individuals and 
transnational groups as primary actors within an international system 
composed of disaggregated States, limits the impact of non-State actors to that 
of ‘explanatory relevance’.25
Several calls have been made for international law to abandon sacrosanct rules
■ • 9 ( \rooted in the past and adapt itself to newly emergent social conditions. The 
number of non-State actors has grown exponentially to outnumber States: the 
41 NGOs granted consultative status with the UN in 1948 grew to 377 by 1968 
and to 2088 by 2001. Of these approximately 200 were business, trade,
20 McDougal M.S., 'International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception (1953- 
I) 82 Hague Recueil 137, 162.
21 Jessup P.C., Transnational Law. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1956,2, 106.
22 Risse-Kappen T., ‘Introduction’ in Risse-Kappen T. (Ed), Bringing Transnational Relations 
Back In: Non-State Actors. Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995, 3.
23 McDougal M., Lasswell H. & Reisman M., ‘The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision’ (1966) 19 J  o f Legal Education 253; Higgins R., Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, 2,4, 50.
24 Reisman M., ‘Designing and Managing the Future of the State’ (1997) 8 EJIL 409.
25 Slaughter A.-M., Tulumello A.S., & Wood S., ‘International Law and International 
Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’ (1998) 92(3) AJIL 367, 
383.
26 Eg South West Africa Cases (1966) ICJ Rep 6, para 49; Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain) (1970) ICJ Rep 3, 37.
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professional or industry- related associations. Commercial activity from above 
the State and the emergence of transnational forces from below may create a
* 97restructured international legal order. Acknowledging that NGOs play a 
‘vital role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy’, 
Agenda 21 called upon intergovernmental institutions to establish procedures 
for including NGOs ‘at all levels from policy-making and decision-making to
? o
implementation’. Several States have moreover agreed to promote access to 
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in
90the context of international environmental decision-making. In short, States 
have indicated a willingness to open up intergovernmental process to 
participation by non-State actors in recognition of their distinctive 
contributions.
A possible re-conceptualisation of international society warrants a more 
accurate account of international lawmaking. Privatisation enables companies 
to execute formerly public functions such as peace-keeping, jail administration, 
refugee processing, immigration control, deportation, police enforcement, 
health care and education. Is it somehow relevant that State officials sign 
agreements in their capacity as directors of State enterprises ? 30 What 
significance is to be ascribed to the fact that the nuclear and insurance 
industries participated in intergovernmental symposia or that private law firms,
27 Falk R., ‘The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New Jurisprudence of Global 
Civil Society’ (1997) 7 Trans’lL  & Contemp Prob 333.
28 Chapter 27.1 & 27.6, Agenda 21, Report on UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, UN Doc A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), Vol 3.
29 Art 3(7), 1999 UN Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the 
Aarhus Convention) 38 ILM5Y1.
30 Cassese A. & Weiler J.H.H. (Eds), Change and Stability in International Law-Making. 
Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1988, 15, 24.
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corporations and financial institutions are ranked among the most frequent 
users of the UN Treaty Series ?31
4. ‘Better Lawmaking* within Europe.
The panalopy of issues relevant to this thesis is usefully illustrated in current 
attempts to improve the quality, effectiveness and legitmacy of rule-making 
within the European Community (EC). Lawmaking is becoming more 
transparent to interested parties.32 The European Commission seeks a more 
accessible, reliable and user-friendly body of legislation. It has become 
evident that ‘poor-quality regulation is hindering economic development and 
undermining the quest for full employment by imposing unnecesary 
compliance burdens on business, and especially small businesses’.34 The 
Commission therefore hopes to ensure legal certainty and reduce compliance 
costs for companies and pubic authorities alike. 35 Economic impact 
assessments will measure effects upon economic growth and competitveness.
The EC acknowledges the right of citizens to form associations for pursuing 
common purposes.37 The EC has a long tradition of consulting with outside 
interests when formulating policy and has identified the desired attributes of
31 UN Secretary-General, United Nations Decade of International Law, UN Doc A/54/362 
(1999), paras 80,148, 209, 277 & fa 16.
32 EC Report to the European Council, Better Lawmaking 2001, COM(2001) 728 Final, 11.
33 EC Communication, Updating and simplifying the Community acquis, COM(2003) 71 Final,
11.
34 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on Simplification, CES 398/2003, para 
3.1.
35 EC Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents.
36 EC Communication on Impact Assessment, COM(2002) 276 Final, 15.
37 Art 12, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) OJEC 364, 8.
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so-called ‘civil society organisations’. Although it has ostensibly rejected an 
accreditation system 39 , organisations wishing to contribute to policy 
development must be representative, transparent and accountable. Additional 
considerations include their structure, membership and track record o f  prior 
participation.40 The EC has also developed eligibility criteria for organisations 
wishing to engage in ‘civil dialogue’.41
Significantly, Articles 138 and 139 o f the EC Treaty already require 
Commission to consult management and labour in preparing proposals within 
the social policy field. Employers and workers organisations have a 
recognised right to conclude collective agreements which may subsequently be 
adopted as legislation.42 This negotiating process has been equated to 
participation by the European Parliament in other forms o f Community 
lawmaking.43 Delegating law-making authority to representatives o f directly 
affected parties is one means o f solving the ‘democratic deficit’ problems 
associated with public institutions.44 However, States are under a duty to 
verify that management and labour representatives are sufficiently 
representative. The European Court o f Justice has also relaxed its locus standi
38 EC Communication, Promoting the Role o f Voluntary Organisations and Foundations in 
Europe, COM/97/0241 (1997).
39 EC Communication, An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and Special 
Interest Groups, (1993) OJEC C63.
40 Commission Discussion Paper, The Commission and NGOs : Building a Stronger 
Partnership, COM(2000) 11 Final, 3, 24.
41 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on European Govemance-A White 
Paper, CES 357/2002.
42 Art 28, EU Charter o f  Fundamental Rights o f the European Union (2000) OJEC 364, 8.
43 Case T-135/96 UEAPME v Council [1998] ECR 11-2335, para 89.
44 Scott J. & Trubek D.M., ‘Mind the Gap: Law and N ew  Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union’ (2002) 8(1) European U  1 ,8 .
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requirements where these social partners have participated in processes leading 
to the adoption of the contested decision.45
NGOs initiated efforts by the EC to render consultative processes more 
consistent.46 The EC recognised the need for a coherent approach which 
maintains and builds upon existing good practice.47 It wishes to reduce the risk 
that policy-makers listen to only one side of the argument or that particular 
groups gain privileged access.48 Administrative measures will also be 
introduced to process complaints where States fail to correctly transpose 
Community law into national legislation.49
As for the final product, the Commission will choose between a range of 
regulatory devices including directives, coregulation, self-regulation and 
voluntary sectoral agreements. 50 Several will not be available where 
fundamental rights or important political options are at issue or where rules 
must be uniformly applied within all States.51 The Commission considers it 
preferable not to make a legislative proposal where voluntary industry 
agreements already exist but does not rule out the prospect where they prove 
insufficient or inefficient. This is comparable to regulatory techniques in the 
US which include review-and-comment, regulatory notification, regulatory
45 Case T-122/96 FEDEROLIO v Commission [1997] ECR11-1559.
46 EC Communication, Consultation Document. Towards a reinforced culture of consultation 
and dialogue-proposal for general principles and minimum standards for consultation of 
interested parties by the Commission, COM(2002) 277 Final, 2-3.
47 EC Communication, European Governance: Better Lawmaking, COM(2002) 275 Final, 3.
48 EC Commission, European Govemance-A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 Final, 17, 27.
49 EC Communication, Relations with the Complainant in respect of Infringements of 
Community Law, COM(2002) 141 Final.
50 EC Communication, Action Plan ‘Simplifying and improving the Regulatory Environment’, 
COM (2002) 278 Final, 7, 11.
51 EU Council, Legislative Acts and Other Instruments: Interinstitutional Agreement on Better 
Lawmaking, 12175/03, para 17.
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negotiation and citizens advisory boards. 52 For example, regulatory 
negotiation envisages States resolving compliance issues through negotiation 
with affected parties.53 In light o f regulatory developments at the regional 
level, one may wonder why the international lawmaking process continues to 
exclude non-State actors, (Vjl ^  I ckju-
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5. Arguments for Continued Exclusion and its Consequences.
Under international law States remain the principal actors in the international 
legal order. The international legal personality o f corporations is derivative, 
limited and dependent upon acceptance in contrast to States which have 
original and objective legal personality. Acceptance by States is a precondition 
for non-State action on the international plane.54 States enjoy the full array o f 
rights inherent in Statehood including the capacity to regulate inferior objects. 
Private actors are the consumers o f law and States the sole producers.55 This 
may be true within the vertically-structured State where governments are the 
most authoritative actors. However, within the horizontally-structured 
international legal order States are just one among a plurality o f autonomous 
entities. Indeed, non-State actors are noteworthy on the international plane for 
linking transborder interests which are constitutive o f States. The subjects o f 
international law need not be identical with respect to the nature o f their rights
52 EC Secretariat, Public Consultation by Agencies : The American Experience, SG/AS 
D(2000).
53 Negotiated Rule Making A ct 5 USC 561 (Supp IV 1992).
54 EC, Convention on the Recognition o f the Legal Personality o f International NGOs (1986) 
ETS'No 124.
55 Bos M., ‘The Recognised Manifestations o f  International law: A N ew  Theory o f ‘Sources” 
(1977) 20 GYIL 9, 11-3.
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or extent o f their duties.56 Indeed, continued adherence to the subject-object 
distinction prevents international society from further self-ordering and 
actualising its own possibilities.57 Corporate contributions to international law
co
make the subject-object distinction less valid and important. Any pretensions 
to sovereign supremacy must also be abandoned.59
Admitting non-State actors into international lawmaking and elevating their 
status to that o f subjects o f international law would be subversive o f the 
traditional international legal order. One could go further and challenge the 
credentials o f corporations to participate in political processes such as 
lawmaking. For example, it could be argued that corporate participation lacks 
legitimacy. The democratic or liberal political model requires representation 
by salient constituents within open, transparent and consensus-based 
processes.60 The democratic notion o f governance with the consent o f the
1governed is not wholly reflected in commercial decision-making given the
V e r t ' d
separation o f ownership from control. However corporations have other
I
sources o f legitimacy.61 This is assessable in terms o f origin (established
I M I W  * t
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under national law), function (produce goods and services to satisfy market 
demand) or purpose (reward for effort). Legitimacy may be self-validating
56 ICJ, Advisory Opinion concerning Certain Expenses o f  the UN  (1962) ICJ Rep 151, 168.
57 Allot P., Eunomia: New Order for a New World. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, 
paras 16.6 & 17.78.
58 Voitovich S.A., International Economic Organisations in the International Legal Process. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995, 4-5; Angelo H.G., 'Multinational Corporate 
Enterprises: Some Legal and Policy Aspects o f a Modem Socio-Economic Phenomenon' 
(1968-III) 125 Recueildes Cours 443, 481, 524.
59 Spiro P.J., ‘Globalisation, International Law and the Academy’ (2000) 32 Int Law and 
Politics 567, 573-5.
60 Eisenberg M.A., ‘Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct and Govemance-Two Models o f  the 
Corporation’ (1983) 17 Creighton LR 1.
61 Buxbaum R.M., ‘Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory and Legal Doctrine’ (1984) 45 
Ohio State LJ  514, 520-5; Schweitz M.L., ‘NGO Participation in International Governance: 
The Question o f  Legitimacy’ (1995) 89 ASIL Proceed  415.
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(self-contained contractual regimes) or derived by association with common 
values (the sanctity o f private property or entrepreneurial freedom) or popular 
and cultural perceptions. Finally, corporate legitimacy may be organisational 
(representing and accountable to a particular constituency) or operational 
(efficiently adding value to raw materials).
An additional concern is that if  others were able to produce it, the normative 
\  power o f international law would lose its special binding force and cease to 
function as an ordering device.62 Rules enjoy authority because they are 
recognised as such.63 Authority can also be derived from inherent rule 
characteristics: determinacy, clarity, specificity and universal application. 
Private associations which do not possess any formal lawmaking powers 
however may formulate instruments which are formally ‘non-binding’ for the 
purposes o f plugging legal gaps which are not opposable against other actors.64 
States exert behavioural control by denying admission to the formal 
lawmaking process, although outsiders are not precluded from informal 
attempts to influence decision-making. Lawmakers are ‘captured’ when they 
adopt policies which would not otherwise be chosen by an informed polity free 
from organisational costs.65 It is doubly detrimental for the authority o f law if  
non-State entities are able to produce it (albeit acting through the medium o f 
States) and are unaccountable for that influence. Special interest manipulation
62 Danilenko G.M., Law-making in the International Community. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1993, 5, 16-7.
63 Franck T.M., ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82(4) AJIL 705, 759.
64 Cp Institut de Droit International: Sands P., ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilisation o f  
International Law’ (1998) 88(1) Yale HR & Dev U  85, 96.
65 Levine M. & Forrence J., ‘Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and the Public Agenda: 
Toward a Synthesis’ (1990) 6 J L  Econ & O rg ’n 167, 178.
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can be addressed by imposing greater discipline upon lawmakers, increasing 
decision-making transparency or providing access on specified terms.
Indeed, the classical trichotomy of the international legal order -  international 
law, national law and conflicts of laws principles -  cannot wholly control 
corporate behaviour.66 The dualist doctrine suggests that the national and 
international legal systems are separate and distinct.67 However, corporations 
operate in multiple legal sub-systems conveniently labelled public (the national 
laws of the home and host States and international law) and private 
(contractual law, internal organisational law and industry practices). 
Transnational commercial operations are not territorially limited. Unilateral 
attempts to apply national law extratemtonally may encounter resistance by 
other States in the form of ‘blocking’ legislation to nullify its impact.69 
Competing jurisdictional authority between home and host States calls into 
question the legitimacy of national regulatory competence. Corporations react 
by ensuring de facto compliance with national law in all jurisdictions or by 
initiating whatever processes are available to them for resolving public policy 
conflicts.70 Since multilateral regimes constrain freedom of action for national 
governments harmonising legal and policy differences has become the second-
66 Jenks C.W., Law in the World Community. Longmans Publishers, London, 1967,49-50.
67 Eg Art 27, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1155 UNTS 331.
68 Cp Hartford Fire Insurance Co & Ors v California & Ors 125 L Ed 2d 612 (SC 1993) 
(antitrust); Environmental Defense Fund v Massey 32 ILM 505 (1993) (CA DC) 
(environmental impact statements); EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co 499 US 244 (1991) 
(labour legislation).
69 Eg EC, Council Regulation 2271/96 Protecting Against the Effects of the Extraterritorial 
Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country 36 ILM 125 (1997).
70 OECD, Minimising Conflicting Requirements: Approaches of ‘Moderation and Restraint’, 
Paris, 1987, 9-12.
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best solution.71 The contemporary patchwork of national legal systems 
imposes different and conflicting legal requirements upon corporations which 
they are free to circumvent or exploit to their own advantage.72
Corporations are strategically-situated actors who can choose to adapt their 
behaviour to existing patterns of authority or to reconfigure those structures.73 
By establishing parallel rules, institutions and enforcement mechanisms, 
private authority can complement, conflict with or substitute for State 
authority.74 For example, the ‘closed circuits’ of private contracting can
• 7Sinteract with or bypass an organised public order. Alternatively, States and 
corporations undertake parallel activities to regulate transactions subject to 
private international law. Commercial responses to regulation tend towards 
either inertia (minimising impacts by circumventing or avoiding its 
application) or dynamism (identifying novel market opportunities such as
• 77deriving benefits from regulatory arbitrage). States become stronger or
weaker depending upon whether they remain principal actors or mere
71 Bondzi-Simpson P.E., Legal Relationships between Transnational Corporations and Host 
States. Quorum Books, Connecticut, 1990, 118.
72 Preston L.E. & Windsor D., The Rules of the Game in the Global Economy: Policy Regimes 
for International Business. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2nd Ed, 1997.
73 Cemy P.G., ‘Reconstructing the Political in a Globalising World: States, Institutions, Actors 
and Governance’ in Buelens F. (Ed), Globalisation and the Nation State. Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, 1999, 89,118.
74 Cutler A.C., Haufler V. & Porter T. (Eds), Private Authority and International Affairs. 
SUNY Press, New York, 1999.
75 Teubner G., “ Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Teubner G. (Ed), 
Global Law without a State. Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, Aldershot, 1997, 3, 16-17.
76 Cp ICC, The ICC Model International Sales Contract, Paris, 1997 & UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 19 ILM 668 (1980); ICC, Uniform Customs and 
Practices on Documentary Credits, ICC Pub No 500, Paris, 1994 & UN Convention on 
Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit 35 ILM 135 (1996).
77 Matthews D. & Pickering J.F., ‘Business strategy and evolving rules in the Single European 
Market’ in Higgott R.A., Underhill G.R.D. & Bieler A., Non-State Actors and Authority in the 
Global System. Routledge, London, 2000, 107, 107-8.
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corporate agents.78 For example, international legal rules on corporate 
nationality are circumvented or rendered inaccurate by international production
70networks, joint venture arrangements and inter-corporate strategic alliances. 
Abandoning the rule in recognition of reality would entail denationalising or
ftOdetaching transnational corporations from any one particular State.
Corporations express industry opinions free from any national sentiment by 
forming business NGOs (BINGOs). Corporate contributions to international 
lawmaking are frequently channelled through various international industry or 
trade organisations, corporate coalitions or business interest associations 
(BIAs).81 Politically-organised business groups could be characterised as the 
institutional expression of corporate legal personality at the international level. 
Their principal functions are information gathering and dissemination, 
informing members of developments and identifying common industry 
perspectives. Although not the topic of this thesis, it may be observed that 
politically organised business groups also contribute to developing private 
international law. BINGOs may be permanent or ad hoc, informal or 
institutionalised, national, regional or international, single-issue, multi-issue or 
cross-sectoral, broadly or narrowly representative and involved in routine 
government activity or limited to long-term strategic planning. Their 
methodology includes lobbying, technical assistance to legislators or firms,
78 Kingsbury B., ‘Whose International Law? Sovereignty and Non-State Groups’ (1994) ASIL 
Proceed 88.
79 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report: 
Transnational Corporations and Integrated International Production. New York, 1993.
80 Eg EC, Regulation No 2137/85 (1985) on European Economic Interest Groupings; EC, 
Regulation No 2157/2001 on the Statute of a European Company (2001) OJEC IL 291/1.
81 Greenwood J. & Jacek H.,(Eds), Organised Business and the New Global Order. MacMillan 
Press Ltd, Hampshire, 2000.
82 USCIB, Letter to Hague Delegates Regarding the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, New York, 2001.
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personnel exchange with governments, commenting on proposed measures 
within position papers, generating ideas, agenda-setting, contributing to public 
debates and initiating legal proceedings.
BINGOs may be interlinked with other business groups and through them to 
intergovernmental organisations. For example, the US Council for 
International Business is the American affiliate to the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) which enjoys consultative status with the United Nations 
(UN), to the Business and Industry Advisory Committee which is affiliated to 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and to the 
International Organisation of Employers which co-ordinates employers groups 
within the International Labour Organisation. Business alliances with slightly 
different configurations and interests are formed and dissolved with little effort. 
For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development was 
the product of a merger between the ICC’s World Industry Council for the 
Environment and the Business Council for Sustainable Development in 
anticipation of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. 
The Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue is an informal business network 
composed of corporate officers from US and European corporations and the 
Caux Roundtable is the equivalent but with Japanese membership.
The credibility of BINGOs derives from the collective expression of business 
opinion and the technical expertise of its membership. They must accordingly 
be appropriately mandated and the need for consensus may hamper the 
articulation of a coherent or strong commercial voice. BINGOs are convenient
57
vehicles for small and medium-sized enterprises although they can preserve 
anonymity for dominant market players. Corporations are not bound by the 
positions espoused by an industry association and can co-operate with other 
like-minded firms through a multiplicity of organisations on distinct legal 
issues. Notwithstanding the emergence of BINGOs and their claims to 
representivity it still remains to be seen in what ways corporations contribute 
to international lawmaking.
6. The Right of States to Regulate and Attributes of Corporate Legal 
Personality.
International lawmaking is a sovereign attribute par excellence. It has been 
suggested that it is not legal personality per se which renders a particular 
function ‘international’ but rather the nature of the function which confers 
international legal personality. However, States are not the only actors which 
‘make’ international law. Intergovernmental organisations as State constructs 
can independently espouse international claims against non-Member States. 
Furthermore, the exercise of lawmaking power is not preconditioned by full
Of
legal personality. Notwithstanding their lawmaking capacity, international 
organisations ‘do not, unlike States, possess a general competence’.86 Non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) perform the functions of standard-
83 Lador-Lederer J.J., International Non-governmental Organisations and Economic Entities: A 
Study in Autonomous Organisation and Jus Gentium. A.W. Sythoff Publishers, Leyden, 1963, 
380.
84 Higgins R., The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations. Oxford University Press, London, 1963; ICJ, Advisory Opinion on 
Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service o f the United Nations (1949) ICJ Rep 174, 178.
85 Friedmann W., The Changing Structure of International Law. Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1964, 223, 375.
86 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Use by a State o f  Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict (1996) ICJ Rep 66, para 25.
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0 *7  D O  O Qsetting , implementing and enforcing international law. The modalities for 
their participation include rights of intervention, engaging in dispute resolution 
procedures and providing input into decision-making processes.90 Finally, 
individuals contribute to international law as ‘highly qualified publicists’ under 
Article 38(1).
The functional attributes of corporations and whether they can engage in 
lawmaking are questions of corporate legal personality. This issue is in turn 
dependent upon the reactions of States. Corporate personality is ordinarily 
acquired under national law provided the formalities of incorporation and 
registration have been satisfied. However, other States may impose additional 
criteria including the existence of a genuine and continuing connection.91 
Within the European Community there is an obligation upon Member States to
Q2recognise a company validly incorporated under the laws of another. By 
virtue of their constituent instruments corporations engage in activity which 
produces legal effects binding upon others. These include shareholder or
87 Eg Chinkin C., 'The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in Standard Setting, 
Monitoring and Implementation of Human Rights' in Norton J.J., Andenas M. & Footer M. 
(Eds), The Changing World of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: A Tribute to the 
late Kenneth R. Simmonds, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, 45, 51; Cohen C.P., 
‘The Role of Non-govemmental Organisations in the Drafting of the Covenant of the Rights of 
the Child’ (1990) 12 HRQ 137.
88 Eg Tolbert D., ‘Global Climate Change and the Role of International Non-governmental 
Organisations’ in Churchill R. & Freestone D. (Eds), International Law and Global Climate 
Change. 1991, Graham & Trotman, London, 95-108.
89 Eg Sands P. & Bedecarre A., ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species: The Role of Public Interest Non-governmental Organisations in Ensuring the 
Effective Enforcement of the Ivory Trade Ban’ (1990) 17 BC Envtl Aff LR 799; Shelton D., 
‘The Participation of Non-governmental Organisations in International Judicial Proceedings’ 
(1994) 88 AJIL 611.
90Cullen H. & Morrow K., ‘International civil society in international law: the growth of NGO 
participation’ (2001) 1 Non-State Actors & I n tL l , 15.
1 Art 1, European Convention on Establishment of Companies 1966 ETS No 57.
92 Micheler E., ‘Recognition of Companies Incorporated in Other EU Member States’ (2003) 
52ICLQ  521.
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director resolutions and the capacity to initiate litigation even when the 
international legal personality of their home State may be questionable.93
International legal doctrine already accepts that corporations can conclude 
contracts with States and enjoy standing within arbitral or judicial fora.94 This 
is not lawmaking per se since corporations are dependent upon States to create 
the enabling framework and the essential element of State consent is evident in 
both instances. That said, corporations can employ international law to 
confine the national regulatory competence of States. For example, 
concomitant with the exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
States possess the inalienable right to expropriate. 95 International law 
preconditions the exercise of that right96 in the interests of protecting private 
property rights.
Similarly, corporations can nominate international law as the lex contractus in 
their contractual relationships with States. 97 Contractual breaches by
no
governments engage State responsibility. The good faith principle which 
compels contractual adherence overrides the argument that States cannot fetter 
their regulatory powers.99 Corporations can enforce contracts against States 
irrespective of political relations at the inter-State level.100 The decision is
93 Sec 1, Foreign Corporations Act 1991 (UK).
94 Ijalaye D.A., The Extension of Corporate Personality in International Law. Oceana 
Publications Inc, New York, 1978, Chapter 5.
95 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 (1962) on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, para 4.
96 Eg Amoco International Finance Corp v Iran (1987) 15 Iran-US CTR 189, para 140-2.
97 Eg Texaco v Libya (1977) 53ILR 389, paras 42-5.
98 BP v Libya (1977) 53 ILR 297, 347-8; LIAMCO v Libya (1982) 62 ILR 140, 198.
99 North & South American Construction Co (US) v Chile (1898) 3 Moore Int Arbitrations 
2318; Kuwait v American Independent Oil Co (Aminoil) 21 ILM 916 (1982), para 90.
100 Eg Tinoco Arbitration (Great Britain v Costa Rica) 1 UNRIAA 369 (1923).
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therefore left with the firm whether or not commercial dealings should reflect 
the foreign policies o f their home State.101 However, commercial rights and 
corporate legal personality are circumscribed by the contract and are not 
opposable to other actors.102 Finally, entrepreneurs bear the risks o f economic 
disruption incidental to foreign direct investment.103 Corporations may insert 
‘stabilisation clauses’ to limit the discretionary exercise o f regulatory power by 
States and ensure contractual stability. 104 However, in the event o f
t
fundamental change o f circumstances ‘special advantages’ may be conferred 
upon States and give rise to an expectation to re-negotiate.105
These examples illustrate corporate resort to international law as a means o f 
curtailing the regulatory competence o f States at national levels. Corporations 
derive their existence from the fact o f incorporation under national law .106 
They are therefore nominally subservient to States within the national sphere. 
Whatever the positive contributions o f corporations may be to economic 
development, States have primary responsibility for creating the national and 
international legal framework conducive to that objective.107 Each State has 
the right ‘to regulate and supervise the activities o f transnational corporations 
within its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities 
comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic and
101 Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v Barclays Bank PLC  [1998] 2 All ER 821.
102 Texaco v Libya supra n91, para 47.
103 Starrett Housing Corp v Iran (Interlocutory Award) (1983) 4 Iran-US CTR 122, 156.
104 Eg Texaco v Libya supra n97, 481-2.
105 Aminoil supra «99, paras 97-8.
106 Art 1(1), European Convention on Establishment o f  Companies, supra n9\.
107UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), Transnational Corporations in World 
Development: Trends and Prospects. New York, 1988.
social policies.’108 States shall co-operate with others in exercising this right to 
prevent unwarranted extraterritorial applications. This proposition says 
nothing about the responsibility of States to regulate or whether non-State 
actors can participate in formulating national law. An obligation to regulate 
may arise in the nature of indirect State responsibility to ensure a particular 
result, for example, adequate enforcement so that private actors do not 
transgress legal standards. To compel States to regulate pre-empts their 
discretion under the free choice of means principle for implementing 
international law.
Exclusive commercial ownership of production processes, industrial mobility, 
extensive capital resources and global distribution networks counterbalance the 
sovereign discretion to allow territorial admission and access to the natural 
resources of the State. The ‘triangular diplomacy’ model suggests that 
corporations bargain with States in competition for control over limited natural 
resources.109 States can become dependent upon foreign direct investment as 
the principal external source of economic development and employment.110 
Similar principles apply to the bargaining characteristic of lawmaking where 
economic information, technical expertise and management experience in the 
possession of corporations counterpoise the sovereign right to regulate. 
Whereas States offer regulatory incentives and threaten increased competition 
commercial decision-making limits the range of policy choices available to
108 Art 2(2)(b), UNGA Resolution 3281 (1974) on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States.
109 Stopford J.M. & Strange S., Rival States. Rival Firms: Competition for World Market 
Shares. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, 19-23.
,I0Blomstrom M. and Lipsey R., 'The Competitiveness of Counties and their Multinational 
Firms' in Eden L. and Potter E.H. (Eds), Multinationals in the Global Political Economy. 
MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1993, 129, 141.
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States.111 Moreover, integrating commercial strategies into one State’s 
bargaining position creates tensions in its relations with other States with 
respect inter alia to employment, ownership, indigenous industries and 
technology transfer. If these are some of the commercial impacts upon a 
State’s right to regulate, has their regulatory responsibility changed in any 
way ?
7. The Regulatory Responsibility of States: from Command and Control 
to Enhancing Competitiveness.
Lawmaking seeks to regulate or control commercial behaviour. However, 
externally imposed requirements hinder the free operation of market forces, 
influences commercial decision-making to criteria other than efficiency and 
allocates market share. Regulatory intervention within the marketplace is 
classically justified to correct for externalities, preserve public interests, 
enhance social welfare and ensure order and stability to cyclical economic 
fluctuations. Orthodox command and control techniques are not the only
119means for directing market behaviour. Classical economics suggests that 
self-interested consumers and producers will be guided by the ‘invisible hand’
l l ^
of self-regulation. The Taws’ of the marketplace include supply and 
demand, specialisation (fragmenting functions in the interests of economic 
efficiency), commodification (bundling resources into tradable commodities)
111 Studer-Noguez I., Ford and the Global Strategies of Multinationals: The North American 
Auto Industry. Routledge Publishers, London, 2002, 224, 227.
112 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Alternatives to 
Traditional Regulation: A Preliminary List, Paris, 1994.
1,3 Smith A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Mathuen & Co 
Ltd, London, 5th Ed, 1930, 6.
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and compliance on the basis of economic necessity. Markets can also 
undermine the rule of positive law since greater profit is the reward for 
assuming higher risk within illegal (‘black’) markets. The contemporary 
regulatory trend is to include market incentives which produce allocationally 
efficient outcomes within the parameters of publicly-defined objectives.114 
Regulation encourages the pursuit of particular commercial ventures 
(‘signposted enterprise’) by incorporating advantageous provisions, decreasing 
uncertainty and establishing secure property rights.115
The economic theory of comparative advantage suggests that all States benefit 
where they specialise in manufacturing those goods and services which they 
are most efficient at producing.116 Strategic trade theory proposes that States 
may actively assist national industry by shaping the contours of the regulatory 
environment.117 By providing stable regulatory environments which provide 
investor confidence States reinforce their international reputations for 
supporting the rule of law. Furthermore, national law can stimulate economic 
activity and push it in desired directions. National regulatory conditions can 
create favourable investment climates and competitive advantages for local 
firms within the international marketplace. For example, mandatory local 
performance requirements can coincide with the exporting ambitions of
114 OECD, Public-Private Alternatives to Traditional Regulation: Business Experiences in 
OECD Countries, Working Paper Vol 5, Paris, 1997.
115 Eg ‘An Act to encourage the search for petroleum in Australia by subsidizing stratigraphic 
drilling’ 1957 (Aus).
116 Ricardo D., The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 
London, 1973, 81-2.
117 Porter M.E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations. Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1990, 
19.
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national industry. Furthermore, adopting national legal models at the 
international level increases regulatory compliance burdens for rivals, poses 
minimal adaptation costs for national firms and embeds their competitive 
position within the international framework.119 An appreciation that the law 
can favourably shape the market encourages corporations to contribute to 
regulatory development. However, the creation of regulatory conditions 
benefiting one economic sector may engender offsetting activity by others.
Regulatory measures may be politically arbitrary, constitute unjustifiable 
discrimination or amount to a disguised restriction on trade.120 National 
regulation should not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil policy 
objectives.121 States may voluntarily submit to international regimes which 
confine the extent of their regulatory discretion.122 For example, universal 
labour standards seek to remove any commercial benefits arising from the 
violation of basic workers rights. States are then subject to a general duty to 
bring national law into conformity with international standards. National law 
is expected to be no less effective than international rules or regulations and 
States are permitted to implement more stringent measures. Hence, 
international standards can be employed for protectionist purposes to deny the
118 UNCTC/UNCTD, The Impact of Trade-Related Investment Measures on Trade and 
Development. UN Doc ST/CTC/120 (1991), 50.
119 Cp Telecommunications Act 1996 (US) 110 Stat 56 & WTO, Agreement on 
Telecommunications Services 36 ILM ISA (1997).
120 Eg Principle 12, Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), UN Doc A/CONF.151/5 (1992).
121 Eg WTO, US-Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R 
(1998), para 9.1; C-67/97 Ditlev Bluhme [1998] 1 ECR 8053, para 35.
122 Eg Ait 20, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 55 UNTS 187 (1947).
123 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994: Transnational Corporations. Employment and 
the Workplace. Geneva, UN Doc UNCTAD/DTCI/10 (1994), 355.
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fact that other States enjoy cheaper labour access.124 Regulatory discretion 
cannot be wholly curtailed from outside the State through international 
disciplines, particularly if national producers have influenced national 
standards from the inside. The focal point then shifts to the causal factor such 
that corporations themselves come under pressure to respect labour standards
i yc
wherever they operate.
There are further illustrations of a cross-pollination of ideas and objectives 
between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ spheres. International law as an 
underdeveloped legal system draws upon concepts such as separate legal
1 Oftpersonality, the corporate veil and limited shareholder liability. States 
engaging in entrepreneurial activity establish corporate vehicles through 
conventional instruments.127 However, international law will deny to firms 
what it accepts for States, particularly as far as the sources of international law 
are concerned. Thus investment contracts do not attain the solemnity of treaty 
instruments even when negotiated under intergovernmental auspices or listed 
within the UN Treaty Series.128 Whereas States and corporations can both 
assert a fundamental change of circumstances to terminate contracts,
124 Preamble & para 5, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its 
Follow-Up, 86th Sess, Geneva, 37 ILM 1233 (1998).
125 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-Commission Resolution 1998/12 
(1998) on Human Rights as the Primary Objective of Trade, Investment and Financial Policy.
126 Barcelona Traction supra n26, paras 41-42, 50 & 58.
127 Eg Franco-Ethiopian Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway Company (1959) 381 UNTS 45; 
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), Agreement Establishing 
the Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System and 
Special Agreement (1964) 514 UNTS 48.
12 The Serbian Loans Case (1929) PCIJ Ser A No 20, 41; Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case 
(UK v Iran) (1952) ICJ Rep 93, 112; The Saudi Arabia and Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO) Case (1963) 27 ILR 117; 1954 Austria-Yugoslavia Treaty 227 UNTS 112.
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corporations may be unable to invoke that doctrine in relation to a treaty when
1 9Qtheir home States continue to assert its validity.
Substantive and procedural questions of international law are linked with 
matters of direct commercial interest. For example, expropriation raises 
questions concerning the regulatory competence of States and the nationality
1 m • •attributes of corporations. Corporate nationality can in turn influence the
credibility of decision-making by States within intergovernmental
1 "71organisations. Public international legal questions pertaining to Statehood, 
recognition or treaties touch upon contractual rights and prospective corporate
1 ^ 9 •liability. These issues are invoked by corporations to frustrate litigation
• • • 1initiated by commercial rivals within national courts. Such precedents
constitute the visible but volcanic products of interest to international lawyers.
However, the titanic ideological debates and procedural interactions between
States and corporations are hidden further underground. The first step will be
to trace their historical origins.
129 Cp Transworld Airlines Inc v Franklin Mint Corporation & Ors 466 US 243, 253 (1984) & 
Questech Inc v Ministry o f National Defence o f Iran (1985) A WD 191-59-1.
130Seidl-Hohenveldem I., Corporations in and Under International Law. Grotius Publications 
Ltd, Cambridge, 1987, Ch 3.
131 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Constitution o f the Maritime Safety Committee o f the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (1960) ICJ Rep 150.
132 Eg Mingtai Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd v United Parcel Service 177 F.Sd 1142 (9th 
Cir 1999).
133 Eg Buttes Gas and Oil Co & Anor v Hammer & Anor [1982] AC 888.
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Chapter One 
An Historical Overview of Corporate Participation 
within the International Legal Order
This Chapter presents a chronological overview of commercial activity within 
the international legal order since first recorded history until the contemporary 
era. The corporate role in the prevailing legal system is bound up with the 
dominant political actor of the period, the regulatory powers of governing 
elites and the evolving nature and form of the corporation. A range of non- 
State actors have been active participants within international legal processes 
for some two hundred years.134 Institutions created for the purpose of making 
profit, albeit not strictly incorporated as presently understood, have been active 
for as long as commercial activity has existed. Indeed, commercial activity 
long predates the emergence of the pre-eminence of the nation State commonly 
marked by the Treaty for the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The symbiotic 
relationship between business and the ruling elite is evident in the construction 
of early empires, the merchant guilds and trade fairs of the medieval period, 
the exercise of governmental authority in the pursuit of exclusive trading 
privileges by chartered trading companies during the colonial period and the 
influence of American multinationals in world affairs. The International 
Chamber of Commerce paralleled moves from bilateralism to multilaterialism 
as politically-organised business groups began to situate themselves within the 
framework of newly-emergent intergovernmental institutions. Corporations 
began to be affected as these institutions assumed greater regulatory roles and
134 Chamovitz S., ‘Two centuries of participation: NGOs and international governance’ (1997) 
18 Michigan JIL 183.
firms in turn sought to influence the outcome of their deliberative processes. 
The purpose of the Chapter is to assess whether there is currently a new phase 
in the evolution of the corporate role within the international legal order or if 
there is simply a return to the actors and influences of earlier times.
1. Early Commercial Activity and the Emergence of the Nation State.
The truism that the flag follows commerce is observable in lawmaking. ‘[I]n 
trading history, if enterprise is the theme, regulation is the counterpoint’ and 
moreover ‘in all the great matters relating to commerce, legislators have copied, 
not dictated’. Entrepreneurial activity precedes regulation before
established authority intervenes to levy taxation and finance the military 
resources with which to protect and extend the interests of traders. Regulation 
also arises whenever foreign trade threatens the stability of local industry. 
Codifying commercial transactions as was done by Hammurabi around 2000 
BC extends governmental power even when administered by respected traders 
and reinforces existing merchant practices.
Governing bodies have always enjoyed an administrative role in commerce 
even when supervision by religious authorities has declined and familial or 
royalty bonds become less important.136 Egyptian royalty encouraged trade 
and the commercial and imperial focus for the Kingdom of Mesopotamia was 
also acquiring resources unavailable to it. Ebla created a common market and
135 Condliffe J.B., The Commerce of Nations. WW Norton & Co, New York, 1950, 27, 33.
136 Moore K. & Lewis D., Foundations of Corporate Empire: Is History Repeating Itself?. 
Pearson Education Ltd, London, 2000, 291.
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protected commercial routes with bilateral trade agreements.137 During the 
Bronze Age providing capital and organisational skill for the export trade 
devolved from crown functionaries and temple officials to self-employed 
merchant princes. The karu (‘harbour’) was a semi-official institution 
empowered to exercise the commercial, legal and administrative 
responsibilities which the public sector could not afford. The military 
expeditions of the Assyrian empire (c745 BC) furthered the transfer of control 
to private merchant associations willing to take risks and reap the profits of a 
free enterprise international trading system. The Phoenician aristocracy, navy 
and business formed an interlocking system of managed commerce supervised 
by priests in which traders enjoyed high political status based on ties of kinship 
and trade, defence and imperial influence that were interwoven into an overall 
geopolitical military strategy defined by treaty law.138 Maritime commerce 
grew on account of their superior ship building and improved navigation 
techniques.
During the fifth century BC tribal kingdoms gave ground to the Greek city- 
state (polis). Athens and Rhodes secured freedom of trade around the 
Mediterranean, supported collaborative effort between bankers, shipowners 
and traders, established a code of mercantile law and developed principles of 
commercial association. The Pax Romana was characterized by expansionist 
militarism in which extended family structures pursued government contracts 
for military procurement, collected taxes, delivered mail and completing
137 Pettinato G., The Archives of Ebla: An Empire inscribed in Clay. Double Day & Co, New 
York, 1981, 226.
138 Aubet M.E., The Phoenicians and the West: Politics. Colonies and Trade. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 29-32.
70
official accounts. Heavier taxes and a shrinking economic base caused a 
decline in business confidence. While Europe entered the medieval Dark Ages, 
international economic activity shifted east. The Abbasid empire around 
Baghdad involved public and private monopolies trading alongside smaller 
partnerships built upon familial or religious ties. Merchants profited from the 
war economy of the Italian crusades. To consolidate governmental control an 
Italian Charter of 1082 discriminated between families for trading rights and 
by 1300 Venetian merchants wishing to trade were compelled to join ‘Flanders 
galleys’. Entrepreneurial capitalism also flourished under the Song, Yuan and
tVi t hMing dynasties of China (10 -16 Centuries). Commercial transactions were 
enforceable through family or partnership-based alliances rather than formal 
legal codes and the Office of the Monopoly of Trade established in 971 issued 
permits to foreign traders travelling along the Silk Route.
During the Medieval period merchants formed caravans to enhance security
from robbers and feudal lords imposed tolls on persons and products to
construct transportation infrastructure and raise revenue. The caravan trade
across the Sahara was also characterized by transit and protection costs
1 ^ 0imposed by various kingdoms and tribes. Political or military turbulence 
and the unpredictability of transportation disrupted commercial networks and 
contributed to the trade’s decline in the fourteenth century.
The marketplace emerged during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a 
government-designated area where most transactions were conducted.
139 Steensgaard N., The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India 
Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade. Chicago, 1973.
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Households were self-sufficient and transportation costs confined trade to a 
small radius. However, specialists skilled in particular crafts organized 
themselves into guilds (gilda mercatoria) to regulate their profession. The 
monopoly was protected from inter-city rivals through trade restrictions, tariffs 
and duties. Although the European gild system, like its Japanese counterpart 
of the time, limited economic liberty, restricted production and artificially 
inflated prices, it received official recognition and was gradually integrated 
into town government as a means of promoting trade. Indeed, the Hanseatic 
League of several cities dominated by merchant interests engaged in 
diplomacy and warfare to maintain monopolistic privileges and resist the 
emerging German State until 1870. European trade fairs attracted international 
wholesalers and enjoyed military protection. Merchants established tribunals 
(‘PiePowder Courts’) to settle disputes and enforce standards of fair dealing 
according to commercial practices. This was a significant development 
because it illustrated that merchants were competent to oversee transnational 
regulatory mechanisms which served their own purposes and functioned 
independently of official political processes. It was not until the nation State 
was consolidated that this committee of respected traders was replaced by a 
public agent commissioned to protect trading interests. Wealthy cities and the 
recruitment of mercenaries contributed to feudalism’s decline.
Merchants supported the emergence of unified national government under the 
Crown, particularly in England and France, to centralize the power of granting 
and enforcing freedom of trade and transit within the realm. National 
governments furthered commerce by suppressing disorder and establishing
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legal systems and courts to resolve commercial disputes. Government postal 
riders could carry private mail from 1635 and private mail delivery systems 
operated alongside government services until the State declared the function a 
public monopoly. Although concerned by increased administrative costs, 
particularly to finance warfare, commercial actors concluded that aspiring 
nation States could support trading opportunities within the newly discovered, 
expanding world. By appealing to reasons of patriotism (military strength,, 
national welfare, economic growth, full employment and the public interest), 
merchants secured a privileged economic position within a regulatory strategy 
which stimulated local industrial growth and protected it from foreign 
competition.
State-building was furthered through colonization to secure raw materials, 
develop external markets for national manufacturers and assure a monopoly for 
colonial exports within local markets. Regulating trade also raised government 
revenue for undermining the competitive advantage of rival powers. For 
example, the English Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 challenged Dutch 
shipping and warehousing by requiring that European goods be brought to 
England in English ships or in ships the same nationality as the commodity. 
Predictably, abolishing these arrangements in 1854 was bitterly resisted by 
adherents who prophesized doom to the shipping industry. When French 
privateers with governmental support sought to destroy English commerce, an 
1807 Order in Council required any neutral trading with Europe to halt at 
British stations, thereby bolstering the English merchant marine and locating 
international commerce within England. An Anglo-French treaty of 1860 was
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replicated in an extensive network of commercial treaties across Europe and 
provided for most favoured nation treatment, reduced tariffs and legal rights 
for foreign traders before protectionist tendencies revived in 1880. However, 
the international legal order of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was 
more noteworthy for the role of chartered trading companies.
2. The Chartered Trading Companies and the Extension of Colonial Empire.
Distant commerce was exposed to the threat of attack, the perils of sea and the 
novelty of the trade. Private individuals pooling their contributions rather than 
the State were better positioned to assume the risk. However, companies 
sought and were assigned monopolies by the State since merchants who 
invested capital should not be deprived of rewards by newcomers who risked 
nothing and contributed little to the orderly development of the trade. The 
chartered trading companies derived their mandates from individual acts of 
Parliament. Royal charters were subject to renewal with additional conditions 
including advancing capital to government revenue or revocation upon six 
months notice. A ‘regulated’ trading company possessed the power to regulate 
individual members operating within that particular economic sector. A ‘joint 
stock’ company managed by a smaller number of individuals enjoyed a 
permanent capital base whose shares were traded in stock exchanges. Their 
regulatory authority included the power to make ordinances consistent with the 
laws of the realm or treaties with foreign States, to confiscate the property of 
traders who defied the privileges of the charter (with proceeds partly allocated 
to the Crown), to assume possession on behalf of the sovereign any territory
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discovered by them or their agents and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over 
their employees in foreign territory.140 Monopolistic trading privileges were 
granted to hold and advance trade for a particular period within a specific 
geographical location. For example, the Fellowship of the Merchant 
Adventurers or Hamburg Company (1505-1807) enjoyed exclusive trade with 
Dordrecht and Hamburg whereas the Merchants of the Levant (1581-1825) 
traded to Venice and Turkey. Similarly, an Act of 1689 providing for free 
trade in wool reserved a monopoly for the Eastland Company (1579- 1764) 
which engaged in trade to the Baltic.
Royal charters were accompanied by prohibitions which prevented rivals from
the same State competing in the trade without corporate permission.
Companies acted in concert with local customs authorities to confiscate the
property of unlicensed or free traders (‘interlopers’) and establish special
courts outside English territorial jurisdiction for their trial. For example, ‘the
mysterie and companie of the Merchants Adventurers for the discoverie of
regions, dominions, islands and places unknown’ -  the Muscovy Company
(cl555-l891) -  concluded commercial treaties on behalf of the UK
government with the Czar of Russia. The Company acquired the use of the
Russian criminal justice system to punish interlopers and rebellious corporate
agents. Although the fortunes of such companies fluctuated, one successful
voyage could be extremely profitable. Other merchants petitioned politicians
to declare the trade free. Competition also arose between the Russia Company,
the Scottish East India Company and the Greenland Company which all
140 Scott W.R., The Constitution and Finance of English. Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock 
Companies to 1720. Vol 2: Companies for Foreign Trade. Colonisation. Fishing and Mining. 
Cambridge University Press, London, 1910, 10.
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enjoyed privileges with respect to whale fishing. The pressure for free trade 
was such that a second East India company (1698-1709) was established by a 
rival merchant group until its amalgamation as the United East India Company.
There was both a harmony of purpose between the chartered trading companies 
and the State as well as ongoing tensions as each sought to use the other for 
their own ends. The nation State was dependent upon corporate revenues for 
expanding its international influence but also sought to control commercial 
behaviour. For example, the UK government periodically investigated 
corporate affairs in response to allegations of abusing their monopolistic 
position, exhorbitant pricing, maladministration, incompetence, falsifying 
accounts, corruption, racketeering and poor production practices. The ebb and 
flow between free trade and protectionism further impacted upon this 
relationship.
2.1 Exercising Governmental Powers and Establishing States.
To discharge their mixed commercial and official mandates, the chartered 
trading companies were empowered to exercise governmental authority. The 
Falkland Islands Company (1851-current) was expected to establish postal 
communication services and the British North Borneo Company (1882-1946) 
principally exercised administrative functions as a precursor to colonization. 
To control commerce along the Niger river, the National African or Royal 
Niger Company (1886-1920) concluded treaties with local rulers, imposed 
customs duties, issued proclamations, administered justice, maintained law and
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order and employed armed forces to suppress smuggling or local dissent. The 
ampler military resources and authority of government was necessary to 
protect treaty-guaranteed commercial interests against predatory Great Powers 
and maintain the permanent subjugation of local populations. The Royal Niger 
Company was relieved of its administrative powers and duties and compelled 
to assign its treaty, territorial and mineral rights when the UK government 
established a protectorate.141
Similarly, the English East India Company (1600-1858) enjoyed exclusive 
rights in the spice trade to East India as well as powers to appoint governors, 
wage war with any non-Christian nation under the company flag, conclude 
agreements with local rulers, administer justice, acquire territories and seize 
property. Corporate officers possessed military rank, commanded military 
forces and enjoyed mandates to protect shipping routes from piracy, recapture 
towns lost to rival powers and recover lost corporate rights and privileges. 
Indeed, ‘the control and commercial exploitation of India became the 
prerogative of an English joint stock company’ with the demise of the Moghul 
empire.142 The East India Company exercised governmental administration 
over Bengal, Behar and Orissa, appointed a corporate officer as Governor- 
General and trained the civil service. Given an unwieldy bureaucracy, the 
Regulating Act 1773 (UK), the India Bill of 1784 and the 1858 Act ‘for the 
better government o f India ’ eventually transferred power to the UK 
government.
141 Robert R., Chartered Companies and their Role in the Development of Overseas Trade. G. 
Bell & Sons Ltd, London, 1969, 141-154, 166-187.
142 Ibid, 82.
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The economic history of the chartered trading companies is self-evidently 
bound to the history of colonialism and the political establishment of States. 
The Virginia Company (1606-cl620) transported settlers including prospective 
brides, surveyed territory and introduced negro slave-labour into tobacco 
plantations. The Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson’s 
Bay (1670-) concluded a deed of surrender with the UK government 
whereupon territories discovered by the firm reverted upon compensation to 
the Crown for subsequent transfer to the emerging Canadian State. The 
Hudson’s Bay Company was entrusted to resolve political disputes, develop 
transportation infrastructure, procure military provisions during World War 
One and attack enemy submarines. Finally, the British South Africa Company 
(1889-1965) was formed to establish British influence around the Cape, 
develop local resources and raise living standards. It bore the risks, costs and 
administrative burdens of development projects (railway and telegraph 
construction) with minimal oversight from the Colonial Office (only 
reprimanded for military incursions into friendly neighbouring States) until 
Southern Rhodesia became part of the British Empire.
The chartered trading companies proved at least as influential as States in 
shaping the modem world. On the other hand, they were initially organized 
with State aid which hardened into monopolistic regulation. Commercial 
activity was intimately associated with extending national political interests, 
developing maritime industries, military defence (fortified trading posts or 
local factories), revenue raising, colonization, exploration and discovering 
novel trading routes. In short, with processes of lawmaking and regulating
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matters of international concern in the interests of the European colonial 
powers. Their territorial acquisitions were recognised as establishing a legally 
valid title where the trading company exercised governmental authority or the 
home State asserted jurisdiction through them.143 This effectively rendered 
corporations complicit with the industrialised States in establishing an 
international legal order which upheld territorial acquisitions and colonial 
exploitation. In turn this would set the scene for subsequent conflict in the 
decolonization era as developing States sought to assert the existence of a New 
International Economic Order (considered further below).144 Interestingly, 
corporations continue to facilitate territorial administration as State 
instrumentalities.145
Companies transported raw commodities and, consistent with mercantilist 
economic policy, bullion, jewels and other precious metals. Particularly 
noteworthy was how the chartered trading companies first shaped the 
institution of slavery and then became active participants in prohibiting the 
practice, including efforts in the contemporary era through the International 
Labour Organisation. Between 1440 and 1860 slavery was a complex 
international trade interlinked with other Atlantic industries and involving the 
transfer of some 90,000 Africans per annum in two to three hundred ships by 
every major maritime power in Western Europe. The commercial prospects 
and goodwill earned by the Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa (1660- 
1821) were detrimentally affected by English slave traders until the company
143 The Island des Palmas Case (1928) 2 UNRIAA 829, 858; Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
(UK v Norway) (1951) ICJ Rep 116, 184 Per Judge McNair.
44 See generally Anghie A., ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth Century International Law’ (1999) 40(1) Harvard JIL 1.
145 DeMauro Construction Corporation v US 568 F.2d 1322 (1978).
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itself entered the trade. Indicative of struggles between NGOs and 
corporations in the contemporary era, abolitionist humanitarian organisations 
entered the fray. However, long before naval blockades the English South 
Seas Company anticipated that English plantations could not compete against 
French, Spanish or Brazilian ones and relinquished the contract for supplying 
slaves under a commercial treaty of 1750.146 Companies also petitioned home 
States to suppress acts of piracy which were in fact the trading ventures of rival 
companies. For example, the Dutch West India Company derived its income 
from attacking Spanish silver fleets around the Caribbean between 1620 and 
1680 and opposed peace between the Netherlands and Spain.147 Portugal 
created the General Company of the Trade of Brazil in 1648 entrusted solely 
with protecting vessels from privateers.
The chartered trading companies complemented the strategic ambitions of 
empire. The Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas (established 1728) traded
from Venezuela and the Royal Company of Havana (established 1740)*
developed trade and agriculture in Cuba. Both were licensed by the Casa de 
Contratacion (House of Trade) which collected tributes and taxes for the 
Spanish Crown and settled commercial disputes.148 The expanding Spanish 
empire was primarily driven by conquest rather than trade with private 
enterprise working under State protection and supervision. English companies 
competed with rivals from Holland, France (which also established an East 
India Company), Germany, Portugal and Spain who disputed and refused to
146 Anstey R., The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition. MacMillan, London, 1975.
147 Rankin H.F., The Golden Age of Piracy. Rhinehart and Winston, New York, 1969.
148 Phillips C.R., ‘The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires 1450-1750’ in 
Tracy J.D. (Ed), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modem 
World 1350-1750. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, 34 at 77, 97.
80
recognise the validity of each other’s territorial claims, jurisdictional control, 
monopolistic market privileges or treaty rights. Rivalry occasionally erupted 
as armed conflict with civilian casualties. Marines from the Dutch East India 
Company (1602-1796) invaded Moluccas in 1605, Java in 1606 and offered 
military protection to the newly-subjugated political system in return for a 
monopoly over the spice trade.
Clashing trading interests necessitated formal boundary delimitations or 
political resolutions at the intergovernmental level. England initiated a 
practice of securing commercial advantages such as trading privileges 
alongside territorial acquisitions when negotiating treaties, particularly in the 
aftermath of armed conflict.149 The South Sea Company (1711-1854) acquired 
rights under the England-Spain Assiento Pact of 1713 to engage in slavery and 
whalefishing in South America. However, it also uniquely functioned as a 
debt-absorbing agency for the UK government. That Company’s history 
illustrated how entrepreneurial syndicates officially commissioned to identify 
commercial opportunities, exploit natural resources overseas and develop 
lucrative European markets could degenerate into overly-promoted and highly 
speculative ventures with artificially high stock values. The South Sea 
Company supported legislative measures protecting it and the public from 
fraudulent schemes notwithstanding allegations of bribery. The scandal of the 
South Sea bubble and public calls for greater regulatory control prompted the 
government towards lawmaking and the so-called Bubble Act 1719 (UK) 
prohibited the formation of joint stock companies except by royal charter or act
149 Day C., A History of Commerce. Longmans Green & Co, New York, 1922, 224.
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of parliament. Only after additional regulatory measures did English 
companies acquire the freedom to incorporate as well as limited liability,150 
two rights also sought within the United States.
3. Corporate Consolidation and the Emergence of American Multinationals.
Colonial corporations within the US were engaged to improve property for 
social purposes (improving drainage, deepening river channels, constructing 
canals and building bridges) and the American Revolution evidenced how 
firms fulfilled government contracts for supplies and war munitions.151 The 
first profit-seeking corporation organized under legislative charter was the 
New London Society United for Trade and Commerce of Connecticut in 1732. 
Corporate officers lobbied government officials and attended constitutional 
conventions so that holding company statutes could be combined into a single 
uniform law of incorporation. This initiated a ‘race to the bottom’ between 
regional States which accorded corporations, directors and shareholders wide-
1 Oranging rights with few responsibilities. Business was directly involved in 
defining federal laws regulating commercial behaviour and many of the largest 
firms were established between 1888 and 1905. The trajectory of industrial 
consolidation towards monopolization was steered to oligopoly with the 
passage of the Sherman Act 1890 (antitrust) and the Clayton Act 1914 
(corporate financing).
150 The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, the Limited Liability Act 1855 and the Companies Act 
1862 (UK).
151 Baldwin S.E., ‘American Business Corporations before 1789’ (1903) 8(3) American 
Historical Review 449, 451-2,463.
152 Prechel H., Big Business and the State: Historical Transitions and Corporate 
Transformation 1880s-1990s. State University of New York Press, Albany, 2000, 34,41, 67.
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The emergence of trade associations during the 1890s marked abandoning free 
competition in favour of fair competition with government support. The 
Japanese Chamber of Commerce communicated with the Japanese government 
through an advisory economic recovery committee formed after the Sino- 
Japanese War (1894-95).153 Within Europe ‘in every case producers instigated 
the governing legislation and controlled the administrative devices set up to 
implement it’.154 Producers spumed State participation when strong enough to 
do so; official support was only desirable for taxpayer support or to coerce a 
recalcitrant minority.
The economic balance of power shifted from Europe to the US after 1918 and 
governmental functions were centralized at the international level through the 
League of Nations to promote peace. Multilateral approaches to the provision 
of essential public services had also commenced: for example, the Universal 
Postal Union was established in 1874 to support commercial activity through 
inexpensive and secure postal services. More prominently, half of all delegates 
to the International Labour Organisation (ILO, established 1919) represented 
employer and worker organisations. Although the Covenant of the League of 
Nations did not envisage consultative relationships with NGOs, it observed 
that ‘the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war 
is open to grave objections’, prohibited ‘abuses such as the slave trade, the 
arms traffic and the liquor traffic’, sought ‘equitable treatment for the
153 Miyamoto M., ‘The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan’ in Yamazaki 
H. & Miyamoto M. (Eds), Trade Associations in Business History. University of Tokyo Press, 
Tokyo, 1988,1, 16.
154 Condliffe, supra «135, 464.
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commerce of all Members’ and encouraged State cooperation with national 
Red Cross organisations.155
3.1 The Emergence o f the International Chamber o f Commerce and 
Intergovernmental Organisations.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was established in Paris in 
1920 to coordinate business contributions to intergovernmental organisations. 
Notwithstanding that the essential nature of commercial activity is constructed 
around competition, the emergence of politically organized business groups 
such as the ICC responds to demand from both States and firms. That said, a 
permanent consultative body advising government officials was not established 
until 1945. ICC policy is formulated at Congress level to synthesize divergent 
industry opinion with authority delegated to an Executive Committee and ICC 
programmes are supported by secretariats and working groups. The ICC 
networks of national and specialist technical committees parallel and rival 
those of intergovernmental organisations. Economic information and 
commercial expertise is the basis for inclusion in intergovernmental 
committees.156 It is simpler for business associations to lobby concentrated 
government forums where individual States compete between themselves. 
Influential States may be targeted and their national legal models promoted. 
Intergovernmental adoption of ICC proposals is also likely where ICC national 
committees lobby at national levels and limit the freedom of choice for States.
155 Arts 8, 22, 23(5), 25, Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919.
156 Eg League of Nations, World Economic Survey 1933.
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Firms are informed of political developments through the information 
gathering function of intergovernmental organisations.
The ICC identifies ‘palliatives for an archaic world order’ to ensure predictable 
and secure international trade.157 It has harmonized divergent national law 
with respect to finance, communications, transport, investment, intellectual
i c o
property rights, taxation and trade. The ICC takes up legal questions 
unaddressed by States and offer solutions which are not dependent upon legal 
authority for their effectiveness. The codification of best commercial practice 
within model contracts and standardised terms are voluntarily adopted by firms 
to reduce transaction costs and facilitate exchange. International commercial 
terms (‘incoterms’) are abbreviated descriptions of sale conditions delimiting 
contractual liability in advance.159 Standby letters of credit have also been 
standardised.160 ICC committees exercise oversight by interpreting such 
instruments. States may adopt them as national law or indirectly through 
bodies such as the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
National courts have regard to such sources in resolving commercial disputes. 
Business recommendations carrying the authority of universal corporate 
opinion require only limited State participation to accord formal legal status to 
conventions drafted by industry. ICC participation at diplomatic conferences 
has included terms of full equality (voting and signing conventions),
157 Turner L., Invisible Empires: Multinational Companies and the Modem World. Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1970, 190.
158 Ridgeway G.L., Merchants of Peace: Twenty Years of Business Diplomacy Through the 
International Chamber of Commerce: 1919-1938. Columbia University Press, New York, 1938.
159 ICC, Incoterms 2000, ICC Pub No 560, Paris, 2000; ICC, Guide to Incoterms 2000, ICC 
Pub No 620, Paris, 2000.
160 ICC, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 500), ICC Pub No 
500/2, Paris, 1994.
85
membership of national delegations and appointment to economic consultative 
committees.
The interwar period tended towards oligopolistic industrial concentration. 
Producer groups participated in State cartels through institutions such as the 
International Wheat Council to manage production pursuant to international 
commodity agreements. The Dawes (1924) and Young Plans (1929) were 
formulated at conferences presided over by American businessmen. 
Commercial solutions were offered to the question of German reparations 
under the post-WWl peace settlement. Business diplomacy at the 1927 World 
Economic Conference was that private economic agreements negotiated in 
parallel with States would create global prosperity and peace. However, 
political activity by business on the international plane subsided with the Great 
Depression and commercial activity re-focused upon national productive 
capacity with the advent of World War Two (see for example the experience of 
the US considered further below). A report of the ICC’s Committee on Trade 
Barriers became the principal negotiating document and was subsequently 
incorporated via the US delegation into the draft agreement for an International 
Trade Organisation.161 The 1948 Havana Charter did not impose any 
obligations upon business but contemplated a complaints procedure with 
respect to restrictive business practices initiated by States.
161 ICC, World Trade and Employment. Paris, 1945.
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3.2 Extending US Hegemony and Domestic Concern for Corporate Power.
The overlapping and occasionally contradictory objectives which characterized 
relations between the chartered trading companies and the colonial powers of 
the eighteenth century are also evident in the relationship between US firms 
and their home State. Business leaders became partners in national economic 
recovery when the Great Depression permitted US President Hoover to create a 
consultative Business Council. World War Two created an informal 
partnership between the US government and American business consisting of a 
domestically-focused military-industrial complex and a subtle globally- 
orientated corporate strategy supported by federal agencies.162 The Strategic 
Materials Act 1939 (US) mandated the stockpiling of war-related material 
through several commercial cartels (the Metals Reserve Company, the Rubber 
Reserve Company, the Defence Plant Corporation and the Defence Supplies 
Corporation). The State Department provided financial and diplomatic support 
to expand US business control over critical natural resources within Latin
1 fJXAmerica. Corporate executives were appointed to key government posts but 
with simultaneous congressional inquiries and anti-trust litigation their 
authority was hedged.
During World War Two American business perfected mass production 
techniques nurtured by national security, defence contracts and Lend Lease. 
Industrial conflicts inspired by the rise of socialism between organised labour
162 Reardon J.J., America and the Multinational Corporation: The History of a Troubled 
Partnership. Praeger, Connecticut, 1992, 35.
163 Wilkins M., The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 
1914-1970. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, 256-7.
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and management in the West necessitated collective bargaining under 
government auspices. The Employment Act 1946 (US) enabled firms to 
contribute policy suggestions via a Council of Economic Advisers. The State 
undertook to provide public services, created public bodies to regulate specific 
economic activities and legislated for preferential treatment to local firms. The 
US government was the principal client of the military-industrial complex 
during the Cold War. The Committee for Economic Development, composed 
of corporate executives, bankers, lawyers and academics, encouraged the US to 
counter communist expansion within Europe by expanding international trade, 
implementing the Marshall Plan and creating international infrastructure. The 
responsibility of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
for example, to reconstruct shattered economies also facilitates business 
opportunities. Banks, financial institutions and investors continue to be 
catalysts for foreign direct investment.
Corporations in the form of State trading monopolies enjoyed a more 
formalised relationship with government in the Soviet block. The USSR 
concluded trade agreements with Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria which 
created bi-national companies who shared capital and management over 
particular industrial sectors. Corporations furthered government control within 
centrally planned economies and constituted a counter-ideology to capitalism 
until the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The 1954 Randall Commission, presided over by the-then Chairman of the 
Inland Steel Corporation, urged greater US foreign direct investment as a
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substitute for government aid. US corporations were deterred by political 
instability, the risk of expropriation, discriminatory regulation and rapid 
inflation. The 1961 Hickenlooper Amendment suspended government 
assistance where discriminatory taxes or restrictive operating conditions had 
the effect of expropriation. Corporations argued that ‘it is desirable to enact 
legislation authorizing guarantees to private capital against certain risks 
peculiar to foreign investment and to continue efforts to negotiate investment 
treaties’.164 The Mutual Security Act 1953 (US) encouraged recipient States to 
foster private incentives, promote competition and accept American private 
investment. However, rather than wait for the executive to negotiate reciprocal 
trade agreements, US businesses established manufacturing and marketing 
points within the European Common Market created by the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome. In addition to investment guarantees US firms requested reduced 
taxation on overseas business income and public funding to identify foreign 
direct investment opportunities.165 The Advisory Committee on Private 
Enterprise in Foreign Aid, authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act 1963 (US) 
and headed by the Chairman of IBM, identified the limits of using foreign aid 
programmes as leverage for private investment.
In 1967-8 the US government encountered aggressive protectionist lobbying 
from several industries (steel, cotton, chemicals and agriculture) seeking to 
neutralize the tariff cuts envisaged by the Trade Expansion Act 1962 (US) and
164 ‘The Annual Economic Review, January, 1951: A Report to the President by the Council of 
Economic Advisers’ in Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress. GPO, 
Washington, 1951, 121.
165 Gaston J.F., Obstacles to Direct Foreign Investment: Report prepared for the President’s 
Committee for Financing Foreign Trade, National Industrial Conference Board, New York, 
1951.
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agreed to in the Kennedy round of trade negotiations.166 On the other hand, 
business support for political initiatives such as the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) seeking the removal of trade barriers 
was channelled through the US Chamber of Commerce. The US textile, 
electronics, automobile, computer and semiconductor manufacturing industries 
would ultimately be captured by Japanese businesses with the support of their 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, patent licensing and 
technological breakthroughs.
Dialogues between firms and governments on measures to promote foreign 
direct investment were replicated internationally. The Business Council for 
the United Nations (UN) was established in 1958 to support the objectives of 
the Organisation. The UN established a Special Fund in the 1960s to identify 
the technical and economic feasibility of investing within developing States
1 67and to design attractive legal frameworks. The petroleum industry for
example evaluates host State law in light of offers by other States and
1 68alternative industries where capital could be invested. Having collaborated 
in their design, implementation of these programmes ultimately served the 
interests of private enterprise for example through subsequent contracting.
166 US Congress, Joint Economic Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, A 
Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970s. Part 4: The Multinational Corporation and 
International Investment, GPO, Washington, 1970.
167 Schwob M., ‘Pre-Investment Activities of the UN in the Mineral Field’ in Bonini W.E., 
Hedberg H.D. & Kalliokoski J., The Role o f National Governments in Exploration for Mineral 
Resources. The Littoral Press, New Jersey, 1964, 185, 189.
168 Newlin R.S., ‘A View from the Mining Industry’ & Taitt G.S., ‘Collaborating for 
Expansion’ in Bonini, ibid, 195 & 205.
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Several congressional investigations illustrated emergent criticism of 
multinational corporations from trade unions during the 1970s. Little was 
known about their detrimental economic impacts within either home or host 
States. The cliche that what was good for General Motors was also true for the 
US came under scrutiny. The Commission on International Trade and 
Investment Policy, composed of business leaders, labour representatives and 
academics, considered that corporations ‘are a major force in expanding both 
world trade and America’s role in the world economy’ and ‘an integral part of 
our technological and managerial expertise’. 169 However, their domestic 
political influence was considerable. For example, rather than attempting to 
influence legislation by lobbying congress through an industry association, the 
steel industry filed anti-dumping complaints against foreign producers 
pursuant to the Trade Act 1974 (US). This strategy legitimated protectionist 
arguments, initiated intergovernmental dispute settlement and resulted in the 
formation of a Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee. This episode importantly 
redefined the parameters of formal State authority at the national level and 
suggested industry’s ability to extract favourable concessions from the 
executive.170
The pervasive corporate influence in the national sphere was also becoming 
evident at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Trade unions expressed concern 
for the detrimental impacts of outsourcing production upon local employment, 
capital exports and technology transfer and recommended regulatory
169 US Congress, Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, The US in a 
Changing World Economy. GPO, Washington DC, 1971.
170 Prechel, supra wl52, 163-5, 171-2.
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solutions.171 The disproportionate commercial influence upon US foreign 
policy was exemplified by the International Telephone and Telegraph 
Company who urged the State Department to intervene within the internal 
affairs of Chile.172 Commercial participation in the coup which precipitated 
the fall of Allende is just one illustration of how firms are heavily entrenched 
in hotly contested political issues productive of malign long term economic 
impacts. Other corporations adopted similar strategies to deter States such as 
Peru and Guatemala from adopting measures of nationalization. 173 
Corporations countered that their political activity was insubstantial, 
ineffective and amounted to information gathering.174 However, investigative 
committees concluded that firms were manipulating the right of diplomatic 
protection.175 The political activities within host States of US corporations 
enjoying the protection of their home government led to a number of initiatives 
in the decolonization era (see further below) and engages the norm prohibiting 
intervention in the internal affairs of States (see further Chapter Two).
The oil industry together with the State Department fashioned the parameters 
of US-Libyan relations to consolidate their market position and maintain US
171 US Congress, Senate Finance Committee Subcommittee on International Trade, 
Implications of Multinational Firms for World Trade and Investment and for US Trade and 
Labour. GPO, Washington DC, 1973.
172 US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations, The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile. GPO, 
Washington DC, 1973, 1-20; Chile, Decree Authorising Intervention in ITT Subsidiary 10ILM 
1234(1971).
173 Feld W.J. ‘UN Supervision over Multinational Corporations: Realistic Expectation or 
Exercise in Futility’ (1976) 19(4) Orbis J  o f World Affairs 1499, 1506.
174 Eg International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation Sud America v Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation 13 ILM 1307 (1974), para 51.
175 US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations, Multinational Corporations and US Foreign Policy. GPO, Washington, 1973.
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oil supplies.176 The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries warned 
major oil companies that they must urge their home governments to abandon 
support for Israel or face restricted supplies.177 The US and UK governments 
supported an oil industry cartel notwithstanding antitrust concerns and the US 
position as a proponent of competition. Investigations also considered the
1 7fiextent to which US business practices perpetuated South African apartheid. 
Corporate officers submitted position papers providing a favourable account of 
their commercial operations and suggested that trade policy should continue to 
develop multinational commercial structures. US businesses also admitted 
bribing foreign government officials but suggested that this activity created 
markets and facilitated business.179 Moreover, imminent American regulations
would have to be internationalised to prevent foreign firms acquiring an unfair
1 80competitive advantage , a development addressed m Chapter Three. Finally,
the investigations revealed commercial activity occurring without political
181oversight and the institutionalized weaknesses of federal governments.
176 Ibid, Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy. GPO, Washington DC, 1974.
177 Sampson A., The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped. 
Bantam Books, New York, 1982, 297-300.
178 US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, US Business 
Involvement in Southern Africa. GPO, Washington DC, 1971.
179 US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations, Multinational Corporations and US Foreign Policy: Political Contributions to 
Foreign Governments. GPO, Washington DC, 1976.
180 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (US).
181 US Congress, House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy, Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad. GPO, 
Washington DC, 1975.
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3.3. Observations on the Historical Relationship between Commercial and 
Political Actors within the International Legal Order.
To summarise the historical overview thus far, international commercial 
activity is a product of and directed towards domestic influences. The 
economic fate of commercial enterprises within the international marketplace 
is directly tied to the political and military strength of the principal political 
authority to which they are subject. Governing elites shift the speculative 
economic risk of developing trade upon the corporate instrumentality and 
enterprises prefer to avoid the administrative burden associated with 
governmental responsibilities. However, business competes with government 
as much as collaborates: ambitious political objectives interrupt commercial 
networks and taxation deters industrial expansion. Corporate revenues 
underwrite the administrative bureaucracy and defence capability of States, 
thereby affording the basis for further territorial acquisitions, novel market 
opportunities and the safe transit of goods and individuals. The military, 
economic and political interests of States are bound together: joint effort 
between firms and political actors determines the most dominant national 
entity within the international legal order. Furthermore, commercial agendas 
are amplified with strategic support from governmental bodies. Although the 
identity and respective roles of political and economic actors mutates over time, 
the contribution of interconnected economic activity to the exploitation of 
unavailable natural resources and the global movement of finished products 
remains constant. Economic development, military expansion and national
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security demand a favourable geographical location, open trade routes, a strong 
navy, a preferred currency and technological advances.
Functional exchange between the private and public sectors depending upon 
resources, capability and interest is such that the corporate form evolves in 
tandem with government constructs. Regulation follows the trails blazed by 
business. Firms expect governments to establish an enabling regulatory 
environment consistent with commercial practices which maintains order, 
facilitates trade and ensures diplomatic and military security. Competitive 
struggles - attempts by rivals to undermine privileged positions and resort by 
incumbents to wealth-preserving action - are reflected in law. Regulation 
furthers commercial activity or entrenches protective measures for particular 
industries in response to prevailing economic conditions. Such trends are 
institutionally expressed through the creation of consultative mechanisms 
whereby commercial actors contribute to regulatory and policy design. 
However, inclusion inevitably reduces the regulatory distance, impeding the 
ability of States to prevent anti-competitive behaviour or bribery and promote 
the social welfare. Although the territorial limitations of State jurisdiction 
suggest international legal solutions it remains to be seen whether the process 
of designing international legal regimes suffers from similar defects. This 
Chapter now considers whether these conclusions also characterize 
commercial relationships with international organisations.
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4. Corporate Confrontation and Collaboration within the United Nations.
NGOs and business associations participated in the San Francisco Conference 
of 1945. The term ‘NGO’ should henceforth be understood generically to 
include corporations and other non-State actors. Subsuming corporations 
within the category of NGO suppresses the fact that these two actors frequently 
espouse opposing positions: a choice therefore lies between differential access 
and treatment to exploit specialization or equality with a view to 
counterbalancing their perspectives. Be that as it may, several States wished to 
admit NGOs in an ‘advisory capacity’. Accordingly, the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) ‘should, as soon as possible, adopt suitable arrangements 
enabling...international NGOs whose experience the ECOSOC will find 
necessary to use, to collaborate for purposes of consultation’. 182 The 
‘arrangements should not be such as to overburden the Council or transform it 
from a body for coordination of policy and action, as contemplated in the 
Charter, into a general forum for discussion’. However, NGOs were 
regarded with suspicion as communist fronts and corporations as capitalist 
instruments of the West, thereby preventing effective cooperation during the 
Cold War. An ICC consultative body established in 1969 to liaise with the 
economic agencies of the UN became obsolete due to commercial disinterest. 
Only in response to greater commercial activity was that relationship 
renewed.184
182 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution (1) (1946).
183 ECOSOC Resolution 2/3 (1946).
184 Oechslin J.-J., ‘Toward Greater International Co-operation’, ICC, Paris, 1977.
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4.1 Intergovernmental Attempts at Regulation and the UN Code o f Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations.
In the 1970s newly-independent States asserted the existence of a New 
International Economic Order.185 Notwithstanding the departure of the former 
colonial powers transnational corporations sought to maintain their commercial 
privileges. The huge ideological and economic confrontations between the 
developed and developing States of the decolonization era are rather blandly 
reflected in the resulting international legal jurisprudence with respect to 
expropriation. In particular, nationalisation and compensation became two 
highly contested provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States.
Exercising permanent sovereignty over natural resources also entailed 
enhancing regulatory capacity over corporate behaviour through the UN and 
reducing economic dependency upon foreign direct investment. As 
instruments of colonialism corporations were perceived as capable of
1 87subverting the political independence of host States. However, successive
US administrations sought to prevent such adversarial postures towards US
1 88corporate multinationalism. As a consequence of competing values between 
States the UN lacked coherent policies or effective institutional arrangements
i85UNGA Resolution 3201 (1974), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order.
186 UNCTC, Progress Made Towards the Establishment of the New International Economic 
Order: the Role of TNCs, UN Docs E/C. 10/74 & E/1980/40.
187 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World 
Development. New York, 1973,46.
188 Grieco J.M., ‘American Multinationals and International Order’ in Thompson K.W. (Ed), 
Institutions for Projecting American Values Abroad. University Press of America, Lanham, 
1983, 7-13.
97
for addressing commercial behaviour.189 The relationship with business was 
ad hoc and burdened by a legacy of mutual mistrust.190 Public and private 
sector representatives were appointed to consider the corporate role within the 
international legal order.191 The Group of Eminent Persons heard testimony 
from inter alia corporations and business associations.192
The Commission on Transnational Corporations was subsequently established 
with the Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) as secretariat.193 
Corporations became concerned by the General Assembly’s apparent lack of 
neutrality.194 This development was to be expected: developing States used 
their numerical superiority to further their interests by resorting to soft legal 
instruments such as recommendations where legally binding agreements could 
not be concluded with developed States. Enhancing the relative bargaining
f
power of host States drew the UN into re-negotiating concession contracts, 
conducting economic feasibility studies and training developing country 
personnel.
The interplay between the competing economic interests of the former colonial 
powers with developing States began to become evident through its impact
189 ECOSOC, World Economic Survey, UN Doc E/5144 (1971), 10.
190 Schollhammer H., 'Business-Govemment Relations in an International Context: An 
Assessment' in Boarman P.M & Schollhammer H. (Eds), Multinational Corporations and 
Governments: Business-Govemment Relations in an International Context. Praeger Publishers, 
New York, 1975,217,218-9.
191 ECOSOC Resolution 1721 (1972); UN Dept o f Economic and Social Affairs, Group of 
Eminent Persons, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on 
International Relations, New York, UN Doc E/5500/Rev.l (1974).
192 UN, Summary of the Hearings before the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of 
Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, New York, 1974, 
290-2.
193 ECOSOC Resolutions 1913 (1974) & 1908 (1974).
194 UNCTC, Resumed Second and Third Session of the Commission on TNCs, UN Doc 
E/5986/E/C. 10/32 (1977), 13.
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upon international lawmaking. For example, States differed along predictable 
lines on whether corporate participation in the Commission’s programme of 
work was permissible. 195 The eventual compromise was government- 
appointed experts who consulted with business. Delegates from the ICC and 
the US Chamber of Commerce participated on these terms at its initial 
sessions.196 Following an allegedly biased investigation of the pharmaceutical 
industry by the UNCTC, commercial representatives were subsequently 
permitted to review draft reports, make oral submissions and nominate 
experts.197 Political distrust, prejudices against the free market ideology from 
socialist States and antagonistic relations with developing ones continued to 
ostracise corporations from the UN.198
The Commission’s principal regulatory objective was to formulate a UN Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.199 Comparative national legal 
analysis was undertaken for this purpose 200 to identify issues for 
consideration. The envisaged instrument would apply to all enterprises 
operating across national boundaries and in any field irrespective of 
ownership. Several States were concerned that equality of status would be 
acknowledged if corporations were direct addressees of the Code. Whereas
195 UNCTC, Second Session of the Commission on TNCs, ECOSOC OR 61st Sess Supp No 5 
(1976).
196 UNCTC, First Session of the Commission on TNCs, UN Doc E/5665/E/C. 10/6 (1975).
197 Dell S., The UN and International Business. Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1990, 
115.
198 Tesner S. & Kell G., The UN and Business: A Partnership Recovered. St Martins Press, 
New York, 2000, 13.
199 UNCTC, TNCs: Codes of Conduct, Formulations by the Chairman, UN Doc E/C. 10 2/8 
(1978); UNCTC, Draft Code of Conduct on TNCs, UN Docs E/1983/17/Revl, 
E/1988/39/Addl & E/1990/94.
200 UNCTC, National Legislation and Regulations relating to TNCs, UN Doc E/C. 10/8 (1976).
201 Asante S.K.B., ‘UN: International Regulation of TNCs’ (1979) 13 J  World Trade L 55, 57- 
8 .
202 UNCTC, Report of the Thirteenth Session, UN Doc E/1987/22, para 139.
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States were ‘sovereign entities, full subjects and makers of international law’, 
corporations were ‘qualitatively different participants’ in the international legal 
order subject primarily to national law.
Although excluded from intergovernmental deliberations and unable to address 
delegates, the ICC and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) 
submitted proposals, engaged informally and exploited home State contacts. 
They successfully argued through their home governments that the Code 
should additionally identify relevant obligations outlining permissible State 
behaviour. Political negotiations stagnated since the regulatory flexibility of 
States would be significantly curtailed. Outstanding topics of disagreement 
included defining corporations, applying international norms, investment 
treatment standards and jurisdiction.204 Particularly controversial was the 
participation of developing States in the relevant international legal sources for 
discerning the standard of compensation for expropriated property. 205 
Differing political ideologies prevented a common position on prospective 
corporate regulation: corporations were alternately perceived as communist 
instrumentalities to facilitate State planning, neo-imperialists or self-regulating 
agents within a laissez-faire environment. Continuing business support was in 
jeopardy when the ICC expressed lost confidence.
203 ECOSOC, TNCs:' Issues Involved in the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, UN Doc 
E/C.10/17 (1976), para 42.
204 UNCTC, Secretariat Report on the Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on 
TNCs, UN Doc E/C.10/1984/S/5 (1984).
205 Cp Robinson P., The Question of a Reference to International Law in the UN Code of 
Conduct on TNCs, UN Doc ST/CTC/Ser.A/1 (1986), 6 & Vagts D.F., The Question of a 
Reference to International Obligations on the UN Code of Conduct on TNCs: A Different 
View, UN Doc ST/CTC/Ser.A/2 (1986), 12-3
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The legal quality o f the Code and the prospects for corporate compliance were 
also uncertain. It was doubtful whether the recommendatory powers o f the 
General Assembly under the Charter afforded that organ sufficient authority 
over corporations.206 Business argued for a voluntary instrument since 
reputable companies would not fail to observe the international origins o f the 
Code.207 In 1973 the Business Roundtable o f US, European and Japanese 
companies had been established to address growing corporate hostility 
including a code o f conduct formulated by the International Confederation o f 
Free Trade Unions in 1975. States were also aware o f proliferating 
intergovernmental codes having overlapping subject matters and 
institutionally-separate supervisory bodies. The Code was ultimately
promoted by States as an instrument o f moral persuasion strengthened by UN 
authority and supported by public opinion. The attempt to exercise regulatory 
control over corporations proved to be overly ambitious, particularly when the 
legitimacy o f State conduct was also questioned.209 The Code was eventually 
shelved210 with the emergence o f a new economic development paradigm: 
while the goal o f redirecting foreign investment towards developing countries 
remains, the economic self-determination o f States expressed by the New 
International Economic Order was replaced by an ever-expanding network o f 
bilateral investment treaties. In 1992 UNCTC was renamed the Division on
206 Bergman M.S., ‘The Norm-creating Effect o f  a General Assembly Resolution on TNCs’ in 
Snyder F.E. & Surakiart S. (Eds), Third World Attitudes Toward International Law: An 
Introduction. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987, 231, 245-7; Feld W.J., 
Multinational Corporations and UN Politics: The Quest for Codes o f Conduct. Pergamon Press, 
New York, 1980, 99-104.
207 Weisglas M., ‘International Business and the UN Code’ in UNCTC (1982) 12 The CTC  
Reporter 16, 18.
208 UNCTC, TNCs: Aspects o f  Possible Relationships between the Work on a Code o f  
Conduct and Related Work in UNCTAD and ILO, UN Doc E/C. 10/AC.2/5 (1978).
209 ECOSOC, Work on the Formulation o f the UN Code o f Conduct on TNCs, UN Doc 
E/C.10/1985/S/2, para 11.
210 UNCTC, The New Code Environment, UN Doc ST/CTC/Ser.A/16 (1990), 20, 30 fn22.
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Transnational Corporations and Investment (DTCI) and relocated to the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).211
4.2. NGO Inclusion in Intergovernmental Decision-making and Agenda 21.
Although the prevailing political ideology during the late 1980s was towards 
greater acceptance of free market virtues, the. 1992 Rio Earth Summit is a 
useful illustration of where commercial and NGO interests differed. 
Tightening regulatory control was an objective shared by NGOs and several 
States at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). 
States were called upon to include all NGOs within national and regional 
preparatory processes. Agenda 21 ultimately acknowledged business’s 
positive contributions to economic development, promoted self-regulation and 
called for business consultation when States formulated national regulatory
919instruments. Agenda 21 provided that ‘relevant NGOs...should be given 
opportunities to make their contributions and establish appropriate 
relationships with the UN system’.214 States were also called upon to develop 
appropriate mechanisms through which the private sector could contribute to 
policy formation, decision-making and implementation within the UN.
The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was subsequently 
established with a mandate to permit NGOs ‘including those related to major 
groups as well as to industry and the scientific and business communities, to
211 UNGA Resolution 47/212B (1993).
212 UNGA Resolution 44/228 (1989).
213 Agenda 21, supra n2S, Chapters 30, 38, 23.
214 Ibid, Agenda 21, para 38.42.
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participate effectively in its work and contribute within their areas of 
competence to its deliberations’. 215 Since its rules and procedures only 
permitted observer status but Agenda 21 contemplated inclusion in decision­
making216, designing effective modes of participation which directly informed 
deliberations was the eventual compromise approved by States. The CSD’s 
programme of work includes exchanging experiences and formulating 
common policy approaches in conjunction with the nine ‘major groups’ 
(women, children/youth, indigenous people, NGOs, local authorities, trade 
unions, business and industry, farmers and the scientific and technical 
community) under the overall direction of the major groups Coordinator.218 
Major groups also participate in a two-day NGO forum held prior to 
Governing Council meetings.219
Business and industry formulate joint undertakings of a quasi-legal character 
with States and commit themselves to specific sustainable development targets 
(Sustainable Development Partnerships), thereby de-linking implementation 
from negotiated political agreements. Multi-stakeholder dialogue sessions 
allow major groups to interact on an equal footing with States and dialogue 
papers become official documents. The private sector seeks to ‘contribute case 
studies and inputs to the Secretary-General’s reports’ and participate in ‘major 
group activities such as interactive dialogues designed to contribute to policy
215 UNGA Resolution 47/191 (1992), Institutional Arrangements to Follow-up the UNCED, 
para 7(b).
16 Agenda 21, supra «28, Chapter 27.
217 ECOSOC Decision 1993/215; UN Secretary-General Note, Representation of and 
Consultation with NGOs in the CSD, UN Doc E/1993/65.
218 ECOSOC Resolution 1997/63.
219 UNEP, Secretariat Note, Report o f the Civil Society Consultations on International 
Environmental Governance, Nairobi, 2001.
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discussions and help shape decisions made by the Commission’.220 However, 
non-State actor participation is programme-specific and limited to ad hoc
991inclusion within decision-making. Similarly, Local Agenda 21’s and 
National Councils for Sustainable Development composed of the private sector,
• • 999trade unions and NGOs have been unevenly implemented at national levels.
The prominence of non-State actors at UNCED prompted ECOSOC to review 
its consultative arrangements with NGOs with a view to introducing coherent 
rules regulating their participation in future conferences.223 NGOs supported 
expanding the relationship provided that the review did not result in any 
downwards revision of existing mechanisms.224 Whereas several States 
supported greater NGO participation, particularly NGOs from developing 
countries enabled by financial assistance to facilitate a more equitable 
geographical distribution, other governments sought to preserve their ability to
99c  # #
exclude NGOs. Attempts by the secretariat to strengthen NGO relationships 
in recognition of their indispensability226 may encounter hostility from States 
who are the targets of NGO criticism. Such circumstances consequently
• • • • 997impede the development of international participatory democracy.
220 Ms Federica Pietracci, Major Groups Programme Coordinator, UN Division for Sustainable 
Development, Response to Questionnaire, 9 August 2004.
221 CSD, Review of Trends in Progress achieved in implementing Agenda 21: Report on Major 
Groups, New York, 1994, 3; UNTCMD, TNCs and Sustainable Development: A Review of 
Agenda 21, New York, 1992.
222 UN Secretary-General, Implementing Agenda 21, UN Doc E/CN.17/2002/PC.2/7 (2001).
223 ECOSOC Resolutions 1993/80 & 1993/214.
224 UN, General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with NGOs, UN Doc 
E/AC.70/1994/NGO/1-11.
225 UN, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Review of Arrangements for 
Consultation with NGOs, UN Doc A/49/215 (1994), paras 55-7, 66-73.
226 UN Secretary-General, General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with NGOs, UN 
Doc E/AC.70/1994/5.
227 Otto D., ‘NGOs in the UN system: the emerging role o f international civil society’ (1996) 
18(1) HRQ 107.
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In 1996 the UN again examined NGO participation ‘in all areas of work’.228 
Developing country governments considered that NGO access had already 
outstripped the scope of existing procedural provisions, Northern countries 
wanted the study limited to the General Assembly and the Group of 77 insisted 
that ‘all areas’ also embraced the Security Council and Bretton Woods 
institutions. A report was requested concerning inter alia the legal implications 
of modifying current arrangements to enhance NGO participation. Although 
the resulting resolution (considered further below) permits access for national 
as well as international NGOs, it also specified additional NGO attributes and 
introduced new mechanisms of State control.
The General Assembly’s Special Session to review and appraise the 
implementation of Agenda 21 after five years concluded inter alia that small 
and medium-sized enterprises particularly from developing countries were yet 
to be engaged.230 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) and the ICC, permitted to address the General Assembly, called for 
more innovative consultative mechanisms to enable greater industry 
inclusion.231 States undertook to render national decision-making processes 
more effective, efficient, transparent, participatory and democratic.232 The
228 ECOSOC Decision 1996/297.
229 UNGA Resolution 52/453 (1997).
230 CSD, Dialogue Sessions with Major Groups: Summary Report of the Dialogue Session with 
Business and Industry, UN Doc E/CN.17/1997/L.10, 5; CSD, Role and Contribution of Major 
Groups, UN Doc E/CN.17/1997/2/Add.22, para 83.
231 WBCSD, ‘Sustainability: A Shared Responsibility’, Address to the UNGA Special Session, 
New York, 1997, 3; ICC, Address to the Plenary of the Nineteenth Special Session of the 
UNGA to Review and Appraise the Implementation of Agenda 21, New York, 1997, 2.
232 UNGA Resolution S/19-2 (1997) Programme for the further Implementation of Agenda 21, 
paras 28, 79, 88.
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practice of channelling commercial perspectives through the CSD was to
233continue.
NGO engagement has paralleled greater transparency and system-wide 
capacity-building within the UN. Business groups are not disinterested in 
international public sector reform.234 Organisational reform includes proposals 
to formalize business relationships.235 However, States resist challenges to 
their entrenched positions and firms prefer managerial autonomy. The expense 
of additional institutional infrastructure was avoided through a UN-business 
website. The UN Office for Project Services was created in 1995 and the 
Business Consultative Group co-ordinates ventures with the private sector. 
Most notably, the UN Foundation, responsible for administering the UN Fund 
for International Partnerships (UNFIP) and financed through a corporate 
donation, concluded a relationship agreement which rendered it on a par with 
UN Specialised Agencies.
4.3. Novel Forms o f Global Governance and the Global Compact.
1998 heralded a further ‘fundamental shift’ in the UN’s attitude to the private 
sector.236 The UN Secretary-General proposed a ‘Global Compact of shared 
values and principles’ with respect to human rights, labour standards and
233 CSD, ICCAVBCSD Submission, Corporate Management Tools for Sustainable 
Development, Background Paper No 5, Sixth Session, 1998.
234 USCIB, Letter to US Government concerning the Reform of the International 
Telecommunications Union, New York, 2000.
235 UN Secretary-General, Renewing the UN: A Programme for Reform, UN Doc A/51/950 
(1997), Action 17(c), (d).
236 UN, ‘Unite Power of Markets with Authority of Universal Values, Secretary-General urges 
at World Economic Form’, Press Release SG/SM/6448, 1998; UN, ‘Secretary General, in 
address to World Economic Forum, stresses strengthened partnership between the UN, Private 
Sector’, Press Release SG/SM/6153, 1997.
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environmental protection. 237 Firms were encouraged to acknowledge 
corporate social responsibility, safeguard market access, enhance employee 
welfare and constructively counter criticism. The ICC accepted the 
challenge conditioned by the economic responsibility ‘incumbent’ upon 
companies to customers, employees and shareholders. Although business 
should not be called upon to meet demands ‘properly the preserve o f 
governments’, perfecting the regulatory environment includes securing ‘the 
help and advice o f business’. On this basis the Global Compact received 
corporate endorsement.240 An original forty corporate adherents have since 
increased to around 1,500 in 2004 and combating corruption has been added as 
a principle under the Compact. Corporations submit annually examples o f 
concrete actions undertaken to apply at least one o f the principles. Since the 
UN lacks the mandate, resources and intention to monitor corporate 
compliance, the ICC champions the Compact as a self-regulatory exercise.241 
NGOs are skeptical o f commercial engagement and critique the Compact for 
its anonymous membership and unrepresentative samples o f implementation.
U NDP’s Global Sustainable Development Facility was terminated following 
sustained NGO criticism .242 Nonetheless, four multi-stakeholder p o ltc y ^ y  
dialogues have since occurred. The Global Compact could offer a novel
governance model in the nature o f a partnership243 and not merely constitute a ^  \
--------------------------------------  jl/vflt V k
237 UN, ‘Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour,
Environment’, Address to World Economic Forum, 1999, Davos, Press Release - 
SG/SM/6881/Rev 1. ; r x t -
238 UN Secretary-General, Address to Svenska Dagblates Executive Club, Stockholm, 1999, f * { 
Press Release SG/SM/7004, 1.
239 ICC, ‘Business takes up Kofi Annan’s challenge’, Press Release, Paris, 1999; ICC, ‘World 
Business Responds to Kofi Annan’s Challenge on Shared Goals with U N ’, Press Release,
Geneva, 1999.
240 Fifth Asia-Pacific High-Level Employers Conference, ‘Asia-Pacific Employers Conference 
Endorses the Global Compact’, Singapore, 2000, para 10.
241 ICC, ‘The Global Compact: Business and the U N ’, International Herald Tribune, 25th 
January 2001.
242 Karliner J., ‘Co-opting the U N ’ (1999) 29(5) The Ecologist 318.
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—iidinn i9f-a-partnership^^d-nQt^£rely^Gonstifate3^oft’ international legal 
instrument such as those considered in Chapter 2. The UN’s Partnership 
Office will bring under one umbrella the Global Compact Office and UNFIP.
The Secretary-General may be attempting to marshal the corporate influence to 
the UN’s advantage.244 Institutional competition with the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) as the most influential forum for international standard- 
setting encounters its relatively more robust rule-making and greater wealth. 
Moreover, the US Chamber of Commerce advocated for continuing North 
American financial contributions to the International Monetary Fund in 1998. 
US firms urged the US government to pay its UN arrears on the basis that a 
strong UN was good for business in terms of potential procurement earnings, 
to discourage cross-border taxation and to assist emerging economies.245 
Provided that trading regimes were left unaffected, industry also supported the 
Secretary-General’s call for greater authority to be delegated to the UN.246 
However, as the range of available international fora increase, the possibilities 
for non-State actors to manipulate the context in which they negotiate policy 
also grow.247 During the ICC’s 1998 Geneva Business Dialogue, the 
Secretary-General called for business contributions to the economic decision­
making processes of UN Specialised Agencies as a way of satisfying industry 
demands for an effective regulatory framework. The Secretary-General also
243 Kell G., ‘Toward Universal Business Principles’, Paper delivered at the LSE, London, 2001, 
6 .
244 UN Secretary-General, ‘Address to Telecom ’99’, Eighth World Telecommunications 
Exhibition and Forum, Geneva, 1999, 3.
245 US Chamber of Commerce/The National Association of Manufacturers/US BRT, Letter to 
President Clinton and Members of Congress, 1999.
246 UN, ‘Business calls for strengthened UN’, Press Release ECO/15 PI/1219, 2000.
247 Zito A.R., ‘Comparing environmental policy-making in transnational institutions’ (1998) 
5(4) JEuropean Public Policy 671.
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undertook to exclude human rights and environmental considerations from 
multilateral trade regimes provided progress was made by firms in satisfying 
social objectives.248
4.4. Public-Private Partnerships and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development.
The corporate-UN relationship has evolved from one of actively seeking 
regulatory control to courting foreign direct investment and more recently 
towards co-operative partnerships for sustainable development. 249 
Corporations are prominently positioned at the core of economic 
development.250 Sustainable development has been further tailored into ‘eco- 
efficiency’.251 Development is a legitimate business objective since it entails 
market security and long term corporate viability.252 A ‘strong relationship’ 
exists with shareholder value and an ‘entrepreneurial culture’ should be 
promoted within developing States.253
For example, States requested the active participation of all major groups in 
preparation for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in
248 UN Secretary-General, Message to the Workshop ‘Today and Tomorrow: Outlook for 
Corporate Strategies’, UN Economic Commission for Europe, Italy, 1999.
249 PWBLF/UNDP/IBRD, Business as Partners in Development: Creating Wealth for 
Countries, Companies and Communities, London, 1996; PWBLF, Building Partnerships- 
Cooperation between the UN and the Business Community, London, 2002.
250 UN Secretary-General, TNCs in the New World Economy: Issues and Policy Implications, 
UN Doc E/C. 10/1992/5, paras 4, 15-17.
251 Desimone L.D. & Popoff F., Eco-Efficiencv: The Business Link to Sustainable 
Development. MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2000.
252 ICC, Multinational Enterprises: Their Contribution to Economic Growth and Development, 
Paris, 1985; CSD, Report of the Sixth Session concerning the Relationship between Industry 
and Sustainable Development, UN Doc E/CN. 17/1998/4.
253 UNDP, Human Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, 30.
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Johannesburg.254 The ICC commenced UN consultation during 2001.255 The
ICC, World Energy Council and WBCSD formed Business Action for
^ —      —  _
Sustainable Development (BASD).256 The ICC updated its sustainable 
development code of conduct in conjunction with other business groups and
9 57the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP). Organised business and UN 
Specialised Agencies prepared economic forecasts for industry and 
policymakers. UNEP also solicited 22 global sustainability reports from
industry.259 Industry associations were free to determine the drafting process
260 °  with NGO consultation as desired. UNEP concluded inter alia that formal
regulatory frameworks needed to be better integrated with corporate voluntary
initiatives.261
9 ^ : 9
The CSD as the Preparatory Committee also called for contributory input. 
Based upon prior CSD practice, major groups were permitted to address the 
Plenary and its subsidiary bodies. The ICC observed that little progress had
254 UNGA Resolution 55/199 (2001) on the Ten-Year Review of Progress Achieved in the 
Implementation of the Outcome of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
paras 12, 15.
255 Business Action for Sustainable Development (BASD), Business, UN meet to set 
sustainability agenda, Press Release, Paris, 2001.
256 ICC, ‘Business gears up for Earth Summit with launch of new initiative’, Press Release, 
New York, 2001.
257 ICC, ICC Commitment to Sustainable Development, Paris, 1997, 3; ICC, Business Charter 
for Sustainable Development, Paris, 1991; UNEP/WBCSD Joint Advisory Panel on the 
Business Charter for Sustainable Development.
258 World Resources Institute (WRI)/UNEP/WBCSD, Tomorrow’s Markets: Global Trends 
and Their Implications for Business, Washington DC, 2002.
259 UNEP, Guidelines for Industry Sector Reports for the WSSD 2002, Paris, 2001, 3.
260 UNEP, Meeting Report: Workshop on Preparing Industry Sector Reports for the WSSD 
2002, Paris, 2001.
261 UNEP, Industry as a Partner for Sustainable Development, 10 Years After Rio: The UNEP 
Assessment, Paris, 2002, 20-21.
262 CSD, Decision 1 para 11 at the Organisational Session, New York, 2001.
263 UN Secretary-General, Report on Suggested Arrangements for Involving NGOs and other 
Major Groups in the Summit and its Preparatory Process, UN Doc E/CN. 17/2001/-.
110
been made since 1992.264 It argued inter alia for market supportive regulatory 
frameworks encouraging foreign direct investment. It also sought to extend
Of i f ibusiness participation within the UN system. Partnerships with States and
9 f f lothers were also promoted. Written submissions by seventy business 
organisations under the auspices of the ICC, the WBCSD and the World 
Energy Council were to similar effect.268 Discussion papers were also
9 AQsubmitted. Multi-stakeholder panels occurred during the first PrepCom with 
two-day dialogue segments arranged for the second and fourth. The WBCSD, 
the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace International called for strong 
political resolve.270
At the Summit itself designated representatives of accredited major groups 
were permitted access to Plenary meetings as observers and to circulate written 
documents.271 Oral statements were permissible only upon invitation and 
written submissions where the organisation possessed special competence.272 
A half-day multi-stakeholder dialogue segment followed the general debate. 
Four informal roundtables enabled the major groups to interact directly with
264 UN Secretary-General, Note on Multi-Stakeholder dialogue segment of the Second Session 
of the CSD acting as the Preparatory Committee for the WSSD, Dialogue Paper by Business 
and Industry, UN Doc E/CN.17/2002/PC.2/6/Add.7, para 14.
265 ICC, Energy for Sustainable Development: Business Recommendations and Roles, Paper 
Presented to the Fourth Meeting of the CSD Preparatory Committee, 2002.
266 ICC, Sustainable Development: A Vision for Partnership, ICC Doc 213/4 (2002).
267 Whelan J., ICC, Statement by Business and Industry to the l(fh Session o f the UN CSD, 
2001.
268 ICC, CSD-9 Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Session: Consolidation of Business Interventions, 
New York, 2001, 3, 5.
269 CSD, Secretary-General Note, Multi-stakeholder Dialogue on Sustainable Energy and 
Transport: Discussion Paper contributed by Business/Industry, UN Doc
E/CN.l 7/2001/6/Add. 1, para 7.
270 WBCSD, Summit Focus, WBCSD World Summit Newsletter, No 3, 2002.
271 WSSD, Information for Participants, UN Doc A/CONF.199/INF/1 (2002), paras 30, 59, 62.
272 UN Secretariat, Note on Provisional Rules of Procedure, UN Doc A/CONF. 199/2 (2002), 
Rules 60, 64, 66.
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State officials.273 The roundtables concluded that the private sector could be a 
positive agent for change provided its social and environmental efforts were 
credible, trustworthy and responsible.274 Experimental partnership plenary 
sessions were also conducted in parallel.275 The eventual Political Declaration 
called inter alia for a broad-based inclusive process of participation in policy 
formulation, decision-making and implementation involving all major 
groups.276 The Plan of Implementation included ‘Type 2 outcomes’ -  
voluntary targets and agreements between industry, States and NGOs -  to 
complement the agreed political commitments by States (‘Type 1 outcomes’). 
ICC and UNEP also jointly announced several World Summit Business 
Awards, an event indicative of contemporary relationships within the UN 
organisation.
5. Contemporary Modalities for Corporate Participation within the UN System.
Corporate participation within the UN system is circumscribed by the UN 
Charter, the constituent instrument of the Specialised Agency concerned, 
organisational rules of procedure, decisions of governing bodies and the 
practice of the relevant secretariat. Although preferential treatment may be 
perceived, corporations formally participate on the same terms as other
273 UNGA, Matters related to the Organisation of Work during the WSSD, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 199/PC/L.7 (2002).
274 WSSD, Chairperson’s Summaries of the Roundtables, UN Doc A/CONF. 199/17/Add. 1 
(2002), 2, 12, 16.
275 WSSD, Secretariat Note, Chairperson’s Summary of the Partnership Plenary Discussion on 
Water and Sanitation, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 199/16/Add.2 (2002), 2, 3.
276 WSSD, The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 199/L.6/Rev.2 (2002), paras 23, 29 & Plan of Implementation.
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NGOs.277 Article 71 of the UN Charter empowers ECOSOC to conclude 
suitable consultative arrangements with NGOs. Indeed, that Article was 
included at the insistence of NGOs including businesspersons since NGO 
engagement in the economic and social field had been the ‘usual practice’ of 
the League of Nations 278 Although Article 71 formalised this practice, it also 
limited participation to consultation and moreover only to matters within 
ECOSOC’s competence.
Arrangements between ECOSOC and NGOs have since grown in detail and
jnQ t
the contemporary criteria appear in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. This 
resolution states inter alia the required attributes for NGOs seeking 
consultative status, the process by which they are accredited to attend UN 
conferences and the terms of their participation thereat (extracts of the 
lastmentioned are reproduced in Annex 1). Particularly noteworthy are the 
criteria for accreditation (paragraph 44), the presumption to attend future 
sessions of preparatory committees (49), the denial of any negotiating role (50), 
that oral statements are subject to State discretion (51) and the opportunity to 
distribute written submissions as unofficial documents (52).
Accreditation requires a letter of intent from an NGO and completion of a 
questionnaire.280 Consultative status is differentiated by category: NGOs in
277 Cp ‘We, the peoples of the United Nations’: Preamble, UN Charter.
278 Simma B. (Ed), The Charter of the UN: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002, 1070.
279 ECOSOC Resolutions 3(11) (1946); 288B(X) (1950), ‘Review of Consultative 
Arrangements with NGOs’; 1296(XLIV) (1968), ‘Arrangements for Consultation with NGOs’; 
1996/31, ‘Consultative Relationships between the UN and NGOs’.
280 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Guidelines concerning Association 
between the UN and NGOs, 2004, 5.
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‘General’ consultative status are concerned with ‘most’ of the activities of the 
ECOSOC Governing Council and its subsidiary bodies, those in ‘Special’ 
consultative status are those NGOs with ‘a special competence in, and are 
concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered’ by 
ECOSOC whereas NGOs on ‘Roster’ status are those that ‘can make 
occasional and useful contributions’ to ECOSOC’s work. NGOs with General 
or Special consultative status must submit four-page quadrennial reports 
providing basic factual information and accounting for their participation in
9R1and contribution to UN work. ECOSOC’s Committee on NGOs composed 
of States reviews NGO applications for consultative status and liaises with 
NGOs through the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the 
United Nations. Consultative status enables access to public areas frequented 
by government delegates and affords opportunities for informal lobbying.
General consultative status is enjoyed by the ICC (since 1946) and the IOE. 
This entitles them to propose agenda items for ECOSOC’s consideration, make 
limited oral statements and written submissions to its meetings, transmit 
communications on proscribed terms to ECOSOC Committees or 
Commissions and attend public meetings of the General Assembly. The ICC 
has utlised its right of initiative to organise study groups, collaborate with the 
International Law Association and prepare drafts for example with respect to 
bills of lading or international sales contracts.282 The ICC accordingly 
occupies a catalytical role within the international legal process for producing
281 UN, Guidelines for Submission of Quadrennial Reports for NGOs in General and Special 
Consultative Status with ECOSOC, 2004.
282 Eisemann F., ‘ICC’s Stake in the Law of International Trade’ (1968) 2(1) J  World Trade L 
1.
114
instruments which are ultimately adopted as treaties imposing obligations upon 
States. Treaty negotiations may be characterised by competition between ICC 
drafts sponsored by developed States and counterproposals from developing
• 283countries.
5.1. NGO Relations with the Organs and Specialised Agencies o f the UN.
NGOs in consultative status are confined to the public balcony of the General 
Assembly, must use designated entrances and their freedom of movement is
JO Arestricted within the building. As indicated in its organisational rules of 
procedure (reproduced in part in Annex 1), experts from the private sector may 
be members of national delegations, appointed to subcommittees, submit 
written statements to the secretariat and be invited to make oral statements 
during the general debate at the discretion of the chairperson. The Assembly 
resolved to give greater opportunities to the private sector, NGOs and civil 
society in contribution to the realization of the UN’s goals and programmes.285 
This extended to concluding arrangements of co-operation and partnership.286 
The General Assembly has also recalled ‘with satisfaction’ the active 
collaboration between the UN and private sector associations.287 The General 
Assembly has recognized that ‘increasing prosperity, a major goal of the 
development process, is contributed primarily by the activities of business and 
industry’. In its view, peace and development are ‘mutually supportive’ of
283 Ju W.J., ‘UN Multimodal Transport Convention’ (1981) 15(4) J  o f World Trade L 283, 284.
284 UN Office of Central Support Services, Information for Members of Accredited NGOs, 
1999.
285 UNGA Resolution 55/2 (2001), Millennium Declaration.
286 UNGA Resolution 55/162 (2000), para 14.
287 UNGA Resolution 48/180 (1993), Entrepreneurship and Privatisation for Economic Growth 
and Sustainable Development.
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commercial objectives such as wealth creation.288 Others suggest that the 
UN’s social agenda is incompatible with the singular profit-making mandate of 
business.289 States were nonetheless encouraged to enact ‘business-friendly’ 
legislation which supported entrepreneurship and facilitated privatization.290
On at least three occasions NGOs have informally briefed the Security Council 
outside its regular room and not forming part of its scheduled meetings (the 
Arria formula). Although these NGOs have to date been limited to human 
rights NGOs, there is nothing under the procedural rules (partly reproduced in 
Annex 1) which precludes business organisations from resorting to this process. 
The extent of NGO participation is left to the discretion of individual Members.
The Specialised Agencies of the UN enter into consultative arrangements with 
NGOs as defined by their constituent instrument. For example, Article 71 of 
the Constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO) enables WHO in 
executing its mandate to conclude suitable arrangements with NGO’s. Official 
relations cannot be established with NGOs pursuing ‘concerns which are 
primarily of a commercial or profit-making nature’291. Thus there is a 
distinction drawn and the term NGO is not used generically. That said, private 
sector interests are represented through trade associations such as the 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations 
(IFPMA) who enjoy the right to appoint representatives, make oral statements,
288 UNGA Resolution 51/240 (1996), An Agenda for Development.
289 UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy, Statement to the Harvard International 
Development Conference, 'Sharing Responsibilities: Public, Private and Civil Society', 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, 2-4.
290 UNGA Resolution 50/106 (1996), Business and Development, para 3.
291 Principle 3.1, WHO Resolution 40.25 (1987) on Principles Governing Relations Between 
the WHO and NGOs.
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secure access to non-confidential documents, circulate memoranda and 
propose agenda items. WHO’s hitherto informal practices of information 
exchange and technical standard-setting with industry are now relatively more 
‘open and constructive’. 292 Additional features include the WHO/Chief 
Executive Officer Roundtable Process, first drafts prepared by industry for the 
International Program on Chemical Safety and working groups on specialist 
topics.293 These positive interactions contrast with corporate efforts to 
undermine negotiations on a framework convention on tobacco control.294
NGOs may be formally accorded membership rights within Specialised 
Agencies. For example, the World Tourism Organisation differentiates 
between States as ‘full members’ and NGOs as ‘affiliate members’. 295 
Affiliate membership within the World Meteorological Organisation enables
JQfNGOs to participate in technical bodies of a non-policy making nature. 
Finally, the membership of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
includes States and some 570 ‘Sector members’ representing all aspects of the 
telecommunications industry. ‘Sector members’ contribute to its expenses, 
participate in study groups, access documentation and have the right to 
participate in and submit written contributions to ITU conferences, assemblies 
and meetings. This may be contrasted with the Task Force established by 
ECOSOC’s High-Level Group of Advisers on Information and
292 WHO, ‘WHO/Private Sector Talks’, Press Release No 64, 1998.
293 Eg WHO, Counterfeit Drugs: Report of a Joint WHO/IFPMA Workshop, Geneva, 1992.
294 WHO, Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World 
Health Organisation: Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents, 
Geneva, 2000.
295 Gilmour D.R., ‘The World Tourism Organisation: International Constitutional Law with a 
Difference’ (1971) 18 Netherlands IntLR 275.
296 WMO and the Private Sector, Report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Executive 
Council Working Group on Long-Term Planning, WMO Doc WGLTPP-III/Doc.6 (1998).
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Communications Technology where there is equality of participation between 
States, the private sector and other stakeholders. Although not a Specialised 
Agency, it is also noteworthy that four NGOs presently enjoy the rights and 
duties associated with the status of International Partner Organisation to the 
Ramsar Convention on wetlands.
The UN Department of Public Information courts NGOs among its principal
7Q7clients. Provided NGOs share the UN’s ideals and disseminate information 
about its work to their constituencies, ‘association’ with the DPI provides 
access to buildings and meeting rooms. The DPI conducts annual conferences, 
organizes weekly briefings, publishes directories and maintains a Resource 
Centre for the NGO community. The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service 
undertakes information, liaison and networking activities on an informal basis 
but has no procedures for the official registration or recognition of NGOs 
within the UN system.
The private sector has collaborated with the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) since at least the 1970s.298 The FAO considers that ‘its leadership and 
credibility in food security will be enhanced as it demonstrates overtime that it 
has brokered increased private investment’.299 Executives from forest products 
companies and industry associations participate in its Advisory Committee on 
Paper and Wood Products. The FAOs assessment procedure is ‘pretty strict to
297 UNGA Resolution 13(1) (1946).
298 Simons W.W., ‘Govemment-Industry Partnership in the Third World: A UN Experiment 
Begins to Pay O ff (1975) 10(3) Colum J  o f World Bus 36.
299 FAO Programme and Policy Advisory Board, A Strategy for FAO/Private Sector 
Partnership to help achieve Food Security, 1997.
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avoid problems’ such as ‘image risk’ and conflicts of interest.300 It has a 
committee composed of auditor, lawyers, public procurement and technical 
cooperation officers to screen all potential partners including NGOs composed 
of private sector members.
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) may ‘make suitable 
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with international NGOs and, 
with the consent of the governments concerned, with national organisations, 
governmental or non-governmental’. Each WIPO body may decide which 
NGOs to invite to their meetings as observers.302 NGO experts act as 
consultants and may participate through the Policy Advisory Commission or 
the Industry Advisory Commission. Appointments generally favour industry 
bodies interested in intellectual property protection. Observers to WIPO 
meetings participate in debates at the invitation of the Chairperson but cannot
'lA'I
submit proposals, amendments or motions. Eighty-four percent of its 
income is derived from fees paid by the private sector for the international 
registration of patents, trademarks and industrial designs.
Members States of the ILO ‘undertake to nominate non-Govemment delegates 
and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organisations, if such 
organisations exist, which are most representative of employers or workpeople, 
as the case may be, in their respective countries’.304 Furthermore, the ILO may
300 Ms Aysen Tanyeri-Abur, Senior Officer (Private Sector), Resources and Strategic 
Partnerships Unit, FAO, Response to Questionnaire, 24 September 2004.
301 Art 13, Convention establishing the WIPO.
302 WIPO General Rules of Procedure, WIPO Doc 399 (FE) Rev 3, Geneva, 1998, Rules 8 , 48.
303 Ibid, Rules 24, 39.
304 Art 3(5), ILO Constitution.
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‘make suitable arrangements for such consultation as it may think desirable 
with recognized non-governmental international organisations, including 
international organisations of employers, workers, agriculturalists and co- 
operators’.305 Employer and worker delegations vote upon instruction from 
their respective organisations including against the government representatives 
of their national delegations. Employers are represented through the IOE who 
is generally able to ensure voting cohesion. The IOE has initiated 
constitutional amendments and participates in drafting international labour 
standards which are subsequently adopted by States. ILO Conventions 
commonly envisage further consultation with employer and worker 
organisations when formulating national implementing legislation.
For example, the IOE recently undertook to eliminate child labour.308 The 
practice affords an unfair commercial advantage which appropriates market 
share from firms who cannot employ this cost-reducing production method. 
Voluntary corporate initiatives include codes of conduct, certification schemes 
and alliances with other actors.309 The IOE encouraged States to ratify and 
implement the relevant Convention to compel enforcement action against 
deviant firms.310 The US Council for International Business conceded that US
305 Ibid, para 3.
306 Kruglak G., 'Tripartitism and the ILO' in Forsythe D.P., The UN in the World Political 
Economy: Essays in Honour of Leon Gordenker. Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1989, 179, 
183.
307 ILO Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention No 144 (1976); 
ILO Tripartite Consultation (Activities of the International Labour Organisation) 
Recommendation No 152 (1976).
308 IOE, Resolution on Child Labour, 73rd Session, Geneva, 1996, para (f).
309 IOE/ILO, Employer’s Handbook on Child Labour: A Guide for Taking Action, Geneva, 
1998,32-66, 69-71.
310 IOE/ILO, An Employers’ Initiative for Ratification of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention 1999 (No 182), Geneva, c l999, 4.
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law and practice would be unaffected.311 To deter resort to the WTO, the IOE 
also proposed an ILO Declaration by which States re-committed themselves to
» 1 1 9  » *observing fundamental principles and rights at work. Once again American 
law and practice is largely unaffected.313 Employer organisations did not 
submit comments during the first review of that instrument.314 To enhance the 
credibility of international labour standards the IOE seeks to improve ILO 
standard-setting with pre-discussions, surveys, simplified procedures and 
targeted revision methods.315 The US Council for International Business has 
also committed itself to strengthening the ILO as an alternative to imposing
 ^1 f \trade measures in response to labour rights violations. Workers and 
employers organisations also participate in the ILO’s Tripartism and Social 
Dialogue in Action programme.
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also permits 
NGO contributions to international legal processes. General consultative 
status is extended to organisations exercising functions and having basic 
interests in most of the Trade and Development Board’s activities and special 
consultative status is reserved to those having a special competence or
311 USCIB, USCIB Plays a Major Role in Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labor, Geneva, 
1999; USCIB, The US Business Community’s Letter to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee: US Ratification of the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, New 
York, 1999, 1.
312 IOE, The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: A Guide for 
Employers, Geneva, c l998, 4.
313 USCIB, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, New York, 1998.
314 ILO, Review of Annual Reports under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO Doc GB.277/3/1 (2000), Pt 1, paras 56, 86-7.
315 IOE, ILO Standards, Position Paper, Geneva, 2000.
316 US Council for International Business (USCIB), Letter to Congress: Trade and Labor 
Linkage, New York, 1999.
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1^7concerned with specific activities. Both enable observer status at public 
meetings, the circulation of written submissions, making oral statements and 
proposing agenda items. Information technology companies developed 
UNCTAD’s Automated System for Customs Data which presently constitutes 
the de facto standard for automated customs procedures. The ICC and 
UNCTAD also formulated interim rules pending the entry into force of the UN 
Convention on the International Multimodal Transport of Goods. 318 
Professional accounting firms participated in UNCTAD’s Group of Experts on 
International Standards of Accounting to measure environmental impacts.319 
This parallels the efforts of the WBCSD in measuring greenhouse gas 
emissions for prospective inclusion in an emissions trading regime.320 The 
International Accounting Standards Committee, composed of financial 
institutions, corporations, stock exchange authorities and central bankers, also 
formulated International Accounting Standard 37 to quantify environmental
7^1liability. Accounting standards have also been applied to human rights.
• • “377Corporate leaders also participate in panel discussions under its auspices. 
Notwithstanding consultation with businesses, States, NGOs and trade unions, 
UNCTAD has been unable to progress the corporate responsibility agenda.
317 Art XV, UNCTAD Constitution; Rule 77, Rules of Procedure; Decision 43 (VTI) (1968) of 
the Trade and Development Board, ‘Arrangements for the Participation of NGOs in the 
Activities of UNCTAD’.
318 UNCTAD/ICC, Rules for Multimodal Transport, ICC Pub No 481, Paris, 1990.
319 UNDESD/Transnational Corporations and Management Division (TCMD), Report of the 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and 
Reporting (ISAR) at its Tenth Session, UN Doc E/C. 10/1992/12.
320 WRI/WBCSD Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative (GhgProtocol).
321 The Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (AccountAbility), The AccountAbility 
1000 Standard (AA1000), London, 1999.
322 UN Press Release GA/EF/2833 (1998).
323 Muchlinski P.T., ‘Attempts to Extend the Accountability of TNCs: The Role of UNCTAD’ 
in Kamminga M. & Zia-Zarifi S. (Eds), Liability o f Multinational Corporations under 
International Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, 97, 116.
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The Director-General of the UN Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO) may establish appropriate relations with NGOs. 324 UNIDO’s 
International Business Advisory Council coordinates cooperation agreements 
with firms and business associations. Private sector development is the 
objective of most of the agency’s technical co-operation within developing 
countries. The Executive Board of the UN Population Fund may similarly 
invite when appropriate intergovernmental organisations and those NGOs 
enjoying consultative status with ECOSOC to participate in its deliberations on 
questions relate to their activities. More specifically, the UN Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) was called upon to ‘obtain from.. .NGOs having a special interest in 
child and family welfare the advice and technical assistance which it may 
require for the implementation of its programmes’.
States invited ‘those NGOs that have an interest in the field of the environment 
to lend their full support and collaboration to the UN with a view to achieving 
the largest possible degree of co-operation’. The desired attribute of NGOs 
-  ‘having an interest in the field of the environment’ -  was construed to 
include business organisations such as the ICC. UNEP was called upon to 
collaborate with these NGOs as well as other actors. NGOs may designate 
representatives to observe public meetings of the Governing Council and its 
subsidiary organs. 328 The secretariat circulates the written statements of
324 Art 19, Constitution of the UNIDO.
325 UNGA Resolution 417 (1950).
326 UNGA Resolution 2997 (1972), para IV(5).
327 Agenda 21, Chapter 38, para 22(g).
328 UNEP Rules of Procedure, Rule 69; UNEP Governing Council Decisions 21/19 (2001) on 
the Role of Civil Society, 18/4 (1995) on the role of NGOs in UNEP & 16/7 (1991) on 
Volunteers for the Environment.
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190 • • • ♦observers where related to specific agenda items. NGO participation is 
coordinated by UNEP’s Civil Society and NGOs Unit. The Global 
Environment Facility also contemplates arrangements with NGOs, private 
sector entities and academic institutions for project preparation and 
execution. 330 Business contributes information to the clearing house 
mechanism of the International Cleaner Production Information Centre. The 
International Council on Mining and Minerals (ICMM) co-sponsors seminars, 
publishes case studies and develops operational guidelines for industrial use. 
UNEP workshops bring together mineral resource managers and national 
regulatory authorities. Government officials are drawn away by the ICMM to 
formulate its corporate social responsibility statement in conjunction with trade 
unions and NGOs.332 For this purpose ICMM argued that it was inappropriate 
to refer to international conventions or provide intergovernmental 
organisations with oversight responsibility. It moreover suggests that 
business and civil society should not undertake the task of building the public 
sector’s regulatory capacity.334 However, firms may provide technical 
assistance on a case-by-case basis as dictated by national law and practice.
Although the International Law Commission possesses a general power to 
‘consult with any international or national organisations, official or non-
329 UNEP, Rules of Procedure, Rule 69(2).
330 Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured GEF, 1994, para 28.
331 ICMM, The Mining and Metals Industries: Progress in Contributing to Sustainable 
Development, Working Paper, London, 2002, 60, 62, 67, 69, 117; UNEP/ICMM, 
Environmental Protection Working Group, Case Studies on Tailings Management, London,
1998.
332 ICMM, Toronto Declaration, 2002.
333 ICMM, Charter on Sustainable Development, London, 1998.
334 ICMM, Response to the Draft Report of the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
Development Project, London, 2002.
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official’, it has not generally been predisposed towards NGO consultation.335 
It encourages States to solicit input from chambers of commerce and has 
considered including business representatives as experts and certifying 
international legal points upon private sector request.336 Commercial interest 
in the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is more 
apparent since national legislation frequently draws upon its model laws.337
Commercial influences are frequently located in obscure technical committees. 
Some three hundred companies participate within the International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consultative Committee and the International Radio 
Consultative Committee of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). 
The International Shipowners Federation, the International Chamber of 
Shipping and the Oil Companies International Maritime Forum contribute 
significantly to the regulatory work of the International Maritime Organisation 
with respect to maritime safety and environmental protection. Commercial 
airliners acting through the International Air Transport Association establish 
international fares at traffic conferences and contribute technical information to 
regulations formulated by the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
Firms and organised business groups limit participation to areas of interest and 
gravitate to those intergovernmental institutions with distinctly commercial 
mandates. Efforts are made to channel corporate contributions. The UN
335 Article 26(1), Statute of the International Law Commission.
336 UN, Making Better International Law: The International Law Commission at 50. New York, 
1998, 31, paras 22, 55, 94, 113-4, 116.
337 Eg UNGA Resolution 47/34 (1992) on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit 
Transfers.
338 Heller P.P., ‘International Regulation of Air Transport* (1973) 7(3) J  World Trade L 301.
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Office for Project Services held a conference in 2000 inviting the private sector 
‘to move beyond a commercial relationship with the UN and become a partner 
in reducing poverty, promoting environmentally sustainable growth and 
extending the benefits of globalization to the poorest countries’. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees considers that firms should voluntarily provide 
humanitarian assistance since market stability is a prerequisite for economic 
activity.339 The Office for the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs meets 
with the Business Humanitarian Forum and the ICC to match humanitarian 
needs with voluntary private sector contributions.340 Technical assistance 
includes commercial banks collecting donations, information technology firms 
generating refugee registration cards and financial institutions formulating 
‘catastrophe’ bonds in the event of natural disasters. Non-State entities 
concerned with disaster mitigation and humanitarian relief such as 
telecommunications firms have a right to provide assistance and requesting 
States are expected to afford the necessary operational privileges and 
immunities including removing regulatory barriers to the transfer of equipment 
and personnel.341
These numerous examples support several conclusions. First, corporate 
participation in many areas of the UN system has been occurring for a 
considerable period. Engagement may occur with individual firms although 
channeling commercial contributions through trade associations is more 
common. Second, each UN institution must be assessed on a case by case
339 Ogata S., UNHCR, ‘Can Business Help? Partnership and Responsibilities in Humanitarian 
Work’, Meeting of the Business Humanitarian Forum, Washington DC, 1999, 2.
340 UN Secretary-General, Message to the Business Humanitarian Forum, Geneva, 1999.
341 Arts 4(6), 9, 11, Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster 
Mitigation and Relief Operations (Tampere Convention) 1998.
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basis. The degree of participation varies with the mandate of the organisation 
and its historical development. The terms of participation typically 
contemplate observer status although occasionally it entails an advisory role 
and more rarely membership. Third, UN practice is highly fluid: a decision of 
the governing body initiates corporate participation and the precise details of 
that arrangement are then resolved by the relevant secretariat. That said, States 
retain formal control over decision-making and only in the ILO do employers 
organisations exercise the right to vote.
5.2. NGO Relations with International Economic Institutions.
Many of the international economic institutions by contrast do not extend 
privileges to NGOs to participate directly in their formal decision-making 
processes. This appears to be somewhat paradoxical, particularly for 
corporations, given the proximity of commercial objectives with their 
organisational mandates. For example, the General Council of the WTO may 
conclude appropriate arrangements of consultation and co-operation with 
NGOs concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.342 However, a 
broadly-held government view considers that NGOs cannot be directly 
involved in WTO activities and resort to national processes is preferable.343 
Such a view has been repeated by the WTO secretariat.344 Since it ‘has a 
limited mandate to deal with NGOs and has no right of initiative or
342 Art V(2), Agreement Establishing the WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results o f the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations Doc MTN/FA.
343WTO, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with NGOs, WTO Doc WT/L/162 (1996), 
paras 4, 6.
44 WTO, ‘The System Shields Governments from Narrow Interests’, 2001.
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independent decision-making powers’, there is no attempt made by firms to 
influence the conditions of their participation ‘at the level of the WTO 
Secretariat’.345 In 1996, the WTO affirmed that ‘closer consultation and 
cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively through appropriate 
processes at the national level where primary responsibility lies for taking into 
account the different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on 
trade policy-making.’346 This position reflects the perceived unfairness of 
well-resourced NGOs lobbying their national governments and again at the 
WTO. Governments also fear that the trade-offs inherent in trade negotiations 
for increasing global welfare will be difficult to secure if open to scrutiny by 
the particularized interests of inefficient industries opposed to removing 
protectionist barriers.347 Developing counties in particular resist any deeper 
NGO involvement whereas other States are prepared to enhance external
349transparency.
The International Trade Organisation similarly contemplated the conclusion of 
‘suitable arrangements for consultation and co-operation with NGOs 
concerned with matters within the scope of this Charter’. It was envisaged 
that NGOs, particularly business and industry associations, would be afforded
345 Mr Bernard Kuiten, Counsellor, External Relations Division, WTO Secretariat, Response to 
Questionnaire, 11 August 2004.
346 WTO, Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/40 
(1996).
347 Esty D.C., ‘NGOs at the WTO: Cooperation, Competition or Exclusion’ (1998) 1 J  Int 
Economic Law 123, 138-9.
348 ‘Developing Counties resist expansion of environment role for World Trade body’ (1999) 
22 Int Env Rep 225, 226.
349 Cp WTO, General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency, 
Communication from Hong Kong WTO Doc WT/GC/W/418 (2000); Informal Paper by 
Canada WTO Doc WT/GCAV/145 (2000); Submission from the US WTO Doc 
WT/GC/W/413/Rev. 1 (2000).
350 Article 87(2), Havana Charter of the International Trade Organisation.
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consultative status, entitled to observe annual conferences, given access to 
documentation, allowed to propose agenda items, invited to address specific 
meetings and permitted to establish an advisory committee.351
'I
Although the WTO may represent an evolutionary step backwards , many of 
these entitlements have been achieved incrementally. NGOs were permitted to 
‘attend’ rather than ‘observe’ plenary sessions of the 1996 Singapore
353Ministerial and an NGO Centre organized meetings and workshops. 
Companies and law firms were informed that to qualify for accreditation they 
had to register through their respective industry association or professional 
organisation.354 NGOs were regularly briefed by the secretariat on the 
progress of informal working sessions at the Geneva Ministerial. The 
preparatory process for the Seattle Ministerial included individual proposals 
for agenda items, access to unrestricted documents, a prior symposium on 
trade issues and daily briefings by the NGO Centre. The secretariat also 
received information which NGOs sought to make available to interested 
delegations, responded to information requests and provided issue-specific 
briefings. Corporations, industry associations and NGOs also attended 
symposia organized by the secretariat with respect to trade and the 
environment (1994, 1997 and 1999) and trade facilitation (1998). However, 
accredited NGOs are not permitted to observe the councils, committees and 
bodies which constitute the daily deliberations of the WTO. Although
351 Executive Committee of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organisation, 
Doc ICITO/EC.2/SC.3/5 (1948); Chamovitz S. & Wickham J., ‘NGOs and the Original 
International Trade Regime’ (1995) 29 J World Trade 111, 113.
352 Loy F., ‘Public participation in the WTO’, http://www.unu.edu/news/wto/ch06.pdf (2000).
353 WTO Doc WT/GC/M/13 (1996).
354 Marceau G. & Pedersen P.N., ‘Is the WTO Open and Transparent?’ (1999) 33(1) J  World 
Trade 5.
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expanding NGO activity increases the prospects for special interest 
manipulation, it is likely that national producer interests are already well- 
served.355 For example, the Australian government circulated two statements 
from international agricultural associations in support of its position. The 
ICC occasionally participated in GATT organs.357 In 1997 it requested official
I fQ
dialogue with the WTO. The Business Roundtable also proposed that the 
WTO convene an annual meeting of business and other NGOs to improve 
communication channels.359 The Director-General currently meets with civil 
society representatives for this purpose.
The instruments establishing the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not contain 
provisions permitting formal NGO participation within their decision-making 
processes. This original position has subsequently been modified over time, 
particularly during the 1990s at the urging of NGOs for greater decision­
making transparency. Although these intergovernmental organisations 
previously enjoyed close informal working relationships with, for example, 
financial institutions, corporations also stand to benefit from the inroads made 
by NGOs. Thus the IMF presently conducts annual consultations with 
academics, business and NGOs. Private individuals based in host States 
‘who believe that they or their interests have been or could be directly harmed
355 Chamovitz S., ‘Opening the WTO to Non-governmental Interests’ (2000) 24 Fordham ILJ 
173.
356 Communications from Australia WTO Doc WT/L/367 (2000) & WT/L/368 (2000).
357 Jackson J.H., World Trade and the Law of GATT. Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis 
1969,453, 457.
358 Barnard B., ‘Business Group wants special role in WTO’ (1997) J  Com Market 5, 3A.
359 The Business Roundtable, Preparing for New WTO Trade Negotiations to Boost the 
Economy, 1999, 3.
360 Chauhan S. & Gurtner B., ‘NGO Participation in Article IV Consultations of the IMF’ 
(1996) 9 Swiss Coalition News 2.
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by a project financed by the World Bank’ can make an application for 
inspection by the World Bank Inspection Panel to assess whether projects are 
being implemented consistently with the Bank’s operational policies. The 
NGO Working Group on the World Bank communicates NGO concerns to the 
secretariat through the NGO-World Bank Committee. NGO participation 
within the IMF is limited to consultations with States when formulating 
poverty reduction strategy papers or initiating IMF surveillance procedures.
Noteworthy at the regional level, the OECD may establish relations with and 
address communications to non-member States or organisations and invite 
them to participate in OECD activities upon such terms as the Council may 
determine.362 International NGOs may be consulted where they have wide 
responsibility in general economic matters or specific economic sectors, have 
affiliated bodies belonging to all or most of the Member States and 
substantially represent non-governmental interests in the field or sector in 
question.363 The consultative status enjoyed by the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory Committee enables them 
to follow the work of OECD committees, express oral views or submit 
memorandums and be consulted prior to Ministerial meetings.
361 See generally Shihata I., The World Bank Inspection Panel in Practice. Oxford University 
Press, Washington DC, 2000..
362 Art 12, Convention on the OECD.
363 OECD, Decision of the Council on Relations with International NGOs, OECD Doc 
C(62)45 (1962), para 2.
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5.3. The Character o f Corporate Relationships with the UN: Standard-setting, 
Programme Implementation and Public Procurement.
The ‘quieter side’ of UN activity is technical standard-setting to design the 
‘soft infrastructure’ of the global economy.364 The ICC considers that the 
UN’s function is to promote the conditions conducive to economic activity 
including developing technical and legal norms to facilitate cross-border 
exchange.365 It expressed its 'strong interest in multilateral co-operation, 
including standard-setting through the UN and other intergovernmental 
institutions'.366 Commercial participation is also observable in emergent fields 
such as electronic commerce. Attempts to influence regulatory development 
necessitates extending model laws, harmonising conflicting national law and
• • ,i / : oallocating risk and prospective liability between market participants. 
Similar efforts are undertaken by the Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee to the OECD.369 Jointly-developed products targeted at industry 
enable leading firms to influence market conditions. For example, the ICC 
and the International Council of Chemical Associations in conjunction with 
UNEP and the IOE under the auspices of the ILO have formulated proposals 
applicable to specific industries with respect to managing chemical
364 UN, Address by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the US Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington DC, Press Release SG/SM/7022, 1999, 1.
365 ICC, ‘World Business Message for the UN Millennium Assembly on the Role of the UN in 
the 21st Century’, Press Release, Paris, 2000.
366 UN, 'Joint Statement on Common Interests by UN Secretary-General and ICC', Press 
Release SG/2043 (1998).
367 UNGA Resolution 51/162 (1996) adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce.
368 ICC, General Usage for Internationally Digitally Ensured Commerce, Paris, 1997.
369 BIAC, The Global Action Plan for Electronic Commerce, Paris, 1998.
370 UNEP/ICC/Intemational Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), Environmental 
Management System Training Resource Kit.
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accidents.371 Such parallel lawmaking processes may give rise to cross­
pollination or competition between different fora but increase the prospects for 
commercially-orientated solutions. The ICC maintains routine communication 
channels with UN Agencies and coordinates business contributions to periodic 
intergovernmental meetings.
Firms or industry associations typically contribute resources and technical 
expertise to pilot projects under Agency auspices. 373 Private sector 
participation has ‘constantly increased’ over time for the UN Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation and changed ‘from a pure fund-raising 
rationale (‘we do-they fund’) towards a partnership rationale (‘they do-we / 
help’)’.374 It is ‘sound practice’ for UN bodies to resort to competent outside 
expertise in support of their mandated programmes when operational resources 
are not available in-house.375 Management consulting firms enjoy an action- 
orientated image, perceived impartiality and provide additional credibility to 
UN reform. For example, private consulting firms restructured peacekeeping 
programmes in 1992 possibly in preparation for employing private military 
companies in UN peace enforcement operations (see further Chapter Two). 
Management consulting arrangements transfer skills and knowledge and
371 UNEP Industry and Environment Programme, Awareness and Preparedness for 
Emergencies at the Local Level (APELL): A Process for Responding to Technological 
Accidents, Paris, 1988; ILO Convention 174 (1993), Recommendation 181 & the 1991 Code 
of Practice concerning the Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents.
372 ICC, ‘Working with the UN: Current Joint Projects with the UN and its Agencies’, Paris,
1999.
373 UN Department of Public Information (DPI), The UN and Business: New Dimensions in 
Cooperation: Case Studies from the UN System, New York, 1998.
374 Mr Philipp Muller-Wirth, Specialist for Cooperation with the Private Sector, Sector for 
External Relations and Cooperation, UNESCO, Response to Questionnaire, 9 August 2004.
375 Secretary-General Note, Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on policies and practices in the 
use of the services of private management consulting firms in the organisations of the UN 
system, UN Doc A/54/702 (1999), JIU/REP/99/7.
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produce the lowest technically acceptable offer by rotating firms and 
advertising bids internationally. The public procurement requirements of the 
UN are a lucrative market.376 However, the delegation of UN authority to 
privatized bodies or recruiting personnel from non-State sources for action 
under UN auspices raises concerns for their level of commitment, 
accountability in the event of misconduct and deterring prospective regulation: 
in an era where State intrusion into the marketplace is resisted, multinational 
intrusion will be more objectionable.
The UN has formulated guidelines, procedures and checklists when corporate 
contractors are employed.377 Although use of the UN name and emblem are 
ordinarily limited to official purposes, business entities can be authorised on a 
non-exclusive commercial basis.378 Bureaucratic procedures, duplication and 
Agency competition create delay, increase transaction costs and impede private 
sector engagement.379 Since firms profit from their association with the UN 
through improved name recognition or image, there is a need to avoid conflicts 
of interest and prevent unauthorized commercial agreements between UN staff
OOA , .
and companies. Furthermore, the immunity enjoyed by international
- l O I
organisations before national courts may preclude contractual enforcement. 
Conversely, control by that organisation does not make a contractor an
376 Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office, UN System: General Business Guide for 
Potential Suppliers of Goods and Services, New York, 2000.
377 Joint Inspection Unit report on outsourcing UN Doc A/52/338 (1997); Secretary-General’s 
Bulletin ST/SGB/177 (1992); Administrative Instruction ST/AI/327 (1985).
378 UNGA Resolution 92(1) (1946).
379 ECE, Committee for Trade, Industry and Enterprise Development, ECE Doc 
TRADE/1999/12.
380 UN Secretary-General, Report on the work of the organisation, UN Doc A/54/1 (2000), 
para 342; Investigation into allegations concerning an electronic commerce project at 
UNCTAD, UN Doc A/54/413 (2000).
381 Atkinson v Inter-American Development Bank 156 F 3d 1335 (DC Cir 1998).
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instrument thereof entitling it to derivative immunity.382 Subcontractors may 
be unable to access development assistance specifically intended for them 
when States have debts under public works contracts.383
Direct contractual dealings are one means of enticing voluntary corporate 
compliance with international legal standards.384 Corporations are rendered
lOf #
ineligible for business partnerships in certain circumstances. However, this 
is not true accountability since there is no declaration or other consequence of 
impermissible activity. The financial sector has committed itself to 
environmental protection. States, corporations and chambers of commerce 
may conclude similar arrangements with industry representatives appointed to 
steering committees.387 Such instruments become a platform from which firms 
may address national regulators.388 The execution of Agency programmes by 
the private sector necessitates novel partnership agreements and Memoranda of 
Understanding. These agreements may entitle business to be consulted by
OQQ
national authorities on proposed regulations or regulatory amendments.
382 IBRD v District o f Columbia 171 F 3d 687 (DC Cir 1999).
383 ForAfrique Burkinabe SA v Commission o f the EC [1993] 1 ECR 2161, paras 23-4.
384 ECOSOC Resolution 1991/55 Sec 2, para 2 (c)(i).
385 UN, Guidelines for Cooperation between the UN and the Business Community, 2000, 
Section 3.
386 UNEP, Statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable Development, 1992; 
UNEP, Statement by the Insurance Sector on the Environment and Sustainable Development, 
1995; UNEP, Statement of Environmental Commitment by the Insurance Industry, 1995.
387UNEP, International Cleaner Production Declaration & Draft Implementation Guidelines for 
Companies and Governments, Nairobi, 1998.
388 UNEP, Report of UNEP Advisory Group Meeting on Commercial Banks and the 
Environment, Geneva, 1995, 2.
389 World Customs Organisation (WCO)/ICC, The Co-operation Agreement between the WCO 
and the ICC to Promote and Support Efficiency in Customs Control and Facilitation, Hong 
Kong, 1996; ICC Position Paper, ICC International Customs Guidelines, ICC Doc 103/190, 
Paris, 1996.
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Commercial engagement also encourages greater inter-Agency co­
ordination.390
5.4. Efforts to Harmonise Secretariat Practice in its Operational Dealings with 
the Private Sector.
As observed above, international organisations may conclude arrangements of
co-operation and consultation with NGOs. Furthermore, UN secretariats
pursue a diverse range of practices in their operational dealings with NGOs.
NGOs enjoying consultative status may be represented as observers at
meetings of the governing body, executive committee or subsidiary bodies, to
make oral and written submissions and to participate in expert meetings and
technical conferences. NGO liaison officers, focal points or external affairs
officers have been appointed and civil society programmes or NGO advisory
committees established. Entry points have also been designated to facilitate
0^1corporate partnerships. Secretariats conclude memoranda of understanding 
and co-operation agreements as required, conduct annual consultations and 
communicate through websites. For example, the Financing for Development 
Office interacts ‘with a group of business interlocutors whom we have 
appointed (comprising major business associations from around the world) and 
liaise with them as to the appropriate business entity to invite to speak on a
390 FAO/ILO/OECD/UNEP/UNIDO/WHO, Memorandum of Understanding concerning the 
Establishment of the Inter-Organisation Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals 
3 4 ILM 1311 (1995).
391 UNDP’s Division for Business Partnerships; WHO’s Private Partnership Unit; UNESCO’s 
Programme for New Partnerships; the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s 
Private Sector/Capital Markets Unit.
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particular issue.’ Moreover, ‘[w]hom we invite to a particular meeting 
depends upon the issue being discussed in that meeting.’
There is no commonly accepted definition of ‘NGO’ and Specialised Agencies 
are left to identify organisations for cooperation. Accreditation applications 
typically require a description of the NGOs activities and its relevance to the 
work of the institution before being assessed in the first instance by the 
secretariat. Each of the Specialised Agencies has formulated their own 
guidelines for private sector interaction.394 This is also true of other 
intergovernmental agencies. For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
had to develop in-house guidelines for engagement with the private sector 
modeled upon instructions issued from the UN Secretary General. Although 
corporations had provided ad hoc funding or in-kind contributions for 
particular small-scale projects at the local field level, there was almost no 
private sector contact at headquarter level.395
There is an inevitable trend to formalize these informal practices 
notwithstanding that ‘formal relations are rarely a prerequisite for 
cooperation’.396 UNEP for example reviewed the procedural rules to allow for
392 Mr Krishnan Sharma, Designated Focal Point for Private Sector Engagement, Financing for 
Development Office, Response to Questionnaire, 23 September 2004.
393 UN Secretary-General, Working with NGOs: Operational Activities for Development of the 
UN system with NGOs and Governments at the Grass-Roots and National Levels, UN Doc 
A/49/122 (1994), para 15.
394 WHO Guidelines on interaction with commercial enterprises, 1999; FAO, Principles and 
Guidelines for FAO Cooperation with the Private Sector; UNESCO, Guidelines for Mobilising 
Private Funds and Criteria for Selecting Potential Partners, 1999.
395 Mrs Gillian Murray, Officer in Charge, Co-Financing Section, Public Affairs and Inter- 
Agency Branch, UN Office on Dmgs and Crime, Telephone Interview, 17 August 2004 (Notes 
held on file).
396 Secretary-General, Report on arrangements and practices for the interaction of NGOs in all 
activities of the UN system, UN Doc A/53/170 (1998), para 32.
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more active NGO participation in the nature of oral and written statements 
during debates.397 Several States consider that no single legal framework 
could serve as a model whereas others suggested that procedures should be 
standardized throughout the UN system.398 NGO interaction with secretariats 
and necessitated by operational requirements frequently exceeded in practice 
what was stipulated in the constituent instrument, enabling resolution or 
organisational rules of procedure. Considering that NGO participation could 
give rise to ‘significant distortions’ and undermine sovereign equality, several 
States believed that to preserve the intergovernmental character of the UN 
States should be able to call upon NGOs as and when necessary. NGOs 
argued that best practice in NGO access and participation should be formalized 
as minimum standards throughout the UN since the present informal practices 
only benefited well-established NGOs.399 Whether relations are centralized or 
decentralized, NGO insistence upon information disclosure enhances 
institutional transparency and accountability. States are prepared to allow 
participation but are determined to retain control. NGO participation is largely 
discretional and dependant upon issue area and prevailing political current. 
These irregularities ‘and the lack of coherent, across the board, guidelines are 
one of the leading causes of frustration among non-State actors seeking access 
to the processes of international environmental governance’. 400 Closer
397 UNEP Governing Council Decision SS.VII/5 (2001) on enhancing civil society engagement 
in the work of UNEP, UN Doc UNEP/GCSS.VII/6 (2001); UNEP Draft Strategy on 
Enhancing the Engagement of Civil Society in the work of UNEP, UN Doc 
UNEP/GCSS.VII/4/Add. 1 (2001).
398 Secretary-General Report, View of Member States, members of the Specialised Agencies, 
observers, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations from all regions on the 
report of the Secretary-General on arrangements and practices for the interaction of NGOs in 
all activities of the UN system, UN Doc A/54/329 (1999), paras 7, 13, 15-17.
399 Ibid, para 57.
400 UN University/Institute of Advanced Studies, International Sustainable Development 
Governance: The Question of Reform-Kev Issues and Proposals. Tokyo, 2002, 35.
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proximity to intergovernmental deliberations need not translate into 
substantive change, particularly where States seek to streamline NGO 
participation but retain the benefits of NGO experiences and views.401
Attempts have been made to formulate system-wide procedures and policies 
governing NGO relations 402 The overall picture ‘is one of concurring basic 
principles but somewhat diverging practices, in particular as regards the 
selection of partners, the recognition of contributions and the avoidance of 
conflicts of interests.’ 403 The private sector ‘has also become a fully-fledged 
participant in the international decision-making process in technical or 
scientific fields, such as telecommunications, while in others such as the 
environment, meteorological services or intellectual property, it is brought into 
consultations at an early stage.’ The Joint Inspection Unit
‘wish to underline, however, that sharing information and harmonizing 
policies and procedures should not necessarily lead to the adoption of 
one single set of standard guidelines for the whole UN system. In fact, 
many agencies caution that the diversity on their mandates and 
activities would probably not allow them to agree on anything but very 
general principles, and that excessively rigid procedures must be 
avoided at all costs. Others, however, stress the need for some 
common point of reference... ’
401 UN, UN System and Civil Society-An Inventory and Analysis of Practices, Background 
Paper for the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on UN Relations with Civil 
Society, 2003, 20-1.
402 Secretary-General Bulletin ST/SGB/209 (1984).
403 Secretary-General Note, Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on private sector involvement 
and cooperation with the UN System, UN Doc A/54/700 (2000), jfu/REP/99/6, paras 51, 62, 
86 .
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The Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) confirmed that ‘there 
is at present considerable diversity’ in respect of the regulations and practices 
that govern cooperation with the private sector.404 It recommended drafting 
guidelines ‘of a generic nature’ aiming to promote coherence and 
accompanying the ‘more specific internal guidance’ of each UN Agency. 
Furthermore, the ACC recommended that ‘suitable mechanisms for the sharing 
of information and best practices with regard to relations with the private 
sector should be established.. .to ensure consistency of policy and 
harmonization of relevant procedures throughout the UN system’.
Relationships between the UN and the private sector assume many different 
forms: policy dialogue (formal and informal participation in intergovernmental 
deliberations, standard-setting, governance), mobilizing philanthropic funds or 
investment capital, operational partnerships (project design, implementation 
and delivery with contributions of financial, in-kind, technical or managerial 
resources, staff secondment and training 405 ), country-level cooperation, 
advocacy (awareness raising, outreach, social marketing), information sharing 
and dissemination (joint research on technical and scientific issues) and public 
procurement. The private sector participates through consultative or observer 
status, participation in working groups, advisory bodies or committees, 
associate status with the Department of Public Information, accreditation for 
specific conferences and events and as members of national delegations.
404 UN, Comments by the Administrative Committee on Coordination on the report of the Joint 
Inspection Unit entitled ‘Private sector involvement and cooperation with the UN system’, UN 
Doc A/54/700/Add. 1 (2000), paras 5, 10, 14.
405 UNFPA, Partnership with Civil Society, Technical Report No 46, 1999.
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An additional determining factor is that private sector participation is topic- 
specific. Indeed, the selective interests of business are ‘possibly...the only 
limiting factor in their participation’ within the secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity:
‘The fairly limited contacts between the private sector and the 
secretariat seem to revolve around the following: (a) requesting 
information, in particular on policy trends; (b) requesting clarification 
on decisions already taken; (c) attempting to participate in 
policymaking; (d) attempting to avoid decisions that may have adverse 
impacts on the operations of the private sector.’406
The Secretary-General concluded that ‘the diversity of relationships between 
the UN and non-State actors is such that it is not possible to adopt a ‘one-size- 
fits-all’ institutional approach for dealing with all types of cooperation at all 
levels of the system.’407 Similarly, there is ‘no single model for successful 
partnerships’ between the UN and non-State actors and there has ‘of necessity, 
been much experimentation leading to different experiences, both good and 
bad’.408 Corporations partner UN Agencies for build images, safeguard long­
term investments, construct future markets, improve supplier quality and 
contribute to stable and predictable business environments. Diversity reflects
406 Mr Arthur Nogueira, Principal Officer, Implementation and Outreach Programme, CBD 
Secretariat, Response to Questionnaire, 30 August 2004.
407 UN Secretary-General, Cooperation between the UN and all relevant partners, in particular 
the private sector, UN Doc A/56/323 (2001), paras 8, 19, 45, 116.
408 UN Secretary-General, Enhanced cooperation between the UN and all relevant partners, in 
particular the private sector, UN Doc A/58/227 (2003), paras 64-5.
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the different mandates and modus operandi of UN entities, the varied scope 
and nature of issues to be addressed, the unique themes of intergovernmental 
events, the diversity of non-State actors and finally the different impacts, 
challenges and contributions made by different business enterprises.
States recognize the potential benefits of private sector cooperation including a 
richer and more informed policy debate (enhanced quality of decision-making, 
joint problem solving, greater operational efficiency). Corporations are 
attracted to new market opportunities, reputation and image enhancement, 
better risk management, access to development expertise and better 
government links. However, the strategic risks and challenges include 
reputational risk, conflicts of interest, implied endorsement, over-expectations, 
over-reliance upon Northern multinationals, operational failure and 
prohibitively high transaction costs. Proposals to regulate NGO participation 
become appealing.409 The challenge is to maintain UN independence, 
impartiality and integrity and preserve the flexibility to encourage successful 
innovation without undermining attempts at international regulation. These 
factors suggest the necessity for basic common operational procedures and 
modalities which are adaptable to specific needs and situations. The 
Guidelines for Cooperation between the UN and the Business Community 
finalized in 2000 constitutes the basic framework and seeks to replicate good 
practice throughout the UN system.
409 Sybesma-Knol N., Non-State Actors in International Organisations: An Attempt at 
Classification. SIM Special 19, Utrecht, undated, 43.
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5.5 Observations on the UN’s relationships with the Private Sector.
The UN’s confrontational relationship with corporations has evolved into one 
of collaboration. Mutating intergovernmental attitudes are evident from the 
change within UN parlance from ‘transnational corporation’ through to 
‘business and industry’ as one of the ‘major’ groups and currently ‘the private 
sector’. Although corporate participation has formally developed in parallel 
with the UN’s uneasy relationship with other NGOs, significant differences 
exist, not least of which are attempts to regulate commercial behaviour during 
the 1970’s. Intergovernmental processes benefit from management practice, 
good governance, capacity-building, novel legal agreements and improved 
programme implementation but encounters greater institutional competition. 
Private sector collaboration with intergovernmental organisations also has 
limits: administrative bureaucracy, political decision-making, corruption, lack 
of resources and a reluctance to relinquish resort to diplomatic protection from 
home States. Pigeonholing particular aspects of commercial behaviour -  for 
example, institutionalizing concern for workers rights within the ILO -  
fragments any focus upon corporate accountability between several institutions 
and arguably makes prospective regulation less likely and weaker. Bilateral 
relationships between States and corporations remain important. National law 
influences corporate behaviour not least because it governs the question of 
incorporation and recognition of the corporate form. The bilateralism which 
has historically characterized corporate-State relationships is by no means 
displaced by the multilateralism of the twentieth century.
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The private sector has always been committed to economic development and 
trade. States benefit from commercial perspectives on increasing the level and 
quality of foreign direct investment and raising business awareness of 
commercial opportunities. As evidenced through international instruments, 
attempts to regulate (the Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations) 
have been substituted by inclusion in policy formation and implementation 
(Agenda 21) rising to the level of partnership and heralding novel forms of 
governance (the Global Compact). Attempts to regulate illegal cross-border 
activity (illicit diamonds, arms or drugs trafficking, people smuggling, trade in 
endangered species) will prompt calls by legitimate commercial operators for 
prior consultation. To preserve their ostensible regulatory authority Member 
States control the terms of participation and reserve final decision-making, 
even if exercising the right to vote may be perfunctory. Multilateral attempts 
to deter undesirable business practices by resorting to ‘soft’ legal instruments 
(Chapter Two) or treaties (Chapter Three) are a significant feature of 
commercial relations with the UN and further evidence international 
lawmaking by States in response to corporate conduct.
Conclusions
The ‘critical weakness of the received historiography’ of international law is 
that it is written from a Statist perspective: corporations are mere instruments 
of mercantilism within a ‘terrain of political and ideological struggle’.410 As 
much as the act of State doctrine for example masks underlying commercial
410 Rajagopal B., International Law from Below: Development. Social Movements and Third 
World Resistance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, 89, 187, 295.
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interventions411, corporate activity manifests the flavour of Western-dominated 
capitalist ideology which currently characterizes international law. A ‘history 
from below’ considers that invisible and autonomous non-State actors have 
important roles (for example, in exploiting the Third World under colonialism 
and shaping the applicable international legal regime) which have the effect of 
shaping the normative framework (concerning sovereignty and property). 
Although the contemporary phenomenon of globalization accentuates the 
corporate role, commercial activity at the global level (however institutionally 
manifested) has always been a pervasive feature of the international legal order. 
However, the mutating character and function of commercial enterprises and 
their relationship with existing political authority of the period make it 
quantitatively difficult to assess whether corporate participation within the 
international legal order has increased since time immemorial. Of the 100 
largest economic entities, 51 are presently corporations of which the largest 
overshadow all but a dozen States 412 Contemporary corporate behaviour is a 
continuation of historical practices: the chartered trading model of firms 
actively extending national political interests or the neo-medievalism413 of 
corporate side-events at diplomatic conferences. Increasing participation of 
corporations in the modem sense of that term was marked at national levels 
with the freedom to incorporate conferred by States.
411 Eg Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabatino 376 US 398 (1964)
4,2 Miller A.S., The Modem Corporate State: private governments and the American 
constitution. Greenwood Press, London, 1976, 233.
413 Kobrin S.J., ‘Back to the future: neomedievalism and the postmodern digital world 
economy’ in Prakash A. & Hart J.A. (Eds), Globalisation and Governance. Routledge, London, 
1999,165, 168.
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Several qualitative changes merit observation. First, commercial activity now 
serves multiple national economic constituencies such that novel structural 
forms and strategic alliances detach corporations from any one nation State 
(‘stateless’). International trade is largely confined to three regional groupings 
(ASEAN, NAFTA and the EC) and one third of crossborder trade consists of 
inter-corporate exchange.414 Second, corporate consolidation is mirrored in the 
public sphere inasmuch as intergovernmental organisations concentrate 
international policymakers. Business has long contributed to international 
lawmaking as a consequence of tensions and conflicts with other actors 
including employees, commercial rivals and States. Formal business input into 
international policy-making in the absence of any counter ideology is now 
conveniently channeled through trade organisations and the ICC who espouse 
commercial perspectives independent of national considerations. Emergent 
models of transgovemmental regulatory cooperation involving professional 
networks with a minimum of legal and institutional infrastructure do not 
preclude private actors from a ‘vast array of opportunities for participation in 
rule-making’. 415 Third, corporate participation within the contemporary 
international legal order has stepped backwards and become more focused, 
particularly in comparison to the wide-ranging administrative powers exercised 
by chartered trading companies. The unique tripartite structure of the ILO 
predates the UN, policymaking arenas are now fragmented and highly 
specialized, accreditation hurdles are increasingly detailed and terms of 
participation strictly curtailed. Constitutional instruments envisage observer
414 UNCTAD, World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations. Market Structure and 
Competition Policy. Geneva, 1997, 18.
415 Slaughter A.-M., ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’ in Byers 
M., The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and 
International Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 177, 180.
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status only and secretariats retain considerable discretion as to whom and how 
they conclude arrangements of consultation and co-operation. Only rarely are 
firms the direct addressees of resolutions from intergovernmental 
organisations.416 Notwithstanding the plethora of non-State actors and their 
diverse activities, the reign of the transformative State continues.
416 Eg Art 4, EC Decision 83/671 concerning a Proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(1983) OJECL316, 30.
Chapter Two
Corporate Contributions to Customary International Law 
And ‘Soft’ International Law
This Chapter identifies commercial contributions to the formation, 
implementation and enforcement of customary international law and ‘soft’ 
international law. Part One re-visits the norm generation process and examines 
the State practice which is classically constitutive of custom. Non-State actors 
also undertake normative interpretation which influences the subsequent 
implementation of custom. States raise or lower regulatory standards at 
corporate insistence and transborder commercial operations horizontally 
transmit standards between States. Corporations can reaffirm and strengthen 
normative rules, accrete details to rules applicable to States, affirm national 
lawmaking, enable persistently-objecting States to resist the application of 
customary rules and potentially overturn normative constraints which ensure 
international legal stability. These arguments will be illustrated with reference 
to the good faith implementation of agreements, non-intervention within the 
internal affairs of States, implementing human rights, apartheid and the 
prohibition on the use of force.
Part Two considers ‘soft’ legal instruments in the nature of guidelines, 
declarations and codes of conduct. Such instruments may be 
intergovernmental, national, industry-specific, firm-specific or issue-specific 
and can be differentiated by reference to their author, addressee, purpose, 
content, mechanism for implementation and verification process. Corporate
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participation in the formulation, implementation and interpretation of 
intergovernmental codes may be formalised whereas corporate standard-setting 
activity and other voluntary initiatives may occur independently of States. 
This Part also considers the position of corporate voluntary initiatives under 
international law. Finally, the case study of the Energy and Biodiversity 
Initiative explains corporate perceptions when engaged in creative processes 
targeted towards States and other firms. The Chapter affirms the regulatory 
role of States: corporations exaggerate the economic elements of State practice 
to indirectly contribute to customary law and States remain indispensable 
actors for ensuring the universal effectiveness of ‘soft’ international legal 
instruments.
1. The Corporate Role in Customary International Law.
Customary international law is classically defined as ‘evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law’.417 State practice must be 'extensive and virtually
• ,  ,  418uniform1 and accompanied by the requisite opinio juris. Of the two, State 
practice is relatively more important.419 Custom develops through iterative 
processes of claim and counterclaim. It is also constructed upon patterns of 
continual behaviour which engender legitimate expectations of continued 
adherence. Conduct as a source of legal obligation is not monopolised by 
States. Constant trade usage creates principles of law opposable against
417 Art 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice.
418 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic o f Germany v Denmark, Netherlands) 
(1969) ICJ Rep 3, para 74.
419 International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of 
Customary (Generali International Law. London, 2000, 32-4. Per contra Nicaragua supra n\2, 
para 183.
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commercial actors (lex mercatoria).420 Although transactions with other actors 
are ordinarily governed by contract, the influence of normative rules guiding 
operational behaviour at the boundaries of the firm is evident for corporate 
law.421 The impact of non-State actors upon customary international law 
remains relatively ‘undertheorized’.422 This Part considers the corporate role 
in generating, implementing and potentially overturning customary law rules.
1.1 Normative Creation
Non-State actor participation is legally irrelevant for discerning customary 
legal rules. Classical analysis of the formation of custom confines itself to one 
aspect of corporate-govemment interaction (for example, State practice 
concerning ‘internationalised’ contracts) or to intergovernmental relationships 
(asserting diplomatic protection on behalf of an injured national firm). The 
essential factual prerequisites which prompt governmental responses in the 
public sphere - the other contractual party or the corporate decision to exhaust 
effective local remedies -  are left aside. For example, the norms generated 
from investment contracts are not opposable against other non-party States.423 
Only where private activity is imputable to States does commercial activity 
formally ‘count’ towards the formation of international custom. Hence, NGO 
interpretations of international law to initiate consumer boycotts and effect 
changes in corporate policy are irrelevant for the formation of custom,
420 Goode R., ‘Usage and its Reception in International Commercial Arbitration (1997) 46 
ICLQ 1.
421 Rock E. & Wachter M., ‘Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-governing 
Corporation’ (2001) 149 U Pa L Rev 1619.
422 Roberts A.E., ‘Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation’ (2001) 95(4) AJIL 757, 775.
423 Aminoil (Kuwait v American Independent Oil Co) (1982) 21 ILM 976, para 157.
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particularly when the views of States have been sidelined.424 Similarly, States 
may become inert when, for example, caught in the cross-fire of competing 
commercial interests represented by whalers and tourism operators.425 Finally, 
it has been argued that custom as an international legal source is less 
influential in a contemporary world characterised by networks of bilateral 
investment treaties and self-organising commercial exchange.426
In short, State practice is proactive and reactive. Firms induce the desired 
governmental behaviour by offering investment and threatening industrial 
migration. Consistent or diverse corporate behaviour influences the degree of 
‘extensive and virtually uniform’ State practice and accelerates or obstructs the 
evolution of custom. As independent actors impacting upon intergovernmental 
relationships in a disparate manner, the corporate catalyst clouds the 
development of custom. Commercial activity which provokes inconsistent 
State practice renders more difficult identifying the precise content of 
customary rules whereas the continuous and harmonious practice of both helps 
to shape pertinent legal norms. On the other hand, such sporadic and 
idiosyncratic interactions may preclude precedents of sufficient stability and 
comparability from emerging.427
The historical account of the formation of custom is therefore incomplete. The 
advocacy activities of non-State actors ‘set in motion’ processes which may
424 Jordan G., ‘Indirect Causes and Effects in Policy Change: The Brent Spar Case’ (1998) 76 
Public Administration 713, 624, 627.
425 International Fund for Animal Welfare, ‘Iceland Private Business Group Votes Against 
Whaling’, Press Release, 2003.
426 Kelly, J. P., 'The twilight of customary international law’ (2000) 40(2) Virginia JIL 449.
427 Vagts D.F., 'The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law' (1970) 
83 H arvLR  739, 743-4.
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ripen into conventions and their views cannot be ‘completely discounted’ when
A f)Qidentifying the requisite governmental intent. Non-State actors indirectly 
affect the development of custom by lobbying for particular State behaviour, 
contributing drafts to treaties or resolutions, articulating emerging norms and 
monitoring State compliance.429 Consequently, WTO rules for example 
‘reflect an agenda that serves only to promote dominant corporatist interests 
that already monopolise the arena of international trade’.430 Alternatively, 
corporate lobbying combined with technical legal critiques contributed to the 
demise of proposed labour standards.431 Corporations are part of the chain of 
causation creating the evidentiary material cited in support of customary legal 
rules. National (and indeed international) judicial decisions resolve private 
disputes, legislation may be introduced, amended or repealed at corporate 
insistence and government statements drafted by firms. The formation of 
custom is deliberative rather than spontaneous: States consult commercial 
opinion before undertaking mining or fishing on the continental shelf, which 
itself generates practice. State practice is also reflected by omission, 
particularly governmental failure to correct non-compliance by private actors 
within areas under its jurisdiction or control.
Continued exclusion is justified by reference to the difficulty of identifying 
authoritative actors and the prospect of generating weaker norms. Resistance
428 International Court of Justice, The Arrest Warrant o f  11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic 
o f the Congo v Belgium), 2002, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, para 27.
429 Nowrot K., ‘Legal Consequences of Globalisation: The Status of Non-Governmental 
Organisations under International Law’ (1999) 6 Ind. J  Global Legal Stud 579, 595.
430 UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), The Realisation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/l 3, para 14.
431 DeVos T., Multinational Corporations in Democratic Host Countries: US Multinationals 
and the Vredeling Proposal. Dartmouth Publishing Co, Hants, 1989.
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by non-State actors could equally weaken the international legal order.432 It 
has therefore been suggested that non-State actors be permitted a direct role in 
the formation of custom 433 Such a proposal must be accompanied by proper 
accountability.434 However, a positivist conception of international law cannot 
hold corporations to peremptory norms accepted and recognised by a 
community of States. On the other hand, national legal prohibitions can be 
easily circumvented.435 Corporations will respond within this regulatory space 
without being formally bound. Legal prohibitions create profitable ‘black’ 
markets for less reputable, more expensive and less efficient commercial 
operators willing to incur greater risk. Other firms will seek to enforce that 
prohibition and remove sources of unfair competition unavailable to them. For 
example, in the view of States and firms, particularly in the ILO context, 
slavery, slavery-like practices and forced labour are impermissible. 436 
National courts have sought to apply the prohibition against slavery against 
firms pursuant to custom.437 Treaties also seek to prohibit trafficking in
A^ a ( #
persons. Piracy, the crime par excellence under custom for which there is 
universal jurisdiction, similarly constitutes a threat to commercial security. To 
preserve their market position firms engage in enforcement activity439, thereby
432 Chamey J.I.., ‘Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law’ 
(1983) Duke U  748, 749.
433 Gunning I.R., ‘Modernising Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human 
Rights’ (1991)31 Va JInt 7 L 211, 227-34.
434 Spiro P.J., ‘New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organisations and the ‘Unregulated’ 
Marketplace’ (1996) 18 Cardozo LR 957, 962-7.
435 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in the Pharmaceutical Industry of Developing 
Countries. Geneva, 1984, 31, 33.
436 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery 226 UNTS 3 (1957); ILO Convention No 105 concerning the 
Abolition of Forced Labour 1957.
437 Burger-Fischer v Degussa AG 65 F Supp 2d 248, 255, 285 (DNJ 1999).
438 Eg 2001 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children & Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, 
both supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
UN Doc A/45/49 (Vol I) (2001).
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their market position firms engage in enforcement activity 439 , thereby 
strengthening customary norms.
1.1.1. Normative Affirmation: Principles o f Contracting.
Several customary norms are applicable to and by corporations and States 
without controversy. For example, the legally binding force of freely- 
concluded agreements and the privity thereof applies to contracts and 
treaties.440 Equally noteworthy is the obligation of good faith for their 
negotiation and subsequent implementation.441 Private associations are also 
free to propose general principles of law.442 Corporations nominate or draw 
upon ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ as a source of 
legal obligation and to resolve contractual disputes.443 Since those principles 
are predominantly drawn from the national legal systems of industrialised 
States, they may be inherently biased towards commercial concerns and are 
therefore likely to be favoured by companies.
439 Andean Regional Contractor Accountability Act HR 1591 (US 2001).
440 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co & California Asiatic Oil Co v Libva 17 ILM 1 (1978) para 
51; An zo, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n61.
441 Eg The Lena Goldfields Arbitration (1929-30) Annual Digest o f Public IntL Cases 258.
442 Simma B. & Alston P., ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and 
General Principles’ (1992) 12 AYBIL 82, 104.
443 Eg Abu Dhabi Arbitration (1952) 1 ICLQ 247.
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1.1.2. Accretions to Existing Rules o f Custom: Corporate Non-intervention in 
the Internal Affairs o f States.
Non-State actors add detail to the content of custom through their behaviour.444 
Transnational corporations act as a bridge between consumer and producer 
States 445 For example, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States is a 
rule applicable to States and firms.446 The significant corporate role in the 
economic development of host States is equated with undue political influence. 
Corporate political activity may be incidental to democratic participation. 
Their freedom of speech encompasses expenditure on and participation within 
political referendums.447 However, the improper use of corporate funds may 
extend to illegal political campaign contributions.448 Taxation revenue can 
perpetuate the dominance of the existing political elite and grant them 
economic legitimacy. Large-scale development projects can also create 
conditions for internal displacement.449 Commercial interests coincide with 
the host State interest in suppressing politically organised labour. The 
inefficiency associated with being sheltered from competition and conflicts of 
interest are the costs for longer term market security. On the other hand, local 
commercial alliances improve the position of particular social groups,
444 Mertus J., ‘Considering Non-State Actors in the New Millennium: Toward Expanded 
Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application’ (2000) 32(2) New York U niJInt’l L 
& Pol 537, 545, 554, 562.
445 US, Final Report: An Evaluation of the Options of the US Government in its Relationship 
to US Firms in International Petroleum Affairs 14ILM 1037, 1039 (1975).
446 Art 2(7) UN Charter; UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN Doc 
E/1990/94, paras 16, 17. See eg ITT’s actions in Chile or United Fruit’s activities in 
Guatemala: Schlesinger S. & Kinzer S., Bitter Fmit: The Untold Story of the American Coup 
in Guatemala. Doubleday, New York, 1982.
447 First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti 435 US 765 (1978).
448 SEC v Dresser Indus Inc 628 F.2d 1368 (DC Cir 1979).
449 Human Rights Commission, Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, 
Addendum to Report of Mr Francis M. Deng, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add 2, Principles 2, 5, 6,25.
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redistribute economic power and stimulate political change.450 Indeed, 
corporations are tempted to contract with rebel groups enjoying effective 
territorial control.451
Home States may employ the less-overt corporate vehicle as an instrument to 
avoid normative prohibitions applicable to them.452 Firms become conduits for 
their home States’s foreign policy objectives. Unilateral legislation may 
contemplate subsidiaries acting in violation of foreign national law.453 Such a 
measure has been used to promote human rights.454 The exercise of competing 
territorial jurisdiction over parent and subsidiary firms accordingly gives rise 
to political disputes between home and host States.455 On the one hand, 
corporations should not engage in practices within host States which are 
contrary to the standards of the home State. On the other, foreign direct 
investment should not be fettered by the extraterritorial application of national 
law. Failing to regulate multinational activity is equated with tacit support 
given the assumed control of home States over parent enterprises. 
Corporations call for constructive engagement and further economic
450 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-examination. New York, 
1978, 75-6.
451 Ontario Ltd v Crispus Kiyonga & Ors (1992) 11 Kampala LR 14, 20-21.
452 Eg Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (the 'Helms-Burton Act') 35 
ILM 357(1996).
453 USCIB, Letter to Congress: China Human Rights and Democracy Act 1997 and Codes of 
Conduct, New York, 1997; Prohibition Against Foreign Assistance to Gross Violators o f  
Human Rights 22 USC 2151 (1990).
454 Orentlicher D. & Gelatt T., ‘Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on 
Business Investors in China’ (1992) 14 N W JInt’lL  & Bus 66.
455 Fruehauf Corporation v Massardy 5 ILM Alb (1966).
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integration when their opinions are solicited by home States when formulating 
foreign policy.456
Within this milieu NGOs call upon firms to effect the necessary change or 
voluntarily divest.457 Unilateral economic disengagement may weaken an 
authoritarian regime and encourage a transition to democratic rule or produce a 
siege mentality for a self-sufficient government with resulting detriment to the 
local population. Products can still reach prohibited markets via intermediaries 
with resulting detriment to corporate reputations. Relinquishing the benefits of 
long term investment activity also entails anti-competitive consequences with 
takeover opportunities for local businesses.
1.2 The Implementation and Application o f Customary Norms
The interpretation of international normative standards by corporations is 
evidenced through implementation. The UN Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations considered in Chapter One presumed that well- 
accepted intergovernmental norms may be applied by firms as good business 
practice. However, such norms are not applied in an identical manner by firms 
given the influence of market forces. Furthermore, States tailor international 
law to local conditions before firms in turn apply such standards through a 
pragmatic economic prism. Within unregulated space where State power is 
weak or non-existent, corporations outsource in the interests of productive
456 Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada’s 
Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future. Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 
Ottawa, 1994, 6.
457 Amnesty International/Pax Christi, Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights. Utrecht, 
1998, 53.
157
efficiency and allocate resources through price. Non-legal factors become 
determinative where norms compete for application.458 Some norms are 
rendered relatively more significant whereas others experience a diluted 
application.459 These processes largely escape the attention of international 
law. Transnational administrative processes such as the activities of customs 
officers similarly fail to register as far as implementation is concerned.460
1.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment as an Inducement to National Standard- 
setting.
Corporations exert pressure upon State practice at the point of entry and exit. 
Competition for and dependency upon foreign direct investment promotes a 
‘race to the top’ or ‘bottom’ in regulatory standards. The former hypothesizes 
that higher national standards are a source of competitive advantage within the 
international marketplace in terms of technological innovation, efficiency and 
consumer demand. The latter hypothesizes that less-innovative businesses 
threaten industrial migration and scout for cheaper factors of production. 
Capital mobility enables transnational firms to escape the ‘burden’ of 
unilaterally-imposed higher national standards. Host States are reluctant to 
assert their right to regulate on account of their weak bargaining position when 
firms nominate particular conditions as investment prerequisites.461 Direct
458 Lowe V., ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation 
Changing’ in Byers M., The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International 
Relations and International Law. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, 207, 219, 225.
459 Weil P., ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77(3) AJIL 413, 415.
460 Sand P.H., ‘Commodity or Taboo? International Regulation of Trade in Endangered 
Species’ in Bergesen H.O. & Parmann G. (Eds), Green Globe Yearbook. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1997.
461 UNHRC, The realisation of economic, social and cultural rights: the relationship between 
the enjoyment of human rights, in particular, international labour and trade union rights, and
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corporate lobbying for less stringent regulation generates downwards pressure 
upon labour, consumer and/or environmental standards. Hence, ‘by playing 
governments off against one another in efforts to receive the most 
advantageous investment package, TNC’s intentionally weaken the capacity of 
governments to promote social welfare’.462 On the other hand, denying 
international standards within export processing zones is a source of mutual 
commercial benefit in terms of employment and revenue.463
The empirical evidence supporting a ‘race to the top’ or ‘bottom’ is equivocal. 
It is unclear whether corporations either actively seek States with less stringent 
regulations or merely adjust existing production standards downwards in light 
of host State conditions.464 It has been observed that corporations regularly 
employ lower environmental standards within developing countries relative to 
operations within developed States.465 Following the adoption of NAFTA, US 
employers reputedly staved off demands for higher wages by indicating the 
possibility of moving production offshore.466 States claim to have introduced 
lower labour standards in response to corporate demands.467 As was evident in 
the case of South African apartheid considered further below, it is difficult to
the working methods and activities of transnational corporations, Background document 
prepared by the Secretary General, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/11, paras 53, 102,108.
462 Kolodner E., Transnational Corporations: Impediments or Catalysts of Social 
Development?, Occasional Paper 5, UNRISD, 1994, 22.
463 ILO, Labour and Social Issues Relating to Export Processing Zones. Geneva, 1998; 
ILO/UNCTC, Economic and Social Effects of Multinational Enterprises in Export Processing 
Zones. Geneva, 1988.
464 UNCTC, Climate Change and Transnational Corporations: Analysis and Trends. New York, 
UN Doc ST/CTC/112, 1992, 26.
465 UNCTC/ESCAP, Environmental Aspects of Transnational Corporation Activities in 
Pollution-Intensive Industries in Selected Asian and Pacific Developing Countries. Ser B No 
15, New York, 1990,61.
466 UN, World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Globalisation. Gender and 
Work. New York. 1999, 15-6.
467 ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, Third Report, Pt 4A, International Labour Conference, 76th Sess, Geneva, 
1989, 209.
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prevent firm exploiting lower standards and in extremis dislodging them at the 
point of exit (divesting) from States. However, a systematic relationship
AfLQ
between labour standards and competitive advantage is not yet established. 
Profit is alternatively derived from downplayed labour rights or higher 
productivity through worker participation.469 Long term commercial profit 
depends upon increasing productivity through technology, developing skills 
and education.470
States are responsible for regulatory laxity as much as corporations for 
fostering substandard practices. The degree of State discretion can be reduced 
by increasing decision-making transparency. 471 Universally applicable 
standards and a level playing field for firms are ensured by a minimum 
regulatory floor established by States. However, it is uncertain whether inter­
state regulatory competition or harmonised national approaches produce the 
optimal outcome 472 It has been suggested that non-homogeneity is desirable 
irrespective of the subject-matter.473 Corporations may be indifferent to 
divergent national legal systems provided the outcome matches their 
investment preferences.474 Environmental regulation tends to be ratcheted
468 Martin W. & Maskus K.E., Core Labour Standards and Competitiveness: Implications for 
Global Trade Policy. IBRD, Geneva, 1999.
469 Johnson J.L., ‘Public-Private-Public Convergence: How the Private Actor can shape Public 
International Labour Standards’ (1998) 24(1) Brook J In t’l Z, 291, 338.
470 OECD, Trade. Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Worker's Rights and 
International Trade. Paris, 1996.
471 Oman C.P., Policy Competition and Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition 
Among Governments to Attract FDI. OECD, Paris, 1999, 5-6.
472 Esty D.D.G., ‘Regulatory Co-opetition’ (2000) 3(2) JInt Eco Law 235.
473 Sykes A., ‘Regulatory competition or regulatory harmonisation? A silly question?’ (2000) 
3(2) JInt Eco Law 257.
474 Perry A.J., ‘Multinational enterprises, international economic organisations and 
convergence among legal systems’ (2002) 2 Non-State Actors and IntL 23, 39.
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upwards whereas labour standards tend to move downward.475 Conventions 
may also expressly deter States from relaxing national health or safety or 
standards.476 Although the jury is undecided on the precise processes at work, 
corporate mobility has a discemable influence upon the national regulatory 
autonomy of States.
1.2.2 Corporations as Conduits for National Standards.
Corporations are also horizontal conduits for the standards of one State into the 
territory of another. The legislative role of host States is conceivably 
diminished. Having echoes of colonial imperialism, corporations become 
transmission agents alleged to impose home State values upon their multiple 
hosts notwithstanding the primacy of local law. Multinational firms create a 
‘spillover’ of best commercial practice into local firms.477 More favourable 
working conditions are then concretised by States as national standards. 
Multinational firms internalise legal and economic values as corporate policy 
at headquarters, utilise homogenous production, distribution and marketing 
techniques and efficiently operationalise standard management practice
47  ftthroughout the corporate network.
475 Braithwaite J. & Drahos P., Global Business Regulation. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000, 522.
476 Art 1114, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993) 3 2 ILM 605.
477 USCIB, Co-operative Efforts of the US and Mexican Business Communities to Address 
Labour and Environment Issues in the NAFTA, New York, 1992.
478 Sauvant K.P., 'The Potential of Multinational Enterprises as Vehicles for the Transmission 
of Business Culture' in Sauvant K.P & Lavipour F.G., (Eds), Controlling Multinational 
Enterprises: Problems. Strategies. Counterstrategies. Westview Press, Boulder, 1976.
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Subcontracting eliminates the potential for such spillover effects. Furthermore, 
corporations economically value differing regulatory conditions shielded by 
State responsibility for establishing the socio-economic agenda. Transnational 
corporations suffer a local (and possibly international) competitive 
disadvantage where they voluntarily exceed standards practised by their 
competitors. Transnational firms enjoy national treatment in addition to the 
privilege of appealing to international law for investment protection 
opportunities unavailable to local enterprises. Whereas States owe a minimum 
standard of treatment to firms, corporations do not owe a legal duty to respect 
international standards wherever they operate. For example, 
intergovernmental effort to transfer technology to developing States includes 
resort to codes of conduct.479 The best available technology becomes the 
industry norm sought to be replicated by rivals. However, corporations argue 
that they are not established for the purpose of transferring production 
techniques or skills between States.480 They recoup their investment cost by 
demanding appropriate intellectual property protection. Hence, pharmaceutical
AS 1companies tend not to invest in States with weak legal regimes. That said, 
the regulatory environment is just one factor for investment siting decision­
making and competitiveness, efficiency and access to the means of production
AO*)
are equally influential. In sum, the commercial practices of transnational 
corporations respond to the national legal standards of home States and may or
479 UN, Seminar on the Mobilisation of the Private Sector in Order to Encourage Foreign 
Investment in Information Technology towards Developing Countries, New York, 2000; 
UNCTAD, Draft Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology UN Doc TD/CodeTOT/25 
(1980).
480 ICC, The International Corporation and the Transfer of Technology, Paris, 1972, 5.
481 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, Intellectual 
Property: Patents and Pharmaceuticals, Geneva, 1997, 3.
482 Rao P.M., ‘Intellectual Property Protection and Foreign Direct Investment: A Global 
Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective’ in Rao C.P., Globalization. Privatization and Free 
Market Economy. Quorum Books, Connecticut, 1998, 232, 243.
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may not (as adjudged by them) influence commercial operations employed by 
subsidiaries within host States. This could in turn prompt a regulatory reaction 
from host States, encouraging either a harmonisation of national standards or 
opportunities for exploitation through regulatory diversity.
1.2.3. The Corporate Role in Implementing Human Rights and the Regulatory 
Responsibilities o f States.
Human rights are classically treaty-based sources of law for States requiring 
national implementation before obligations arise for non-State actors. The 
manner by which corporations implement human rights raises a series of 
relevant questions. What are the regulatory consequences for States where 
corporations implement human rights standards in their transborder operations 
on account of economically-efficient labour relationships or standardised 
management practices ? Are the processes of treaty ratification and national 
lawmaking obviated ? Would commercial practices as a feature of national 
conditions further entrench human rights standards into custom binding upon 
States ‘from below’ and reciprocally justify the application of customary 
human rights norms upon firms ? Does the notion of corporate voluntariness 
equate with imperialism if these practices have been perfected as a result of 
legal obligations within industrialised home States ? This section examines the 
corporate role in applying customary international law in light of the 
regulatory responsibilities of States.
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One commentator has identified a fundamental affinity between business 
objectives and human rights.483 Corporate respect for human rights norms 
contributes to favourable social and political conditions, economic stability, 
reliable workforces, consumer loyalty and long-term operational viability.484 
Corporations support human rights such as water or food insofar as they 
provide the necessary infrastructure for their realisation and can reap monetary 
reward from their provision. Corporations it may be argued need do little since 
respect for human rights is incidental to economic development. Economic 
growth may enhance those conditions conducive to human rights.485 However, 
liberalisation policies contemplating user fees may qualify as de facto 
discrimination against marginalised social groups such as the poor. 
Governments cannot abdicate their right and duty to regulate if universal 
access to essential services is to be ensured. More proactive commercial
AO'l
practices can realise fundamental rights and freedoms. Consider, for 
example, the role of the media with respect to children’s rights.
Corporations are considered incapable of enjoying human rights on account of 
their incorporeal nature. Furthermore, by their nature several human rights 
such as freedom from torture and the right to life are incapable of being
483 D ’Amato A., ‘Are Human Rights Good for International Business?’ (1979) 1 Northwestern 
J  o f Int ’IL & Bus 22, 32.
4840ffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Giving a Human Face to the Global 
Market-The Business Case for Human Rights’, Statement by Mary Robinson, Interlaken, 1999, 
4.
485 Meyer W.H., ‘Human Rights and MNC’s: Theory versus Quantitative Analysis’ (1996) 
18(2) Human Rights Qtly 368.
486 UNHRC, Economic, social and cultural rights: liberalisation of trade in services and human 
rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, para 44-5, 70.
487 Art 18(3), UNGA Res 53/144 (1999) Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
488 Arts 4, 17, 32, UNGA Res 44/25 (1989) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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enjoyed by corporations. However, firms do not possess nor exercise the full 
range of rights. The human rights of particular concern to business include 
legal equality, non-arbitrary arrest of employees, private property (including 
intellectual property protection and proper compensation in the event of 
compulsory acquisition489, particularly where it is discriminatory490), non­
discrimination and freedom of movement. Courts have accordingly adjudged 
corporations as possessing the rights to property, fair trial and privacy 491 For 
example, neither the legal nature of a body corporate, its commercial activity 
nor the intrinsic character of the right prevents firms from exercising freedom 
of expression.492 Of course, exercising that right may be limited to protect the 
reputation of others including rival firms.493 Corporations are liable for 
commercial and not protected political speech 494 Furthermore, concentrated 
media ownership can militate against an individual’s rights to information and 
freedom of expression.495
Where an entity benefits from human rights protection the proposition is 
stronger that it bears a concomitant duty to observe them. Firms enjoy national 
treatment within trade agreements just as they must not unfairly discriminate
489 Retimag SA v Federal Republic o f Germany (1961) 4 Yearbook ECHR 384.
490UN Human Rights Committee, Simunek, Tuzilova & Prochazka v Czech Republic, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 para 11.3.
491 Addo M., ‘The Corporation as victim of human rights violations’ in Addo M. (Ed), Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1999, 187.
492 Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) ECHR Ser A Vol 178 para 47.
493 Jersild v Denmark [1986] ECHR Ser A Vol 298, 23; Markt Intern Verlag GmBH & Klaus 
Beerman Case [1989] ECHR Ser A Vol 165.
494 Cp Association o f National Advertisers Inc v Lungren 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir); Kasky v Nike 
Inc, Case No A086142 (1st App Dist Cal CA 2000).
495 UNHRC, Secretary-General Report, The impact of the activities and working methods of 
transnational corporations on the full enjoyment of all human rights, in particular economic, 
social and cultural rights and the right to development, bearing in mind existing international 
guidelines, rules and standards relating to the subject-matter, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/12
(1996), para 59.
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against employees.496 Bilateral investment treaties do not abrogate applicable 
anti-discrimination law.497 Human rights standards are applicable to all 
members of the international community.498 Nothing within them can be 
interpreted as implying for any group any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at their destruction.499 For example, a corporation 
‘would be seriously disadvantaged as against its competitors’ if it were obliged 
to employ individuals with HIV/AIDS.500 However, legitimate commercial 
requirements cannot condemn those individuals to ‘certain economic death’.501 
Corporations can promote anti-discrimination legislation and pursue non- 
discriminatory employment practices notwithstanding that such voluntary 
initiatives are driven by the legal consequences of non-compliance.503
Commercial practices have a positive and detrimental impact upon human 
rights standards where manifested as customary international law. Economic 
rights are affected as much as social and cultural ones.504 Marketing practices 
create appeal for Western lifestyles or emphasise local values (the right to
496 Eg Art 3, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (194^) 55 UNTS 187; Irish 
National Caucus, The MacBride Principles, Washington, 1984 (amplified 1986); Art 2, UNGA 
Res 1904 (1963) UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
Arts 2(e), 4(c), UNGA Res 34/180 (1981) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.
497 Wickes v Olympic Airways 745 F 2d 363, 368 (CA 1984).
498 UNGA Res 2627 (XXV) (1970).
499 Art 30, UNGA Res 217 (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Art 5, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) 999 UNTS 171; Art 5, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966) 993 UNTS
3.
500 South African High Court, Hoffmann v South African Airways (2000) 2 SA 628 (W), paras 
26-8.
501 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Hoffmann v South African Airways, [2000] ICHRL 69, 
paras 33-4, 38.
2 Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)/The Prince of Wales Business Leaders 
Forum/The Global Business Council on HIV & AIDS, The Business Response to HIV/AIDS: 
Impact and Lessons Learned. Geneva, 2000, 21-2.
503 The Conference Board, Corporate Response to HIV/AIDS. New York, 1997.
504 Final Report of Special Rapporteur Danilo Turk, The Realisation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16, 27 para 98.
166
culture), employment-displacing technology shifts workforces into other 
productive sectors (the right to work) and genetic modification can realise or 
threaten the right to food. Developing States are particularly susceptible.505 
Human rights violations could be committed on a massive and systematic scale, 
particularly within the economic, social and cultural sphere, and not appear by 
design or default on the radar of customary international law.
Corporate implementation of human rights is best evidenced within the 
workplace.506 Corporate strategies can adversely affect labour standards.507 
Employing externally-sourced labour accentuates ethnic plurality, achieves
• CAOproductivity advantages and minimises the likelihood of unionisation. 
Businesses are reluctant to incorporate the rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining within their codes of conduct.509 Firms also perpetuate 
the sexual division of labour when the proportion of women within 
management is low whereas female employment within labour intensive 
assembly industries remains high. The undervaluation of their true productive 
capability has consequences for financial empowerment, labour mobility and 
family units. Enterprises have been requested to ensure gender equality, equal 
opportunity, non-discrimination and the prevention of violence against
505 Eg UNGA Res 42/115.
506 UNCTAD, Transnational Corporations and Employment. UN Doc E/C. 10/1994/3.
507 UN Secretary-General, The relationship between the enjoyment of human rights, in 
particular, international labour and trade union rights, and the working methods and activities 
of transnational corporations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/11, (1995), paras 17-8.
508 Enloe C., 'Multinational Corporations in the Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Groups' in 
Grant R.M. and Wellhofer E.S., Ethno-nationalism. Multinational Corporations and the 
Modem State. Monograph Series in World Affairs Vol 15(4), University of Denver Press, 
1979, 10.
509 Forcese C., Human Rights and Corporate Codes of Conduct: Commerce with Conscience. 
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Montreal, 1997.
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women.510 However, ‘socially responsible’ employment practices may simply 
mask staffing flexibility.511
It is the failure of States to demonstrate leadership as discerned through 
national legal directives which forces management into complex decision­
making.512 Within this unregulated space or where a conflict between rights 
arises then firms naturally have regard to cost and competitiveness 
implications which inevitably infuses or extenuates the underlying economic 
tenor of human rights. Notwithstanding their indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated nature, human rights norms are likely to be fragmented, differently 
applied and relativised. It is only in recognition of contemporary reality that 
corporations have been suggested to bear ancillary duties for implementation, 
for example, with respect to the right to development.513 Over the past decade 
net private sector investment flows to developing States has grown whereas 
official development assistance has declined.514 However, firms resist the de 
facto transfer of governmental functions to the private sector.515 Ensuring 
human rights remains the first responsibility of States.516 Corporations express 
their public commitment to respect human rights conditioned by the legitimate
510 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action, World Summit 
for Social Development, Copenhagen, UN Doc A/CONF. 166/9 (1995), para 45; UN, Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, UN 
Doc A/CONF.177/20 (1995), paras 125, 126.
511 UNCTC/ILO, Women Workers in Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries. 
Geneva, 1985.
512 Harvard Law School/Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights. 
Harvard, 1999, 52-69.
513 Arts 2(2), 3(1), UNGA Res 41/128 (1986) UN Declaration on the Right to Development; 
UN Secretary-General, The Regional and National Dimensions of the Right to Development, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/1421 (1980).
514 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Global Development 
Finance. Washington DC, 2001.
515 Special Rapporteur Danilo Turk, The Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Second Progress Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/17, para 186.
516 Paras 1, 5, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human 
Rights, UN Doc A/CONF. 157/24 Pt 1, Ch 3 (1993).
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role of business. However, every social organ is entrusted with promoting 
respect for human rights.517 The private sector can realise the right to adequate 
food by pursuing their activities within the framework of a code of conduct
CIO #
agreed upon jointly with States and NGOs. Firms may also voluntarily 
adopt international human rights standards within corporate strategy and
519contracting.
Appeals to corporate roles may enable States to avoid responsibility for 
instituting an effective regulatory framework. However, exclusive State 
responsibility bestows a relative immunity upon non-State actors. Efforts
m  -I
are therefore made to define the appropriate corporate role. Businesses are 
only expected to respect and promote human rights within their ‘sphere of 
influence’. 522 A corporate duty to condemn widespread human rights 
violations is accordingly unlikely. A corporate role does not displace the 
State-centric model. Human rights norms must typically be reformulated with 
the legislative addition of detail before they are capable of corporate 
implementation.524 Ideally corporations operationalise human rights subject to 
governmental oversight. Human rights provisions can be included in contracts
517 Preamble, UDHR supra «499.
518 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 12 (1999) on 
the Right to Adequate Food (Art 11), UN Doc E/C. 12/1999/5 (1999), paras 20, 27.
519 Amnesty International/The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, Human Rights: is it 
any of your business? London, 2000.
520 Jochnick C., ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion 
of Human Rights’ (1999) 21(1) Human Rights Qtly 56, 59, 79.
521 The Confederation of Danish Industries/The Danish Centre for Human Rights/The 
Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries, Defining the Scope of Business 
Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses Abroad. Copenhagen, c l999, 6.
522 Robinson M., 'The Business Case for Human Rights', Visions of Ethical Business, Geneva, 
undated, 1.
523 Cassel, ‘Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?’ (1996) 19 Fordham 
Int’lL J  1963, 1983.
524 Dubin L., ‘The Direct Application of Human Rights Standards to, and by, Transnational 
Corporations’ (1999) 61 Int’l Commission o f Jurists-The Review 35,41.
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with host States.525 Alternatively, human rights impact assessments may 
precede investment projects.526 Until that point, the voluntary assumption of 
human rights obligations remains firmly entrenched within the context of a 
corporate social role rather than a legal responsibility. Contemporary 
corporate measures include management primers, employee training, internal 
compliance units and social auditing.
Andrew Clapham has suggested that multinationals as repositories of power 
commit violations independently of States such that human rights obligations 
ought to apply directly to them.529 Although the appropriate remedies ‘may 
have to be carried over to the private sphere’, private actors are ‘not obliged’ to 
introduce measures such as implementing legislation to prevent or punish 
human rights violations.530 Firms are only bound to obey the law and it is for 
States to regulate.
His thesis may be usefully refined in several respects. One reason for 
extending human rights ‘into the private sphere’ is precisely because the 
positive obligation upon States to legislate is unfulfilled or ineffective. The 
national lawmaking role of States becomes obsolete where human rights
525 UNHRC, Working document on the impact of the activities of transnational corporations on 
the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 
1997/11, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/6 (1998).
526 The Confederation of Danish Industries/The Danish Centre for Human Rights/The 
Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries, Human Rights and Business. Copenhagen, 
cl999.
527 UNCTAD, The social responsibility of transnational corporations. New York, 1999.
528 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights: A 
Progress Report. Geneva, 2000, 23-9.
529 Clapham A., Human Rights in the Private Sphere. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, 137-8, 
343, 354-5.
530 Ibid, 205-6, 344, 348.
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standards operate horizontally between private actors.531 This thesis argues 
firstly that within regulatory vacuums corporations become de facto standard- 
setters. Secondly, although the failure o f States to fulfil their regulatory 
responsibilities could be expected to shift the onus to firms, the limits to self­
regulation affirm the lawmaking role o f States.
r
Both these points are illustrated with reference to corporate codes o f conduct 
which reflect a set o f business values and do not enjoy a formal legal status. 
However, such instruments create minimum expectations to observe the 
standards contained therein.532 Corporations can be held legally accountable 
under self-proclaimed codes o f conduct for failure to satisfy industry standards, 
failure to exercise reasonable care or due diligence, breach o f contract or 
misrepresentation.533 As will become evident in Part Two below, the process
o f lawmaking contemplates ‘soft’ law such as codes o f conduct hardening into
( L  i « \ K .  w - ' A o t f l u f  \ ' W t A  
positive legal obligations through implementation in practice. It may be
somewhat illogical to hold corporations to account and yet deny to codes the
status o f law during their formulative period. It is more so when the transition
from non-law to law is made without State participation. Corporations are
evidently willing to voluntarily adopt measures intended to prevent human
rights violations which may have legal impacts akin if  not comparable to
implementing legislation.
531 Eg Walrove & Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1 4 0 5 .< ^
532 Muchlinski P., ‘Human Rights and multinationals: is there a problem?’ (2001) 77(1) 
International Affairs 31, 37.
533 Muchlinski P., ‘Human rights, social responsibility and the regulation o f  international 
business: the development o f  international standards by intergovernmental organisations’ 
(2003) 3 Non-State Actors and International Law 123, 130, 143.
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The effectiveness of self-delimiting commercial responsibilities is a separate 
question. Codes of conduct adopted by individual firms or industry 
associations are not opposable against other actors including non-members. 
Human rights standards as a uniform basis of competition are only effective 
where States mandate and enforce a minimum regulatory floor. In other words, 
the limits of voluntarism affirm tire lawmaking role of States. Indeed, soft 
legal instruments may be embraced within legislation.534 State practice in the 
implementation of human rights is essential. Corporate codes of conduct can 
therefore be an important but limited step towards the further implementation 
of pre-existing customary norms. Organised business groups call upon States 
to develop regulatory standards with respect to human rights but minimise 
trade barriers.535 Is the corporate role any different when national law violates 
international human rights standards ?
1.2.4. Resisting Prohibitions o f Customary International Law: The Example o f 
South African Apartheid.
South African apartheid illustrates the influence of corporate opinion upon 
national lawmaking (and thus State practice) in the context of implementing 
human rights. It also evidences the extent to which a commercial presence can 
insulate a persistently objecting State, thereby enabling it to resist the 
application of a customary law prohibition. The example also demonstrates 
the mechanics of how States and firms implement or resist Security Council 
Resolutions, a topic to be addressed in greater detail in Chapter Four.
'y  534 Eg Corporate Code o f Conduct Bill 2000 (Aus).'C
535 USCIB, An Open and Efficient Global Food System, 1998, New York, 3.
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In calling for non-discrimination and equal pay under the apartheid regime, the 
UN appreciated that corporations subject to South African jurisdiction would 
be acting contrary to national law.536 Notwithstanding that corporations should 
not intervene within internal political affairs, businesses as part of their social 
responsibility could not ignore universally-accepted human rights of a non­
derogable character. Organised business groups made written and oral 
submissions before UN public hearings. Although acknowledging that 
apartheid was morally indefensible, economically counterproductive and 
fundamentally irreconcilable with free enterprise, the ICC advocated in favour 
of continued deference to national law. By contrast, South African business 
organisations supported continued international engagement and publicly 
committed themselves to accelerating politico-legal change. Individual firms 
having South African affiliates publicly urged legislative reform.
The UN determined that firms had sustained the illegal occupation of Namibia 
and linked effective governmental administration with the validity of property 
rights.538 The General Assembly had previously terminated the mandate of
536 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia: United Nations Public 
Hearings, Vol 1, Reports of the Panel of Eminent Persons and of the Secretary-General, UN 
Doc ST/CTC/68 (1986), 5,16.
537 Cp UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia: United Nations 
Public Hearings, Vol 2: Verbatim Records, New York, UN Doc ST/CTC/68, 1986, 52-62 
(ICC); 147-163 (the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa and the South 
African Federated Chamber of Industries); UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in South 
Africa and Namibia: United Nations Public Hearings, Vol 3, Statements and Submissions, UN 
Doc ST/CTC/68, 1986, 40-1 (ICC); 44-7 (the Association of Chambers of Commerce for 
South Africa, the National African Federation of Chambers of Commerce, the South African 
Federated Chamber of Industries & the Urban Federation o f South Africa); 61-105 (individual 
firms).
538 Report of the Secretary-General, Activities and Operations of Transnational Corporations in 
Namibia, with particular emphasis on their exploitation of Namibian resources and their 
contribution to and support of South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia, UN Doc 
E/C. 10/AC.4/1985/6, 16-7.
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administration exercised by South Africa.539 The UN Council for Namibia 
subsequently declared null and void concessions or licences granted by the 
South African government and called upon States to ensure that titles or 
contracts were not entitled to diplomatic protection against claims by a future 
lawful Namibian government.540 That said, litigation by the UN against 
corporations before national courts was hampered by several questions of 
international law.541 The UN also called upon corporations to cease their 
commercial dealings with South Africa. 542 Several intergovernmental 
resolutions condemned corporate collaboration with the apartheid regime and 
called for the termination of investment.543 Various legislative measures were 
accordingly adopted by States.544 However, several States justified inaction on 
the basis of non-binding resolutions and the extraterritorial application of 
national law.545 Others were not so restrained.546 However, sanctions regimes 
were routinely circumvented by corporations with the collusion of their home 
States.547
539 UNGA Resolution 2145 (1966).
540 SC Res 301 (1971) para 12; UN Council for Namibia Decree No 1 for the Protection of the 
Natural Resources of Namibia, 27 September 1974, UNGAOR 35th Sess Supp No 24 
(A/35/24) Vol 1 Annex 2 as affirmed by eg UNGA Res 39/50A (1984), para 57.
541 Report of the UN Commissioner for Namibia, ‘Implementation of Decree No 1 for the 
Protection of the Natural Resources: Study of the Possibility of Instituting Legal Proceedings 
in the Domestic Courts of States’ (1986) S0(2) AJIL 442.
542 Eg UNGA Res 31/6 H (1976); UNGA Res 40/64A (1985) para 10; SC Res 283 (1970) para
4.
543 Eg UNGA Res 37/233 A (1982); ECOSOC Res 1985/72 (1985), para 6.
544 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia: United Nations Public 
Hearings, Vol 4, Policy Instruments and Statements, UN Doc ST/CTC/68, 1986, Pt 2.
545UNCTC, Activities of Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia and the 
Responsibilities of Home Countries with Respect to their Operations in this Area, UN Doc 
ST/CTC/84, New York, 1986, 31.
546 Eg The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 22 USC s5001-5116 (1988).
547 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in South Africa: Second United Nations Public 
Hearings, 1989, Vol 1: Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons & Background Documentation, 
New York, 1990, UN Doc ST/CTC/102, 7, 31.
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International business resisted compliance with UN resolutions on the basis 
that corporate responses required legislative guidance by their home States. In 
their view, the UN was attempting to use the corporate vehicle to effect 
political change within a State without the benefits of diplomatic protection. 
Moreover, unilateral initiatives would penalise national businesses without 
removing apartheid. Corporate codes of conduct were advocated as sufficient 
alternatives.548 Conditional public procurement and shareholder initiatives 
were largely ineffectual. However, defensive appeals by firms to the primacy 
of national law in authoritatively determining the permissibility of corporate 
behaviour are not without limit. South African firms emphasised their law 
reform initiatives including contributions to legislative proposals, advocating 
for the repeal of discriminatory labour laws, waiving applicable legal 
provisions in labour disputes and providing legal assistance to employees.549 
Their incidental objective was to remove unfavourable barriers to labour 
market flexibility. Local enterprises lacking the option to divest have the 
greatest incentive to cajole States into rectifying national law notwithstanding 
that they may have contributed to the design of the legal regime, were 
complicit in its implementation and economically benefited from its 
application.
548 Export Administration Amendments Act 1983 (US) HR 3231, 98th Congress Vol 129 No 
137; The Sullivan Statement of Principles for US Corporations Operating in South Africa 
(Fourth Amplification) 24 ILM 1486 (1985); Code of Conduct concerning the Employment 
Practices of Canadian Companies Operating in South Africa 24 ILM 1464 (1985); European 
Community Code of Conduct for Enterprises having Affiliates, Subsidiaries or Agencies in 
South Africa (1977) 9 EC Bulletin 2.2.4.
549 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in South Africa, Second United Nations Public 
Hearings, 1989, Vol 2: Statements and Submissions, UN Doc ST/CTC/102, New York, 1990, 
150, 152, 155, 164, 170, 175.
175
The eventual withdrawal of international business was attributed to a 
weakened economy and an uncertain political situation: although initially 
enjoying higher profits suspected to derive from the denial of labour standards, 
South Africa became a high risk investment on account of rising worker 
militancy, poor productivity and import dependency. Voluntary withdrawal 
was also warranted to preserve the corporate reputation. The account 
illustrates that transnational corporations can assist target States resist the 
application of customary legal prohibitions. They are reluctant to relinquish 
the global competitive advantage their subsidiaries derive from national law 
and may collude with home States to that end. By contrast local firms will 
explicitly urge national legal reform and seek to influence State practice from 
within. Conformity with international law is incidental to alleviating sanctions 
regimes, opening trade routes, removing labour market constraints and 
ultimately occupying the market positions of departing firms. Overall, the 
ability for corporations to influence State practice is most apparent where 
States fail to regulate (giving rise to an expectation to self-regulate) or where 
national law is inconsistent with international law (an expectation to ensure 
conformity).
1.3 Overturning Normative Constraints which Maintain International 
Legal Stability: The Prohibition on the Use o f Force.
Having considered firstly the corporate role in the creation of custom and 
secondly the implementation of pre-exiting normative rules, it remains to 
consider the extent to which commercial participation in the application of
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customary rules can challenge the international legal order. This section 
examines the corporate influence upon the prohibition on the use of force. The 
legal concepts of ‘armed attack’ and ‘self-defence’ may apply to non-State 
action.550 It is uncertain whether States can employ force against non-State 
actors when exercising their right to self-defence.551 International peace and 
security is conducive to unhindered resource exploitation, unimpeded 
communication and trade networks and the protection of employees, customers 
and assets.552 The international economic order and market stability are left 
affected. Armed conflict challenges the rule of law with resulting commercial 
insecurity. Forcible territorial annexation extinguishes property rights 
acquired under previous regimes. National courts may refuse to recognise 
foreign laws which purport to transfer property.554 Peacefully resolving 
disputes is a task is ‘too important to be entrusted to States alone’. 555 
Corporations can diffuse inter-State conflicts as intermediaries building closer 
economic relationships, refraining from corruption and curtailing resource 
competition.556 On the other hand, reducing workplace tension requires 
institutionalising participatory structures which considerably alter 
contemporary models of corporate governance. Finally, inter-commercial 
disputes can be resolved peacefully through resort to arbitration.557 Such a
550 Nicaragua, supra nl2, para 195; SC Res 1368 (2001) (terrorism).
551 Cp Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
2004, para 139 & Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, para 6.
552 Clausen A.W., 'The Internationalised Corporation : An Executive's View' (1972) 403 The 
Annals 21.
553 Gosalia v Agarwal & Ors (1981) AIR SC  1946, paras 28-9.
554 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Company and the Republic o f Iraq (2000) 116 ILR 
534, 587-95.
555 UN Department of Public Information, Statement by the UN Secretary-General Boutros- 
Ghali at the Forty-Seventh Annual Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations, 1994, 2.
556 Fort T.L. & Schipani C.A., ‘The Role of the Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace’ 
(2002) 35 Vanderbilt J  Transnational L 389, 409.
557 ICC, Rules of Arbitration, ICC Pub No 581, Paris, 1998.
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technique has been endorsed by the Security Council to also resolve disputes 
between firms and States.558
Corporations derive some protection under international humanitarian law. 
Civilian objects (installations containing dangerous forces, hospitals, scientific 
and educational buildings and undefended structures) are protected and 
employees are not to be targeted as combatants. Occupying powers may not 
be liable under international humanitarian law for failure to maintain law and 
order when local businesses are looted.559 However, States are subject to a due 
diligence obligation to adopt precautionary measures when conducting military 
operations.560 Corporations may be able to obtain compensation for property 
damage from States pursuant to bilateral investment treaties.561 Individuals 
can also recover the costs associated with the non-consensual use of privately- 
owned premises by UN peacekeeping forces before specially-instituted claims
Cf*\
tribunals. The legal character of hostilities is also relevant for insurance
C f f l
which is reflected in a body of jurisprudence and therefore State practice.
Corporations are also concerned by prospective corporate liability. Only 
States are liable for serious violations of the laws of warfare.564 The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court does not contemplate corporate
558 SC Res 118 (1956) (Suez Canal Company & Egypt).
559 Industria Panificadora SA v US 957 F 2d 886 (1992); Goldstar (Panama) SA v US 967 F 
2d 965(1992).
560 ICSID, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic o f Sri Lanka (1997) 106 ILR 416, 451- 
64.
561 ICSID, American Manufacturing & Trading Inc v Republic o f Zaire, Case ARB/93/1
(1997).
562 UN Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc A/51/389 (1996), para 46.
563 Eg Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd [1902] AC 484.
564 Common Art 3, 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War 75 UNTS 287.
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criminal responsibility.565 However, declarations of corporate criminality were 
observed following World War Two.566 Industry is integrated into the State 
apparatus for a concerted war effort. For example, IG Farben collaborated 
with the German government in acquiring chemical facilities across occupied 
Europe.567 Other firms were less opportunistic given the long-term insecurity 
of foreign acquisitions.568 However, the penalty for IG Farben was dispersing 
its ownership rather than extinguishing its juristic personality.569 Corporations 
also utilised concentration camp interns, prisoners of war and civilians as 
forced labour. Individual criminal responsibility derived from voluntary 
membership of an organisation and knowledge of its criminal purposes. 
Knowledge could be inferred from profit levels within the firm.570 Corporate 
officers were accordingly convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and violations of the laws and customs of warfare.571 Corporations have more 
recently settled claims made against them arising from their forced labour 
practices. Claimants had been unable to recover compensation from States, 
particularly where legislation impermissibly interferes with the conduct of 
foreign policy by the executive.572 Furthermore, litigation against firms had
565 Art 25(1), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9
(1998).
566 Arts 9, 10, Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London 
Agreement) 82 UNTS 280; IMT Judgment (1947) 41(1) AJIL 172, 249-72.
56 Borkin J., The Crime and Punishment of IG Farben. Andre Deutsch Ltd, London, 1979.
568 Overy R.J., 'German Multinationals and the Nazi State in Occupied Europe' in Teichova A., 
Levy-Leboyer M. & Nussbaum H., Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, 306.
569 Allied High Commission Law No 35 (1950) ‘Dispersion of Assets of IG’.
570 US v Oswald Pohl et al 5 Trials o f War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
1055; Mauthausen Concentration Camp Trial (Trial o f Hans Alfuldisch and Six Others) 11 
War Crimes LR 15; Trial o f Bum Tesch and Two Others (Zyklon B Case) (1946) 13 ILR 250, 
252.
571 In re Flick & Ors (1947) 14 ILR 266; In re Krupp & Ors (1948) 15 ILR 620; In re Krauch 
& Ors (IG Farben Trial) (1948) 15 ILR 668.
572 Hirsch v State o f Israel and State o f Germany 962 F Supp 377, 382-3 (DC NY 1997); 
American Insurance Association et al v Garamendi (2003) US SC.
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proved unsuccessful since prior reparations agreements between States 
foreclosed individual claim s.573 However, firms settled these lawsuits to 
preserve their reputation, avoid government sanctions and provide an exclusive 
remedy. A compensation fund and claims resolution panel was subsequently 
established in Switzerland.574 A similar process was established in Austria.575 
Corporations may therefore become liable for collaborating with States in 
violating the prohibition on the use o f forceT\ f v ^  ^  ^
CtfYVt**jxU /  I'l 4? Imx*. 7  sVtXC W wA
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Commercial decision-making can have a catalytic effect in initiating 
confrontation and indirectly prolong conflict.576 Natural resource extraction 
provides revenue for States and access to remote areas, thereby contributing to 
spiralling cycles o f violence. 577 Business ordinarily relies upon the State 
security apparatus to protect personnel and property. Engaging military 
activity may incur prospective corporate liability. The provision o f support 
and direction to law enforcement officers in a common mission is sufficient to
S7Restablish joint action. Purchasing firearms, paying allowances, training
573 Iwanowa v Ford Motor Co 67 F Supp 2d 424 (DNJ 1999); Sec 354.6 California Code o f  
Civil Procedure relating to World War Two Slave and Forced Labour Victims 39 ILM  231 
(2000) declared unconstitutional in Deutsch v Turner Corporation US CA 9th Cir 2003; In Re 
World War II Era Japanese Forced Labour Litigation MDL-1347 (ND Cal 2000); In re 
Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litigation 80 F Supp 2d 164 (SDNY 2000); Watman v 
Deutsche Bank (2nd Cir 2001); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation: Polish American 
Defence Committee v Swiss Bankers Association 96 Civ 4849 (DC NY 2000 & 2nd Cir 2000); 
Bodner & Banque Paribus No CV 97-7433 (ED NY 1997); Benisti v Banque Paribus No CV 
98-7851 (ED NY 1998).
574 Swiss Federal Banking Commission/Independent Committee o f Eminent Persons/Swiss 
Bankers Association, Statement on Comprehensive Claims Resolution Process for Dormant 
Accounts in Swiss Banks dating from prior to the end o f  World War Two and Announcement 
o f the Claims Resolution Process 36 ILM  1379 (1997).
575 US-Austria, Joint Statement and Exchange o f  Notes concerning the establishment o f  the 
General Settlement Fund for Nazi-Era and World War Two Claims 40 ILM  565 (2001).
576 Anderson M.B. & Zandvliet L., Corporate Options for Breaking Cycles o f Conflict. 
Collaborative for Development Action Inc, Massachusetts, 2001.
577 Canadian Department o f  Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Human Security in 
Sudan: The Report o f a Canadian Assessment Mission. Ottawa, 2000, 64.
578 United Steelworkers o f  America v Phelps Dodge Corporation 865 F 2d 1539, 1545 (9th Cir 
1989).
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security personnel and transporting troops contributes to military operations. 
Corporations can therefore be complicit in  human rights violations.579 At a
CO A
minimum business should pursue socially responsible practices. Codes of 
conduct and contracts with security providers can be benchmarked against
CO 1____
international standards. These arrangements invoke the concepts o f
CO A
proportionality, distinguishing targets and command responsibility 
Formulating such instruments can involve the participation o f States, 
corporations, trade unions and NGOs.
There is also a commercial interest in resort to armed force. The post-conflict 
corporate role includes profitable reconstruction opportunities (for corporate 
contractors, security consultants, engineering companies or essential utility 
services) and creating market-orientated legal regimes.584 The arms trade is an
CO c
identifiable source o f conflict. The industrial military sector includes arms 
manufacturers and traders but also aerospace, transport, electronics, 
communications and research and development. The defence industry has a 
market-preserving interest in ensuring that States prevent illicit arms transfers
579 Pegg S., ‘The Cost o f Doing Business: Transnational Corporations and Violence in Nigeria’
(1999) 30(4) Security Dialogue 473, 475.
580 Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Global Compact Dialogue on the 
Role o f  the Private Sector in Zones o f Conflict’, Palais Wilson, 2001.
581 International Alert/Council on Economic Priorities/Prince o f  Wales Business Leaders 
Forum, The Business o f Peace: The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution. London, 2000.
582 UN, Basic Principles on the Use o f Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 
Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention o f  Crime and the Treatment o f  Offenders, Havana, 
1990.
583 US & UK Governments, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 2000; US 
Department o f  State, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Washington, 2000.
584 Davies R., ‘Business: why do private companies have a role in conflict prevention ?’ Paper 
presented at Wilton Park Conference on Humanitarian Principles and Non-State Actors, 
PWBLF, 2000, 5.
585 Secretary-General Report, The causes o f  conflict and the promotion o f durable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa, UN Doc S/1998/318 (1998), para 14.
by ‘illegitimate’ traders lacking government approval.586 The normative 
prohibition on the use of force extends to arming, equipping, supporting and 
assisting military activity but does not distinguish between public and private 
manufacturers.587 The ability of shareholders to review military contracts for 
compliance with international law is narrowly circumscribed. 588 States 
accordingly attempt to control the monopoly over military resources by 
preventing the illicit trade.589 However, international legal controls are only 
emerging.590 Technological development by arms manufacturers will be 
affected by prohibitions on a particular means of conducting warfare.591 
Finally, other non-State actors such as terrorists and organised criminals 
employ the corporate organisational form as instruments of war or for illicit 
purposes such as money laundering. Distinctions between firms are 
warranted when considering the different markets constructed on the 
peripheries of the legal regime on the use of force.
The evolution of international law with respect to prohibiting the use of 
mercenaries illustrates the reaction of States to a specific commercial interest 
in armed conflict. Mercenaries threaten the political independence and
586 UNGA Res 46/36 (1992) on International Arms Transfers.
587 Nicaragua supra nl2, para 292.
588 SA Avions Morcel Dassault Breguet Aviation v Association Europeenne Droit Contre 
Raison D ’Etat (1997) 106 ILR 216.
589 Eg OAS, Inter-American Convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in 
firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials 37 ILM 143 (1998).
590 UN, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established Pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 54/54 (1999) entitled Small Arms, UN Doc A/CONF. 192/2 (2001) paras 
18-30.
591 Eg UN, Anti-Personnel Mines Convention 36 ILM 1507 (1997).
592 Orts E.W., ‘War and the Business Corporation’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt J  Transnational L 549, 
561.
593 Zarate J.C., ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security 
Companies, International Law and the New World Disorder’ (1998) 34 Stanford J In t’l L 75.
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territorial integrity of States.594 Contracts for the control of natural resources 
impair the right of self-determination.595 However, States continue to resort to 
their services. The nature of mercenary activity has also evolved.596 Private 
military companies (PMCs) have further commodified military services for the 
benefit of States, international organisations and corporate clients from the 
energy or minerals sector.597 The paradoxical suggestion has been made that 
PMCs be deployed for UN peace enforcement operations.598 However, their 
military efficiency may derive from failure to observe human rights obligations 
and the laws and customs of warfare. Although States are reluctant to condone 
mercenary activity, informal technical co-operation is not improper and PMCs 
are entitled to diplomatic protection.599 International law does not prevent 
PMCs from enforcing military contracts against States.600 Indeed, the Human 
Rights Committee recommended international regulation to enhance their 
positive contributions.601 National legislation which provides for licensing 
legitimates an infant industry and marginalises disreputable operators. The
594 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries 29 ILM 90 (1990).
595 UNHRC, Report made pursuant to Commission Resolution 1998/6, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1999/11 (1999), para 75.
596 UNHRC, The Right of Peoples to Self-determination and its Application to Peoples under 
Colonial or Alien Domination of Foreign Occupation, Report on the question of the use of 
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 
peoples to self-determination submitted by Mr Enrique Bemales Ballesteros, Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/31 (1998), paras 69, 112.
597 Ballesteros E.B., ‘International and Regional Instruments’ in International Alert, The 
Privatisation o f Security: Framing a Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Policy Agenda. 
London, 2001, 48, 50.
598 UN, ‘Secretary-General Reflects on ‘Intervention’, 35th Annual Ditchley Foundation 
Lecture, Press Release SG/SM/6613, 1998, 5.
599 Legg T. & Ibbs R., Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation. HMSO, London, 1998, 
para 11.9.
600 In the Matter o f an International Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules between Sandline 
International Inc and the Independent State o f Papua New Guinea (2000) 117 ILR 551, para 
11. 1.
601 UNHRC, Report pursuant to Commission Resolution 1999/3, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/14
(2000), paras 71-2.
602 Eg Arms Export Control Act 22 USC (1968) & International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
22 Fed Reg 120-30 (1998); Regulation o f Foreign Military Assistance Act, 15 of 1998 (Sth
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fundamental tensions created by PMC’s (such as preserving or disturbing the 
peace, protecting or violating human rights, enabling or hindering economic 
development, bolstering or destabilising States) as well as preferred responses 
(private efficiency or public accountability and regulation or free enterprise) 
are yet to be wholly reconciled.
To conclude thus far, this Part has categorised various aspects of the State- 
corporate relationship in terms of its impact upon normative rules. Normative 
rules such as good faith are operationalised by firms in a manner identical to 
States and are likely to be strengthened within the international system. 
However, inter-corporate competition injects tension into the observance of 
normative rules such as the prohibition on intervention in the internal affairs of 
States and the use of force. Normatively malleable rules such as respect for 
human rights when implemented by firms emphasise their underlying 
economic imperatives and promote property interests over individuals 
concerns. A continuing State role is necessary to maintain normative 
alignment. Is this conclusion also warranted where States exercise less than 
their full regulatory capacity in the nature of ‘soft’ international law and 
corporate roles are formalised ?
2. Corporate Participation in Developing ‘Soft’ Legal instruments.
‘Soft’ law is defined as those instruments which ostensibly are not formally 
binding but have a definite albeit indeterminate legal effect. Such expectations
Africa); UK House of Commons, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation. HC 577, 
HMSO, London, 2002.
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of future conduct may make the transition to ‘hard’ law.603 Soft law can be 
used in a variety of ways to serve different interests. It constructs mutual 
confidence, encourages transparency and ensures predictable behaviour. States 
resort to this tool when consensus for legally-binding agreements is lacking: 
for example, attempts by developing States to regulate corporate activity 
through the General Assembly on account of their numerical majority and 
inability to conclude treaties with the industrialised States. Soft law can also 
disperse the burden of administration or monitoring to other actors. 
Corporations are not precluded from participating in the formulation, 
implementation and enforcement of these instruments. Intergovernmental 
codes serve a legitimising function for corporate behaviour, thereby affirming 
the positive contributions made by industry. They are moreover a relatively 
costless technique for reinforcing State compliance.604
2.1 Corporate Participation in Intergovernmental Codes o f Conduct.
The origins of intergovernmental codes follow identifiable patterns. 
Undesirable commercial practices lead to public pressures for a regulatory 
response. Corporate officers participate as experts or industry representatives 
to formulate effective proposals. Drafts are circulated to States and the 
business community to solicit comment. The final product may be formally 
adopted by States as law, adopted as a formally non-binding instrument or 
recognised by firms as indicative of best commercial practice. For example, 
the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes of the World
603 Eg Colloquium, ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’ (1988) 82 ASIL Proc 371.
604 Kline J.M., ‘Entrapment or Opportunity: Structuring a Corporate Response to International 
Codes of Conduct’ (1980) 15(2) Columbia J  World Bus 6, 11-2.
Health Organisation (WHO) emerged in response to criticism of commercial 
marketing practices within developing States during the 1970’s.605 Following 
national court proceedings and consumer boycotts the International Council of 
Infant Formula Industries formulated a Code on Infant Food Marketing. This 
effort led to subsequent collaboration with the WHO to design the Breastmilk 
Code.606 The industry association called for further tailoring of that instrument 
to national conditions.607 Responsibility for implementation falls upon States 
and NGOs may report violations. Few States have fully implemented the 
Code: the instrument has cascaded into further sources of soft law with many 
States preferring voluntary agreements with industry.
2.1.1 The Interpretative Function and Institutional Oversight Responsibility.
Institutions composed of States, trade unions, NGOs and firms are typically 
established with oversight responsibility. Companies alleged to have breached 
intergovernmental codes participate in complaints proceedings individually or 
through business associations. Given their non-judicial character and the 
voluntary nature of the instrument sanctions rarely rise to censure. Complaints 
are considered with reference to a general survey of experiences. The process 
refrains from specific conclusions on the propriety of conduct by individual 
firms. Although co-opting criticism, the framework is noteworthy for
605 UNCTC, 'The International Code of Marketing Breast-Milk Substitutes' (1982) 11 The CTC 
Reporter 29.
606WHO/UNICEF, Meeting on Infant and Young Child Feeding, Statement, Recommendations, 
Participants, Geneva, 1979; WHO Res WHA34.22 (1981) on an International Code of 
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes.
607 The International Council of Infant Formula Industries, 'Infant Formula Marketing in the 
Third World' (1981) National Journal 854.
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continuing dialogue between interested actors and encouraging continuous 
improvement.
For example, the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO’s) Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy enjoys the authority of adoption by States, trade unions and employers 
organisations.608 First adopted in 1977, it was amended in 1987 and 1995.609 
In 2000 it was updated to include the 1998 Fundamental Rights at Work 
Declaration and ILO Conventions concerning child labour.610 Employers 
organisations consider that the Declaration contains standards which they 
expect their members to apply.611 Indeed, adherence is conducive to long-term 
commercial interests in developing markets. The ILO Governing Body 
requested States to periodically report on the effect given to the Declaration 
after appropriate consultation with employers and workers organisations. The 
first survey indicated substantial acceptance although differences of opinion 
arose between employer and worker groups. The survey also demonstrated 
‘on the whole, a good degree of acceptance’ by industry.614 More recent 
studies confirm ‘a fairly wide degree of observance’ by employers including
608 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy 17 ILM 423 (1978).
609ILO, Updating of references annexed to the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO Doc GB.277/MNE/3 (2000).
610 ILO, Report of the Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises, ILO Doc GB.279/12 (2000).
611 Coates J.A.G., ‘ILO Tripartite Declaration concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy’ in Confederation of British Industry, International Codes of Conduct, London, 1981, 
19.
612 Morawetz, R., ‘Recent Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Towards a possible 
role for the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy’, ILO Working Paper 71, Geneva, 1991, 58-60.
613 ILO, Report of the Committee to Consider Reports on the Effect Given to the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO Doc 
GB/214/6/3 (1980), 22-6.
614 Gunter H., ‘The Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy: History, Contents, Follow-up and relationship with relevant instruments of 
other organisations’, ILO Working Paper 18, Geneva, 1981, 12.
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further standard-setting by them with respect to occupational health and 
safety.615 Employers were satisfied that positive observations outweighed 
adverse criticisms in the sixth survey.616 However, they also argue that NGOs
617should be excluded from a process intended for ILO constituent bodies.
The tripartite Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises interprets provisions 
to resolve disagreements on their meaning arising from actual situations
f\ 1 ftbetween parties to whom the Declaration is commended. The
Subcommittee construes the Declaration broadly in light of the interests to be 
safeguarded.619 Although some twenty-three requests for an interpretation 
have been received, very few have passed the test of ‘receivability’. States 
may request interpretations notwithstanding declarations of corporate 
compliance with national law by its national courts or settlement agreements 
between that firm and its employees.620 The Subcommittee consults the trade 
union, corporation and home State directly concerned in addition to employer 
and worker organisations and business associations. Interpretations are first 
drafted by trade unions and management before submission for endorsement 
by the ILO Governing Body. Consensus thus prevents authoritative
615 Romero A.T., ‘The ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy: An Introductory Essay’, Philippine Roundtable on Labour and 
Social Issues Arising out of the Activities of Multinational Enterprises and Foreign Direct 
Investment, ILO, Geneva, 1997, para 5.2.
616 ILO, Follow-up and Promotion of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, Report of the Subcommittee on Multinational 
Enterprises, ILO Doc GB.268/9 (1997), para 5.
617 ILO, Report of the Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises, ILO Doc GB.277/12 (2000), 
para 9.
618 Arts 1, 2, Procedure for the examination of disputes concerning the application o f the 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by 
means of interpretation of its provisions (1986) ILO Official Bulletin Vol 69 Ser A No 3, 196.
619 ILO, Report of the Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises, ILO Doc GB.239/14/24 
(1988).
620 Ibid, ILO Doc GB.270/18 (1998).
621 Ibid, ILO Doc GB.229/13/13 (1985).
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interpretations where conflicting opinions arise between employer and worker 
groups.622 Moreover, the process cannot be instituted in anticipation of 
corporate decision-making or where trade unions lack a mandate from their 
representative national affiliate (notwithstanding that freedom of association 
may not be respected within that State). To the extent that the Tripartite 
Declaration reflects customary international law (and the implementation 
procedures strengthen this argument), employer and worker organisations are 
also contributing to further interaction between formally soft law instruments 
with substantive custom.
2.1.2 Maintaining Corporate Adherence by Updating Intergovernmental 
Codes.
Firms also participate in the amendment of intergovernmental codes. For 
example, the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises adopted in 1976 by the 
Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) carry the 
weight of a multilateral recommendation by States on expected corporate 
behaviour.624 It was introduced in part to deter efforts to render the UN Code
of Conduct legally binding. Harmonising national law and promoting
OECD policy were equally important objectives.626 Corporations would 
observe the Guidelines if the instrument was kept under continuous review.627
622 Ibid, ILO Doc GB.264/MNE/2 (1995).
623 Ibid, ILO Doc GB.254/MNE/4/6 (1992).
624OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 40 ILM 236 (2001).
625 Tapiola K., ‘The Importance of Standards and Corporate Responsibilities-The Role of 
Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct’, OECD Conference on the Role o f International 
Investment, Paris, 1999, 2.
626 (1975) 74 The OECD Observer 14 -5.
627 (1976) 82 The OECD Observer 13.
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Notwithstanding business calls for stability, the Guidelines have been reviewed 
on four occasions, subjected to a mid-term assessment and updated to include
f.'yo # ,
environmental protection and human rights provisions. The Guidelines are 
also addressed to the public as much as employees, shareholders and 
investment institutions.629
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) ensures that reviews
reflect contemporary industrial opinion. 630 BIAC encouraged corporate
adherence to the Guidelines as ‘reasonable standards of good management
practice’ which ‘served to demonstrate that the voluntary approach -  viewed
against strong international pressures to introduce mandatory codes of conduct
1-  is a viable and credible one’. Enterprises will respect the Guidelines 
provided they are treated fairly and consistently with international law and 
contractual obligations.632 Textual revisions are acceptable provided they
/TOOresult from consensus and the instrument remains voluntary. BIAC 
recommends corporate declarations of support within annual reports, executive 
statements, press releases and intra-corporate communications.634 Although 
the initial take-up in 1978 involved nearly one hundred prominent enterprises,
Tully S., ‘The 2000 Review of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2001) 
5 0 ICLQ 394.
629 Coolidge P., Spina G. & Wallace D. (Eds), The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: A Business Appraisal. Washington DC, 1977, 56.
630 BIAC, ‘Report of Activities 1982-1983’ in Blanpain R., The OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Labour Relations 1982-1984: Experience and Review. Kluwer 
Publishers, Deventer, 1985, 13.
631 BIAC, Brochure on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Paris, 1983,4-5.
632 Coates J., ‘Multinational Enterprises, Industrial Relations and Codes of Conduct: The 
Employers Point of View’ (1979) 10 Bulletin for Comp R el’ns 125.
633 OECD, ‘Labour and Employment Practices in Today’s Global Economy: Implications for 
the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises’, Working Paper Vol 7 No 40, Paris, 1999, 
12 .
634 BIAC, A Report for Business on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Paris, 
1980, 19-20.
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by 1984 corporate interest had dissipated. Only in rare instances do annual 
reports expressly indicate consideration of the Guidelines.
Responsibility for clarifying the Guidelines is entrusted to the OECD’s 
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIIME). 
CIIME invites BIAC and the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to 
express views which are then considered by the OECD Council. OECD 
Member States also concluded a legally-binding decision which entitles
• 636individual firms to make submissions on matters affecting its interests. 
TUAC and BIAC have a substantial impact upon CIIME deliberations; in 
effect States merely approve the compromises identified by management and 
trade unions. 637 This interpretative process has spawned a form of 
jurisprudence, particularly for the normative principles of the industrial 
relations chapter. An alternative solution is rectifying the government measure 
which gave rise to the disputed application of the Guidelines. The first 
clarification demonstrated the extent to which industry could pressure 
individual firms and limit accountability to the OECD forum.638 Although the 
principal impetus for clarifications has historically been TUAC, it has become 
disillusioned by the lack of political commitment and questionable corporate 
compliance. 639 The evolution of the Guidelines is attributable to the
635 OECD, ‘Disclosure of Information by Multinational Enterprises: Survey of the Application 
of the OECD Guidelines’, Working Document No 3, Paris, 1987, 8, 27.
636OECD, Council Decision C(76)117 (1976) on Intergovernmental Consultation Procedures 
on Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as revised by Decision C(79)143 (1979).
637 Blanpain R., The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Labour Relations 
1976-1979: Experience and Review. Kluwer Publishers, Deventer, 1979, 268 para 232.
638 Blanpain R., The Badger Case and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
Kluwer Publishers, Deventer, 1977, 128.
639 Blanpain R., The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Labour Relations 
1979-1982: Experience and Mid-term Report. Kluwer Publishers, Deventer, 1983, 66-7.
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concurrence of opinion between States and corporations.640 It is uncertain 
whether NGO admission into the process will reinvigorate implementation.641 
Unfortunately, NGOs have already experienced the territorial limitations to the 
Guidelines.642
2.1.3 The Impact o f Intergovernmental Codes on Corporate Behaviour: 
Towards Human Rights Principles for Business.
Use of soft law forms allows States to employ less than their full regulatory 
capacity. Statements of principle will leave national legal obligations 
unaffected.643 Governmental codes improve the extraterritorial reputation of 
national firms without overburdening them. States thereby compete in 
formulating codes for prospective adoption by national industry. For example, 
the UK government’s Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) seeks to apply 
international labour standards throughout supply chains.644 Transposing the 
ETI Base Code into national-specific standards encounters difficulty where 
collective bargaining is prohibited within host States. 645 Hence non- 
compliance with the Code relates principally to freedom of association and 
working conditions.646 The US equivalent, the Apparel Industry Partnership,
640 Blanpain R., ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, for Ever? The OECD Guidelines 20 
Years Later’ (1998) Int’lJ  o f Comp Labour L & Indust Rel’ns 337, 345.
641 OECD, National Contact Points, Procedural Guidance, DAFFE/IME/WPG/(2000)9. —
642 Bashir S. & Mabey N., ‘Can the OECD MNE Guidelines Promote Responsible Corporate 
Behaviour? An Analysis of P & O’s Proposed Port in Dahanu, India’, World Wildlife Fund 
(UK), 1998, 8.
643 US Department of Commerce, Model Business Principles, Washington DC, 1995.
644 UK, Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st 
Century’, White Paper, Cmnd 3789 (1997), 64.
645 ETI, Pilot Interim Review, London, 1999, 5.
646 ETI, Annual Report, London, 1999/2000, 4.
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has an identical objective.647 However, once again the code has a limited 
extraterritorial effect.
Opinions differ on whether intergovernmental codes constitute sources of 
positive law for corporations.648 On one view, codes only assume a legally- 
binding character when formally adopted by those within the orthodox 
lawmaking process. However, codes may also have ‘unknown and possibly 
legal implications’.649 National courts have taken into consideration voluntary 
endorsement of intergovernmental codes when determining corporate 
liability.650 Corporations expect to be adjudged against national^ law^ 
Conduct undertaken pursuant to an intergovernmental code doe/become legal
when it is contrary to national law.667j|Such codes can become binding upon 
States as customary international law provided the elements of custom are
c .
satisfied and thereafter upon firms when that source is automatically 
incorporated into national law. In this manner corporate adherence to
intergovernmental codes influences pertinent State practice to become 
circuitously binding upon firms. Where States and corporations are addressees 
of the same instrument, why should a legal impact be accepted for States but 
denied for firms, particularly where corporations may thereby derive rights and
647 Apparel Industry Partnership, Workplace Code o f Conduct and Principles of Monitoring, 
Washington, 1997.
648 Cp Brownlie I., 'Legal Effects of Codes o f Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: 
Commentary' & Vogelaar T.W., ‘The OECD Guidelines: Their Philosophy, History, 
Negotiation, Form, Legal Nature, Follow-up Procedures and Review’ in Horn N. (Ed), Legal 
Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises. Kluwer Publishers, Deventer, 
1980, 39,41, 127, 136.
649 Slayton P., ‘The OECD: ‘Soft Law’ for Transnational Business Transactions’ (1985) 14 
Canadian Council on Int L Proc 219, 220-1.
650 Economic Chamber of the Higher Court in Amsterdam, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 
1980/71.
651 Guertin D.L. and Blair J., ‘A Business View on the Implementation of Codes of Conduct’ 
in Horn N. (Ed), Legal Problems, supra «648, 295, 311.
652 New York City Employees Retirement System v American Brands 634 F Supp 1382 (SDNY 
1986).
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benefits which they may call upon States to observe under international law? 
Intergovernmental codes are analogous to workplace agreements where the 
solutions reached by employer and worker organisations are merely 
legitimated by States. The exclusive competence of States to provide an 
authoritative stamp which adopts non-law as law is partly diluted by the 
multipartite nature of participation. Where firms participate in the formulation, 
interpretation or implementation of an intergovernmental code the argument 
for holding them to account thereunder must be stronger.
The legal status of the instrument is less important where management draws 
upon intergovernmental codes in their routine commercial decision-making. 
Corporate commitments are not territorially-bounded. Firms ‘go beyond’ strict 
legal requirements when compliance with intergovernmental codes exceeds 
national legal requirements.653 The difficulty for the firm of extricating itself 
from intergovernmental processes is counterbalanced by further opportunities 
to influence State policy and binding regulation. Intergovernmental codes 
conveniently centralise transnational regulatory, functions, for example, with 
respect to the distribution and u ^ o f  pesticides)654 States can also permit
equality of participation by other non-State actors such as NGOs and trade 
unions to enhance the instrument’s effectiveness. Although models for 
prospective national regulation, intergovernmental codes can pull down more 
stringent national law and encourage a less deferential attitude to legally- 
binding agreements.
653 Vogelaar T., ‘The Guidelines in Practice’ (1977) 86 OECD Observer 7, 8.
654 Arts 3, 6.2.3, 7.2, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Conference Res 10/85 (1985) & 
UNGA Res 39/248 (1985) on International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of
Pesticides.
The legal impact of corporate behaviour, most explicitly evidenced by 
permitting corporate representatives to participate in the formulation of 
intergovernmental guidelines, also illustrates the extent to which firms 
influence the legal development of normative standards such as human rights. 
In 1998 the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights initiated several studies on the impact of transnational corporations 
upon human rights.655 Many human rights such as access to food, health, work 
and freedom of expression as well as the right of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources are affected by commercial practices with respect to 
technology transfer, restrictive business practices and intellectual property 
rights. A Special Rapporteur recommended that ‘it would be appropriate to 
examine all these questions in a broader framework’. 656 Particularly 
noteworthy were trends towards a ‘new comprehensive set of rules’ 
representing expected standards of corporate conduct. 657 All interested 
constituencies including business were invited to participate in developing a 
code of conduct for corporations. Differences of opinion emerged with 
respect to defining its scope of application, legal nature, title, purpose and
655 Weissbrodt D., ‘The Beginning of a Sessional Working Group on Transnational
Corporations within the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities’ in Kamminga M.T. & Zia-Zarifi S. (Eds), Liability of Multinational
Corporations under International Law. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, 119.
656 UNHRC, The realisation of economic, social and cultural rights: the question of
transnational corporations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/6, para 28.
657 UNHRC, The Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The impact o f the 
activities and working methods of transnational corporations on the full enjoyment of all 
human rights, in particular economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, 
bearing in mind existing international guidelines, rules and standards relating to the subject 
matter, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/12, para 74.
658 UNHRC, The realisation of economic, social and cultural rights: the question of
transnational corporations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/9, paras 5, 37.
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manner of implementation.659 Whereas one business representative considered 
that corporate participation was deficient another challenged the competence of 
the Human Rights Commission to establish a working group on the topic.660 
However, the Working Group also observed the failure of States to regulate 
effectively.661
The resulting Human Rights Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises of 2002 are noteworthy for 
several reasons.662 First, corporations participated in international lawmaking, 
albeit that where adopted by States the effort was ultimately self-regulatory. 
As stated in the Preamble, the Human Rights Principles ‘contribute to the 
making and development of international law’. Individual firms, corporate 
coalitions and organised business groups contributed to an authoritative set of 
principles to ‘establish a level playing field for business competition’. 
Second, ‘States possess the principal responsibility to assure the 
implementation of human rights and businesses should not be asked to take 
over the primary role of States’.664 States retain indirect legal responsibility in 
the event of corporate violations given their regulatory authority to adopt the
659 Report of the Seminar to discuss the Draft United Nations Human Rights Guidelines for 
Companies, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/WG.2/WP.l/Add.3 (2001).
660 UNHRC, Economic, social and cultural rights: report of the sessional working group on the 
working methods and activities of transnational corporations on its fourth session, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13, para 31.
661 Ibid, paras 12, 18.
662 UNHRC, Economic, social and cultural rights: Human Rights Principles and 
Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP. 1. See also the Commentary on the Principles, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/W G.2/WP. l/Add.2.
663 UNHRC, Economic, social and cultural rights: Human Rights Principles and 
Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP. 1/Add. 1, paras 16, 60.
664 Ibid, para 17.
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necessary measures of protection or prevention.665 Corporations are only 
obliged to respect and prevent human rights abuses as ‘recognised in 
international as well as national law’. Furthermore, paragraph 10 of the 
Principles states that corporations shall recognise and respect applicable norms 
of international law, national law, administrative practices and the rule of law. 
This is notwithstanding the admission that the Principles will be most effective 
when internalised as corporate policy or practice and enforced through self- 
assessment; in other words, through measures which obviate the regulatory 
role of States. Third, industry or commodity group initiatives, framework 
agreements between multinationals and workers’ organisations, self-imposed 
company codes and NGO or trade union model guidelines are quoted as 
relevant sources on a par with ILO Conventions, human rights treaties and 
intergovernmental guidelines.666
The ICC and IOE took the view that the Principles ‘would do more harm than 
good’ and affirmed their primary obligation to act in accordance with host 
State law.667 Human rights obligations apply to States not corporations, the 
Norms impose vague duties, the Sub-Commission has exceeded its authority, 
the principles of transparency and accountability have not been respected and
• • • f i fS lbusinesses are now a target for vilification. The Commission on Human 
Rights affirmed that the Principles have no legal standing and noted that the
665 Lopez Ostra v Spain (1994) ECHR Rep Ser A No 303-C, para 51; Guerra & Ors v Italy 
ECHR Rep 1998-1, No 64, para 58; Scott C., ‘Multinational Enterprises and Emergent 
Jurisprudence on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Eide A. et al. (Eds), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, Kluwer, The Hague, 2nd Ed, 2001.
666 Background Paper on Source Materials for the Draft Universal Human Rights Guidelines 
for Companies, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/WG.2/WP. l/Add.2 (2001).
667 Commission on Human Rights, Joint Written Statement submitted by the ICC and IOE, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44 (2003), 2.
668 ICC/IOE, Joint views on the draft Norms on the responsibilities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, Paris, 2004.
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Sub-Commission does not perform any monitoring function.669 The norm 
generating effect of the Principles remains to be seen: they could either 
constitute a major building block which crystallises State practice around 
corporate social responsibility or be disregarded as a mere statement of 
aspiration. Further consultation with relevant stakeholders including business 
to guide future developments in this field could usefully consider the virtues of 
independent corporate initiatives.
2.2 Corporate Standard-Setting Activity.
Corporations engage in technical standard-setting of a self-regulatory nature 
with respect to products or processes to facilitate trade and transfer technology. 
Standardisation may be defined as the process of establishing provisions for 
common and repeated use to achieve an optimal order in a given context with 
respect to actual and potential problems.670 Homogenous technical rules 
reflective of best commercial practice enable firms to avoid the expense of 
developing their own product specifications. International product standards
67 1are more important than national and regional ones. National standards
679must be justified where they appreciably depart from international ones. 
Furthermore, trade agreements such as those with respect to sanitary, 
phytosanitary or standards-related measures contemplate non-governmental
669 Commission on Human Rights, Report to ECOSOC on the Sixtieth Session o f the 
Commission, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/L.ll/Add.7, Decision 2004/116 on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights.
670 ISO/IEC, Guide 2, General terms and their definitions concerning standardisation and 
related activities, Geneva, 1991.
671 De Vries H., Standards for the Nation: Analysis of National Standardization Organisations. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1999,48, 222.
672 WTO, EC-Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/R/CAN 
(1997), paras 8.76, 8.90.
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participation.673 However, national product standards constitute technical 
barriers to trade where they favour the production specifications of local firms 
or are required for industry membership. Private bodies need not comply with 
intergovernmental agreements binding upon States. National entities 
responsible for standardisation are encouraged to accept the World Trade 
Organisation’s (WTO’s) Technical Barriers to Trade Code of Good Practice 
for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards.674 Standardising 
bodies shall use international standards where they exist or their completion is 
imminent unless they are ineffective or inappropriate.
2.2.1 The International Organisation for Standardisation.
International standards presumed to be WTO-consistent include those 
emanating from the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). With respect to the former, the private 
sector enjoys a prominent role on account of its technical expertise and 
possession of information. Codex standards are the product of government- 
appointed experts consulting with industry associations, circulating drafts to 
States and industry for comment and recommending adoption by States as 
national law. Corporate representatives participate in national delegations to 
Codex Committees and chair technical groups. Business associations such as
673 Eg Arts 712, 718, 904-10, NAFTA supra »476.
674 WTO, Table of Standardising Bodies having Notified Acceptance of the WTO Technical 
Barriers to Trade Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards, Geneva, 2001.
675 Paras E & F, WTO/ISO Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and 
Application of Standards, Annex 3 to Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT 
Secretariat, supra n342, Annex 1(A) Pt 6.
676 Wassermann U., ‘Codex Alimentarius’ (1969) 3(6) J  World Trade L 702.
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the US Grocery Manufacturers Association, US Food Processor Association, 
their European counterparts and the International Council of Grocery 
Manufacturers Associations undertake lobbying activity.
The ISO was originally established to influence national law.677 Contemporary 
objectives include removing trade barriers, assuring product quality to 
regulators and consumers and devising the technical basis for international 
regulation.678 The ISO enjoys UN consultative status and co-operates with its 
Specialized Agencies and the WTO.679 The ISO formulated product standards 
and management systems applicable to environmental protection at the 1992 
Rio Earth Summit.680 Since ISO standards are voluntary the ISO relies upon 
accuracy, acceptability and impartiality for its authority. Their formulation 
involves consensus building between industry, research institutes, States and
intergovernmental organisations. The process is dominated by firms given the
£0 1
lack of resources of consumer groups and developing country governments. 
The ISO considers that the institutions responsible for certification should be 
distinct from those responsible for developing the standard.682 Conformity 
assessment is undertaken by other specialist private sector organisations such 
as inspection bodies, accreditation agencies, testing laboratories and end users.
677 Latimer J., Friendship Among Equals, ISO, Geneva, 1997, 25-6, 60.
678 ISO, Raising Standards for the World: ISO’s long-range strategies 1999-2001, Geneva, 
1999. See eg Preamble & Annex 1, para 5, EC/Canada/Russian Federation, Agreement on 
Humane Trapping Standards 3 7 ILM 542 (1998).
679 WTO, Ministerial Decision 5(a) on Proposed Understanding on WTO-ISO Standards 
Information System, GATT Secretariat, Uruguay Round Final Act, supra n342.
680ISO/IEC Strategic Advisory Group on the Environment, ‘Standardisation of Environmental 
Management Systems-A model for discussion’, Geneva, 1993.
681 Consumers International, ‘Consumer Protection in the Global Marketplace-from a 
Consumer Perspective’, Kyoto, 2000.
682 ISO/IEC, Technical Report 17010: General Requirements for Bodies providing 
accreditation of inspection bodies, Geneva, 1998, para 4.2.1.
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The appeal of ISO standards is attributable to including the ultimate end users 
in the formulative process.683 Standard-setting levels the playing field for 
production specifications, grants automatic rights of market access and 
harmonises differing national requirements. Moreover, product standards 
preserve managerial autonomy and are outcome-orientated: they do not 
mandate technological choices or specify production processes. Corporate 
standard-setting activity obviates law’s authority where the implementation if 
not the formulation of standards are a market prerequisite or technically 
necessary. Indeed, constantly-evolving processes quickly render formal 
technologically-forcing regulation obsolete. Standard-setting lowers 
transactional costs, stimulates price competition, enables corporate 
interoperability and outsourcing, reduces risk through common production 
specifications, satisfies consumer expectations and provides a reputation for 
reliability. In short, business opportunities are created.
Furthermore, States become technologically dependent upon firms since it
simpler to adopt as national law standards which have been vindicated in
commercial practice. Critical technical decisions are made without
governmental input and become prohibitively expensive to reverse. The EC,
for example, collaborates with the Comite Europeen de la Normalisation, the
Comite Europeen de la Normalisation Electrotechnique and the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute. Indeed, the International Conference
on Harmonisation, for whom the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association is secretariat, rivalled the World Health
683Roht-Arriaza N., “ Soft Law’ in a ‘Hybrid’ Organisation: The International Organisation for 
Standardisation’ in Shelton D.( E d), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, 263, 279.
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Organisation as the principal forum for harmonising health standards. 
European, Japanese and American regulatory authorities collaborate with 
pharmaceutical industry associations to refine medicinal product registration
/'O f
procedures. Government authorities electronically exchange regulatory and 
product information with industry to reduce research and development 
expenditure and eliminate delay in getting novel medicines to the market.686
However, standard-setting is time and resource intensive. It also encounters 
those obstacles bedevilling lawmaking by States: incremental advances, 
obsolescence, organising relationships, acquiring technical information and
r o n
engendering competitive lobbying. National standards provide national 
corporations with advantages which other firms will seek to emulate or 
eliminate. Businesses espouse national legal models as appropriate for 
international adoption to realise globally their competitive advantage and 
increasing regulatory burdens for their rivals less familiar with them. National 
standard-setting bodies lobby for their standards to be internationally
/TOO
recognised for member benefit. Product or production standards also have a 
strategic value where patents are included. Since precise rules are more likely
684 Jordan D.W., ‘International Regulatory Harmonization: A New Era in Prescription Dmg 
Approval’ (1992) 25 Vanderbilt J  TransnationalL 471.
68 IFPMA, International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), The Value and Benefits of ICH to 
Industry, Geneva, 2000.
686 US Food and Drug Administration, Electronic Standards for the Transfer of Regulatory 
Information, Rockville, 1994.
687 Schwartz A. & Scott R.E., ‘The Political Economy of Private Legislatures’ (1995) 143(3) 
Uni o f Pennsylvania LR 595, 609-10.
688 Roht-Arriaza N., ‘Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organisation for 
Standardisation and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment’ (1995) 22(3) Ecology 
L Qtly 479, 500.
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to inefficiently allocate resources 689 , securing consensus and ensuring 
sensitivity to national conditions or existing trading relationships will produce 
broadly formulated standards. Benefits are limited to well-established firms 
where implementation or certification costs are prohibitively high. Finally, 
consumer organisations and NGOs may press for greater transparency, access 
and participation. Non-commercial stakeholders having interests in technical 
standard-setting are yet to be offered the open participatory processes 
demanded by firms for regulatory design within intergovernmental fora. 
Claims by NGOs to participate in processes having distinctly public 
international impacts may turn upon the legal status of the resulting 
instruments.
2.2.2 The Position o f Voluntary Corporate Initiatives under International Law.
The failure of States to regulate leaves space for other actors.690 Firms may 
make unilateral commitments to achieve specific objectives to enhance their 
reputations. The proliferating voluntary corporate initiatives include codes of 
conduct, declarations, environmental reporting, social auditing, standard- 
setting and eco-labelling activity.691 Drafting a code of conduct or declaration 
does not require formal lawmaking authority. However, States may establish
689 Ehrlich I. & Posner R.A., ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking’ (1974) 3 J  Legal 
Stud 257, 268. " \
690 Keamey N., 'Corporate Codes of Conduct: the Privatised Application of Labour Standards'
in Piccioto S. & Mayne R. (Eds), Regulating International Business: Beyond Liberalisation. > 
Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1999, 205, 208-9. '
691 Eg World Industry Conference on Environmental Management, Declaration, Official 
Report, Rotterdam, 1991; International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), ISO 14000- 
Meet the Whole Family!, Geneva, 1998.
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the enabling framework within which such initiatives arise.692 Voluntary 
corporate initiatives are addressed to various parties who may be internal to the 
firm (shareholders, employees or managers) or external (consumers, NGO’s, 
States, subcontractors and other firms such as insurance companies). 
Corporate compliance can forestall regulation when addressed to States. 
Although receptive to corporate codes, the UN Development Programme for 
example also seeks to improve their implementation.693 States can legally 
embed the industry’s own expectation of acceptable corporate behaviour. 
Voluntary initiatives can yield a competitive edge and act as a de facto barrier 
to market entry when addressed to rivals. Voluntary corporate initiatives 
evidence good corporate citizenship which distinguishes between products and 
extends market share. Such initiatives enrich staff morale and improve 
productivity. Although voluntary initiatives may increase corporate 
vulnerability to NGO criticism, codes can also deter litigation or decrease 
sanctions arising under formal regulation.
Corporate codes of conduct are also formulated by umbrella business 
organisations. For example, the ICC has drafted several environmental 
commitments which draw upon national regulation and promote self­
regulation.694 Competing values such as corporate freedom of expression
692 EEC, Council Regulation No 1836/93 (1993) allowing voluntary participation by 
companies in the industrial sector in a Community eco-management and audit scheme 
(EMAS) (1993) ECOJ LI 68 Vol 36; EEC, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on Environmental Agreements, COM (96) 561 Final, 
Brussels, 1996.
693 UNDP, Human Development Report: Human Development and Human Rights. Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2000, 125.
694 ICC, Environmental Guidelines for World Industry, Publication No 435, Paris, 1974 ; ICC, 
Business Charter supra n251.
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against a consumer’s right to privacy are sought to be balanced.695 The 
standards codify contemporary commercial practices to ensure their 
acceptability to firms and rely upon economic necessity for prospective 
adherence. 696 Codes of conduct are also formulated by industry trade 
associations.697 For example, the American Chemistry Council (ACC) 
obligates member companies to participate in the Responsible Care 
program.698 Responsible Care promotes efficiency, minimises prospective 
liability, reduces insurance costs and improves regulatory compliance by 
transposing national regulation into environmental management systems. 
Implementation is highest at the initial commitment stage and lowest during 
verification.699 The codes are also a platform for corporate legal activity: to 
encourage national legal reform, incorporated into agreements with States, 
integrated into regulatory programs and advocated to deter litigation.700 For 
example, the ACC’s Community Awareness and Emergency Response Code, 
introduced shortly after the Bhopal incident, is reflected under US law (the 
Superfimd Amendment and Reauthorisation Act) and UN standards (UNEP’s 
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level programme). 
The ICC presented the first Responsible Care status report to States at the UN 
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) during 1997 and 
showcased it at the UN General Assembly’s Special Session on Rio + 5.701
695 Eg ICC, International Code of Direct Selling, Paris, 1999.
696 ICC, Incoterms, London, 1990; ICC, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits, Paris, 1993.
697 Eg World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI), Code of Best Practice 
concerning Child Labour, Verbier, 1995.
698 ACC, Responsible Care Progress Report 2000, Virginia, 2000, 5, 28.
699 CEFIC, Improved Global Health Safety and Environment through Chemical Industry’s 
Responsible Care, Brussels/Washington, 1999.
700 ICCA, Responsible Care Status Report 2000, Geneva, 2000, 7-9, 13-4.
701 Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), Responsible Care Progress Report 1997: 
Meeting Expectations and Achieving Goals, Virginia, 1997, 15.
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The second report (timed for release at an ILO Conference) and the third (for 
the third IFCS meeting in 2000) described how Responsible Care formed the 
basis for memorandums of understanding with intergovernmental 
organisations.702
It would be easier to draw conclusions about the status of voluntary corporate 
initiatives under international law if it were possible to generalise about the 
state of contemporary commercial practices purported to be reflected by them. 
The instruments formulated by prominent corporations are limited to the best 
practice of those firms.703 The terminology of corporate commitments is 
variable and industry, firm and site-specific factors create further diversity. 
However, corporate consensus has reputedly crystallised around consumer 
protection, bribery and environmental protection.704 Furthermore, the majority 
of corporate codes address employees, refer to labour standards, are monitored 
by independent auditors and terminating business relationships is the measure 
of last resort.705 Virtually all codes contain a commitment to observe national 
law in all jurisdictions where the subscribing entity operates. International
H C\fL
standards are cited in only eighteen per cent of corporate codes. y
Corporate voluntary initiatives cannot be pigeonholed within orthodox legal 
categories. Their legal character is comparable to lex mercatoria insofar as
702 CEFIC, Responsible Care Status Report 2000, Brussels, 2001.
703 Compa L. & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere T., ‘Enforcing International Labour Rights through 
Corporate Codes of Conduct’ (1995) 33 Columbia J  Trans 7 L 663, 675-85. \
704 OECD, Deciphering Codes of Corporate Conduct: A Review of their Contents, Working u 
Paper No 99/2, Paris, 2000, 7, 13, 16, 28-9. C
705 OECD, Codes of Corporate Conduct: An Inventory, Paris, OECD Doc 
TD/TC/WP(98)74/FINAL (1999).
706 Ibid, 16, 20.
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they reflect best commercial practice.707 Companies welcome baselines which 
measure and manage corporate performance. The unilateral manifestation of 
corporate intent could be analogised to opinio juris giving rise to an 
expectation upon which others can rely. However, corporate monitoring is 
typically self-conducted through voluntary disclosure which protects 
confidential information. External assurance can be provided by independent 
verifiers such as NGO’s, trade unions, States and professional auditing firms. 
Ongoing oversight sustains corporate momentum towards adherence and 
continuous improvement irrespective of the formal legal status of the 
instrument. One business group responded that calls for legally binding and 
enforceable rules in the context of the Global Compact (considered in Chapter
70ROne) put ‘the clock back to a bygone era’. Voluntary corporate initiatives 
do not command recognition beyond the individual firm or industry. However, 
trade associations may enforce codes against non-members by referring the 
matter to national regulatory authorities.709 Other techniques include refusing 
business relationships, selective contracting and informal pressure. The critical 1 
question is not the legal status of the instrument but whether it effectively
71 ninfluences the decision-maker to apply the proscribed standard. 
Effectiveness requires user-friendly stand-alone instruments which are concise, 
clear and pragmatic, institutionalising review processes within corporate 
structures and demonstrating operational compliance. Deviation therefrom
  \ \
707 Horn N., ‘Codes of Conduct for MNE’s and Transnational Lex Mercatoria: An [' 
International Process of Learning and Law Making’ in Horn N. (Ed), Legal Problems, supra /  
nXXX,45, 81.
708 ICC Secretary-General Maria Cattaui, ‘Code of Conduct will Turn Clock Back’, Financial 
Times, 21 July 1999.
709 Eg IFPMA, Complaints Procedure to the Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices, 
Geneva, 1981 & 1994.
710 UNCTC, The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. New York, 
UN Doc ST/CTC/Ser.A/4 (1986), 27.
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will damage corporate reputations in a competitive market environment.
• 711Codes can also be rendered de facto enforceable through labelling.
Corporations reject the ‘one size fits all* approach of universally-applicable
organisational capacity. Universal rules, as noted above, are desirable only in 
technical fields. Effective guidelines accommodate unique project needs,
relations tool codes can deflect responsibility to other institutions or actors. 
Firms pursue a singular mandate to observe national law: it is not their 
responsibility to pre-empt governmental discretion concerning implementation 
and comply with international law if the host State elects not to. However, the 
reality is that unilaterally appropriating international standards for commercial 
practice obviates national lawmaking. Since their commitment and manner of
t i  r
implementation emanate from their own free will , corporations are, like 
States, the creators, addressees and subjects of voluntarily assumed obligations. 
Corporate voluntary initiatives also encourage trends away from command and 
L' control regulatory approaches. cLtO^
711 USCIB, ‘Statement on Codes of Conduct: Old Solutions to New Problems’, New York, 
1997; USCIB, ‘USCIB Position Paper on Codes of Conduct’, New York, 1998, 3-4.
712 OECD, ‘Multinational Enterprises and Environmental Protection: Implications for the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises’, Working Paper Vol 7 No 46, Paris, 1999, 
paras 9-11, 13-4.
13 ICC, ‘Responsible Business Conduct: An ICC Approach’, 2000, 3.
714 CRT, Principles for Business, 1995.
715 The Lotus Case supra ni l .
codes and defer to speciality, site-specific conditions and individual
717particular management styles and distinct business personalities. Firms or 
industry sectors seek to define their own responsibilities.713 Codes delineate 
the self-perceived corporate role and State responsibilities.714 As a public
I t  i<\jtwk
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The free choice of means principle in this context entails the most efficient 
production process in light of commercial conditions. Voluntary corporate 
initiatives are auto-interpreting and self-validating means for assessing 
corporate performance. However, poorly-performing firms do not possess
i
self-regulatory capacity. Moreover, the authority of the standard from which 
the code draws its substantive content may be weakened. Finally, selectively 
invoking international standards, self-identified prioritisation, variable 
definitions and inconsistent application carries the potential for fragmented 
applications. Embracing the normative legitimacy of international standards is 
an accessible route to universal respectability without the burden of 
institutional oversight. For example, the ILO is concerned by self-definition in 
preference to national or international standards, the piecemeal implementation 
of fundamental labour rights, the lack of employee participation and the 
difficulty of drawing accurate comparisons. Corporate codes were useful 
where States had not ratified the relevant Convention.717 The International 
Organisation of Employers (IOE) considers that codes complement national 
regulation where they are competition neutral and the functions of formulation 
and verification are left to companies. Invoking the theory of third parties, 
ILO Conventions are not appropriate for inclusion within corporate codes since 
they are addressed to States and drafted as legislative guidance where they
71 Rattain final binding form. For similar reasons corporations do not consider 
themselves bound to the ILO Fundamental Rights at Work Declaration 
notwithstanding that employers groups are part of the ILO’s tripartite
716 ILO, Overview of Global Developments and Office Activities concerning Codes of 
Conduct, Social Labeling and other Private Sector Initiatives addressing Labour Issues, ILO 
Doc GB.273AVP/SDL/1 (1998), paras 49, 50 59, 112.
7,7 Ibid, paras 120, 122, 124.
718 IOE, Codes of Conduct, Geneva, 1999, 12.
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structure. 719 ILO Conventions and Recommendations referred to by the
720Tripartite Declaration retain a separate application for States party to them. 
The IOE instead undertook to research the viability of corporate codes in
771conjunction with the ILO.
Although considering non-binding instruments to be ineffective, several NGOs 
are willing to enforce corporate voluntary initiatives. NGOs evaluate
777commercial practices against a firm’s own stated benchmarks. NGOs, trade 
unions and consumer groups also formulate their own codes to define
n'y'i
standards of expected corporate behaviour. International labour standards 
are emphasised by trade unions and consumer organisations promote respect 
for competition law and advertising regulation.724 Such codes compete for 
recognition and adoption by firms. For example, the Forest Stewardship 
Council and the American Forest and Paper Association’s Sustainable Forestry 
Initiative both offer templates on timber management and harvesting practices.
719 USCIB, Position Paper 1998 supra n il  1, 3.
720 ILO, References to Conventions and Recommendations in the Tripartite Declaration (1988) 
Official Bulletin Vol 71 Ser A No 1, 50.
721 IOE, Resolution on Codes of Conduct, Geneva, 1999.
722 The Inter-Faith Centre on Corporate Responsibility/Ecumenical Council for Corporate 
Responsibility/Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Principles for Global 
Corporate Responsibility: Benchmarks for Measuring Business Performance, Ontario, 1995 & 
1998.
723 Eg Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, The Maquiladora Standards of Conduct, San 
Antonio, 1991.
724 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), The ICFTU/ITS Basic Code of 
Labor Practice, Brussels, 1997; Consumers International, A Consumer Charter for Global 
Business, London, 1997.
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2.2.3 Corporate Voluntary Initiatives as Platforms for Influencing Regulation.
NGOs and firms share the intention of influencing government policy and 
industry opinion. This need not be for the same purposes or in the same 
direction. For example, the Energy and Biodiversity Initiative (EBI) involved 
collaboration between five environmental NGOs and four energy firms with a 
view to formulating biodiversity conservation standards for oil and gas 
operations (see further Annex 9). ChrevronTexaco, ‘made a judgment that it 
would be better to participate in order to help shape the discussion and 
products that we expect would set standards for industry behaviour and 
performance’. 725 Although operational guidelines for environmental 
management have hitherto been developed unilaterally by energy companies or 
NGOs, collaborative action ‘puts the stamp of approval by five highly 
recognised, international NGOs on the products’ and provides ‘another layer of 
legitimacy’. ChevronTexaco moreover considered that valuable perspectives 
could be solicited from individuals ‘who could effectively represent 
government views and practices’. Indeed, Shell would have conducted more 
consultative workshops with ‘selected government departments’.726
The EBI products will be employed as part of permit negotiations with 
States.727 They are also a platform for intergovernmental negotiations since 
they constitute guidelines on what should be expected from companies’ 
operations and what policy standards should be with respect to environmental
725 Written response to questionnaire by Ms Kit Armstrong & Mr Patrick O’Brien, 
ChevronTexaco, 8th August 2003.
r72^  Written response to questionnaire by Mr Sachin Kapila, Shell, 18th August 2003.1 Tully S., ‘Corporate-NGO Partnerships, Biodiversity Conservation and Protected Areas: \  Lessons from the Energy and Biodiversity Initiative’ (2004) 1 NZYIL 59. „___ 1
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protection. However, one needs to be ‘cautious drawing conclusions about the 
overall EBI effort from an industry perspective’. 728 ChevronTexaco 
anticipates that the EBI guidelines will ‘produce incremental improvements in 
how we focus on biodiversity in some specific relevant areas above our already 
good practice.’ It added that:
‘Anything that gets done by individual companies in the field will be 
voluntary with each company having different needs and priorities as 
well as organisational structures and philosophies (central 
control/decentralised authority and decision-making). The word 
‘enforce’ implies a legal compliance obligation, which doesn’t exist.’
Shell observed that ‘each organisation is very well-known in its own field and 
is in itself accountable either to its members or shareholders’. Furthermore, 
‘from the industry’s standpoint, to have agreed working documents that might 
influence the industry with the aid of conservation organisations was a very 
powerful mechanism.’
The EBI illustrates that corporations can consult with States when formulating 
industry codes. Such initiatives in turn form the basis for influencing 
regulatory development and market conditions. On the other hand, their 
practical impact upon market leaders may be negligible insofar as they already 
implement best commercial practice and voluntariness poses obstacles to
728 Correspondence with Kit Armstrong, ChevronTexaco, 20 December 2003.
212
accountability. The expense and effort is justified provided subsequent 
regulation follows the path set down by commercial practice.
729Codes are a ‘springboard for legally creative action’ in other ways. The 
commercial response to the ILO Tripartite Declaration -  novel corporate 
guidelines, labour regulation lobbying and collaborating with governments for 
legislative amendments - prompted the ILO to affirm State responsibility for 
lawmaking.730 Similarly, the UN Code on Transnational Corporations was a
77 1model for over two hundred company-specific instruments. Corporate 
voluntary initiatives are a platform enabling participation in other processes. 
Indeed, codes explicitly declare a corporate intent to influence national
777regulation and collaborate with States in the lawmaking process. Codes 
‘lead the way’ in regulatory development since what is attainable voluntarily 
can subsequently become mandatory. Such instruments are a significant 
evolutionary step in lawmaking or a gap-filler within regulatory vacuums 
which capture the field with a first-draft advantage. Adoption by States as law 
increases regulatory compliance burdens for rivals, requires little adaptation 
effort and shifts enforcement responsibility onto government.
However, it is equally plausible that codes preserve the legal status quo and 
commercial practices are unaffected. Corporate voluntary initiatives ‘chill’
729 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations: Certain Modalities for Implementation of a Code of 
Conduct in Relation to its Possible Legal Nature, UN Doc E/C.10/AC.2/9 (1978), 8.
730ILO, Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises, Report of the Working Group entrusted 
with analysing the reports submitted by governments and by employers’ and workers’ 
organisations, Doc GB.268/MNE/1/2, Geneva, 1997, para 207.
731 UNCTC, 'Corporate Guidelines' (1978) 1(5) CTC Reporter 16.
732 American Petroleum Institute, Environmental Health and Safety Guiding Principles, 
Washington DC, 1999.
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regulatory development where firms can resist demands for binding
regulation. 733 Weak terminology and vaguely-formulated aspirational 
principles do not meaningfully inform corporations of how to respond to 
specific circumstances. Their frequent internal contradiction - mandating 
national legal compliance and respecting international standards -  does not 
suggest which enjoys supremacy. 734 Employers are expected to develop 
parallel means of implementation where national labour rights are restricted. 
Finally, codes shield corporations from divestment pressure and provide 
operational legitimacy.
Corporate voluntary initiatives paradoxically affirm lawmaking by States. 
Codes and standards require an appropriate institutional setting: a homogenous 
industry of few players or an industry association possessing enforcement 
powers.736 Codes are at best a partial solution to policy questions.737 By
• ' 7 ' i o*\ themselves they do not eliminate unconscionable labour practices. Codes
7^ 0require legislative support to be truly effective. Legally enforceable rules 
ensure a minimum regulatory floor universally applicable to all market actors.
733 Mayne R., ’Regulating TNC’s: The Role of Voluntary and Governmental Approaches’ in 
Piccioto, Regulating International Business, supra «690, 235, 246-7.
734 Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), Charter for Good Corporate 
Behaviour, Tokyo, 1991 & 1996.
735 WFSGI, Committee on Ethics and Fair Trade, Model Code of Conduct, Verbier, 1997.
736 ECOTECH/World Business Council for Sustainable
Development/USCIB/Keidanren/WWF/UNEP, Business Voluntary Initiatives to Address 
Climate Change, Final Report, Brussels, 1999, 15, 57.
737 US Department of Labour, The Apparel Industry and Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the 
International Child Labour Problem?, Washington DC, 1996, Chapter 4.
738 Krug N.J., ‘Exploiting Child Labour: Corporate Responsibility and the Role of Corporate 
Codes of Conduct’ (1998) 14 NYL Sch J  Hum Rts 651, 675.
739 Eg Slepak Principles Act HR 2366 101st Cong 1st Sess (1989); Miller Principles Act HR 
3489 102nd Cong s401-05 (1991); US House of Representatives, A Bill to require nationals o f 
the United States that employ more than twenty persons in a foreign country to implement a 
Corporate Code o f Conduct with respect to employment o f those persons and for other 
purposes, Washington DC, 6 April 2000; European Parliament, Resolution A4-0508/98 (1998) 
on EU standards for European Enterprises operating in developing countries: towards a 
European Code of Conduct.
Voluntary corporate initiatives complement regulation: outcomes have a sense 
of ownership, are participatory in design and delivery, build partnerships and 
generate renewed commitments.740 States bear the responsibility to construct 
appropriate enabling regulatory frameworks if multi-stakeholder participation 
is sought to be achieved.741 Codes of conduct may be juxtaposed with formal 
regulatory tools.742 However, the corporate willingness to adopt voluntary 
codes of conduct on account of their non-binding character can deter resort to 
command and control by States. Business may persuade governments that 
legislation is uncertain, unnecessary or unworkable.743 Corporate concerns 
include the extraterritorial application of national law and adverse impacts 
upon commercial activity.744 Nonetheless, self-regulatory corporate codes of 
conduct, corporate participation within intergovernmental codes, national law 
and interactions between these tools are options for States in fulfilling their 
regulatory responsibility.
Conclusions
The development of custom is complicated by dynamic processes involving 
cross-cutting economic pressures, sporadic interactions between multiple 
actors and sui generic factual conditions. The extent of corporate participation
740 Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), Voluntary Initiatives and Agreements, 
Secretary-General Report, UN Doc E/CN. 17/1999/12 (1999), paras 18-9; CSD, Draft 
Resolution on Voluntary Initiatives and Agreements, para 1.  „
741 CSD, Multi-stakeholder Consultative Meeting on Voluntary Initiatives and Agreements, 
Toronto, 1999, Chairman’s Summary, para 12.
742 Eg Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences 13 ILM 912 (1974); 
Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999 (Aus).
743 Australian Parliament, Report on the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, Canberra, 2001, 
para 4.53.
^Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint 
Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities Inquiry into the provisions o f the 
Corporate Code of Conduct Bill, Canberra, 2001, 6.
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within this amorphous norm generation and implementation process is difficult 
to identify. Corporations prompt reactions by States, engender competitive 
regulatory behaviour and act as conduits for national standards. Investment 
offers induce lower national standards at the point of entry into a State and 
deter voluntary corporate divestment at the point of exit. ‘Widespread and 
consistent’ State practice is consequently more or less difficult to discern. 
Rather than perpetuating a State-centric appreciation of custom where 
commercial influences are hidden, unaccounted for but legally irrelevant, it is 
preferable to acknowledge that corporate influence and determine what weight 
to properly attach to it.
The multiple influences exerted by non-State actors upon State practice are 
reflected by the expanding sources of international law. Novel processes 
which contemplate formal participation by non-State actors produce outcomes 
that cannot be addressed in conventional legal terms, nor readily dismissed as 
non-law. Intergovernmental codes initiate the communicative processes 
inherent in law design between interested actors where formal status is 
irrelevant. Mutually-agreed solutions are identified and subsequently adopted 
by States. Denying the legal effects of codes of conduct for firms but 
recognising intergovernmental codes as a potential source of law for States 
suggests a doctrinal double-standard. Furthermore, corporate voluntary 
initiatives and technical standard-setting are the functional equivalent of and 
potentially substitutable for law. Their lack of legal authority iaimmateriaQif 
behavioural changes are otherwise effected and enforcement procedures are 
unnecessary for prospective adherence. However, voluntary corporate
216
initiatives complement the regulatory role of States. Prominent market actors 
may lead regulatory development but regulatory floors are required to meet 
minimum social objectives and provide a uniform basis of competition within 
industry.
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Chapter Three 
Treaty Formation and Implementation
Classical international law posits that only States possess the legal capacity to 
conclude treaties and that only heads of government, diplomats and other 
accredited representatives can express the consent of that State to be bound.745 
However, the negotiation and implementation of treaties is an elongated and 
dynamic process involving multiple entities interacting within various fora. 
Indeed, the techniques commonly employed by non-State actors blur the 
boundaries between creating, applying and enforcing international law.746 The 
distinctive contribution of corporations to treaty negotiations is observable in 
the context of several multilateral legal regimes described in Part One. In 
particular, the evolving regimes with respect to ozone layer depletion and 
climate change usefully illustrate the full range of modalities for corporate 
participation as well as their respective merits. These topics constitute the case 
study considered in Part Two. Part Three examines intergovernmental efforts 
to enrich deliberations by soliciting contributions from non-State actors 
including corporations such as proposals which define the participatory 
conditions for their inclusion. The possibility that the accreditation criteria and 
procedural rules applicable to Conferences of the Parties support an emergent 
right of participation for non-State actors generally is discussed in Part Four. 
This question is significant since these matters determine access to conference 
venues, define the formal entitlement of non-State actors to submit written
745 Arts 6, 7, Vienna Convention on Treaties supra nXXX.
746 Sands P., ‘The Role of NGOs in Enforcing International Environmental Law’ in Butler W.E. 
(Ed), Control over Compliance with International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 
1991,61,65.
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statements or make oral interventions and provide platforms upon which 
additional informal activities can be undertaken. Part Five evaluates 
commercial influences upon the substantive outcome of treaty negotiations and 
Part Six the corporate role during subsequent implementation. It is evident 
that commercial objectives are espoused through States, in conjunction with 
intergovernmental organisations and independently. More challenging are the 
difficulties for business engagement where fluid informal practices are likely 
to exceed procedural rules and inter-firm differences preclude the identification 
of a common industry perspective.
1. Illustrations of Corporate Participation in Treaty Negotiations.
This Part selects several treaty topics, illustrates commercial contributions to 
negotiations, foreshadows the techniques employed and identifies several 
generalisable lessons. The treaties concern the exploitation of natural 
resources (the law of the sea, biological diversity), chemical weapons, 
international trade, investment protection and finally regulatory attempts to 
address adverse corporate behaviour (bribing government officials, anti­
competitive behaviour and tobacco advertising).
It is important to first note that corporations seek to influence the State’s 
position prior to negotiations. The degree to which corporations are 
institutionally embedded within governmental decision-making varies between 
States. National legal processes range from ad hoc communication channels 
between the public and private sectors to corporate participation within
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advisory standing committees. 747 Corporations can exert a 'pervasive 
influence’ on national political processes.748 Their lobbying efforts include a 
range of activities such as study groups, disseminating reports and economic 
analysis, conducting surveys and interviews, contributing to parliamentary 
inquiries, organising speeches and seminars and recruiting public relations 
firms, consultants or law firms. States solicit and corporations submit business 
perspectives on proposed regimes. Corporations possess technical information 
relevant to the economic and resource implications of contemplated legal 
obligations. Industry submissions reduce the information-gathering burden for 
States, informing them of what they can commit to and deliver, and business 
objectives and points of concession contribute to national negotiating positions. 
Several examples will serve to illustrate the impact of commercial influences 
on the international plane.
1.1. The Law o f the Sea.
Corporations have long contributed to the law of the sea including developing 
the notion of freedom on the high seas.749 The UK’s attempts to prevent 
smuggling during the eighteenth century led to the definition of contiguous
*7 f A
zones beyond the territorial sea. Accounts have been provided elsewhere of 
how Western mining consortia influenced their home States to secure
747 US President’s Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations 19 USC 2155 
(1976).
748 UNCTC, TNCs in World Development: A Re-evaluation. New York, 1978, 131.
749 Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum (1633) was a legal opinion for the Dutch East India 
Company.
750 Hovering Acts 1736-1876 (UK).
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preparatory investment protection751 during initial negotiations of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning prospective commercial 
exploitation of the deep seabed.752 Contractors and companies may submit 
disputes to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.753 A seabed 
mining code also provides for the protection of commercially sensitive 
information and limited security of tenure.754 Other treaties touching upon 
maritime activity such as species conservation similarly seek to maximise 
optimum sustainable yield but maintain orderly industrial development.755
The Torrey Canyon and Exxon Valdez disasters drew attention to the 
environmental and economic costs associated with maritime oil pollution. Oil 
companies and the shipping industry initially sought to forestall regulation by 
adopting voluntary contractual principles, additional compensation 
mechanisms and codes of conduct.756 These voluntary initiatives facilitated 
the transition to a conventional agreement. 757 States delineated financial 
burdens such that where shipowners are insolvent the compensation will
751 Deepsea Ventures Inc, Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights and 
Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investment 14ILM 51 (1975) & Reply of 
the UK Government 14 ILM 196 (1975).
752 Dubow M., ‘UNCLOS: Questions of Equity for American Business’ (1982) 4 
Northwestern J  Int’l L & Bus 172, 186; Brown E.D., ‘UNCLOS 1982: The British 
Government’s Dilemma’ (1984) 37 Current Leg Prob 259, 281-3.
753 Arts 186-7, 288(2), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc A/CONF.62/122 
(1982).
754 UN, ‘Seabed Council Receives Mining Code Draft’, Press Release SEA/1578, 1998.
755 Eg Art 6, UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UNCLOS of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 34 ILM 1542 (1995).
756 Eg The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution 8 ILM 
497 (1969).
757 The International Chamber of Shipping, the Oil Companies International Marine Forum, the 
Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum and the International Association 
of Independent Tanker Owners participated during the negotiations of the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 30 ILM 733 (1991).
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emanate from oil companies.758 Shipowners had unsuccessfully challenged a 
comparable scheme before national courts.759 More recent instruments have
7<TA f
established the joint, several and limited liability of shipowners. Reducing 
oil discharges is attributed to a regulatory structure which exploited the
Hfs\different preferences and capacities of tanker operators.
1.2. The Convention on Biological Diversity.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to fairly and equitably 
share the benefits of genetic resources and ensure technology transfer upon 
agreed terms.762 The biotechnology industry favoured regulation to ensure
n fs i
continued access to medicinal, agricultural and pharmaceutical materials. 
During negotiations the ICC was concerned by the excessive costs of acquiring 
genetic resources and the risk that intellectual property protection may be 
undermined.764 The ICC utilised orthodox principles of treaty interpretation to 
assert that the CBD and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) were compatible but in the event of
7 /rr
conflict the latter prevailed. The US Council for International Business
758 Preamble, Brussels International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 11 ILM 284 (1972).
759 International Association o f Independent Tanker Owners v Locke 148 F.3d 1053 (1990).
760 Arts 5, 7(1), 8, Brussels International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 9 ILM 45 (1970); Art 4, 1992 London Amending Protocol IMO Doc LEG/CONF.9/15
(1992).
61 Mitchell R.B., ‘Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-State Actors and Intentional Oil 
Pollution’ (1994) 6(4) J  Theoretical Politics 625.
762 Arts 1, 19(2), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 31 ILM 818 (1992).
763 WBCSD/World Conservation Union (IUCN), Business and Biodiversity: A Guide for the 
Private Sector, Geneva, 1997.
764 ICC, Comments on the UN Convention on the Protection of Biodiversity, Paris, 1992.
765 ICC, ‘TRIPS and the Biodiversity Convention: What Conflict?’, Paris, 1999; International 
Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), Position on TRIPs and the Environment, Virginia, 
1999, 3.
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sought the adoption of the least trade restrictive measures.766 The chemical 
industry supported protecting indigenous knowledge and to avoid weakening 
TRIPs advocated for the creation of a sui generis right under WIPO auspices 
prior to transferral to the WTO.767 Business groups acknowledged that the 
environmental credibility of the CBD had to be enhanced if trade regime 
integrity was to be maintained.768 Such perspectives were espoused by the US 
government. 769 Other States acknowledged the slim prospects of yielding 
commercial benefits and the lengthy investment cycles required to develop 
pharmaceutical products.770 Voluntary corporate codes and novel contractual 
arrangements had emerged between pharmaceutical companies and NGOs in 
defining ‘fair and equitable’ access to genetic resources. 771 However, 
legislation was necessary to support material transfer agreements, facilitate 
environmental impact assessments and enable the acquisition of any necessary 
consent. 772 The private sector participated in preparing guidelines which 
elucidated respective roles and responsibilities in the interim.773
766 USCIB, Business Statement on the Biosafety Protocol, New York, 1992, 2.
767 CEFIC, The Chemical Industry Comments on the Legal Protection o f Traditional 
Knowledge and Access to Genetic Resources-Patenting, Brussels, 2000.
768 US BRT, Blueprint 2001: Drafting Environmental Policy for the Future, Washington DC, 
2001, 10-13.
769 US, Declaration made at the UNEP Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the 
CBD 31 ILM 848(1992).
770 CBD, Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits arising from the Use of Genetic Resources, 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/3/Inf.53 (1996), 5, 13.
771 Goldman K.A., ‘Compensation for Use of Biological Resources under the CBD: 
Compatibility of Conservation Measures and Competitiveness o f the Biotechnology Industry’ 
(1994) 25(2) Law & Policy in Int’l Bus 695, 720.
72 World Resources Institute (WRI), Biological Diversity, Washington DC, 1997,4.
773 Tully S., 'The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing' 
(2003) 12(1) RECIEL 84.
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1.3. Chemical Weapons.
The concerns of the chemical industry during negotiations for the Chemical 
Weapons Convention included intellectual property rights, intrusive
• • 774inspections, monitoring costs and onerous reporting obligations. The 
chemical industry pointed to the complex nature of multi-purpose operational 
facilities and to deter strict command and control regulations offered to open 
all production sites for inspections.775 Chemical manufacturing associations 
provided technical advice to devise an independent verification system which 
balanced the commercial interest in avoiding operational disruptions with the 
State interest in securing effective compliance.776 It also offered to assist 
eliminating the illegitimate chemical trade and to harmonise national customs 
procedures.777 States incorporated these concerns within their deliberations 
and agreed to adopt measures prohibiting legal persons from undertaking 
chemical weapons-related activity. Corporations complemented these 
commitments by adopting ‘soft’ legal instruments which were compatible with 
the further implementation of the Convention.779
774 Zeftel L., Weinberg P. & Schroy J., ‘Approaches to the Use of Instruments in Monitoring 
the Production of Chemical Weapons and Precursor Chemicals’ in Lundin S.J. (Ed), Non- 
Production by Industry of Chemical-Warfare Agents: Technical Verification under a Chemical 
Weapons Convention. Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, 136.
775CEFIC/Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), Position on Chemical Weapons Issues 
Affecting the Chemical Industry, Brussels, 1991.
776 Trapp R., Verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention: On-Site Inspection in 
Chemical Industry Facilities. Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, 90.
777 ICCA, Memorandum of Understanding between the International Council of Chemical 
Associations (ICCA) and the World Customs Organisation, 1994.
778 Art 7, UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 3 2 ILM 800 (1993).
779 UNEP, Code of Ethics on the International Trade in Chemicals, Nairobi, 1994.
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1.4. International Trade Agreements.
Firms from industrialised States enjoying the advantages of pre-establishment 
(prior experience, expertise and financial strength) are better positioned than 
small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly those in developing States, to 
exploit trade liberalisation. 780 Business groups customarily issue position 
statements before each round of trade negotiations, assess the outcome and 
inform members.781 The US Council for International Business promotes the 
extent of its influence over trade negotiations as a means of attracting 
members.782 It perceives little merit in forging a consensus with trade unions 
or NGOs and argues that constituencies should be consulted separately. 
During the Uruguay Round business NGOs and corporations worked through 
governments to influence negotiations but other NGOs did not enjoy
*7$Mequivalent access. Indeed, the objectives of the American chemical industry
were more often achieved than their Canadian counterparts during the Tokyo 
Round: the former enjoyed legislatively-entrenched processes for directly 
engaging with government officials whereas the latter was excluded from
780 Woolfson P., ‘The WTO Financial Services Agreement and Its Impact on Insurers-A 
European Perspective’ (1998) 6 Int’lInsurLR 189, 193.
781 Eg CRT, Trade Policy Position Statement, Caux, 1993 & 1994; ICC, The GATT 
Negotiations: A Business Guide to the Results of the Uruguay Round, ICC Pub No 533, Paris, 
1994.
782 USCIB, USCIB Applauds WTO Decision on the Basic Telecommunications Agreement, 
New York, 1998.
783 USCIB, Civil Society and Trade Negotiations: A Business Perspective, New York, 1998.
784 Sell S.K., ‘Multinational Corporations as Agents of Change: The Globalisation of 
Intellectual Property Rights’ in Cutler A.C. et al (Eds), Private Authority and International 
Affairs. SUNY Press, New York 1999, 169.
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national delegations and trade associations lacked an effective and co-
• 785ordinated advisory capacity.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) resulted inter alia from 
collaborative effort by the Canadian Business Council on National Issues, the 
US BRT and the Mexican Council of Businessmen.786 Redrafting the rules of 
origin provide an opportunity to remedy legal uncertainty.787 Mexican firms 
channelled commercial opinion through a single business entity, established 
cross-border alliances, conducted sectoral studies through working groups to 
identify market access objectives and assisted the national delegation with 
simultaneous feedback during negotiations.788 US business coalitions filed an 
amicus brief supporting the US government’s view that NGO’s lacked the 
right to compel environmental impact assessments prior to NAFTA 
ratification.789
Industry has been particularly active in bringing matters within the remit of the 
World Trade Organisation during treaty negotiation rounds. For example, US 
pharmaceutical and entertainment firms sought to extend the US legal model 
of restrictive patent law to other States. The Intellectual Property Committee
785 Denis J.-E. & Poirier R., ‘The North American Chemical Industry in the Tokyo Round: 
Participation of Canadian and American Firms in the GATT Negotiation Process’ (1985) 19(4) 
J  World Trade L 315, 319, 328-9, 342.
786 Jacek H.J., ‘The Role of Organised Business in the Formation and Implementation of 
Regional Trade Agreements in North America’ in Greenwood J. & Jacek H. (Eds), Organised 
Business and the New Global Order. MacMillan Press Ltd, Hampshire, 2000, 39, 39-40.
787 Cantin F.P. & Lowenfeld A.F., ‘Rules of Origin, The Canada-US FTA and the Honda Case’
(1993) 87(3) AJIL 375, 385-7.
788 Lara de Sterlini M., ‘The Participation of the Private Sector in International Trade 
Negotiations: The Mexican Experience with NAFTA’,
(http://www.intracen.org/worldtradenet/docs/information/referencemat/roomnextdoor.pdf) 
(accessed 25 September 2004).
789 Public Citizen v US Trade Representative 5 F.3d 549 (1993).
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proposed a draft text and argued that intellectual property protection was a 
commercial right, pointed to revenue lost to illegitimate producers and 
suggested that patent protection contributed to economic development.790 It 
claimed credit for contributing to the negotiating position of the US and the 
interests of the semiconductor industry were specifically recognised within 
Article 31 of the resulting TRIPs Agreement.791 Similarly, financial services 
are subject to diverse regulatory requirements and transnational firms are at a
7Q9competitive disadvantage if they are not transparently applied. The US 
Coalition of Service Industries played an instrumental role in shaping the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. The US Business Roundtable has 
proposed a Transparency of Government Policies Agreement for the WTO 
which contemplates the publication of rules, notification of intended regulatory 
changes and the adoption of procedures which enable private sector input into 
rulemaking.793
1.5. Investment Protection Agreements.
Business has sought to protect private property from host State interference 
through investment protection agreements since the 1930’s. ICC proposals to 
minimise sovereign risk including codes of conduct pre-date intergovernmental
790 IPC/Keidanren/UNICE, Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property: 
Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and US Business Communities, Brussels, 1988.
791 Weissman R., ‘A Long, Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonise 
Global Intellectual Property Rules and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to 
Third World Countries’ (1996) 17(4) UPa J In t’lEcon L 1069, 1084.
792 UNCTC, TNCs. Services and the Uruguay Round. UN Doc ST/CTC/103 (1990), 111.
793 US BRT, Preparing for New WTO Trade Negotiations to Boost the Economy, Washington 
D C .J^T fc. 15.
efforts.794 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) confer upon firms incorporated 
within one State Party treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
national firms within another. BITs are modelled upon the Abs-Shawcross 
Draft Convention first proposed by the Association for the Promotion and 
Protection of Foreign Investment, an entity composed of lawyers and 
businesspersons, and introduced to the OECD through the ICC.795
Negotiations to conclude a universal investor protection agreement most
70 f srecently include the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). 
Controversies arose in relation to the strict disciplines imposed upon the 
regulatory competence of States including ‘measures having the equivalent 
effect’ of expropriation. Indigenous groups and NGOs had asserted before 
national courts that licenses were merely privileges subject to modification and 
revocation in the ordinary exercise of regulatory authority and not property 
rights. 797 Although negotiators proposed a 'right to regulate' clause States 
would have to justify decisions as complying with ‘normal governmental 
activity’. Notwithstanding business resistance a ‘non-lowering of standards’
7QRclause was proposed to protect labour and environmental concerns. The 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Business Council of 
Australia and the Australian Industries Group for example became dissatisfied 
with the secretive nature of intergovernmental negotiations and selective
794 ICC, International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments, ICC Pub No 129, Paris, 
1949; ICC, Guidelines for International Investment, ICC Pub No 272, Paris, 1972.
795 UNCTC/ICC, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991. UN Doc ST/CTC/136 (1992), 2; 
ICC, Bilateral Treaties for International Private Investment, Paris, 1976.
796 OECD, Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, OECD Doc DAFFE/MAI/NM(98)2 
(1998) & REV1 (1998).
797 Minors Oposa v Secretary o f the Department o f Environment and Natural Resources 
(DENR) 33 ILM 173 (1994).
798 BIAC/ICC, Letter to the Editor, The Financial Times, 15 January 1998.
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consultation processes.799 NGO criticism and numerous derogations by States 
ultimately contributed to the temporary deferral of an international investment 
agreement. Corporations can be expected to continue to address the 
circumstance that the rights they acquire under bilateral investment agreements 
are sui generis and do not evidence customary norms for commercial 
benefit.800
1.6. Bribing Foreign Government Officials.
Allegations of bribing foreign government officials arose prominently for US 
corporations during the 1970s. Bilateral agreements were concluded between 
States to facilitate information exchange with a view to prosecution.801 Illicit 
payments (but not their tax deductibility) were criminalised under US law. 
US corporations argued that unilateral legislation held them to higher standards 
than competitors and with the support of their home government sought to 
extent the prohibition universally.803 The ICC also called for stringent national 
regulation supported by a multilateral treaty.804 It adopted a code of conduct to 
stimulate self-regulatory action. 805 The resulting instruments include an 
intergovernmental code of conduct for public officials, a General Assembly
799 Australian Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, Report No 18, Canberra, 1999, paras 7.28-7.31, 8.16.
800 Barcelona Traction supra n26, 40.
801 Japan-US, Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in 
the Lockheed Matter 15 /LM278 (1976).
802 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (US) 17ILM 214 (1978) & 28 ILM 455 (1989).
803 US, Statement of Deputy Secretary of State on Corrupt Practices including US 
Multinationals Abroad 15 ILM 469 (1976).
804 ICC, Report of the Commission on Ethical Practices, Extortion and Bribery in Business 
Transactions, ICC Pub No 315, Paris, 1977, Pt 2.
805 ICC, Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
Paris, 1978, revised 1996 & 1999.
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declaration and several regional agreements.806 The ICC and the International 
Organisation of Employers also observed sessions of ECOSOC’s
• 807intergovernmental working group which formulated a draft Convention. 
The General Assembly called upon companies to observe national law and 
ethical standards.808 Commercial practices to eliminate the practice include 
corporate voluntary initiatives, record-keeping, whistle-blowing and internal 
compliance mechanisms. 809 Businesses have also called for independent
Ol A
monitoring and systematic auditing as a precursor to an eventual
international instrument.
1.7. Anti-competitive Behaviour.
Anti-competitive behaviour or restrictive business practices has given rise to
o i  1
bilateral and regional measures of co-operation and information exchange. 
States may request others to adopt enforcement measures and defer or suspend 
their own. 812 States and corporate experts have formulated a restrictive 
business practices code under the auspices of UN Conference on Trade and
806 Eg UNGA Resolution 3514 (1975); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, OECD Doc 
DAFF/IME/BR(97) 16/FINAL (1997).
807 ECOSOC, Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of 
Corrupt Practices in International Commercial Transactions, UN Doc E/6006 (1977), Part A.
808 UNGA Resolutions 51/59 (1996), para 10 & 51/191 (1996), para 6.
809 OECD, Bribery and Codes of Corporate Conduct: An Analysis, Paris, 2000, 2, 9; The 
Conference Board, Global Corporate Ethics Practices: A Developing Consensus, Report No 
1243-99-RR, Washington DC, 1999.
810 Eg Caux Roundtable (CRT), Anti-Corruption Measures, Singapore, 2000.
8,1 Eg US-Federal Republic of Germany, Agreement relating to Mutual Cooperation regarding 
Restrictive Business Practices 15 ILM 1282 (1976); OECD, Council Recommendation 
concerning co-operation between member countries on anti-competitive practices affecting 
international trade, OECD Doc C(95) 130/FINAL (1995).
812 Arts 4, 5, US-EC Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the 
Enforcement of their Competition Laws 37 ILM 1070 (1998).
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Development.813 The seeds for a prospective multilateral agreement within the 
ambit of the WTO 814 include jurisdictional conflicts and industrial 
concentration eluding national law. The US Council for International Business 
supports the transparent and non-discriminatory application of competition 
law.815 Firms are concerned that confidential business information may be 
jeopardised.816 The ICC has initiated efforts to harmonise national competition
017
regimes by formulating guidelines for prospective adoption by States.
1.8. Tobacco Advertising.
An interesting counter-example concerns negotiations for a framework 
convention with respect to the pricing, taxation, packaging, labelling and 
advertising of tobacco products. The tobacco industry was excluded to prevent 
inappropriate lobbying and in light of the health nature of the initiative. The 
decision of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body concerning NGO 
participation (and hence tobacco industry exclusion) also applied to
0 1 0
subsequently-established intergovernmental working groups. The
framework convention requires States to protect efforts to adopt and 
implement effective national legislation on tobacco control from commercial
813 UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control 
of Restrictive Business Practices, UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF/IO (1980).
814 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996).
815 USCIB, Position on the Work Program for the WTO Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy, New York, 1997; ICC, Statement on International 
Cooperation Between Antitrust Authorities, ICC Pub No 225/450 Rev 3, Paris, 1996.
816 BIAC/ICC, Questions from Business regarding the Protection of Confidential Information 
in the Context of International Antitrust Cooperation, Paris, undated.
817 ICC, Recommended Code of Practice for Competition Authorities on Searches and 
Subpoenas of Computer Records, ICC Pub No 225/507 Rev, Paris, 1998.
818 WHO Secretariat, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO Doc A56/8 Rev.l
(2003), para 9.
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and other vested interests of the tobacco industry. British American 
Tobacco supported combating illegal trade and under-age smoking, expressed 
concern at higher taxation and committed itself to offering governments 
‘proposals and solutions for real and workable tobacco regulation’ at national 
levels. 820 In 2004 the EU and Philip Morris International concluded an 
agreement to combat contraband and counterfeit cigarettes.
1.9. Observations.
Commercial participation extenuates the common or disparate economic 
interests of States. As illustrated by conventions with respect to exploiting 
natural resources (the deep seabed, genetic resources), intergovernmental 
negotiators can be readily distracted by inflated profit expectations. In this 
context private actors are in effect the ultimate beneficiaries of treaties which 
confer rights to States and authoritatively define the extent of State
Q«} 1
jurisdiction. Within this process significant policy questions arise such as 
the respective merits of controlled exploitation over free enterprise. Fisheries 
management for example employs market-based regulation alongside co-
O'}*}
management approaches. International legal issues also emerge such as 
conflicts between treaty provisions or the right to self-determination of 
peoples. Developing or socialist States advance competing theories on the
819 Art 5(3), Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO Doc A/FCTC/INB6/5 (2003).
820 British American Tobacco, Response to adoption of WHO Tobacco Treaty, 21 May 2003.
821 Williams S.M., ‘International Law and the Exploration of Outer Space: A New Market for 
Private Enterprise?’ in Snyder F.E. & Sathirathai S. (Eds), Third World Attitudes toward
temational Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987, 787.
822 Dubbink W. & van Vliet M., ‘Market regulation versus co-management? Two perspectives 
mrregulating fisheries compared’ (1996) 20(6) Marine Policy 499.
3 Portugal v Australia (the East Timor case) 1995 ICJRep 90, Application, para 2.09-2.10.
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appropriate corporate role and NGOs may challenge the subsequent 
implementing legislation upon which the conferral of concessions or licenses 
to firms depends. 824 The opportunity for firms to articulate concerns to 
sympathetic States therefore poses challenges for the orderly development of 
international legal regimes. The possibility of unilateral action outside the 
agreed multilateral framework (as was the case with negotiations for the law of 
the sea, outer space and the Antarctic) has detrimental implications for treaty 
integrity and the prospects for universal participation by States.
Corporate participation in treaty negotiations can be a strategic business 
opportunity, a proposition most apparent with respect to international trade 
agreements. National measures for pollution control also establish lucrative
O'yc
industries such as waste disposal. Treaties constitute regulatory drivers 
which create new markets, identify profitable applications of novel technology 
and permit natural resource extraction. The TRIPs negotiations illustrate that 
national models may be promoted for adoption as the appropriate international 
legal regime since it entails less adaptation costs, increases regulatory burdens 
for rivals and promotes international commercial activity. On the other hand, 
commercial contributions can be seen as attempts to re-level the competitive 
playing field or reverse unfavourable legal precedents at the national level. 
Unilateral measures prohibiting undesirable corporate behaviour 
(anticompetitive behaviour, bribery) or pursuing particular public policy 
objectives (pollution or tobacco control) can disrupt international 
competitiveness for local firms.
824 Horta v Commonwealth (1994) 181 CLR 183.
825 International Finance Corporation, Investing in the Environment: Business Opportunities in 
Developing Countries. Washington DC, 1992, 1-3.
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Finally, industry participates through the ICC, ad hoc alliances or trade 
associations to formulate regimes which circumscribe their prospective 
liability. States allocate liability between commercial operators within 
particular industries 826 and under national law. 827 Corporate voluntary 
initiatives in the nature of codes of conduct can parallel, precipitate or forestall 
intergovernmental agreement. The necessary investment of time and resources 
in formulating such instruments as well as staying abreast of lengthy treaty 
negotiations evidences industry’s commitment to the topic under consideration. 
The participation of the chemical industry enabled States to perfect regimes 
which balanced public policy objectives (regulating chemical weapons) with 
commercial requirements (minimal disruption and preserving confidentiality). 
A more detailed case study will further detail the particular techniques and 
processes at work.
2. Corporate Contributions to Protecting the Ozone Laver and Preventing 
Climate Change.
This Part considers the role of corporations in the evolving international legal
0 ^ 0
regime with respect to protecting the ozone layer and preventing climate 
change. The case study is noteworthy since it usefully illustrates the full range 
of contemporary modalities for corporate participation. Industry participation
826 Eg Art 7, 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 1063 UNTS 265.
827 Cp Merlin v British Nuclear Fuels Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 711; Blue Circle Industries PLC v 
Ministry o f Defence [1998] 3 All ER 385.
828 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 26 ILM 1516 (1987); Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 26 ILM 1541 (1987); London 
Adjustments and Amendments 30 ILM 537 (1990).
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predates NGO interest and first arose as a transatlantic commercial dispute. 
The commercial response is conditioned by pressures arising from the 
marketplace, regulation, consumers, environmental NGOs, the media and 
scientific opinion. Two issues are of particular interest: first, the corporate role 
in transferring technology to developing States and second, commercial 
attempts to influence the terms of their participation within negotiations. The 
patterns of corporate behaviour identified in Part One are also discemable here: 
corporations continue to lobby States, frame issues in economic terms, submit 
proposals, distribute position papers, organize side-events and raise issues for
890decision-making. Additional commercial techniques include access to 
meetings, oral interventions, participating in workshops, summits or 
roundtables, conducting constituency meetings, information gathering and 
dissemination, shaping the contours of regulatory regimes, verifying 
compliance and supporting international secretariats.
The author attended the two week session of the Ninth Conference of the 
Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Milan 
during December 2003 as an observer. Interviews and discussions were 
conducted with corporate officers from individual firms, politically-organised 
business groups and trade associations (see the list of individuals in Annex 7). 
The author observed plenary meetings of the Conference of the whole and 
meetings of its two subsidiary bodies: the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation. The 
author also attended contact group meetings, roundtables, panel discussions,
829 Giorgetti C., ‘From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of NGOs in the Negotiations 
on Climate Change’ (1999) 7 NYU Environmental LJ 201, 220-33.
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‘side-events’, BINGO meetings and secretariat briefings. The following 
account assesses the respective merits of each modality of engagement in light
OOA
of earlier COPs. A COP is not merely an administrative or review 
conference: the boundary between negotiation and implementation is 
particularly blurred in the context of climate change and the decisions adopted 
by States contribute to ongoing lawmaking in this area.
2.1 Transatlantic Commercial Disputes.
Regulation for the prevention of climate change originates with the 
introduction of an aerosol ban in the US during 1978 following an initial 
period of scientific study and research. 831 European manufacturers had 
blocked meaningful EC regulations and secured a competitive advantage 
through the adoption of weak EC directives and voluntary agreements with 
States. 832 NGOs initiated litigation in the US seeking the introduction of
o'i'X
tighter environmental controls. US firms cautioned against unilateral 
regulatory action which was not binding upon other CFC-producing States and 
called for a level playing field. Pressure for regulatory controls to prevent 
depletion of the ozone layer increased with the rise in CFC production.834 The 
chemical industry initially denied any connection between damage to the 
ozone layer and CFC use and sought to cast doubt upon scientific evidence.
830 For an account of NGO participation prior to 1997, see UNFCCC Executive Secretary Note, 
Mechanisms for Consultations with NGOs, Addendum, The Participation of NGOs in the 
Convention Process, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/1997/14/Add.l.
831 Toxic Substances Control Act 15 USC s2605 (1978).
832 Eg EC Council Decisions 80/372/EEC (1980) & 82/795/EEC (1982).
833 Eg Natural Resources Defence Counsel v Thomas 824 F.2d 1211 (DC Cir 1987).
834 Chemical Manufacturers Association, Production, Sales and Calculated Release of CFC-11 
and CFC-12 through 1987, Washington DC, 1988.
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However, a Du Pont executive had promised that ‘if credible scientific 
data...show that any chlorofluorocarbons cannot be used without a threat to 
health, Du Pont will stop production of these compounds’.835
The commercial strategy of US firms altered when an intergovernmental 
scientific assessment cautiously concluded in 1986 that human activity had 
contributed to climate change. The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, a 
coalition of 500 producer and user companies, declared their support for 
international CFC regulation provided sufficient time was permitted for 
developing alternatives. Although differences of business opinion precluded 
specific recommendations, the Alliance proposed additional research,
• o ^ oconservation in CFC end-use and production cuts. European companies 
suspected that US firms were endorsing regulatory controls to capture
Q ' iQprofitable export markets from them through product substitution. The EC 
echoed industry views with respect to scientific uncertainty, the uneconomic 
feasibility of substitutes and adverse effects on living standards.840
Three industry associations, the ICC and two European federations observed 
the 1985 Vienna conference on account of concerns for prospective corporate
835 Testimony of McCarthy R.L., US Government. Fluorocarbons: Impact on Health and 
Environment. GPO, Washington DC, 1974, 381.
836 World Meteorological Organisation, Atmosphere Ozone 1985: Assessment of Our 
Understanding of the Processes controlling its Present Distribution and Change, Geneva, 1986.
837 World Meteorological Organisation, Atmospheric Ozone 1985: Assessment of our 
understanding of the Processes Controlling its Present Distribution and Change, Geneva, 1986.
838 Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, The Montreal Protocol: A Briefing Book, Virginia, 
1987.
839 Diprose G. & Reddy D.W., ‘An Industry Perspective on the Chlorofluoromethane/Ozone 
Issue’ in Council of Europe, Prohibition of the Use of Chlorofluorocarbons and Other 
Measures to Preserve the Ozone Layer, Strasbourg, 1980, 37.
840 Jachtenfuchs M., ‘The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer’ J 
(1980) 28(3) Common Market Studies 263, 275.
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liability. 841 North American firms supported universal ratification of the 
Vienna Convention which also bound their foreign competitors as an 
alternative to draconian regulation confined to the US. Du Pont proposed 
voluntarily phasing-out CFC production before States did so after initially
qaj
resisting CFC emission reductions. European chemical companies remained 
intransigent. Du Pont observed that ‘neither the marketplace nor regulatory 
policy...has provided the needed incentives’ to justify the necessary 
investment for developing substitutes.844 On the other hand, it was dawning 
upon EC exporters that treaty obligations could reinforce their monopoly over 
existing foreign markets provided CFC-importing States could not acquire 
supplies from other producers or construct their own CFC-production capacity.
The adoption of the Montreal Protocol concluded attempts by the European 
chemical industry to block international regulation. 845 Imperial Chemical 
Industries sought to strengthen the instrument whereas the French firm 
Atochem had not lifted its opposition.846 The Alliance for Responsible CFC 
Policy described the treaty as ‘an unprecedented step to protect the global
O A - 7
environment’. However, the reduction schedule attempted ‘to go too far, too 
fast and far beyond that which is necessary based on current scientific
841 Eg UNEP, Report of the UNEP Meeting of Experts Designated by Governments, 
Intergovernmental and NGOs on the Ozone Layer, UN Doc UNEP/WG/7/25/Rev.l (1987).
842 Glaberson W, ‘Behind Du Pont’s Shift on Loss of Ozone Layer’ New York Times, 27 
March 1988.
843 Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), Chlorofluorocarbons and the Ozone Layer, Cheshire,
1986.
844Du Pont Position Statement on the Chlorofluorocarbon/Ozone/Greenhouse Issue (1986) 
13(4) Environmental Conservation 363-4.
845 Lammers J.G., ‘Efforts to Develop a Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer’ (1988) 1 Hague YBIL 244.
846 ICI, Press Release, Cheshire, 1988.
847 Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, The Montreal Protocol: A Briefing Book, Virginia,
1987.
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understanding’. One UK firm warned of unemployment if there were ‘any 
rash further restrictions...beyond the prudent measures embodied in the UN 
agreement’. 848 The company was officially reprimanded for resorting to 
discredited language.849 The House of Lords recommended a mandatory EC- 
wide ban as ‘the quickest and easiest way to produce a significant reduction’ of
OCA
CFC’s in response to mounting consumer concerns. One European industry 
association conceded that phasing-out CFC use is ‘both feasible and desirable’ 
with ‘minimal anti-competitive or socio-economic disruption to the 
Community’ since ‘European industry is in the fortunate position of being able 
to introduce the alternative techniques developed [in America] without 
suffering the same degree of hardship’.851
European chemical manufacturers opposed the inclusion of HCFC’s within the 
Montreal Protocol. ICI observed that ‘if HCFC’s are designated as controlled 
substances in the revised Protocol...the chemical industry will have no 
incentive to invest in production of these products’.852 US industry viewed 
HCFC’s as only a transitional chemical and called for regulatory incentives for 
investing in alternatives.853 However, industry also required time to adapt. 
Phase-out schedules should reflect normal product and equipment lifetimes 
since an overly strict timetable would impose costly second transition periods
848 ISC Chemicals, ‘Chlorofluorocarbons and the Ozone Layer: The Facts and the Fiction’, 
Bristol, 1987.
849 UK House of Lords, Hansard 500, 20 October 1988, col 1310.
850 UK House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Seventeenth Report, 
1988, 12 in UK Government, The Ozone Layer: Implementing the Montreal Protocol, HMSO, 
London, 1988.
851 Comments of Eurimpact to the Commission of the EC on Implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol, Brussels, 1987, 30, 37.
852 ICI, ‘HCFC’s- The Low ODP Solution’ in ICI, The Ozone Issue and Regulation, Cheshire, 
1990.
853 Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, Realistic Policies on HCFC’s Needed in Order to 
Meet Global Ozone Protection Goals, Washington DC, 1990.
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before the full value of earlier investments had been realized.854 Indeed, the 
EPA requested Du Pont to reverse its declared intention to cease CFC 
production altogether and to satisfy permissible production quotas to ensure 
sufficient stockpiles at reasonable prices for servicing older equipment.
As a regulatory driver the Montreal Protocol pushed industry in directions 
hitherto considered impossible. Technology-forcing regulation encourages 
commercial innovation and the emergence of new service sectors. Industries 
responded to the inevitability of regulation and sought to quickly develop and 
commercialise alternative products and processes. Particularly noteworthy is 
that European firms forged transatlantic commercial links with 
technologically-superior US firms rather than obstruct regulation.855 Corporate 
consortiums such as the Programme for Alternative Fluorocarbon Toxicity 
Testing enabled the chemical industry to share the costs of co-operative
Of/
research and testing. It is also noteworthy that whereas corporations 
originally intended to delay regulation, environmental NGOs were more 
concerned by the long-term adverse effects and pressed States for accelerated 
adjustments.
2.2 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol.
Notwithstanding overlapping subject-matters between ozone layer depletion 
and climate change, their respective legal regimes are distinct and States
854 Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, Potential Worldwide Impact of a reduction of 
the HCFC Consumption Cap, Washington DC, 1995.
855 Eg International CFC and Halon Alternatives Conference, Washington DC, 1992.
856 ‘CFC Producers from Seven Nations Plan to Pool Knowledge, Jointly Conduct Tests’ 
(1988) 11(2) International Environment Reporter 110.
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adopted the Framework Convention/Protocol model to address the question of 
global warming. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992.857 In 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change stated that the balance of evidence suggests that there is a
QCQ
discemable human influence upon the global climate. In 1997 BP broke 
ranks with other industry bodies by adopting precautionary measures to 
manage the risks associated with climate change. This was partly in response 
to consumer concerns but also as a deliberate measure to enhance its prestige 
as a progressive market leader. The World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development similarly acknowledged that ‘it is prudent for business to play its
• • O C Qpart by looking for ways to reduce emissions of those gases’. Although 
environmental NGOs distrusted industry’s motivations, the issues of 
availability, safety and effectiveness of substitutes could not be dismissed. 
NGOs collaborated with small firms to produce environmentally safe and 
energy efficient technologies. Indeed, ‘hydrocarbons have made a remarkable 
penetration in the domestic refrigeration market, partly because of their support 
and promotion by NGOs’.860
o / r  1
Industry also participated in negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto 
Protocol provides three ‘market-based’ mechanisms by which State Parties 
satisfy their obligations. First, international emissions trading under Article 17 
allows Annex I Parties (developed States) to buy or sell assigned emission 
amounts with other Annex I Parties. Second, Annex 1 Parties may acquire
857 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 31 ILM 849 (1992).
858 IPCC, Second Assessment Report: Climate Change. Geneva, 1995.
859 WBCSD, Climate and Energy, London, 1999.
860 UNEP, Report of the TEAP, 1994, 95-110.
861 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC 37 ILM 22 (1998).
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carbon credits (credits for emissions avoided or emission reduction units) by 
investing in projects within Annex 1 States (joint implementation under 
Articles 3, 4 and 6). Third, Annex 1 Parties may acquire certified emissions 
reductions which lead to ‘real, measurable and long-term’ greenhouse gas 
reductions by investing within non-Annex 1 Parties (developing States) 
through the clean development mechanism or CDM under Article 12. Twenty 
to fifty percent of investment within developing States is estimated to be 
directed towards ‘pollution intensive industries’. As will be observed 
further below, the Kyoto Protocol explicitly contemplates a private sector role 
within these ‘flexibility mechanisms’.
The ICC was represented by a 100 member delegation863 and its statements 
were endorsed by trade associations, national chambers of commerce and 
individual firms.864 Detailed accounts of State positions were prepared to
o r r  ( Q/r/r
inform members of developments and enable informed lobbying. It
proposed a transparent and non-discriminatory regulatory framework posing
Qf.n
no trade or investment barriers. Although legal predictability was a
precondition to investment firms should be free to introduce cost-effective
o/ro
market-orientated solutions. To avoid inequitable compliance costs it
862 UNTCMD, World Investment Report 1992:TNCs as Engines of Growth, New York, 1992, 
Annex.
863 ICC, Climate, Business and Society: elements for success at COP-6, Paris, 2000.
864 ICC, ‘Climate change conference should encourage innovative technologies’, Press Release, 
The Hague, 2000.
865 Cp ICC, Note to Members and National Committees on the UNFCCC, Paris, 2003.
866 ICC, A Compilation of Summary Business Reports, COP5-SB12, Paris, 2000.
867 ICC, Monitoring, compliance, enforcement and liability under the Kyoto Protocol: an 
international perspective, Paris, 1999.
868 ICC, ICC Statement at the conclusion of COP-3 to the UNFCCC, Kyoto, 1997, 1; ICC, 
‘Business disappointed at Hague Setback’, Press Release, The Hague, 2000.
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proposed resort to voluntary corporate initiatives. ICC representatives 
attended intergovernmental workshops to promote these messages. 870 The 
Business Council for Sustainable Energy also convened roundtables composed 
of corporations, NGOs, States and the UNFCCC Secretariat. 871 The US 
government was urged to consult with business prior to ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol. Market solutions were suggested to be more effective than 
national law.873 Several industry groups orchestrated a USD$13 million media 
campaign in 1997 to strengthen US opposition. 874 The US Business 
Roundtable endorsed the US government’s decision not to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol. Nonetheless the ICC foresaw continued business participation 
particularly by European firms within the international framework875, thereby 
attempting to diminish the political significance of non-ratification.
2.3. Technology Transfer and the Position o f Developing Countries.
Industry’s relationship with developing countries in the context of climate 
change revolves around participation, technology transfer and financial 
assistance. A global market necessitates universal participation by all States to 
prevent competitors operating outside the regime from undermining the
869 ICCA, Statement on Global Climate Change Post COP-5, Virginia, 2000.
870 ICC, UNFCCC Technology Transfer Workshop, Summary Report, El Salvador, 2000.
871 Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE), Summary of the Industry Roundtable on 
Risk Management for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, Washington DC, 2000; BCSE, 
Industry Roundtable on the Draft Negotiating Text on Mechanisms, Washington DC, 2000.
872 USCIB, Unresolved Issues in the Kyoto Protocol and US Implementation of its 
Commitments, New York, undated.
873 European Roundtable (ERT), Climate Change: How Governments and Industry Can Work 
Together, Brussels, 2000.
874 Oberthiir S. & Ott H.E., The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st 
Century. Springer, Berlin, 1999, 72.
875 ICC, ‘Business will persevere with climate change remedies’, Press Release, Paris, 2001.
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market.876 For example, the ICC and the US Business Roundtable called upon 
States to recognize as valid all credits and allowances acquired by companies 
under emissions trading without imposing selective criteria based on their 
national origin.877 The latter warned that energy-intensive industries might 
migrate to low-cost havens within developing States. 878 The corporate 
relationship with developing countries is therefore a further factor for 
consideration during intergovernmental deliberations: although the commercial 
presence typically tilts the balance in favour of developed States, firms will 
explore the prospects of relocating operations and developing countries will 
evaluate the available technological opportunities.
Developing country participation within the climate change regime depended 
in part upon resolving the technology transfer issue. Developing countries 
sought independence from foreign patent holders and access to affordable 
technologies. They did not wish to forgo the economic benefits of CFC 
applications or to pay for substitutes produced by the very chemical industries 
which created ozone layer depletion in the first place. Firms argued that 
multilateral choices between positive and negative technology ‘winners and 
losers’ should be avoided and technology decisions should be left to host
0 - 7 Q
States in consultation with industry.
Industry argued that technological development into substitutes required the 
legitimate prospect of recouping a reasonable return on investment. Enabling
876 US BRT, Principles for the Design of an Emissions-Credit Trading System for Greenhouse 
Gases: Issues and Implications for Public Policy, Washington DC, 1999, 5-11.
877 US BRT, The Kyoto Protocol: A Gap Analysis, Washington DC, 1998, 26.
878 US BRT, Trade and Industry Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, Washington DC, 1999, 36.
879 Sir Charles Nicholson, Senior Adviser, British Petroleum, 8 December 2003.
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frameworks for technology transfer require intellectual property protection, 
transparent and equitable legal structure and strong contractual 
arrangements.880 Intellectual property protection is such that States can only
QQ 1
persuade firms to transfer technology on non-commercial terms. Firms 
suggested that technical transfer is most effective between industry through
QO^
joint ventures and licensing arrangements. Industrialized States also 
appreciated that commercial rivals in developing countries could capture 
markets using technology which they had not worked to develop.883 Novel 
arrangements of cooperation between industry, States and intergovernmental 
organisations were an additional outcome. For example, UNEP facilitated the 
transfer of non-proprietary information to developing countries. 884 The 
Industry Cooperative for Ozone Layer Protection, composed of the electronics, 
communications and aerospace industries, worked with UNEP to pool research 
and development, organize workshops, publish technical papers and promote
o o c
information exchange.
Industry also called for a multilateral fund to assist developing States reduce 
production of ozone depleting substances, particularly since a consumption 
surcharge within the US would raise considerable revenue for the US 
government. Investment assistance for capital conversion ultimately benefited 
small and medium-sized national enterprises facing uncertain CFC supplies,
880 ICC, Enabling Environments for Technology Transfer, Discussion Paper, Paris, undated.
881 UNEP, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol, UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II(2)/7 (1990), 3.
882 ICC (1990) 23 Newsletter.
883 Vallette J., Deadly Complacency: US CFC Production, the Black Market and Ozone 
Depletion, Ozone Action, Washington DC, 1995, 12.
884 UNEP, Summary Report of the Informal Consultative Meeting with Industry, Paris, 1990.
885 O’Connor D.C., ‘Solvent Cleaning in the Asian Electronics Industry: The Search for 
Alternatives to CFC-113 and Methyl Chloroform’, UNEP Industry and Environment, 1991.
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higher prices and technological obsolescence. However, Southern businesses 
preferred to bypass State intermediaries on account of bureaucracy and 
corruption. Competition and collaboration within the marketplace was such 
that ‘substantial efforts to transfer technologies to developing countries are 
now being undertaken under existing bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements’. 886 Nonetheless the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund 
finances the incremental costs of using ozone-safe technology for developing 
countries.
2.4 Commercial Contributions to the Ninth Conference o f the Parties (COP-9) 
to the UNFCCC.
The participation of non-State actors in Conferences of the Parties (COPs) is 
circumscribed by treaty provisions, procedural rules and decisions of 
governing bodies. The UNFCCC provides that the Conference of the Parties 
shall, at its first session, adopt its own procedural rules and those of subsidiary
OOH
bodies established by the Convention. COP-1 was unable to adopt 
procedural rules and draft rules have since been applied. The participation of 
non-State actors as observers to the COP springs from Article 7(6) of the 
UNFCCC, these provisionally applied draft rules and Decision 18/CP.4 (see 
Annex 5). Their participation is also influenced by the practice of States, the 
UNFCCC secretariat and non-State actors themselves.
886 UNEP, Sixth Meeting of the OEWG, UNEP Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG. 1/6/2 (1991), 4.
887 Arts 7(2)(k), (3), UNFCCC 1771 UNTS 107 (1992).
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Having invited 168 non-State actors ‘to play an active role in the Convention 
process’, the COP at its Eighth Session observed the opportunity for 
cooperation with the private sector through the Clean Development 
Mechanism, noted that seven applications for operational entities had been
QQO
received and heard several statements from business and industry. Pnvate 
sector investment was necessary to develop innovative technologies and the 
desirability of industry dialogue to exchange information concerning ozone- 
depleting substances was recognised.889
COP-9 was attended by some 6000 individuals of which approximately 750 to 
800 were businesspersons. The principal actors were predominantly the ICC, 
corporate coalitions and trade associations although several individual firms 
also attended. Business and industry NGOs (BINGOs) divided into those 
threatened by the Kyoto Protocol regime (for example, fossil fuel extractors, 
energy intensive industries, automobile producers) and those seeking novel 
business opportunities (renewable energy technologies, the forest and nuclear 
industries and service providers including certifiers, verifiers and brokers). 
The former have been involved in the UNFCCC process since its inception 
whereas the latter are more recent entrants. Business opinion has also evolved 
since COP-1: whereas competition between firms and trade associations 
peaked in 1994, the factions are now more settled.
888 UNFCCC, Report o f COP-8, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2002/7 (2003), paras 4, 29, 119, 133, 137- 
8, 140.
889 Ibid, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add. 1 (2003); Decisions 1/CP.8 (2002), para (h), 11/CP.8 
(2002), para 4, 12/CP.8 (2002), para 4 & 12/CP.8 (2002).
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The business concerns at COP-9 centred around two issues. First, what are the 
consequences if the Kyoto Protocol does not enter into force and in particular, 
does the CDM Executive Board cease to function? Second, what are the 
specifics of national and regional emissions trading as precursors to a global 
regime: how do they interact, is there mutual recognition of credits and what 
are the transaction costs such as taxation? The following account of the 
principal actors and activities at COP-9 is the manner and form of regular 
practice under the UNFCCC and is assessed in light of earlier COPs and 
developments in other fora.
2.4.1. Principal Actors.
i) The International Chamber of Commerce.
The ICC’s self-perceived role is to accurately portray the views of its member 
federations to national delegates. Although it remains hamstrung by the need 
to secure member consensus for its activities, its contemporary service 
function is to enable its membership to undertake ‘more informed and effective 
interventions’. 890 This compares with the US Council for International 
Business which perceives its objective as ensuring consistent State positions 
within different UN fora and in accordance with national decisions. 
Environmental issues ‘do not stay in a box’ and national delegations need
O Q 1
reminding of positions espoused elsewhere. The ICC seeks to co-ordinate
890 Mr Nick Campbell, Chairman, Task Force on Climate Change, International Chamber of 
Commerce Environment and Energy Commission, 10 December 2003.
891 Ms Norine Kennedy, Vice President, Environmental Affairs, USCIB, 3 December 2003.
248
various actors to reinforce identical business messages across a range of issues. 
The challenge is to get ‘tuned in and willing business supporters’.
The ICC represents ‘mainstream’ industry which in practice is the interests of 
transnational companies. The ICC supports the UNFCCC process provided
OQ2
that business is recognized as part of the solution. Non-discriminatory 
treatment, freedom of trade, access to information and encouraging foreign
OQO
direct investment are its principal concerns. The ICC wants companies 
affiliated to multinational firms to be eligible to participate in Kyoto 
mechanisms to the same extent as national companies irrespective of 
ratification by the State where the parent corporation resides. Internal transfers 
between affiliated companies should not be subject to taxes or quotas but can 
be utilized to satisfy national obligations where they operate, be bankable for 
future use or exchanged through emissions trading.
ii) Trade Associations.
Firms are ‘plugged-in’ to several organisations such as special interest, 
national or trade-specific industry associations representing slightly different 
interest configurations.894 Trade associations have several functions: recruiting 
members, reporting (monitoring political developments for its membership), 
education (expressing industry issues to national delegates, providing scientific 
or policy advice to small businesses and informing interested actors of best 
commercial practice) and marketing (promoting voluntary environmental
892 ICC, Climate Change: The Business View, Paris, 2003.
893 ICC, The Role of Companies in Kyoto Mechanisms, Paris, 2003.
894 Mr Neil Cohn, Senior Director, Natsource LLC, 5 December 2003.
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efforts of industry or advertising upcoming trade fairs).895 Trade associations 
enjoyed a close working relationship with national delegations at COP-9 on 
account of their routine national-level engagement. For example, the 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, representing inter alia fossil fuel 
producers, acted as industry adviser to the Australian delegation. The latter 
briefed the Network’s representative on political deliberations daily which 
were reported back to BINGO meetings subject to confidentiality 
obligations.896
Trade associations complete interim and final reports summarising each COP 
for distribution to members and formulate position statements and responses. 
Trade associations may create ‘noise’ around a particular issue to demonstrate 
activity but when pressed by States are unable to assume a position without 
prior consultation with its members. Furthermore, anti-competition law also 
prevents information exchange and complete cooperation between members. 
Promoting voluntary measures of mitigation by industry is easier than
QQ7expressing a universal opinion from its members on any given issue. The 
mandate of trade associations at a COP must reflect both progressive and 
conservative elements: some members may encourage participation whereas 
others avoid it. For example, the Australian Coal Institute did not establish a 
side exhibit given uncertainty as to how business messages would be 
communicated and received.
895 Mr Eli Turk, Vice President, Government Relations, Canadian Electricity Association, 5 
December 2003.
896 Ms Robyn Priddle, Executive Director, Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, 8 
December 2003.
897 Mr Tim Stileman, International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation 
Association, 11 December 2003.
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iii) Corporate Coalitions.
Politically organised business groups may be ad hoc or permanent coalitions, 
represent one or several economic sectors and promote single or multiple 
issues. Corporate coalitions are established to communicate corporate 
environmental responsibility, voluntary private initiatives and contemporary
OQO
technological developments to States and other firms. One coalition awards 
an annual ‘Climate is Business e-ward’ for these purposes. 899 Another 
coalition - Responding to Climate Change - has been active since COP-6 and is 
composed of individual firms, NGOs and States.900 Individual firms contribute 
donations to purchase time slots in promotional side-events where voluntary 
corporate initiatives for tackling emissions may alternatively be characterized 
as showcasing research and development or reducing costs.901
2.4.2. Principal A ctivities.
i) Access to Meetings.
All NGOs can attend open meetings of COP plenary sessions, the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA, responsible for 
technological advice and methodological issues), the Subsidiary Body for
898 Ms Marian Hopkins, The US Business Roundtable, 9 December 2003.
899 Mr Julio Lambing, European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future (e5), 11 
December 2003.
900 Adam Bumpus, Programme Coordinator, Responding to Climate Change, 9 December 2003.
901 Mr Masayuki Sasanouchi, Project General Manager-Environment, Toyota, 10 December 
2003.
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Implementation (SBI, responsible for implementation issues including 
assessing national communications) and informal contact groups. The terms of 
NGO participation are left to the discretion of individual chairpersons. All 
NGOs always sit at the rear and lack access to microphones. Attendance may 
be unproductive and uninformative given diplomatic posturing, limited time 
and the public nature of proceedings. Real decision-making occurs elsewhere 
including confidential sessions formally closed to NGOs, within other 
intergovernmental fora or in national capitals. Such arrangements preserve 
authority and credibility for States and render non-State actor influences less 
apparent.
Observers may attend ministerial roundtables concerning particular themes 
intended to produce constructive and interactive dialogues between delegation 
heads. Press briefings by observer organisations are typically open to all. For 
example, the International Emissions Trading Association promoted a report 
on the greenhouse gas market through this means. 902 The International 
Hydropower Association and the World Economic Forum by contrast strictly 
reserved briefings to accredited media to control information delivery and 
exclude critics. Other meetings closed to observers include press briefings by 
national delegations, constituent group meetings and daily briefings between 
national delegations and national industry associations. Observers are denied 
access to meetings of intergovernmental groups other than convention bodies 
ostensibly because they do not have any negotiating role. These meetings 
involve national delegates imparting information on political developments to
902 International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) Report, GHG Market 2003- Emerging 
but Fragmented, Geneva, 2003.
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business (much of which is already familiar) and industry pressing for greater 
clarity such as further implementation details or raising issues for negotiation. 
The US met with national industry four times over two weeks and hosted a 
bilateral event with Italy and Italian firms.
ii) Assisting Oral Interventions by States.
Commercial interests can assist States to prepare the content of their oral 
interventions. Oral interventions by States may be formal prepared statements 
delivered during plenary sessions or spontaneous statements during debates. 
These interventions are incorporated into official records such that true sources 
are obscured. The ability of firms to employ this technique is determined by 
access to delegates, knowledge, procedural expertise, effective co-ordination 
with other interested groups and identifying sympathetic States for 
constructing strategic alliances.
iii) Oral Interventions by NGOs at the Conclusion of Plenary Sessions.
NGOs typically address the COP just before closure of the final plenary 
session. Speakers follow the self-organising ‘constituency’ system recognized 
by the UNFCCC. Research and independent NGOs (RINGOs), business and 
industry NGOs (BINGOs), environmental NGOs (ENGOs), local NGOs, 
indigenous peoples organisations (IPOs), local government and municipal 
authorities (LGMA), islanders, trade unions and faith-based groups were each 
permitted to make three minute oral presentations. NGOs select the groups
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and individuals to speak on their behalf. Participation in a constituency is the 
choice o f individuals or organisations, is not official or binding and does not 
preclude direct secretariat communication. The designated constituency focal 
point does not posses ‘sovereignty’ over the constituency. They are conduits 
ensuring effective NGO participation by undertaking information exchange, 
providing logistical support to the secretariat, co-ordinating interaction with 
States and identifying attendance demand or qualified individuals.
f  ' \   ^ }L(dDs
NGOs do not perceive oral interventions to be useful or effective although the 
opportunity to do so is jealously safeguarded. Five minute interventions after 
decisions have been effectively taken do not provide opportunities for
\J\
meaningful dialogue with States. Nevertheless, NGOs welcome inclusion in 
the UNFCCC process and call for greater engagement. (
JuW'fALfMr- 
JlhXa^ )
iv) Membership o f and Advice to National Delegations.
NGO representatives may be appointed by States to national delegations either 
in a general advisory capacity or to act as negotiators on specific points. States 
enjoy the widest possible freedom when appointing delegates particularly 
where specialised matters o f a highly technical character require enlisting 
experts with the necessary training and experience.903 Reliance upon NGOs 
increases with the number and complexity o f issues to be addressed.904 This
903Intemational Law Commission, Fifth Report on Relations between States and International 
Organisations (1970) YBILC Vol 2, 19; Arts 43, 45 Vienna Convention on the Representation 
o f States in Their Relations with International Organisations o f  a Universal Character, UN Doc 
A/CONF.67/16 (1975) (not in force).
904 Yamin F., ‘NGOs and International Environmental Law: A Critical Evaluation o f their 
Roles and Responsibilities’ (2001) 10(2) RECIEL 149, 158-9.
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includes representatives of the private sector in an advisory role as experts or 
consultants and exceptionally as head of delegation. 905 Private sector 
representatives may not speak on behalf of the US government to other States 
but may explain technical or factual details if they are the most competent to 
promote national objectives.906 Membership constrains NGO perspectives to 
official State positions, lobbying is prohibited and obligations of 
confidentiality are assumed. However, NGO representatives may secure 
access to closed sessions, thereby raising conflict of interest concerns.
BINGOs in their advisory capacity can exert a pervasive influence over the 
negotiating position of States. Most notoriously, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Russia collaborated with Western oil and coal interests to obstruct progress 
during earlier COPs. The Global Climate Coalition, led by Don Pearlman, a 
US lawyer, instructed delegations in private session on techniques to stall 
deliberations and additional issues to raise for consideration. Indeed, the 
Kuwaiti delegation submitted proposals written in Pearlman’s handwriting 
weakening the language of intergovernmental scientific reports 907 The 
Coalition employed different arguments in public than in negotiations, 
recruited scientists, think tanks and public relations firms to refute the 
scientific consensus, proposed further research, emphasized the opportunity 
costs of implementation and highlighted disparities between developed and 
developing States. Its obstructionist role was most evident during negotiations
905Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Cooperation between the ECE and the Business 
Community, ECE Doc E/ECE/1360 (1998).
906 US, Final Guidelines on Participation o f Private Sector Representatives on US Delegations, 
44 Fed Reg 17846, 17848 (1979).
907 Leggett J., The Carbon War: Dispatches for the End of the Oil Century. Penguin, London, 
1999.
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at Kyoto908 where it continued to assert that ‘existing scientific evidence does 
not support actions aimed solely at reducing or stabilizing greenhouse gas 
emissions’.909 It predicted increased energy costs, unemployment and lower 
living standards.910 The Coalition has gradually lost credibility and influence 
over the outcome of subsequent COPs, particularly when pressure on the US 
government proved counterproductive and several corporate members 
withdrew. Nonetheless, the Global Climate Coalition ‘will continue offering 
assistance to international policymakers’.911
v) BINGO Meetings.
The ICC acts as focal point for the business and industry constituency. It 
conducts daily briefings for BINGOs for one hour to review the previous day’s 
developments, identify State positions and like-minded delegations, assess the 
progress of negotiations and highlight forthcoming events. The meetings 
facilitated invitations by States to meet privately with national firms or 
particular industrial sectors. The ICC coordinated contributions from other 
BINGOs to formulate common business messages for upcoming meetings with 
governmental and intergovernmental representatives. There is equality of 
opportunity to participate for individuals within BINGO meetings but those 
most experienced with the UNFCCC process assume the greatest workload. 
BINGO meetings were mostly attended by industry groups and trade 
associations from Japan, North America and Europe and very rarely from
908 Pearce F., Playing Dirty in Kyoto, New Scientist, 17 January 1998, 48.
909 Global Climate Coalition (GCC), GCC’s Position on the Climate Issue, Washington DC, 
1999.
910 GCC, The Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, Washington DC, 2000.
911 GCC, 21st Century Climate Action Agenda, Washington DC, 2000.
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developing countries. The ICC argues firstly that business organisations 
represent companies which are headquartered, sited or have operations within 
developing countries and secondly that business representatives from OECD 
States should not be discouraged from attending since they will largely assume
019the burden for implementation.
vi) Roundtables.
Roundtables are an informal means for States to collect information 
concerning the capacities, mandate, expectations, experiences and constraints 
of other actors. For example, three individual firms and two industry 
associations participated in a technology transfer roundtable during COP-9. 
However, roundtables may constitute missed opportunities since oral 
interventions are limited to three minutes should the Chairperson call upon 
speakers. Although the technique offers participation closer to conditions of 
equality, there need not be any meaningful dialogue or sense of progress.
vii) Information Gathering.
BINGOs attend COPs as observers: to gather information useful for assessing 
cost implications, understanding regulatory mechanisms, establishing 
relationships, building internal capacity and formulating corporate strategy.913 
BINGOs are generally interested in prospective transaction costs, trading 
opportunities, decision-making time-frames, compliance procedures and
912 UNFCCC, Mechanisms for Consultation with NGOs: Compilation of Submissions, UN 
Doc FCCC/SBI/1997/MISC.7, Submission by the ICC, 5-7.
913 Mr Stephen Dahl, Environmental Planner, Norske Skog, 2 December 2003.
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details of implementation. Transnational firms can acquire advantages over 
national ones who are unaware of likely policy developments by exploiting 
time lags prior to national implementation and minimizing disruption to 
commercial operations. Scientific organisations also collect information in 
anticipation of eventual regulation.914 They return to later COPs to encourage 
the adoption of climate change indicators as tools for more informed and 
effective commercial decision-making.915
NGOs enjoy access to all official documentation. The Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation encouraged ‘the secretariat to proceed with...activities, within 
the available resources’ for ‘improving the availability of documentation and 
information to NGOs’. 916 Ordinarily there is only a presumption that 
documentation will be made public unless the relevant body decides otherwise. 
However, observers to the UNFCCC including NGOs enjoy a formal right of 
access to official documents917, final conclusions, preliminary reports and draft 
COP decisions.
BINGOs are already well-informed and seek to become better informed. For 
example, a question and answer session was conducted with the UNFCCC 
Executive Secretary concerning budgetary arrangements for the secretariat and 
anticipated decision-making time-frames. BINGOs were concerned that the 
CDM Executive Board would be unable to procure the necessary resources to 
competently assess investment eligibility or evaluate methodologies if the
914 Mr Justin Portelli, Director, Carbon Management Group, CSIRO, 3 December 2003.
915 Mr Kevin Baumert, World Resources Institute, 5 December 2003.
916 UNFCCC, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on its Eighth Session, 
Involvement of NGOs, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/1998/6, 23.
917 UNFCCC Decisions 16/CP.7, Annex, para 16 & 24/CP.7, para 7(6).
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Kyoto Protocol did not enter into force. BINGOs also sought to insert business 
representatives within intergovernmental decision-making processes to 
monitor developments, contribute expertise and ensure an accurate 
understanding of commercial perspectives. The principal obstacles are not the 
competency criteria for experts but rather the difficulty of attracting industry 
interest: USD$400 per day was insufficient to attract well-remunerated
918executives.
viii) Information Dissemination.
The ICC seeks ‘the opportunity to contribute to rule making by providing 
information and views’.919 BINGOs engage in information dissemination by 
educating uninformed government officials or articulating selected issues of 
business concern and pressing for their resolution. Business performs a 
‘corrective function’ by signalling the acceptability of proposals to States from 
a commercial perspective. It is the ‘role and responsibility’ of industry to 
identify market impacts and deter States from adopting regimes which unfairly 
accord preferential treatment.920 BINGOs also identify points within decision­
making systems susceptible to outside manipulation or political arbitrariness.
Although ENGOs outnumber BINGOs the business message carries greater 
weight in several respects. BINGOs forecast likely implementation impacts, 
provide economic analysis, formulate work programmes and share commercial
918 Andrei Marcu, President and CEO, IETA, 4 December 2003
919 ICC, Perspectives on the need for discussion now of issues affecting business and society in 
addressing long-term climate change risks, Paris, 2003.
920 Dr Brian Flannery, Manager, Science, Strategy and Programs (Safety, Health and the 
Environment), Exxon Mobil Corporation, 10 December 2003.
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experiences through case studies, technical reports and position papers. The 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) continued 
the practice of the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development
• 921of co-chairing information sessions, this time with the UNFCCC secretariat. 
The Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy partners national regulatory 
authorities and intergovernmental organisations. The influence of ENGOs 
may be marginalized as States and businesses match legal obligations with 
technical issues requiring familiarity with financial or securities markets and 
risk management.
Corporations are voluntarily contributing information and it is not apparent 
how that collection effort is rewarded. It is a costless way for States to acquire 
information and can be expected to be tailored to commercial perspectives. 
The EU encouraged other States to draw upon the case studies and technical 
papers developed by ‘stakeholders’. States and firms are engaged in mutual 
learning to smooth transition periods towards legally-binding targets and 
minimize political and commercial disruption. For national delegations to 
understand industrial techniques within compressed decision-making time­
frames necessitates assuming the accuracy of business information in good 
faith. The acceptability to States of real-time analysis and advice depends 
upon specialised expertise, well-established relationships of trust, commonality 
of interests and sufficient resources. States cannot alienate business goodwill
921 Mr Bjom Stigson, President, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 9 
December 2003.
922 US Environmental Protection Agency/Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry/UNEP/Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, Responsible Use Principles for 
HFC’s, 2003.
923 IISD (2003) 12(222) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2.
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if policy objectives are to be realized, particularly where markets are sought to 
be constructed around regulatory regimes. Corporations may seek to formulate 
regulatory frameworks around existing market conditions, maintain the status 
quo and deter directive action by States. Firms accordingly downplay the 
extent to which States rely upon their technical expertise or scientific 
information and characterise their role as advisory rather than participatory.
Information-sharing by business is incomplete: business proprietary
information such as trade secrets is excluded and full disclosure is unrealistic 
given competitive relationships with State enterprises and other firms. 
Furthermore, BINGOs only cooperate on matters of mutual interest, if 
interaction is precedential or where technical advantages are enjoyed. 
BINGOs are wary of tokenistic consultation, assuming commitments which are 
properly a State responsibility and volunteering information which may be 
ignored, filtered or misused. Workshops, meetings and panel discussions may 
merely provide the appearance of collaboration and a presumption that 
practical technical and economic information has been identified. It is left to 
State discretion whether or not to solicit NGO information. Business can only 
respond to information requests (principally technology transfer questions) but 
has also identified policy issues where input could usefully be provided.
Information exchange also has a flavour of artificiality. Several State 
delegations had previously observed trade association presentations at pre- 
sessional meetings which were simply repeated at COP-9. National 
delegations attended commercial side-events not to acquire information but to
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demonstrate solidarity with national industry.924 Indeed, lobbying becomes 
superfluous where senior government officials promote novel climate change 
technologies.925 Joint collaboration satisfies legal obligations for States and 
enables firms to secure an international competitive advantage. For example, 
energy service companies promote their technology transfer role as a means of 
implementing Kyoto Protocol obligations.927
ix) Influencing Decision-making under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).
Participation within the CDM, including acquiring certified emissions 
reductions, may involve private and/or public entities and is subject to 
guidance from the Executive Board. 928 The Board has to date approved 
approximately 100 projects and several different methodologies. However, its 
lethargic decision-making procedures with respect to acceptable project design 
templates and accredited methodologies are creating market uncertainty. 
Private sector participation is principally speculative trading hindered by 
transaction risks such as approval by host States. 929 Several firms had 
previously developed candidate CDM projects to evaluate investment project
924 Mr Manabu Kubota, Federation of Electric Power Companies, 10 December 2003.
925 Eg US, Climate Vision: Voluntary Innovative Sector Initiatives, Statement made at COP-9, 
Milan, 2003.
926 Eg CFC Action Programme: Cooperation between Government and Industry, The Hague, 
1993.
927 Korea Energy Management Corporation, Role of Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) in 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions and a Potential Financing Mechanism for International 
ESCO Projects, Yongin, 2003, 2.
928 Article 12(9), Kyoto Protocol, supra «861.
929 IETA/ADB, Private sector demand for CDM Projects, Toronto/Geneva, 2003.
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feasibility and distributed the resulting data to States. 930 To push the 
regulatory process further firms are designing draft standards which facilitate 
market growth. For example, the WBCSD attended COP-9 to promote a 
revised Greenhouse Gas Protocol Corporate Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for prospective adoption by firms as a risk management tool931 and 
by States as a basis for national regulation. 932 Including several 
intergovernmental organisations across a single issue is one technique for first 
‘road testing’ these standards. The process entails an assessment of the 
Executive Board’s methodology and further refining the attractiveness of such 
products to industry.933
BINGOs analyse recent Executive Board decision-making on baselines and 
methodologies to assess commercial prospects and identify investment project 
eligibility.934 The International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) has 
studied the Board’s accreditation methodology, its temporal and financial 
limitations and available expertise. The Association promotes its familiarity 
with the Executive Board’s decision-making processes and its ability to 
provide input thereto as the basis for its expertise and appeal to industry.936 
Since IETA represents traders and brokers it may inflate expectations of 
business opportunities to attract clients and derive more commissions.
930 IPIECA, Opportunities, Issues and Barriers to the Practical Application of the Kyoto 
Mechanisms, London, 2000, 45.
931Cp International Association of Oil and Gas Producers/IPIECA/API, Petroleum Industry 
Guidelines for Reporting Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2003.
932 Mr Simon Schmitz, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 9 December 
2003; WBCSDAVRI, Voluntary Corporate GhG Targets: Draft Guidance Chapter for GhG 
Protocol Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard, Revised Edition, Geneva, 2004.
933 Mr Machua Acharya, WBCSD, 5 December 2003.
934 Ms Lisa Jacobson, Business Council for Sustainable Energy, 3 December 2003.
935 IETA, Summary of Discussions at the 12th Meeting of the CDM Executive Board, Bonn, 
2003.
936 Mr Robert Domau, IETA, 5 December 2003.
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x) Furthering Emissions Trading.
To implement their Kyoto Protocol obligations State Parties may authorize 
legal entities to participate in actions leading to the generation, transfer or
0^7acquisition of emission reduction units. Market participants (particularly 
brokers) wish to mould the characteristics of a robust and credible market 
around the regulatory regime. Firms seek recognition of their accounting 
methodologies by States to ensure security of tenure for techniques over which 
they enjoy intellectual property rights. For example, EETA has the opportunity 
to direct the growth of an emergent market as well as influence regulatory 
design. It drafted a standard form contract to streamline commercial 
negotiations, reduce transaction costs and facilitate emissions transactions in 
anticipation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.938
Emission reduction units are assets of value to firms which may be taxed and 
possibly expropriated by host States. Lawyers formulate standard terms for 
inclusion in emissions reductions trading contracts. 939 Their efforts are 
constrained by regulatory uncertainty such as whether emissions reduction 
units are legislatively-entrenched property rights or whether national courts are 
sufficiently familiar with the technical issues to provide cost-effective dispute 
resolution.940
937 Art 6(3), Kyoto Protocol, supra w861.
938 IETA, EU Allowances Emissions Trading Master Agreement, Version 1.0, Toronto/Geneva, 
2003.
939 Ms Laura Campbell, President, Climate Change Legal Foundation, 11 December 2003.
940 IETA, Carbon Contracts Cornerstones: Drafting Contracts for the Sale of Project Based 
Emission Reductions, Discussion Paper No 02-01, Toronto/Geneva, 2001, 5.
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Regional, national or intra-national emissions trading regimes are promoted at 
COP side-events by States in conjunction with national industry experts.941 
States are appealing to foreign firms to buy into government-backed schemes 
having commercial credibility. Although offering opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage, different participatory conditions frequently confer exclusive 
advantages on local industry. Industry groups analyze the merits of each 
emissions trading scheme and call for further refinement.942 States and firms 
share a mutual interest in understanding the business opportunities and 
acquiring experience with emissions trading as a form of environmental 
regulation before the Kyoto Protocol becomes operative.943 BP and Shell have 
developed intra-corporate emissions reductions schemes and the Chicago 
Climate Exchange also illustrates voluntary experimentalism by industry.944 
To increase market size IETA is advocating for the merger of emissions 
trading within the EU such that credits under the CDM can be converted into 
allowances acquired under joint implementation. The design issues of linking 
emissions trading regimes trade environmental integrity for efficiency.945
941 EC Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community (2003) OJEC L; UK Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: Framework Document and Reporting 
Guidelines, London, 2001.
942 Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry, Meeting the Kyoto Protocol 
Commitments Summary-Domestic Emissions Trading Schemes, Oslo, 2000; Jacobson L. & 
Schumacher A., Emissions Trading: Issues and Options for Domestic and International 
Markets, Business Council for Sustainable Energy, Washington DC, 2000.
943 Mr David Feldner, Chief Accounting Executive, Emissions Marketing Association, 8 
December 2003.
944 BP, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in BP, London, 2001; Shell International, The 
Shell Tradable Emission Permit System: An Overview, London, 2000.
945 IETA/Intemational Energy Agency/EPRI, Linking Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
Systems, Discussion Paper, Toronto/Geneva, 2002.
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xi) Continuing the Technology Transfer Debate.
A continuing theme of the historiography of climate change outlined above is 
the impact of scientific evidence upon corporate behaviour. Those firms which 
accept scientific opinion argue that applying or adapting existing technology is 
sufficient to mitigate climate change since it is proven in the field, less risky 
and presently available. Developing novel, practical and commercially-viable 
technology requires time and expenditure. Firms seek to maximise the value 
and shelf life of products, recoup a reasonable profit and defer or defray the 
huge investment costs associated with new technology.
The technical expertise of firms and the personnel marshalled by trade 
associations enables industry representatives to participate in the technological 
assessment panels underpinning negotiations such as the Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer. The International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA) attends plenary sessions of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), participates in expert 
workshops, publishes reports jointly with UNEP and organizes 
intergovernmental symposia. 946 IPIECA has sought to recruit corporate 
officers in response to the IPCC’s call for a stronger industry presence 
including contributions to IPCC technical reports.947 NGOs are admitted as 
observers and allowed to intervene as experts on matters of direct relevance to 
agenda items.
946 IPIECA, Buenos Aires and Beyond: A Guide to the Climate Change Negotiations, London, 
1999, 15-7.
947 IPIECA, A Guide to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, London, 2nd Ed, 2000, 
6 .
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The substantive decision-making power of the Conference of the Parties has to 
be balanced against the procedural agenda-forcing power of expert groups.948 
For example, several members of the US Crop Protection Coalition 
participated in the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee of the 
Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP). The Coalition 
criticized TEAP’s research findings and methodology.949 TEAP countered that 
‘persistent criticism of the science.. .by advocates of continued methyl bromide 
use discourages investment in alternatives’.950 Informed criticism by industry 
alternated with allegations of improper influence. Sweden proposed tightening 
State control over the appointment and dismissal of industry experts. Other 
States resisted reforms on account of potential political influence over 
scientific and economic deliberations. States affirmed that the Panel ‘presents 
technical and economic information relevant to policy’ but ‘does not 
recommend policy’. 951 The independence and impartiality of experts is 
ensured through an informal advisory group of States.
xii) Providing Assurances of Compliance.
The compliance procedure of the Kyoto Protocol is triggered where 
‘competent’ NGOs submit information to the Compliance Committee
948 Parson E., ‘Protecting the Ozone Layer’ in Haas P.M., Keohane R.O. & Levy M.A. (Eds), 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 1993, 67.
949 UNEP, Report of the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee, Nairobi, 1994.
950 UNEP, Report of the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP), Nairobi, 1994, 
2 .
951 UNEP, Draft Report of the Preparatory Meeting for the Eighth Meeting of the Parties, 
UNEP Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro/Prep/L. 1 (1996), 30-40.
952 UNEP, Report of TEAP, Nairobi, 1996, 136-49.
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concerning an existing case.953 The private sector may submit relevant factual 
and technical information where a question of implementation is raised.954 
Interestingly, non-State actor participation under the non-compliance 
procedures of other environmental agreements has been rejected on account of 
the non-confrontational character of the process and the perception that their 
concerns could be effectively channelled through other means. 955 
Standardization and verification firms compete with other applicant entities 
under the Kyoto Protocol for approval by the CDM Executive Board so that 
they may offer officially-sanctioned assurance services to industry. 
Accounting firms also provide management systems or audit emissions 
reductions. One brokering firm provides renewable energy certificates to 
assure the quality of emissions transactions.956
Industry has previously contributed to monitoring the subsequent 
implementation of the ozone treaties. For example, the US chemical industry 
identified a black market in the production and use of ozone-depleting
QCH
substances. UNEP confirmed that assessment. The illegal CFC trade 
penalized firms who complied with phase-out schedules and reduced 
industry’s incentive to introduce substitutes.958 Producers of CFC-substitutes 
encouraged greater enforcement effort by States. 959 The Alliance for
953 UNFCCC, Decision 24/CP.7 (2001).
954 UNFCCC Secretariat, A Guide to the Climate Change Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, 
Bonn, 2002.
955 Redgwell C. & Fitzmaurice M., ‘Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and 
International Law’ (2000) 31 Netherlands YBIL 35.
956 Mr Christiaan Vrolijk, IT Power, 2 December 2003.
957 UNEP, Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleting Substances: is there a hole in the Montreal 
Protocol?. Paris, 2001.
958 Brack D., International Trade and the Montreal Protocol. Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London, 1996, 105-14.
959 IPIECA, COP5 Summary Report, Bonn, 1999, 5.
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Responsible Atmospheric Policy provided instruments for detecting counterfeit 
CFC products at border entry points, publicized the legal and technical risks of 
using CFC’s of dubious origin and established a committee of industry 
representatives to assist government investigators.960
xiii) Supporting the UNFCCC Secretariat.
The UNFCCC secretariat deals routinely with NGOs. It has formulated 
guidelines concerning observer participation within the UNFCCC process 
‘reflecting current practice’ and ‘in line with those governing NGO 
participation at sessions of other bodies in the UN system’. 961 Each 
constituency is briefed separately by the Executive Secretary, given meeting 
rooms and assigned office space for the duration of the COP. The secretariat 
liaises with constituency groups without direct governmental oversight to 
arrange meetings with senior delegates. Although the constituency system 
usefully structures NGO participation it inaccurately pools distinctive groups, 
ignores political fractures and obfuscates overlapping membership. This 
informal arrangement leaves the accreditation process unaffected: the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation concluded that ‘the current arrangements 
for the accreditation of NGOs were satisfactory, and that no change in the 
accreditation procedures was required’.962
960 Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, Background on Illegal Imports of CFC’s, 
Press Release, Vienna, 1995.
961 UNFCCC Secretariat, Guidelines for the participation of representatives of NGOs at 
meetings of the bodies of the UNFCCC, Bonn, 2003.
962 UNFCCC, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on its Eighth Session, 
Involvement of NGOs, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/1998/6, paras 81-3.
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BINGOs can be relatively more organized, knowledgeable and professional 
than ENGOs. They contribute business logic of economics, practicality, 
effectiveness, financing, operational and technical issues, risk management and 
capacity building to secretariat operations. Close working relationships tend to 
be developed with well-established business groups such as the ICC who 
promise greater stability. The secretariat is continually trying to draw business 
into its work programme. Corporate experts may occupy temporary positions 
to share experiences or information and acquire familiarity with institutional 
performance. However, senior corporate executives may be disinterested in 
participating within roundtable sessions given their daily business demands, 
particularly where only two-minute comments are possible. The secretariat is 
pressuring States to adopt innovative formats and ‘more impromptu events’ 
which produce ‘open and spontaneous discussions’.963
xiv) Organising Side Events.
Formally all NGOs enjoy equal privileges at COPs. However, the de facto 
influence of BINGOs is likely to be relatively greater given the financial 
resources devoted to promotional publicity or sponsorship and the interest of 
States in courting prospective market participants. These factors are most 
evident in the multiple activities occurring alongside meetings of the COP, 
subsidiary bodies or contact groups. For example, UNFCCC secretariat 
officials and the Expert Group on Technology Transfer convened an event on 
enabling environments for technology transfer where participation was limited
963 Ms Barbara Black, NGO Liaison Officer, UNFCCC Secretariat, 2 December 2003.
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to States and BINGOs. The expense of organising side-events includes hiring 
Conference facilities, providing refreshments and staff attendance at exhibits. 
Exhibits are only available to accredited organisations upon allocation by the 
secretariat. Although the secretariat does not screen messages businesses are 
only permitted to promote products in a trade fair organized nearby. 
Documents can also be displayed at designated locations around the 
Conference venue provided a sample is deposited with the secretariat, thereby 
equalising opportunities between NGOs.
Off-site side events (‘side-bars’) organized outside Conference venues and 
located in local hotels are advertised within the daily programme of activities. 
Industry-specific presentations and workshops establish links with invited 
government delegates and secretariat officials. BINGOs organised more side 
events than ENGOs at COP-9. For example, IETA conducted fifteen side 
events involving sixty-five speakers. BINGO presentations tended to be 
conducted jointly with States or secretariat officials whereas other NGOs, 
several governments and academic institutions preferred to conduct individual 
briefings. Several BINGO presentations were explicitly directed at developing 
States.964
Side events assume greater significance when political negotiations stagnate 
and the focal point for debate shifts to non-State actors.965 States become 
observers of contemporary business practices, opinions and ideas.
964 Eg Consortium for North-South Dialogue/Partnership for Climate Change/Business Council 
for Sustainable Energy, ‘Walking the Talk’, 8 December 2003.
965 Mr Jack Whelan, Secretary, Task Force on Climate Change, International Chamber of 
Commerce Environment and Energy Commission and designated BINGO contact person at 
COP 9, 2 December 2003.
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Corporations control the agenda and the content of BINGO presentations. 
These efforts are a source of competitiveness by increasing corporate 
knowledge, improving operational efficiency, facilitating product development, 
enhancing reputations and evidencing good corporate citizenship. 966 
Presentations were also conducted jointly by the ICC, USCIB and Keidanren. 
Corporate voluntary initiatives include products developed jointly with 
ENGOs.967
xv) Informal Activities.
Opportunities for informal lobbying arise at social functions, arranged 
meetings, within common areas or corridors, following the conclusion of 
plenary meetings and between meetings. BINGOs, ENGOs, national 
delegations and secretariat officials are well-acquainted with each other’s 
position from prior professional contact. Whereas ENGOs readily resort to the 
media, BINGOs prefer a subdued approach involving personal meetings away 
from Conference venues including ‘over dinner’ encounters. Informal 
activities can be more rewarding than some of the more formal but less 
effective activities (eg official statements at the conclusion of plenary debates) 
but are difficult to accurately assess on account of their nature. It is also 
probable that greater lobbying activity is directed at national arenas.
966 Eg Shell, Meeting the Energy Challenge, The Hague, 2002.
967 Mr Oliver Haugen, World Economic Forum, 9 December 2003.
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2.5 Corporate Attempts to Influence the Conditions o f Participation.
It was apparent at COP-9 that BINGOs were concerned to maintain the 
effectiveness of their participation irrespective of the individual merits of each 
technique outlined above. They offered proposals for improving the process 
and communicated with the Secretariat to that end. The designated BINGO 
contact person at COP-9 remarked that BINGOs generally prefer less formal 
presentations and less structured panel sessions which enable audience 
participation and greater opportunity for free form dialogue.968 Other oft- 
repeated proposals include swifter document dissemination, improved access 
to the floor during plenary sessions and informal meetings, the opportunity for 
oral interventions during discussion of specific agenda items or soliciting NGO 
views through the secretariat and greater expert participation. BINGOs 
suggested a Policy Dialogue Forum open to all States, NGOs and 
intergovernmental organisations for a frank exchange of all optimum policy 
options in a transparent and depoliticized forum. Business also proposed the 
opportunity to comment on issues whenever States were invited to do so and to 
circulate comments via a miscellaneous document. Although the secretariat is 
receptive to these suggestions, States are careful not to establish precedents 
and are guided by their requirements on particular occasions.
The process of achieving privileges from the secretariat is incremental: once 
secured they must be safeguarded and can be withdrawn without notice upon 
discretion or where abused. The principle of parity requires that advances
968 Mr Jack Whelan, supra n965.
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made by one constituency group be extended to all others. For example, 
business proposed that States and accredited BINGOs wishing to participate 
should have regularly scheduled open meetings at each subsidiary body session 
which other NGOs may observe. Several BINGOs have adversely affected the 
terms of NGO participation. For example, suggestions were made by States to 
filter out NGOs who espoused interests at odds with the Convention’s 
objectives after several business coalitions inaccurately derided the scientific 
consensus underpinning negotiations. NGOs are prohibited from approaching 
national delegations during plenary debates on account of one BINGO 
prompting a co-ordinated series of interventions. Indeed, the CDM Executive 
Board closed its first meeting to observers to prevent inappropriate corporate 
lobbying.
States have attempted to formalise communication channels with NGOs within 
the UNFCCC process. For example, New Zealand expressed a willingness to 
receive perspective and counsel directly from business in the mid-1990s. The 
COP conducted a workshop concerning NGO inputs into the UNFCCC process 
and on the desirability of NGO advisory committees.969 Business supported a 
more structured process for expanding its role, effectively communicating 
business views and assisting deliberations. Industry representatives argued 
that business participation is critical for selecting, developing and 
implementing economically-sound policies and programmes. Moreover, 
businesses are significant stakeholders having impacts upon economic growth, 
employment, competitiveness, environmental protection and social
969 UNFCCC, COP Decision 6/CP.l (1995).
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development. Their inclusion ‘provides an assurance that practical technical 
and economic information will be used’. Business argued that creating a new 
and additional communication channel was appropriate since no other 
arrangement currently fulfilled the needs of either industry or government. A 
single mechanism involving different constituencies was neither feasible nor 
desirable.970
As noted above, the discretion of States and chairpersons is critical to NGO 
participation within UNFCCC practice. The majority of NGOs consider that
071current mechanisms for soliciting NGO input require strengthening. The 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation undertook a comparative study of NGO 
entitlements associated with consultative status within various UN
Q77Agencies. It concluded that the UNFCCC secretariat ‘tended to generosity’ 
where State Parties required consultation or technical input and secretariat 
practices were frequently improvised but never codified.973 Systematically 
soliciting NGO perspectives would add a ‘new dimension’: it is uncertain 
whether States wish to routinely obtain NGO perspectives and whether NGOs 
are entitled to be heard.974 Additional questions include how to address 
different opinions within the same constituency, whether States should be 
encouraged to engage with lobby groups at national levels so that interaction 
between NGOs and the Convention process reflects international interests and
970 UNFCCC, Workshop on Consultative Mechanisms for NGO Inputs to the UNFCCC, Views 
of NGOs, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/1996/MISC.2 (1996), 2-6.
971 UNFCCC, Mechanisms for Consultations with NGOs, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/1997/MISC.6, 
4-9, 14.
972 UNFCCC, Involvement of NGOs: Mechanisms for Consultation, UN Doc 
FCCC/SBI/1998/5.
973 UNFCCC, Mechanisms for Consultations with NGOs, Addendum, The Participation of 
NGOs in the Convention Process, FCCC/SBI/1997/14/Add.l, paras 7-8.
974 UNFCCC, Mechanisms for Consultations with NGOs, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/1997/14, paras 
29-30.
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whether States should have direct access to the unfiltered views of individual
corporations.
Three constituencies participated in the workshop convened by the COP: 
^BINGOs, ENGOs and municipal leaders or local authorities. BINGOs 
proposed the adoption of a business consultative mechanism (BCM, see Annex 
6). It would not form part of the UNFCCC structure and its framework, 
activities and internal processes would be decided by participating BINGOs.975 
Achieving a consensus perspective would not be required since the full range 
of business opinion informs the process and demonstrates the complexity of 
issues requiring resolution by States. Furthermore, the BCM was not a process 
for negotiating commitments from business which can only be made at 
national or regional levels. In industry’s view, NGOs ‘cannot and should not’ 
be negotiating parties who assume commitments on behalf of national 
constituencies. It is for States not NGOs to decide first what is 
environmentally necessary based on credible scientific assessment and second 
what is practically achievable given credible technical and economic 
assessments.
Other NGOs rejected the proposal since mechanisms for NGO input must be 
open and available to all. A business consultative mechanism would provide 
industry with privileged access, enable the submission of unreviewed material 
and kerb the numerical superiority of other NGOs. Commercial 
recommendations have a self-interested flavour and NGOs are wary of
975 UNFCCC, Mechanisms for NGO Consultations: Workshop on Consultative Mechanisms 
for NGO inputs to the UNFCCC, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/1996/11, 9-21.
potential conflicts of interest that purveyors of particular technologies possess. 
Consensus on consultative mechanisms between NGOs participating at the 
workshop could not be identified. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice accordingly proposed that for the time being existing
* Q 7 Aconsultative processes would be improved.
Notwithstanding all the above, the UNFCCC reports for COP 9 emphasized 
State-centricity in decision-making and only recognized the efforts of non- 
State actors en passant. The Conference of the Parties had welcomed newly- 
admitted NGOs and ‘invited them to play an active role’, observed that several 
companies were accredited as operational entities under the CDM and noted 
the fact that statements had been made by organised business groups. The 
report of the roundtable session on technology transfer identified the ‘catalytic 
role governments play’ whereas the ‘importance of the private sector was 
acknowledged’.977 The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice welcomed the exchange of views with industry during pre-sessional 
consultations, invited business to continue cooperation with the Expert Group 
on Technology Transfer and envisaged industry participation in sector-specific
Q 7 0
workshops. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation foreshadowed 
concluding arrangements with the private insurance sector for developing 
alternative risk transfer mechanisms.979 The next Part continues this theme -
976 UNFCCC, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the 
Work of its Third Session, UN Doc UNFCCC/SBSTA/1996/13, para 50(c).
977 UNFCCC, Report of COP-9, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2003/6 (2004), paras 29-30, 114, 116, 129, 
130,135.
978 UNFCCC, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its 
Nineteenth Session, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2003/15 (2004), paras 11, 34, Annex 1.
979 UNFCCC, Report o f the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on its Nineteenth Session, 
UN Doc FCCC/SBI/2003/19 (2004), Annex 1.
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corporate attempts to influence their participatory terms and the substantive 
impacts this may have -  but broadens the scope of study.
3. The NGO Role in defining the Modalities for their Participation.
Part Three considers the role of non-State actors in developing the applicable 
procedural rules governing their attendance and conditions of participation 
within other intergovernmental fora. The term NGO will apply generally to 
include corporations and references will be made to international conferences 
convened under UN auspices, World Summits and Special Sessions of the 
General Assembly. Heightened NGO demand for access to intergovernmental 
deliberations brought these fora to the forefront during the 1990s. During the 
1970s States had recognized the significance of NGO education and publicity 
for implementing international policy decisions.980 Attempts by NGOs to 
become involved in intergovernmental deliberations initially encountered 
resistance from States and only since the 1990s are the substantive 
contributions of non-State actors being recognized.981 For example, Agenda 
21 seeks to enhance or establish formal participatory procedures ‘for the 
involvement of [NGOs] at all levels from policy-making and decision-making 
to implementation’. Unique features of the modalities for NGO 
participation will be identified in the fields of environmental protection and 
sustainable development before being contrasted with that of human rights.
980 Clark A.M., Friedman E.J. & Hochstetler K., ‘The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil 
Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, 
Human Rights and Women’ (1998) 51(1) World Politics 1,10.
981 For accounts of NGO activity within various institutional settings of the UN from the 1970s 
up until the 1990s, see Willetts P. (Ed), ‘The Conscience of the World’: The Influence of 
NGOs in the UN System. Hurst & Co, London, 1996, 86-92, 120-141, 149-173, 218-230.
982 Agenda 21, Chapter 27, supra «28.
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Procedural rules are typically provisionally drafted by a Preparatory 
Committee (PrepCom) before endorsement by the UN General Assembly and 
final adoption by States at the event itself. The General Assembly invites 
NGOs to participate in PrepCom organisational sessions where they provide 
their views on the content, scope and objectives of the event. Organisational 
arrangements are finally approved taking into account NGO proposals on the 
terms of their participation. The importance of NGO participation during the 
preparatory process and the event itself is recognized by States in all 
procedural rules. The impact of NGOs on the outcome of the Conference is 
therefore a product of NGO interest in ensuring their participation in response 
to invitations and of the receptiveness of States to their contributions.
This Part presents the arrangements for NGO participation first for 
international conferences convened under UN auspices and World Summits 
and second with respect to Special Sessions of the General Assembly. The 
former compares the role of corporations and NGOs across the fields of 
environmental protection and sustainable development with that of human 
rights where the commercial presence is much less apparent. The objective is 
to determine whether the nature of the topic or the character of the NGO makes 
any difference to the conditions for participation. Although these samples 
illustrate the range of possible characteristics they also evidence two 
continuing themes: first, the emergence of the private sector as a distinct group 
given the topic of the meeting and second, that the conditions of non-State
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actor participation are tightly controlled by States notwithstanding efforts by 
them to include NGOs.
3.1 International Conferences and World Summits.
i) Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development.
In preparing for the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) of 1992, the Secretary-General was requested to solicit NGO views 
on the objectives, content and scope of the Conference with the assistance of 
NGOs then in consultative status with ECOSOC. 983 Effective NGO 
participation within the Preparatory Committee and the Conference was 
encouraged to enrich deliberations, disseminate results and mobilize public 
support.984 A variety of forums were proposed to facilitate productive 
interaction between States and NGOs including national and international 
briefings, NGO Conferences and national arrangements.985 NGOs could 
contribute information and counsel on matters of special relevance through
Q O Z
papers, presentations and speeches as well as a half-day informal dialogue. 
The Preparatory Committee decided that its ‘policy should be to encourage an 
equitable representation of NGOs from developed and developing countries 
and from all regions and also to ensure a fair balance between NGOs with an 
environment focus and those with a development focus.’ Appointing NGOs to
983 UNGA Resolutions 43/196 (1988) & 44/228 (1989), para 12.
984 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/2, para 33.
985 UNCED Preparatory Committee, Suggested guidelines for the contribution of relevant 
NGOs to UNCED, First Organisational Session, UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/CRP.5.
986 UNCED Preparatory Committee, Report of the Secretary-General to UNCED, First 
Organisational Session, UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/9 (1990), paras 11-14.
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official delegations was encouraged.987 NGOs ‘shall not have any negotiating 
role’ in the preparatory process nor in the Conference itself. Oral interventions 
would ‘in accordance with normal UN practice’ be at the discretion of
Q Q Q
Chairpersons and require the consent of the relevant body. These 
arrangements were subsequently approved by the General Assembly.989
In anticipation of UNCED the ICC formulated a code of conduct at the Second 
World Industry Conference on Environmental Management in 1991 and the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) was 
established to promote self-regulation.990 Over a thousand individual firms 
participated in the Summit with around forty involved in a broad range of 
activity.991 The ICC responded positively to Agenda 21.992 The WBCSD 
considered that it had successfully recast business as an efficient economic 
change agent which promoted sustainable development rather than the 
principal source of environmental pollution.993
For the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development 
ECOSOC was requested to adopt modalities ensuring NGO participation 
‘taking into account the procedures followed in the UNCED process and the 
experience gained in this regard during previous UN population
987 UNCED Preparatory Committee, ‘The Role of NGOs in the preparatory process for the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development’, First Organisational Session, UN Doc 
A/45/46 (1990), Annex I, Decision 1/1, paras 1, 3; UNGA Resolution 45/211 (1990), para 13.
988 UNCED, Report of the Preparatory Committee for UNCED, UN Doc A/45/46, Annex I, 
Decision 1/1, para 4; UNGA Resolution 45/211 (1990), para 13.
989 UNGA Resolution 46/168 (1991), para 9(f).
990 WBCSD, Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on Development and the 
Environment. MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1992, Chapters 11-17.
991 UNTCMD, Follow-up to UNCED as Related to TNCs, UN Doc E/C. 10/1993/13.
992 Willums J.-O. & Goluke U., From Ideas to Action: Business and Sustainable Development. 
ICC, Norway, 1992, 20-1.
993 WBCSD, Annual Review 1996, Atar Roto Presse SA, Geneva, 3.
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Conferences.’ 994 Once again NGOs would have no negotiating role ‘in 
recognition of the intergovernmental nature’ of the Conference.995 As was the 
case at UNCED, relevant NGOs could ‘briefly’ address the Preparatory 
Committee, any oral interventions ‘should, in accordance with normal UN 
practice, be made at the discretion of the Chairman’ and any written 
submissions ‘will not be issued as official documents except in accordance 
with UN rules of procedure.’
By the late 1990s the General Assembly began to differentiate between NGOs 
in recognition of their diversity and more importantly terms such as 
‘stakeholder’, ‘civil society’ and ‘the private sector’ begin to appear. For 
example, the Secretary-General of the Third UN Conference on the Least 
Developed Countries held in 2001 was requested ‘to make arrangements, on 
the basis of consultations with Member States, to facilitate the involvement of 
civil society, including NGOs and the private sector, in the preparatory process 
and the Conference’. 996 Accrediting ‘interested civil society actors, in 
particular NGOs and the business sector’ was a matter for the Bureau of the 
Preparatory Committee.997 States make a special effort to attract private sector 
interest where the subject matter of the Conference would usefully benefit 
from commercial perspectives. Particularly noteworthy were preparations for
994 UNGA Resolution 47/176 (1992), paras 12, 13.
995 ECOSOC Resolution 1993/4, Annex containing the Guidelines for the Participation of 
NGOs in the International Conference on Population and Development and its Preparatory 
Process, paras 9, 10, 11; UNGA Resolution 48/186 (1993), para 8.
996 UNGA Resolution 53/182 (1998), para 9.
997 UNGA Resolution 55/214 (2000), para 8; Preparatory Committee to the Third UN 
Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Report of the Second Organisational Session, 
UN Doc A/CONF.191/3 (2001), Annex 1: Decision on Accreditation on Civil Society Actors.
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the 2002 International Conference on the Financing for Development.998 The 
Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group recommended that the preparatory 
process and final event should involve interactive and other innovative 
modalities enabling participation by all relevant stakeholders.999 The General 
Assembly moreover encouraged flexible consultation.1000 The Secretary- 
General observed that each stakeholder community had different traditions and 
practices regarding UN engagement, potentially different contributions to 
make and different priorities given the scope and agenda of the Conference.1001 
Matching NGO diversity with particular intergovernmental requirements 
accordingly lent itself to tailoring NGO participation rather than transplanting 
templates from elsewhere.
The Bureau was requested to consider ‘possible proposals and 
recommendations for additional modalities for the participation of the private 
sector’. 1002 It differentiated between several distinct private sector 
stakeholders on account of the specific functions they performed: private banks, 
institutional investors, other market institutions, non-financial corporations and 
business associations. Efforts were made to identify the ‘leading’ institution 
within each category as well as adequate representation from business entities 
in developing countries.1003 The Bureau envisaged three modalities for their
998 UNGA, Report of the Second Committee at the resumed Fifty-Second Session, UN Doc 
A/52/840 (1998).
999 Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc A/54/28, Ch IV, para 20 (c).
1000 UNGA Resolution 54/196 (1999), paras 6, 10.
1001 UN Secretary-General, Consultations on the potential modalities of the participation of all 
relevant stakeholders in both the substantive preparatory process and the high-level 
intergovernmental event on financing for development, UN Doc A/AC.257/1 (2000), para 20.
1002 UNGA Resolution 54/279 (1999), para 4.
1003 Report of the Bureau to the resumed organisational session of the Preparatory Committee 
for the International Conference on the Financing for Development, UN Doc A/AC.257/8 
(2000), para 13.
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participation: written statements to and attendance at meetings of the 
Preparatory Committee and intergovernmental event; hearings and panel 
sessions on selected topics; and ‘web-based consultations’ soliciting comments 
on policy proposals. NGOs including business were welcome to organize 
information sessions in which members of the Preparatory Committee could 
participate.1004 A two-day set of panel discussions was conducted with 
business representatives and side activities held in parallel to the final event 
were encouraged.1005 Focused and interactive roundtables and workshops 
where other NGOs could present contrary opinions was the preferred modality 
for engaging with the business community.
The Business Hearings involved short presentations by participants, reactions 
from appointed commentators and an ‘interactive dialogue’ before outcomes 
were recorded in summary reports and distributed to national delegations for 
use in deliberations. Seventeen businesspersons made the point that firms look 
for growth potential, satisfactory rates of return and the ability to spread 
risk.1006 They argued that States should not abdicate their responsibility to 
establish an enabling regulatory environment and over rely upon self­
regulation. A civil society hearing was also organised.1007
1004 UNGA, Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Financing for 
Development, Modalities of the participation of all relevant stakeholders in the substantive 
preparatory process and the high-level intergovernmental event on financing for development, 
UN Doc A/AC.257/6 (2000), paras 14-20.
1005 Report of the Bureau to the resumed organisational session of the Preparatory Committee 
for the International Conference on the Financing for Development, UN Doc A/AC.257/9, 
paras 12-14.
006 Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Financing for Development, 
Financing for Development: Hearings with the business community, Summary of panel 
presentations and discussion, UN Doc A/AC.257/19 (2000), para 34, 39, 85, 104, 108.
007 Resumed Organisational Session of the Preparatory Committee to the International 
Conference on the Financing for Development, Conference Room Paper One, UN Doc 
A/AC.257/CRP. 1 (2000).
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In light of these hearings the Bureau was requested to ‘explore ways and 
means to deepen the efforts of all relevant stakeholders’ including the business 
sector.1008 It was noted that the business sector is heterogeneous and 
identifying representatives was difficult. The Preparatory Committee 
concluded that it would be useful to appoint appropriate interlocutors 
representing different segments of the business community.1009 The ICC, trade 
associations and corporate coalitions were encouraged to use internal processes 
to generate written contributions on substantive issues and surveys on business 
opinion. Business sector representatives would be selected by reference to 
their business interests, likely investment in developing States, geographical 
distribution and gender perspective. They need not be corporate chairpersons 
but should possess professional hands-on expertise, be sufficiently influential 
and competent to provide innovative input. The General Assembly approved 
these informal discussions with business, authorized other forms of input and 
encouraged additional initiatives which involved business at national and 
regional levels.1010 The preparatory process for the International Conference 
on Financing for Development is particularly noteworthy for its sophistication 
and the diverse range of practices which can be utilized.
1008 Report of the Second Organisational Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 
International Conference on the Financing for Development, UN Doc A/55/L.77 (2001), para 7.
1009 UNGA, Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, Third Report of the Bureau, UN Doc A/AC.257/22 (2001), paras 18-27 & 
Addendum 1, Report of the Task Force established by the Bureau to consider modalities for 
engaging the business community in the financing for development process, paras 18-27.
10l5f UNGA Resolution 56/445 (2001), para 9.
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ii) The International Protection o f Human Rights.
States have also attempted to include human rights NGOs within 
intergovernmental deliberations. For example, all NGOs were requested to 
undertake reviews and submit recommendations by way of assisting the 
Preparatory Committee for the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and 
to participate actively therein.1011 The Preparatory Committee successfully 
recommended that participation be extended to those NGOs in consultative 
status with ECOSOC who are also active in the development field.1012
Although not a human rights conference per se, the Fourth World Conference 
on Women during 1995 considered inter alia the role of human rights for 
empowering women. The Commission on the Status on Women acted as the 
preparatory body. It requested consultative status for those NGOs concerned 
with the advancement of women and recommended that ECOSOC Resolution 
1296 (1968) be reviewed to make consultative status more accessible.1013 
ECOSOC extended the application period for accreditation when States 
excluded NGOs from the Preparatory Committee’s fourth organisational 
session.1014 The Commission also invited States ‘to include, whenever 
possible, NGOs in their delegations’ and that ‘the proper functioning of the 
Conference and the efficient participation of NGOs’ required that the number
1011 UNGA Resolution 45/155 (1990), para 10.
1012 UN Doc A/CONF. 157/PC/54 (1992), Annex II; UNGA Resolution 47/122 (1992).
1013 Commission on Status on Women acting as the Preparatory Body, Decision 36/8 
‘Preparations for the Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development 
and Peace’ UN Doc E/CN.6/1992/13, paras 3, 4.
1014 Ibid, Acting as the Preparatory Body, Draft decision on the accreditation of NGOs to the 
Fourth World Conference on Women and its preparatory process, UN Doc E/CN.6/1995/L.20 
(1995).
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of NGOs not be excessive.1015 The importance of ‘close proximity’ including 
‘some concurrence in time’ between the Conference and the NGO Forum was 
emphasized. 1016 The Beijing Conference marked the largest recorded 
assembly of NGOs and fifty-one NGO statements were made before the 
plenary. However, NGOs were not permitted to address the Main Committee 
and the result of the NGO Forum was not part of the Final Report. Thus 
although the Conference targeted particular NGOs the modalities for their 
participation did not approach the degree of sophistication undertaken for the 
International Conference on Financing for Development considered above.
The emergence of a distinctive ‘private sector’ within a broader ‘civil society’ 
during the 1990s as noted above is evident not only in the strictly commercial 
sphere. For example, NGOs particularly from developing States were invited 
to participate in the 1996 UN Conference on Human Settlements with the 
participatory arrangements expected to follow that of UNCED.1017 The 
General Assembly called ‘upon all States to encourage the broad-based 
participation of local authorities and all relevant actors, including the scientific 
community, industry, trade unions, NGOs and the private sector, in the 
national, regional and international preparatory process and to encourage a 
wide exchange of information and experience in this respect’.1018 Moreover, 
‘every effort should be made to involve the greatest representation of interested
1015 Commission on the Status of Women, Resolution 37/7 (1993), paras 1, 3.
1016 Commission on the Status of Women acting as the Preparatory Body, Decision 36/8 (1992).
1017 UNGA Resolution 47/180 (1992), para 6.
10,8 UNGA Resolution 49/109 (1994), para 16.
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groups’ including the private sector to formulate credible action plans.1019 
Meaningful NGO participation including that of ‘industry, commerce, finance 
and services’ was sought ‘with a view to attaining representation of the 
broadest possible spectrum of views and contributions’. Illustrative of general 
trends elsewhere, Habitat II also ‘needs to become a Conference of 
partnerships’. However, since it was observed that ‘Member States have the 
sole and final responsibility in the decision-making process’1020, it is apparent 
that the conditions of NGO participation are circumscribed by States.
NGO participation in World Summits generally occurs on similar terms as 
those of international Conferences. For example, NGOs in consultative status 
with ECOSOC were invited ‘to contribute in accordance with established 
practice’ to the 1995 World Summit for Social Development as well as its 
preparatory process.1021 The General Assembly called upon NGOs ‘to 
contribute fully to the work of the Preparatory Committee and to the 
Summit’.1022 The Preparatory Committee also adopted special measures to 
facilitate the participation of NGOs from developing countries. At the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development NGOs could access official
1019 Report of the Secretary-General to the First Organisational Session of the Preparatory 
Committee to the UN Conference on Human Settlements, UN Doc A/CONF.165/PC/2 (1993) 
para 24 & Annex 1.
1020 Report of the Third Organisational Session of the Preparatory Committee to the UN 
Conference on Human Settlements, UN Doc A/CONF.165/PC/3/7 (1996), Decision II/3, 
Annex, paras 2 & 3.
1021 UNGA Resolution 47/92 (1992), para 17.
1022 UNGA Resolution 48/100 (1993), para 9.
1023 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Preparatory Committee for the World 
Summit for Social Development at its organizational session, UN Doc A/48/24 (1993), Annex 
II, Decision 4.
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documentation, distribute written statements through the secretariat, were 
briefed by it and were allocated office space for the duration.1024
3.2 Special Sessions o f the UN General Assembly.
NGO participation in specially-convened Sessions of the General Assembly is 
somewhat different. NGOs may participate where they have been accredited 
to ECOSOC by virtue of Resolution 1996/31 (1996), have previously been 
accredited by the Preparatory Committee which organized the earlier 
Conference or have a collaborative relationship or partnership with the 
intergovernmental organisation entrusted with conducting the follow-up 
Session.
The procedural rules of the General Assembly may apply to Special 
Sessions.1025 For example, the Commission on the Status of Women was 
nominated as the preparatory committee for the 2000 Special Session on 
Women (‘Beijing + 5’). Participation was open to States, specialized Agencies 
and observers in accordance with the practice of the General Assembly.1026 
Active NGO involvement was encouraged. Those NGOs in consultative 
status with ECOSOC made statements during the plenary debate and before
1024 WSSD, Information for Participants, UN Doc A/CONF.l99/INF/1 (2002), paras 29-30, 60- 
61.
1025 UNGA Rules of Procedure, UN Doc UNGAOR/Rules*/Rev. 15/1984.
1026 UNGA Resolution 52/100 (1997), para 46.
1027 UNGA Resolution 54/142 (1999), para 15.
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the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole.1028 However limited space restricted 
more effective participation.
Alternatively, Special Sessions may adopt the procedural rules of the earlier 
Conferences from which they spring. For example, accreditation and 
preparatory processes for the Special Session for an Overall Review and 
Appraisal of the Implementation of the Outcome of the UN Conference on 
Human Settlements (Istanbul + 5) during 2001 followed the procedural rules 
adopted at the UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II).1029 States 
were encouraged to establish participatory mechanisms involving all civil 
society actors including the private sector to assess and review the Habitat 
Agenda1030 Financial assistance for NGO attendance was also contemplated: 
all Member States 'in a position to do so [were invited] to provide financial 
resources...to enable least developed countries and their national civil-society 
partners to prepare adequately for, and be fully involved in, the preparatory 
process and the special session itself.’1031
The General Assembly has upon occasion specified the desired attributes of 
NGO participants. For example, ‘associations of people living with HIV/AIDS, 
NGOs and the business sector, including pharmaceutical companies’ were 
invited to participate in the preparatory process and Special Session for the
1028 Commission on the Status of Women acting as the Preparatory Committee, UN Doc A/S- 
23/2 (2000), Chapter V, Section B, Decision II, para 16.
1029 Report of the Commission on Human Settlements acting as the Preparatory Committee at 
its First Organisational Session, UN Doc HS/C/PC.OS/4 (1999), paras 2, 3.
1030 UNGA Resolution 51/177 (1996), paras 8. 10.
1031 UNGA Resolutions 54/209 (1999), para 5 & 55/195 (2000), para 11 (‘voluntary financial 
contributions’).
290
Review of the Problem of HIV/AIDS in All its Aspects in 2001.1032 Relevant 
NGO qualifications included evidence of recognized work in the area of 
HIV/AIDS and previous experience in regional and/or international events. 
NGOs were also allowed to attend two open-ended informal consultations of 
the plenary and panel discussions were established. Summary outcomes would 
constitute informal input into the preparatory process and the Special Session 
itself.1033
To summarise thus far, PrepComs have encouraged States to solicit the 
maximum possible input from non-State actors in preparatory processes at 
international, regional and national levels. This has been occurring since at 
least preparations for the UN Conference on the Human Environment during 
the late 1960s. However, there is no assurance that NGO contributions will be 
rewarded or acknowledged in the final product. Preparatory Committees 
typically encourage broadly representative NGO participation with an 
appropriate and equitable geographical balance and possessing a relevant 
orientation and organisational competence. However, the NGOs which 
actually participate are predominantly from Northern industrialized States. 
Hence financial assistance may be provided to encourage the participation of 
NGOs from developing States. NGO observers are also expected to be 
represented at senior levels. Developments since the 1990s suggest that 
distinctions are increasingly being made between non-State actors not for the 
purposes of differential treatment but by way of recognizing diversity between
1032 UNGA Resolutions 55/13 (2000), paras 13-14 & 55/242 (2000), para 8.
1033 UNGA, Conference Room Paper of the President on the modalities for civil society 
involvement in the Special Session of the UNGA on Review of the Problem of HIV/AIDS in 
All its Aspects, UN Doc fflV/AIDS/CRP. 1 (2000), paras 18,23, 34,47, 50, 51, 53.
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non-State actors. The ‘private sector’ is frequently a pseudonym for business 
and industry but need not be so interpreted. Trends also indicate that the 
modalities for NGO participation evolve by accretion based upon 
experimentation and prior experience. Innovative techniques suggested by 
NGOs such as roundtables and panel discussions which encourage greater 
interaction with States may be adopted and utilised elsewhere. NGO forums or 
side events conducted in parallel to intergovernmental proceedings are 
encouraged.
The procedural characteristics of Conferences, summits or special sessions 
suggest that NGOs are intended to assist deliberations rather than participate in 
decision-making. Although problems of causality make it difficult to assess 
actual impacts any instances of apparent NGO influence only arise with the 
concurrence of States. State practice in the environmental, human rights and 
developmental contexts illustrated above indicates that NGO participation is 
tightly controlled, sometimes contested and occasionally resisted by States. In 
light of NGO participation in defining the terms of their participation and the 
procedural rules with respect to accreditation, it remains to be considered what 
entitlement States are prepared to grant them for the purposes of enriching 
deliberations.
4. The Procedural Rules applicable to UN Conferences.
The importance of NGO participation at COPs was discussed in the specific 
context of the case study presented in Part Two (the UN Framework
292
Convention on Climate Change). Part Three above considered NGO 
participation within ad hoc international conferences, global summits and five- 
yearly implementation reviews organised by the UN General Assembly. This 
Part undertakes a comparative analysis o f the criteria for accreditation and 
modalities for NGO participation. Once again NGO refers to all non-State 
actors including corporations. The objective o f this Part is to discern whether
i4
procedural law or whether NGO participation remains reliant on a case by case
basis, it tbe tormer, what is the content and scope o f this emergent right, 
particularly as currently circumscribed under international environmental law? 
In answering this question reference will be made to procedural rules drawn 
principally from COPs in the environmental field with useful comparisons 
made to the modalities for NGO participation within the monitoring 
mechanism o f human rights institutions.
The arrangements for NGO participation consist o f two components: the 
process o f prior accreditation and the modalities for participation at the 
Conference itself. As considered above, the latter seek effective NGO 
participation and information exchange between States and NGOs. Procedural 
mechanisms seek to mobilize outside talent, expertise and experience and 
channel ideas and proposals into deliberations, thereby enhancing the accuracy 
and effectiveness o f  intergovernmental outcomes. NGO participation at COPs 
is circumscribed by a primary enabling provision located within the text o f the 
Convention, secondary rules o f procedure for the COP itself, any relevant 
decisions o f the governing bodies and finally the practice o f States, the relevant
there could be an emerge] right to der common international
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secretariat and non-State actors. Host States also influence matters, for 
example, by expediting visas, timetabling convenient schedules and situating 
proceedings in accessible locations. Annex 5 reproduces the relevant treaty 
provision, procedural rules and governing body decisions in the context of the 
UNFCCC. This Part considers first the criteria and process of accreditation 
and second the secondary rules of procedure for a COP.
4.1 Prior A ccreditation Procedures.
NGOs must first pass the procedure for accreditation to attend a COP. The 
Conference secretariat or bureau is responsible for evaluating applications and 
admission is without prejudice to subsequent decisions by the COP. The 
criteria for accreditation are first formulated by Preparatory Committees during 
organisational sessions and then endorsed by the General Assembly. NGOs 
seeking admission as observers must provide official documents describing 
their mandate, scope and governing structure, evidence of non-profit status, 
activities suggesting competence, affiliation details, funding sources, 
publications and designated contact points.
NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC or the relevant UN Commission 
are accredited to participate in the preparatory process and the Conference 
itself without further screening after expressing their interest to the secretariat. 
Other NGOs must apply to the secretariat and include information on their 
relevance and special competence. ‘Relevance’ is determined by their 
background and involvement in the issues to be considered at the Conference.
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Conferences may have particular agendas and NGOs may be requested to 
confirm their interest in the objectives of the event.1034 The procedure for the 
ad-hoc accreditation of business associations is the same as for NGOs not 
accredited to ECOSOC.
The Secretariat recommends NGOs for accreditation to the Preparatory 
Committee at least one week before the beginning of each organisational 
session. Accreditation is therefore a continuous process.1035 Where unable to 
recommend NGOs the secretariat has to provide reasons. The Committee 
decides on accreditation by consensus within twenty-four hours. Final 
decisions are taken by the Preparatory Committee if a State expresses concerns. 
Where unable to decide interim accreditation shall be granted until a final 
decision is taken. Hence, NGOs may not receive accreditation where a State 
raises objections but the question is ultimately decided by vote or consensus 
within the Committee. Only exceptionally are NGOs refused accreditation.
NGOs must be ‘qualified in matters covered by the Convention’ for attendance 
at a COP. They must be relevantly competent or represent a broad 
constituency interested in the particular issue. Furthermore, there must not be 
any objection from State Parties. NGOs do not possess a recognized right of 
entry to a COP and the ultimate decision lies with States. For example,
1034 Cp ECOSOC Resolution 1993/4, Annex containing the Guidelines for the Participation of 
NGOs in the International Conference on Population and Development and its Preparatory 
Process; UNGA Resolution 48/186 (1993), para 8.
1035 177 admitted at the first session (UNFCCC, Admission of Organisations as Observers, UN 
Doc FCCC/CP/1995/3 (1995)), 36 for the second (UN Doc FCCC/CP/1996/3), 157 for the 
third (UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/4), 66 for the fourth (UN Doc FCCC/CP/1998/14 & Add. 1), 
36 for the fifth (UN Doc FCCC/CP/1999/4 & Add.l), 23 for the sixth (UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2000/2/Add. 1 & FCCC/CP/2001/4), 19 for the seventh (UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/7), 
34 for the eighth (UN Doc FCCC/CP/2002/5) and 60 NGOs were newly admitted for COP-9 
(UN Doc FCCC/CP/2003/4).
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‘technically qualified’ bodies or agencies ‘shall’ be admitted and ‘shall have 
the right to participate but not to vote’ in meetings under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) provided that they ‘have 
been approved for this purpose by the State in which they are located’.1036 To 
similar effect, qualified NGOs ‘shall be entitled to participate’ under the 
Aarhus Convention ‘unless at least one third of the Parties present in the 
meeting raise objections’. 1037 At most there is only a presumption of 
admission given the possibility of objection by States. The word ‘shall’ 
indicates an entitlement to participate and NGOs already accredited to 
ECOSOC have at least a legitimate expectation of admission. Representatives 
from organisations and other entities having a standing invitation from the 
General Assembly have a greater prospect of admission. Furthermore, 
accreditation also carries over from earlier COPs or where NGOs have already 
been accredited by the relevant UN Agency. Duly accredited NGOs receive 
notification of impeding COPs and the proposed agenda items.1038 Conversely, 
accreditation to a Conference may facilitate accreditation to a UN Agency or 
commission. For example, NGOs accredited to UNCED were automatically 
given the right of accreditation to the Commission on Sustainable 
Development.
Annex 2 and the tabular summary contained overleaf illustrates the 
accreditation criteria with respect to international conferences convened under 
UN auspices, World Summits and Special Sessions of the General Assembly
1036 Art 11(7), 1973 Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, 
993 LW7S243.
1037 Art 10(5) Aarhus Convention, supra n29.
1038 Eg UNFCCC Secretariat, Notification, UN Doc ICA/OBS/COP9/03 (2003).
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since the early 1990s. Several conclusions may be made. First, the 
information required as a precondition for accreditation has grown by accretion, 
continues to do so and has become increasingly specific. The required 
information was codified by ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. Since that date 
States have specified additional requirements such as possessing a ‘special 
interest’, NGO roles during the implementation phase and the desirability of 
equitable participation. There is therefore a risk that entry hurdles could be 
raised still higher. For example, NGO participation could be preconditioned 
with greater information disclosure (reporting, financial accounting), 
transparency or accountability (democratic decision-making, oversight by 
independent ombudsman or panels). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that 
the non-profit criterion is partly irrelevant: individual businesses were invited 
to attend the International Conference on Financing for Development and a 
legitimate purpose of trade associations is to defend and advance the interests 
of enterprises they represent.
Second, accreditation remains the ‘prerogative of Member States’. That said, 
NGOs already accredited to ECOSOC ‘shall as a rule be accredited’ to attend 
the conference. Those seeking ad hoc accreditation have to apply to the 
secretariat as outlined above. These NGOs are entitled to an ‘opportunity to 
respond’ to objections from States and reasons for decisions where refused 
accreditation by the secretariat. Hence, ECOSOC-accredited NGOs possess at 
least a legitimate expectation of attendance whereas other NGOs attend on the 
basis of a privilege conferred by States. The underlying rationale of soliciting
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NGO contributions would encourage States to admit NGOs through the 
gateway and only occasionally refuse accreditation.
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Comparative Table of Information required for Accreditation
Information
Required
UNCED
Rio
(1992)
WSSD
Copenhagen
(1995)
Copenhagen 
+ 5 
(2000)
Special
Session
On
Women
(2000)
Habitat
2
(Istanbul 
+ 5) 
(2001)
WSSD
Johannesburg
(2002)
NGO Name V
Contact
Information
V
Purpose V V V V V V
Programmes 
& Activities
V V V V V V
Location of 
Activities
V V V V V V
Confirmation 
of Activities
V V V V V
Annual
Reports
V V V V V V
Financial
Statements
V V V V V V
Financial
contributors
including
government
V V V V
Members of 
Governing 
Body
V V V V V V
Nationality of 
members of 
governing 
body
V V V V V V
Description of 
membership
V V V V V V
Number of 
members
V V V V V V
Names of 
Organisational 
Members
V V V V
Geographical 
Distribution 
of members
V V V V V V
Constitution 
or by-laws
V V V V
Completed
Registration
form
V
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4.2 The Rules o f Procedure.
Organised business groups such as the ICC and trade associations formally 
participate on the same procedural terms as other NGOs: as observers. There 
are several preliminary provisions common to all procedural rules which are 
noteworthy. First, State Parties retain full procedural capacity including the 
right to vote. In this respect NGOs have not called for voting rights since this 
entails responsibility for decisions taken. Second, Parties are represented by 
national delegations consisting of a head and such other accredited 
representatives, alternate representatives and advisers as required. Third, COP 
procedural rules typically apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings of subsidiary 
bodies. All meetings of the COP and subsidiary bodies are held in public 
unless decided otherwise. However, some procedural rules provide that 
subsidiary body meetings are conducted privately as a general rule. Fourth, 
Presidents are responsible for the conduct of COP proceedings including 
calling speakers to order and imposing time limitations. Finally, NGO 
participatory entitlements are always listed last in the pecking order of 
observers behind Specialised Agencies and intergovernmental organisations.
By way of illustration Annex 3 reproduces the modalities for NGO 
participation within several COPs. The standard formula in the first operative 
paragraph is that ‘any body or agency whether national or international, 
governmental or nongovernmental’ ‘qualified’ in relevant fields and informing 
the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a meeting of the COP as an
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observer ‘may be admitted unless at least one-third of the Parties present 
object’. The procedural rules moreover provide that secretariats shall notify 
these relevant bodies and agencies of upcoming COP meetings. Registration 
with the secretariat confers the legitimate expectation (but not the right) to 
observe COP meetings and meetings of subsidiary bodies.
Several observations may be made. First, the standard formula is subject to 
considerable variation. Significant modifications include omitting ‘whether 
national and international’ and extending NGO participation to ‘any meeting’.
f
Most importantly NGOs must be qualified in the subject covered by the 
convention and in one instance ‘have special qualifications’. The procedural 
rules for CITES are the most detailed and contemplate seating arrangements, a 
right to speak, the submission of ‘informative documents’, exhibitions, a 
complaints procedure and observer participation in working groups.
Second, inconsistencies exist between institutions without apparent reason. 
For example, the procedural rules for meetings of the COP to the Convention 
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accident permit observer 
attendance at private meetings and the right to make decisions is explicitly 
excluded. In contrast, the procedural rules for COPs to the Ramsar Convention 
acknowledge the contributions of NGOs to decision-making but also 
contemplate restricting their attendance on account of space limitations. Third, 
the procedural rules applicable to the micro-level of a Committee, for example, 
the CITES Plants Committee, illustrates that control remains firmly with States 
and secretariats possess considerable discretion in defining working
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relationships. Finally, the identity of NGOs may vary since their qualifications 
are defined by reference to ‘matters covered by the Convention’ or the topic 
under consideration.
NGO participation at COPs is authorized either explicitly through procedural 
rules or implicitly via established and evolving practice. The former are 
limited in scope or detail and are usually permissive rather than restrictive. 
NGO participation beyond them depends upon the practice of States, 
secretariat officials and the efforts of NGOs themselves. NGO participation 
relies upon the discretion of the Chairperson and the consent of the relevant 
body. Secretariat practices are fluid and include NGO briefings, information 
sessions outlining the substantive issues for negotiation, allocating office space 
and permitting side-events.1039 Treaty secretariats establish close working 
relations with NGOs to facilitate the COP including commissioning work or 
expertise, exchanging information, arranging meetings with senior officials 
and identifying suitable individuals to participate in panel discussions.
Contemporary NGO practice includes disseminating information, information 
gathering, advocacy activity with States through formal channels or interactive 
sessions, participation in negotiations, providing counsel or advice, supporting 
international secretariats and informal contact. Account was taken of the 
activities of the major groups when formulating the modalities for NGO 
participation at the Special Session for the Overall Review and Appraisal of
1039 Reference document on the participation of civil society in UN Conferences and Special 
Sessions of the General Assembly during the 1990s, 2001,
(http://www.im.org/ga/president/55/speech/civilsocietyl.htm) (accessed 25 September 2004).
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Agenda 21 (Earth Summit + 5) in 1997.1040 Major group representatives 
participated in the plenary debate and addressed the Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Whole.1041 That said, procedural rules make specific provision for oral and 
written statements by NGOs.
i) Oral Statements.
The conditions for observer participation at ‘open’ meetings are determined by 
States. Their discretion extends to oral interventions by NGOs during debates 
in plenary session.1042 Annex 4 reproduces the procedural rules applicable to 
several illustrative UN Conferences, World Summits and Special Sessions with 
the oldest being the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1974. Oral 
statements by NGOs are made upon the invitation of presiding officers or at 
the discretion of Chairpersons with the approval of the body concerned. State 
practice regarding oral interventions varies in light of time constraints, 
personalities, substantive issues under consideration, the identity of the NGO 
and the wishes of national delegations. NGOs in consultative status with 
ECOSOC and other NGOs may be requested to first organise themselves into 
constituencies and make oral statements through spokespersons where the 
number of requests is high (see for example the rules for the World Food 
Summit). The Special Session for the Review and Appraisal of the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development
1040 UNGA Resolution 51/181 (1996), para 10.
1041 UNGA Resolution 51/864 (1997).
1042 Rule 32, Rules of Procedure (ROP), UNFCCC; Rule 31, ROP, CBD; Rule 38, ROP, UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD); Rule 31, ROP, Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer; Rule 31, ROP for Meetings of the COP to the Ramsar 
Convention.
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of Small Island Developing States in 1999 also permitted the participation of 
‘NGOs designated by their constituencies’.1043 Once again variation is the 
theme: the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights identified specific 
meetings, the Rome Conference for the International Criminal Court detailed 
the specific terms of NGO participation and Habitat II specifically requested 
particular attendees.
Decisions of governing bodies may further clarify and regularize such 
practices. Under UNEP Conventions NGOs may intervene freely from the 
floor to make textual suggestions on individual agenda items and orally 
intervene within contact group meetings.1044 Although priority is extended to 
States there is no attempt to balance NGO statements. In UN practice informal 
meetings such as open-ended (open to all States) contact groups are ordinarily 
closed to accredited observers. However, the UNFCCC has departed from this 
practice through a decision taken at COP-4 (see Annex 5),
ii) Written Statements.
As indicated in Annex 4, NGOs may produce at their own expense written 
statements (reports, position and issue papers) at each of these conferences in 
the languages of the UN. These are distributed by the secretariat and do not 
constitute official UN documents. Secretariats may also issue official
1043 Report of the Commission on Sustainable Development acting as the Preparatory 
Committee at its First Organisational Session, UN Doc A/S-22/2 (1999), Chapter V, Section A, 
Decision II, paras 16, 18.
1044 Yamin F. and Wasserstein T., ‘NGO Participation in the UNFCCC’, Paper presented at the 
Concluding Workshop for the Project to Enhance Policy-Making Capacity under the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol, London, Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development (FIELD), 1999, 9, 16.
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documents containing information submitted by NGOs.1045 The provision of 
‘objective’ information which increases the knowledge base for States is also a 
lobbying technique of NGOs. The submission of written statements by NGOs 
is discretional: there is no right or expectation to submit statements. More 
importantly, there is no attendant obligation upon States to consider their 
content since they are merely assistance for deliberations.
4.3 An Emergent Right o f NGO Participation in UN Conferences o f the 
Parties.
As observed above, the practice of COPs in the environmental sphere is to 
create a legitimate expectation\upornNGOs that they be allowed to participate. 
The procedural rules do not confer any right of participation potentially 
enforceable against States. 1046 CITES exceptionally provides for an 
unconditional right for NGOs to participate where there has been prior 
approval by the home State. Most multilateral environmental agreements 
contemplate the possibility of objection by a third of States and the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer provides for objection by a 
simple majority.1047 None contemplate the possibility that one State acting 
alone can prevent the admission of a given NGO (although the People’s 
Republic of China in fact achieved this at the 1995 World Conference on 
Women). The potential for objection by States - however infrequently
1045 Eg Art 16(l)(b), Basel Convention; UNCCD, COP Decision 11/COP. 1 (1997).
1046 Institute for International and European Environmental Policy (Ecologic)/FIELD, The 
Participation of NGOs in International Environmental Governance: Legal Basis and Practical 
Experience. Final Report, 2002, 206, 208, 210.
104 See Annex 4.
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exercised1048 - points to the possibility of arbitrary exclusion and must militate 
against a right of NGO participation. Furthermore, informal contact group 
meetings or bodies dealing with politically sensitive matters (particularly 
implementation review and compliance, dispute settlement or financing) are 
generally closed to NGO observers.
It is too early to conclude that these are merely procedural refinements 
purporting to be more or whether the international lawmaking process is in fact 
becoming more inclusive. The accreditation procedures and modalities for 
NGO participation suggest at best a presumption that NGOs may attend and 
participate at COPs. NGO participation is subject to State consent and 
chairpersons control the orderly conduct of proceedings. It is the element of 
State discretion that NGOs are refused any formal entitlement to 
participate. 1049 Reasons for restricting NGO participation include 
confidentiality (national security or business proprietary information), to avoid 
politicization, encourage frank intergovernmental exchange, logistical 
considerations (space limitations or time constraints) and more effective 
functioning. Different institutional structures, Conference topics and the 
requirements of Parties account for the diversity of State practice. NGO input 
may be structured through constituency systems or advisory bodies. Indeed, 
BINGOs lead this development by organising coalitions. Although this 
encourages simpler decision-making for States and adds the weight of numbers 
to proponents it may also silence important minority opinions.
1048 Cp three accreditation applications were rejected for Rio, one for Copenhagen and two for 
Johannesburg.
1049 UN, Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.B/21 
(1985).
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Procedural rules provide an important platform o f legitimacy and facilitate 
formal access. However, several NGO techniques such as lobbying, providing 
advice, information gathering and information dissemination do not depend 
upon procedural rules for their effectiveness. Treaty secretariats enjoy fields 
o f co-operation with NGOs beyond the confines o f the COP. NGO 
participation is dependent upon establishing credible reputations for balanced, 
rational proposals possessing intrinsic merit above author self-interest. 
Corporations who present unreliable technical data, make exaggerated claims 
or misjudge public opinion undermine their influence. Informal activities such 
as lobbying, organising side events and supporting international secretariats 
favour the well-resourced and experienced NGOs who can secure influential 
positions within the existing system. Uniformly applied procedural 
entitlements would ensure formal parity between NGOs. The next question is 
the terms o f that participation. ,
i) The Scope and Content o f an Emergent Right o f Participation.
Annex 4 illustrates the two formal modalities for NGO participation -  oral and 
written statements -  as formulated in the procedural rules o f several COPs. 
Their terms range in sophistication and the analysis suggests an evolution over 
time. However, there is a clearly identifiable common core with respect to the 
permissibility, scope and content o f oral interventions and written statements. 
Observer representatives upon invitation and subject to State consent ‘m ay’ 
make oral statements on questions in which they possess special competence.
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Written statements ‘shall’ be distributed by the secretariat to national 
delegations in the quantities and language provided to it at the Conference 
venue where such statements relate to the work of the Conference and the 
NGO has a special competence. Although accreditation criteria may have 
expanded, particularly in 1996, the conditions of NGO oral and written 
interventions have remained relatively static. They may be analogized to 
privileges conferred by States: it is left to NGOs to avail themselves of the 
opportunity to make oral and written statements and even when an obligation 
of distribution arises for secretariats the content of the message may be 
rejected for irrelevancy or where the NGO lacks competence. Minor variations 
if they exist are located in the practice of secretariats and the informal activities 
of NGOs.
States may be concerned that overt displays of NGO influence undermine the 
authority and credibility of intergovernmental processes. It is easier for States 
to rein in unruly NGO behaviour or abuse. The logistics of managing many 
participants may create NGO dissatisfaction and render any ‘right to 
participate’ practically ineffective. Since States retain control over the terms 
of NGO participation in COP, any disproportionate NGO influence will 
originate elsewhere (for example, membership of national delegations or 
appointment as experts). Informal NGO activities and secretariat interactions 
with NGOs clearly exceed these procedural rules. Annex 4 reproduces the 
existing terms for novel processes such as roundtables and multistakeholder 
dialogue sessions, distributing materials outside the conference venue, 
thematic presentations and side events. It also illustrates the extent to which
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oral statements by NGOs during plenary debates and membership of national 
delegations are currently regulated. It is clear that guidance for the conduct of 
these modalities is yet to be reflected in the formal procedural rules for COPs. 
The organisational sessions of different Preparatory Committees repeat the 
process of creating procedural law and defining the terms of NGO participation. 
The constancy of variation prevents procedural law from becoming too settled 
and innovative NGO entitlements from crystallising.
Procedural rules are frequently accompanied by a disclaimer that accreditation 
criteria and the modalities for NGO participation do not establish precedents 
for future sessions. However, procedural rules may be copied from earlier 
Conferences. This is particularly true of Special Sessions of General 
Assembly. For example, NGO participation at the Special Session on the 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD + 5) in 1999 
took into account ‘the practice and experience gained’ at ICPD.1050 A limited 
number of NGOs made statements during the plenary debate and before the Ad 
Hoc Committee of the Whole. 1051 Similarly, negotiations concerning 
persistent organic pollutants adopted the UNCED approach of encouraging an 
equitable representation of NGOs including a ‘fair balance’ between 
environmental and development ones.1052 The Preparatory Committee also 
adopted the tests for determining the competence and relevance of NGOs.1053
1050 UNGA Resolution 52/188 (1997), para 11. See to identical effect UNGA Resolution 
53/189 (1998), para 8 (the practice and experience of an earlier Global Conference on the 
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States) & UNGA Resolution 53/180 
(1998), para 7 ( ‘the practice and experience gained at the Habitat II Conference’).
1051 Commission on Population and Development acting as the Preparatory Committee, Report 
of the First Organisational Session, UN Doc A/S-21/2 (1999), Chapter V, Section A, Decision 
II, paras 16, 18.
1052 UNEP, Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Binding 
Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants
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Further codification of the rules governing NGO participation and their 
eventual harmonization is considered desirable with respect to international 
environmental governance.1054 Useful comparisons may be made with the 
modalities for NGO participation within the monitoring mechanisms of human 
rights institutions similarly established by treaty (see Annex 1). The 
International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘may’ 
receive written submissions from NGOs and time ‘will’ be made available for 
oral statements. Information has to focus on the Covenant, be relevant to 
matters under consideration, reliable and not abusive. The Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women may also decide receive 
information from NGOs and ‘shall decide the form and manner in which such 
additional information will be obtained’. The Committee against Torture is 
similarly empowered but draws distinctions between information, written 
statements and documentation and contemplates answers to questions. In short, 
the modalities for NGO participation within UN human rights institutions as 
specified by their procedural rules are variable, conditional, unspecific and 
discretional. Interestingly, the procedural rules for the consultative Conference 
cited in Annex 1 identifies particular groups and distinguishes between 
participants and attendees. General debates are characterised by equality of 
participation between States and NGOs where the President controls 
proceedings and the secretariat arranges oral speakers.
adopting Decision 1/1 (1990) of the Preparatory Committee for UNCED on the role of NGOs 
in the preparatory process, UN Doc UNEP/POPS/INC. 1/INF/l (1998).
1053 Ibid, adopting Decision 2/1 (1991) of the Preparatory Committee for UNCED, UN Doc 
UNEP/POPS/INC. 1/INF/l (1998).
1054 Ecologic Report, supra «1046, p225ff.
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The appeal of one size fitting all must be balanced against more tailored 
participation. Business supports standard procedural rules for treaty 
negotiations.1055 Formalization in writing could produce more restrictive rules 
which discourage NGO participation where States backtrack on progressive 
measures employed by secretariats. The currently informal practices may be 
eroded without first being safeguarded. Informality provides for flexibility and 
accommodates differences in institutional structures, cultures, history, 
memberships and legal circumstances. On the other hand, formalization 
provides greater precision about the applicable rules, constitutes an insurance 
against further weakening and promotes best practice to wherever NGO 
participation is deficient. Accountability, fairness and equality could be 
promoted but rules would have to be constantly updated to reflect current 
practices. Harmonisation increases efficiency and system coherence, enhances 
synergies between institutions and may ultimately lead to their integration. 
Guidelines may be preferred to legally-binding solutions such as amending 
treaties, revising procedural rules or governing body decisions. Innovative 
techniques may be stalled for a short period before these minimum standards 
are again exceeded in practice through further experimentation.
Overall, entry benchmarks have increased, the formally-recognised core 
privileges remain static, novel participatory processes have emerged which 
contemplate greater parity between States and NGOs (roundtables, panel 
discussions) and finally informal activities (lobbying, side events, exhibits, 
information sessions) favour well-resourced NGOs. The scope and content of
1055 Susskind L.E., ‘New Corporate Roles in Global Environmental Treaty-Making’ (1992) 27 
Colum J  World Bus 63, 66-8.
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an emergent right for NGOs to participate within international policy-making 
should ensure equality o f treatment between NGOs within each institution. 
Standardising participatory entitlements across all institutions may not be 
possible: different NGOs have different contributions to make which should be 
channeled where most effective according to the matter under consideration 
and the needs o f States. In short, procedural rules should be tailored to 
particular institutional requirements and not to NGO characteristics. Equal 
opportunities for NGOs to make oral and written submissions whatever their 
orientation should continue to be procedurally embedded. The identification 
o f a distinct ‘private sector’ within the NGO community is worthwhile for 
States and NGOs alike but has not yet led to the emergence o f different 
participatory conditions. Solutions to remedy unequal informal activity 
include capacity-building and financial assistance for NGOs from developing 
states. Even if  well-resourced NGOs such as business continue to enjoy 
relatively privileged positions in practice, does this in fact equate with a 
significant influence upon substantive outcomes ?
5. The Corporate Impact upon the Negotiation o f Treaties.
An account o f efforts to protect the ozone layer ‘clearly demonstrates the 
crucial role played by industry in developing and implementing international 
environmental policy.1056 The ‘new diplomacy’ is reputedly characterized by 
novel multilateral negotiation procedures1057 involving corporations driven by
1056 Benedick R.E., Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. Harvard 
University Press, Massachusetts, 1998, 309.
1057 Benedick R.E., ‘Behind the Diplomatic Curtain: Inner Workings o f the New Global 
Negotiations’ (1992) 26 (3) & (4) Columbia J  World Business.
competitive considerations.1058 Treaty-making and implementation is an 
elongated process characterized by many venues peripheral to the PrepComs, 
diplomatic conferences and subsequent Conferences of the Parties: fact-finding, 
workshops, roundtables, conferences, consultations, expert panels, working 
groups and seminars.1059 States, intergovernmental organisations and non- 
State actors attend pre-sessional workshops.1060 Additional activities include 
the decisions of international secretariats, the meetings of executive bodies and 
government officials attending industry-convened conferences.1061 They are 
vehicles for informal information exchange or advice and opportunities for 
consensus-building outside intergovernmental negotiations. The convenor 
determines the procedural rules, whether observers are permitted and the terms 
of their participation. Technical decision-making is shifted further behind the 
scenes to less transparent fora where only the well-resourced non-State actors 
such as politically organised business groups can monitor developments and 
participate.
Inter-firm competition has been injected into the intergovernmental bargaining 
process that characterises treaty negotiations. States ordinarily promote 
national economic interests during negotiations. For example, the US 
Environmental Protection Agency provides US firms with recognition for their 
environmental responsibility and technical assistance for completing
1058 Boczar B.A., ‘Avenues for Direct Participation of TNCs in International Environmental 
Negotiations’ (1994) 3 NYUEnvLJ  1, 15.
1059 International Institute for Sustainable Development (USD) (2003) 12(221) Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin 2.
1060 USD (2003) 12(220) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1.
1061 Eg Participants to the 15th Annual Earth Technologies Forum and Mobile Air Conditioning 
Summit, Washington DC, 2004 include the US EPA, Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, UNDP, UNEP, WBCSD and IETA.
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greenhouse gas inventories.1062 States are also identifying inter-sectoral gains 
and losses having national consequences. Industries compete for participation 
and influence since legal frameworks will direct the basis for competition, 
appropriate market share, secure easier capital sources and allocate adaptation 
costs. Corporate responses to environmental regulation oscillate between 
reactive and obstructionist strategies to proactive and constructive 
approaches.1063 Environmental matters have been elevated from a technical 
production process issue with corporate liability implications to a strategic 
objective offering competitive advantages. Embedding the best commercial 
practice of Western multinationals within the regulatory regime eliminates 
uncompetitive rivals and encourages consolidation.
5.1 Motivations for Corporate Participation.
Intergovernmental meetings are more than marketplaces for ideas. COPs are 
strategic business opportunities to test ideas and products or to network, 
developing peer and customer contacts with companies and States. Although 
contracts are concluded by firms and States, business opportunities are not the 
principal reason for attendance. One publisher secured at least one publication 
for each intergovernmental Conference and hence justified the costs of 
attendance.1064
1062 US Environmental Protection Agency, The Climate Leaders Partnership, 2003.
1063 UN Secretary-General, TNCs and Issues Relating to the Environment, UN Doc 
E/C. 10/1990/10.
1064 Mr James Ramsey, Managing Director, Entico Corporation Limited, 2 December 2003.
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COPs are opportunities for firms to promote their particular industry (fossil 
fuels, nuclear, hydropower, wind, solar) as policy solutions in preference to 
other economic sectors. For example, the International Gas Union promoted 
natural gas as a readily-available alternative fuel to coal, wood and oil with 
potential to reduce carbon emissions. 1065 Its strategy was to attach this 
proposal to the transportation theme of COP-9.1066 Renewable energy firms 
are promoting their technology for prospective sale to States and approval 
within regulatory regimes. Strategic positioning may be the precursor to 
political recognition and international legal backing which propels the market. 
Raising industry’s profile can be achieved by convening panels with 
Ministerial delegates.1067 For example, the British Standards Institute had a 
‘long history’ of involvement with the UNFCCC process, was consulted on the 
development of the EU’s emissions registry system and made itself available at 
COP-9 to advise States on compliance monitoring and standards 
implementation.1068
Business momentum may encourage treaty ratification. Corporations 
encourage universal participation by States to increase the geographical scope 
and liquidity of markets, reduce regulatory compliance costs and simplify 
cross-border procedures. Commercial practice will lead regulatory 
development but only to a point since a legal framework will be required to 
underpin market transactions. Whether or not the Kyoto Protocol enters into 
force or is implemented nationally, firms have anticipated the inevitable
1065 International Gas Union, Seven Decades with IGU. Denmark, 2003.
1066 Mr Peter Storm, International Gas Union, 6 December 2003.
1067 Mr Richard Taylor, International Hydropower Association, 8 December 2003.
1068 Mr Nick Marshall, Global Product Manager, British Standards Institute, 2 December 2003.
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direction of intergovernmental policy. It is a case of industry incorporating 
climate change policy into investment decision-making rather than States 
redirecting commercial operations towards environmental protection. 
Production processes will be adapted and disruption to commercial operations 
minimised. Firms will merely keep pace with governmental decision-making 
for the purposes of legal compliance: pioneers ‘can also get scalped’. 1069 
Moreover, non-State actors will be ‘frustrated’ if they attend COPs with the 
ambition of influencing policy. Prudence dictates a ‘wait-and-see’ approach 
before commercial decisions are made according to orthodox business criteria 
in light of what States decide. Importantly, firms owe duties to shareholders 
who do not wish managing directors to engage in overly-speculative 
investment activity on account of weak political commitments which cannot be 
enforced.
Firms participate in COPs with domestic conditions in mind to assess whether 
operational and sovereign factors are conducive to investment. Participation at 
the international level is cost-effective provided implementation is uniform 
across all States and obviates the necessity to lobby for identical results within 
each national jurisdiction.1070 National lobbying may have proven ineffective 
and undesirable national legislation or judicial opinion can be reversed. The 
‘real action’ occurs at national levels during implementation where ‘powerful 
forces’ are at work.1071 Observer participation enables timely access to 
intergovernmental policy and assists national lobbying. Moreover, political
1069 Dr Brian Flannery, supra n920.
1070 American Petroleum Institute (API) Press Release, ‘API Statement’, Washington DC, 1993.
1071 Mr David Stirpe, Executive Director, The Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, 2 
December 2003.
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recognition secured at intergovernmental levels can be usefully directed 
towards domestic audiences. For example, the coal and oil industry dominates 
business opinion within Australia and the government is resistant to the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Australian renewable energy industry financed ministerial 
attendance at COP-9 where opinion is favourably disposed to renewable 
energy sources. Australian firms hoped to signal through the national media a
1079possible expression of government support. The industry also organized 
roundtable sessions with national delegates to bolster its message.1073
5.2 Procedural Challenges for Engaging with Business.
Attempts are made by States, the UNFCCC secretariat and BINGOs to counter 
industry disinterest. BINGOs highlight the business case for voluntary 
initiatives and raise industry awareness. Firms may possess projects which 
qualify under the UNFCCC regime (and will be promoted for public relations 
purposes) but lack the incentive to formally participate: ‘the CDM will make 
profitable activities more profitable and not unprofitable activities 
profitable’.1074
To simplify regime design States prefer to deal with organized groups 
representing mainstream opinion. However, it is difficult to identify which 
interlocutor reflects dominant business opinion, carries sufficient authority to 
make commitments and may act ‘on behalf of industry’. Organised business
1072 Mr Alex Beckitt, Executive Officer, Renewable Energy Generators Australia Ltd, 5 
December 2003.
1073 Dr Syd Shea, Chairman and Managing Director, The Oil Mallee Company of Australia Ltd, 
8 December 2003.
1074 Dr Brian Flannery, supra n920.
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groups require prior approval from their membership for official statements 
which must be sufficiently broad to encompass divergent opinions. At general 
levels the business community expresses homogenous perspectives with 
respect to market-supportive regulatory frameworks and applying best 
commercial practice. Firms seek to prevent States from ‘picking winners’ by 
conferring a legally-embedded competitive advantage to a particular 
technology or production process. Industry is mistakenly assumed to possess a 
coherent voice: ‘scratch the surface and change the scenarios and differences 
begin to emerge’1075 as dictated by organisational attributes and operational 
specialisation. It is also easier to organize firms around particular themes since 
producers, suppliers, distributors and marketers within the same sector have 
disparate interests.
It may be feared that intergovernmental decision-making may be overwhelmed 
by complexity or a tendency to inertia given the infusion of commercial 
perspectives. For example, in contrast to North American firms, Korean 
industry is resolutely opposed to the Kyoto Protocol and has been sending 
delegates to the UNFCCC since 1997.1076 Differences also exist between 
progressive companies and firms which continue to discredit the scientific
1 0 7 7basis for climate change. The diversity of industrial sectors represented at 
negotiations makes it difficult to discern any single business position. For 
example, renewable energy firms (cogeneration, natural gas and energy 
efficient technologies) compete against energy intensive industries (coal and
1075 Ibid.
1076 Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, A Guide to Climate Change Activities of 
Korean Industry, Seoul, 2003, 3.
1077 Lord Oxburgh, Shell Chairman quoted in The Guardian, 17 June 2004, 1.
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oil). The chemical sector is represented by the International Climate Change 
Partnership and the American Petroleum Institute represents US oil 
companies.1078 Insurance and re-insurance firms also participate in expectation 
of a greater number of claims resulting from global warming.1079 Although 
actively courted by NGOs the industry has been unable to counterbalance the 
influence of energy corporations.1080 Companies may also be members of 
more than one group: oil companies for example have renewable energy 
divisions with modest research budgets. Moreover, firms may manipulate 
decision-making by obfuscating issues with detail and temper unfavourable 
outcomes by introducing more moderate States. New actors may seek to 
obtain exemptions or favourable treatment as negotiations expand to include 
other substances. For example, pharmaceutical companies and health 
professionals lobbied for a metered dose inhaler exemption on account of its 
safety, effectiveness and affordability in treating asthma and related 
diseases.1081
Common industry positions exist at the level of generality. These include the 
ability to enforce State compliance, developing country participation subject to 
binding commitments, the details of prospective national implementation and
1089the terms of corporate participation. Corporations seek to insulate
1078 API, Recommended Actions to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 1998.
1079 UNEP, Financial Sector Responding to Climate Change-Impatient with Pace of Political 
Progress, Press Release, Bonn, 2001.
1080 Paterson M., ‘Global Finance and Environmental Politics: The Insurance Industry and 
Climate Change’ (1999) 30(3) IDS Bulletin 25, 26.
1081 UNEP, Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, UNEP Doc 
OzL.Pro8/12 (1996) & COP Decision VIII/8 (1996).
1082 ICC/USCIB, The Kyoto Mechanisms: A Business Perspective, Paris, 1999; ICC, A 
business perspective for SB 12, Paris, 2000; International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Agency (IPIECA), Practical Application of the Kyoto Mechanisms, Milan, 2000, 
5.
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commercial decision-making and investment planning from policy and 
regulatory uncertainty created by States. Most notable is a preference for 
market-supportive instruments which facilitate market transactions rather than 
command and control measures. Firms promote the ability to trade, respect for 
property rights, free competition and non-discrimination. Stable regulatory 
environments require government transparency, access to information, non- 
arbitrary decision-making, minimal transaction costs such as taxation, 
intellectual property protection and contractual certainty. Non-compliance by 
States should not prejudice trading values and greenhouse gas emission credits 
having economic and competitive values should be protected from 
expropriation. Intergovernmental organisations repeat the call for States to
establish stable regulatory conditions which send the right market signals to
1 08^investors and enable accurate risk assessment.
The strategies employed within negotiations are also reasonably predictable. 
For example, coal and oil companies, vehicles manufacturers and energy 
intensive industries, more likely to be affected by emissions reductions, are 
likely to undertake cost-benefit analysis, propose further research and caution 
against the assumption of legal commitments. Regulatory action is 
discouraged by appealing to the strategic (military) importance of industry, 
domestic energy requirements, detrimental employment impacts, lower 
economic growth, loss of business competitiveness, high investment cost, 
modest environmental impacts and imminent improved technology. The 
renewable energy sector by contrast will push for stricter timetables and targets
1083 International Energy Agency, Integrating Energy and Environmental Goals: Investment 
Needs and Technology Options, Paris, 2003, 20, 26.
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whereby national regulation boosts sales, enhances technology exports and 
captures market share from energy intensive industries. Industrial sectors 
should be disaggregated and their position evaluated separately.
5.3 Assessing Commercial Influences on Substantive Outcomes.
The extent to which non-State actors have influenced international lawmaking 
and substantive policy outcomes cannot be measured by reference to their 
procedural entitlements, number of oral interventions or access to official
documents. It has been suggested that their role can be assessed in terms of
process influence (such as access to decision-makers or extent to which their 
proposals are injected into negotiations) or product influence (the degree to
accurate assessment of the former. As for the latter, non-State actors are not 
influential simply because they share the same opinion as States and even 
rejected proposals constitute contributions to deliberative processes.
BINGOs query their effectiveness in getting business messages across: 
selected information is experimentally submitted and reactions are observed. 
Although firms raise issues for consideration, channel agendas in particular 
directions and push States towards a resolution, final outcomes can be 
unpredictable and decisions may be deferred. Experienced participants are 
uncertain as to whether deliberate strategies succeeded or States were merely
1084 Arts B., The Political Influence of Global NGOs: Case Studies on the Climate and 
Biodiversity Conventions. International Books, Utrecht, 1998, 59.
which such proposals are adopted or blocked).1084 Informality hampers an
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receptive at the time: in short ‘whatever it was, it worked’.1085 That said, 
corporate executives are reluctant to disclose the nature and extent of 
relationships with States. BINGOs seek to continuously improve the 
effectiveness of business messages: meetings are conducted during each COP 
to informally identify issues around which business opinion has coalesced, 
discern where differences remain, correct misinformation, share information 
and discuss topics of common interest.
Environmental regulation spurs industrial performance and creates novel 
markets but can equally stifle innovation and impede economic growth.1086 
For example, the control of transboundary hazardous waste enhances the
1 0 8 7  1088economic viability of recycling. On one view, regulation and contracts 
with State agencies 1089 should establish minimum standards. Regulatory 
effectiveness can be enhanced by embracing market incentives. The 
environmental protection objectives of the UNFCCC are enveloped within an 
economic development agenda intended to divert foreign direct investment to 
developing states and encourage growth in the carbon emissions market.1090 
Allowing firms to determine the most cost-effective solution may amount to 
what is most technologically convenient for firms, most conducive to long­
term investment planning and imposing the least economic disruption upon 
industry. Firms want States to recognize the lead times necessary for adjusting
1085 Mr Leonard Bernstein, The Global Climate Coalition, 2 December 2003.
1086 OECD, The Global Environmental Goods and Services Industry. Paris, 1996, 24.
1087 International Council on Mining and the Environment, Implementing and Assuring a 
Practical Approach for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Metal 
Recyclables, London, 2001.
1088UNICE, European Industry’s Views on EU Environmental Policy-Making for Sustainable 
Development, Brussels, 2001, 6, 8.
1089 UNICE, Climate-Change-Related Long-term Agreements: A Practical Complement to 
Regulation, Brussels, 2001.
1090 Mr Daniel Chartier, President, Emissions Marketing Association, 3 December 2003.
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to new regulatory conditions. Meaningful regulatory controls may be 
necessary to overcome initial inertia or pre-occupation with short-term profits 
and give a competitive boost to those firms inclined to innovate.
In particular, legal uncertainty has been identified as a barrier to business 
participation.1091 For example, Shell supports practical regulations which give 
companies the confidence to make long-term investments which reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.1092 The lack of information on intended long-term 
commitments by States is unsettling business with respect to the investment 
decisions made today to secure energy supplies required for the future.1093 The 
future cost, quality and availability of energy supplies requires decisions on 
technology, siting, permitting, access and infrastructure. These operational 
requirements have lifetimes and cost-recovery considerations extending 
beyond the first commitment period for States (2008-2012). Although the 
Kyoto Protocol calls for subsequent commitments by Annex 1 Parties to be 
considered no later than 2005, it does not proscribe their nature, 
commencement or duration nor does the Protocol specify the obligations of 
Non-Annex 1 Parties. Firms have a legitimate interest in limiting commercial 
risks or transactions costs and identify business opportunities and threats. 
However, it is unreasonable to require too much regulatory predictability from 
States. How justifiable are commercial demands for secure investment 
planning ?
1091 ICC, Business: Part of the Solution, UNFCCC COP-6, Bonn, 2001.
1092 Mr David Hone, Vice President Climate Change, Shell, 8 December 2003.
1093 ICC, Statement to the UNFCCC COP 9 Plenary, 10 December 2003.
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6. The Corporate Role in Treaty Implementation.
Corporations argue that their important implementing role entitles them to 
prior participation in treaty negotiation. This carries the implicit threat that 
exclusion will render subsequently implementation more difficult given likely 
non-compliance and regulatory avoidance. States and corporations ‘to the 
extent they are able’ have been called upon for example to jointly implement 
the applicable international legal provisions for environmental protection.1094 
Businesses press States for the further implementation in good faith of 
internationally-agreed commitments and offers suggestions to align national 
law and practice. This is particularly true with respect to trade agreements 
where industry has invested considerable effort during negotiations.1095 ILO 
conventions formulated with contributions from national employer and worker 
organisations notably contemplate further consultation by States to determine 
the details of national implementation. Interestingly, the US Council for 
International Business argues that ILO Conventions should not benefit from 
the same speedy implementation procedures as enjoyed by trade 
agreements.1096
Implementation allows corporations to influence the conceptual evolution of 
principles and concepts identified in treaties. Treaty interpretation considers 
how the instrument has been subsequently implemented in the practice of
1094 UNGA Resolution 37/7 (1982) on a World Charter for Nature, para 21.
1095 IFPMA, WTO Millennium Round, Geneva, c l999; CEFIC, The Chemical Industry 
Comments on the Possible Millennium Round and Trips, Brussels, 1999; CEFIC, The 
chemical industry comments on a possible new round and TRIPs, Bmssels, 2001; USCIB, 
Statement on the GATS Financial Services Agreement, New York, 1997.
1096 USCIB, Statement on the Administration’s Proposal on Fast Track, New York, undated.
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States.1097 Terms and principles find their practical expression in commercial 
practices such as commercial airliners under air services agreements.1098 A 
clearer example is where treaty provisions explicitly provide platforms for 
commercial participation within intergovernmental institutions. 1099 
Conventional obligations may contemplate channels which enable industry to 
provide information to end users including States, consumers and other 
firms.1100
For example, the precautionary principle is being incorporated with greater 
frequency as a standard term within environmental agreements.1101 The 
precautionary principle provides that lack of full scientific certainty should not 
justify postponing the adoption of cost-effective preventative measures where 
threats of serious and irreversible environmental damage exist. Business 
argues that intergovernmental consensus is lacking given the variety of 
national specific obligations. It is unclear whether the principle has attained 
the status of a rule of customary international law and may not be directly 
applicable at national levels.1102 The principle should only be located within
1097 Art 31(3)(b), VCLT, supra n67.
1098 Case concerning the Air Services Agreement o f  27  March 1946 (US v France) (1979) 54 
ILR 303, paras 69, 83.
1099 Arts 2, 11, Paris Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 29 ILM  1077 (1990).
1100Preamble, Art 10, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, UNEP Doc 
UNEP/POPS/CONF/2 (2001).
1101 Eg Art 3(3), UNFCCC, supra «857.
1102 Cp WTO, EC-Measures concerning M eat and M eat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (1998); Hungary v Slovakia (the Gabcikovo Case) (1997) 
ICJ Rep 1 p e r  Weeramantry J; R v Secretary o f  State fo r  Trade and Industry ex parte  
Duddridge and Others (1994) Enviro LR 151.
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preambular paragraphs since inclusion within operational provisions 
introduces novel and ambiguous obligations for States.1103
Business supports the precautionary principle insofar as it engages routine 
environmental management techniques such as scientifically-evaluated risk 
and developing ameliorating strategies.1104 Compliance provides reputational 
assurances and enforcement eliminates uninnovative rivals. The European 
chemical industry association has called for a reasonable, balanced, 
proportionate and non-arbitrary interpretation of this principle. 1105 
Precautionary measures must be urgent, provisional, scientifically-justified, 
transparent, communicated to affected parties and subject to legal review.1106 
The burden for implementing the principle is shifted upon industry to institute 
environmentally sound practices and employ the best available technology. 
The US Council for International Business advocates science as the basis for 
regulatory design.1107 Science is perceived to be objective, accurate, subject to 
peer review and free from political arbitrariness.1108 Scientifically-derived 
standards do not require any lawmaking capacity and technology is 
predominantly owned by corporations. Risk assessment and cost-benefit
1103ICCA, UNEP Global POPs Treaty-INC5: Statement on Key Issues, Virginia, 2000, 2; 
CEFIC/Euro Chlor, Comments on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), Brussels, 2000; 
American Chemistry Council, ‘Bush Administration Support of POPs Treaty’, Virginia, 2001.
1104 ICC, A Precautionary Approach: An ICC Business Perspective, Policy Statement, Paris, 
1997, 1.
1105 CEFIC, The Precautionary Principle, Industry and Law-making, Bmssels, 1995; CEFIC, 
Views on the Precautionary Principle, Bmssels, 2000.
1106 CEFIC, Comments on the Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle of 
2 February 2000, Bmssels, 2000; ICCA, Comments on the Application of the Precautionary 
Principle in Regulatory Decision-making, Virginia, 2000.
1107 USCIB, Science, Risk, Precaution and Business: USCEB Recommendations for 
International Policymakers, New York, 2000, 3.
1108 USCIB, ‘OECD Conference Reaffirms Role of Science in Biotechnology Debate’, Press 
Release, Edinburgh, 2000.
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analysis -  tools commonly employed by firms - provide additional alternatives 
to command and control regulation.1109
Corporations are one of the ultimate targets of international regulation. 
However, industries which originally caused environmental damage also 
possess the technical solutions for rectification. The polluter pays principle 
provides that polluters bear the costs of prevention and environmental 
restoration. 1110 Businesses operationalise that principle by internalising 
environmental costs and passing them to consumers. Multilateral 
environmental agreements may define corporate liability without the need to 
establish fault.1111 The European Chemical Industry Council supports strict 
liability and promotes the principles of operational control, proportionality and 
limited liability.1112 However, it is unclear in the event of insolvency whether 
obligations remain with the corporate entity or are transferable to creditors and 
shareholders.1113 States ensure that operators participate in financial security 
schemes1114 and seek to remove the inequalities arising from overlapping
1109 ACC, The Precautionary Principle: An Industry Perspective on Domestic and International 
Developments in Precaution, Virginia, 2001.
1110 Principle 16, Declaration on Environment and Development, supra «120.
1111 UNTCMD, International Environmental Law: Emerging Trends and Implications for 
TNCs. UN Doc ST/CTC/137 (1993), 7.
1112CEFIC, Consideration of a Draft International Convention on Liability and Compensation 
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 
Bmssels, 1995; CEFIC, Consideration of a Draft International Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal, Bmssels, 1997 & 1998.
1113 Official Receiver as Liquidator o f Celtic Extraction Ltd and Bluestone Chemicals Ltd v 
Environmental Agency [1999] 1 All ER 746; Re Wilmott Trading Ltd (in liquidation) (Nos 1 & 
2) [1999] 2 BCLC 541.
111 Cp Arts 7, 9, 12, 37, International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage 
in connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, IMO Doc 
LEG/CONF. 10/8/2 (1996).
327
liability regimes.1115 States may also provide financial assistance to stimulate 
experimentation with novel technology or permit temporary derogation in the 
event of disproportionate costs.1116 Treaty negotiations occur in light of pre­
exiting economic constraints and the obligations envisaged for States have to 
also be evaluated in light of their likely market impact for firms.
Environmental treaties accordingly draw upon familiar commercial tools. The 
obligations upon States to conduct environmental impact assessments or
1117undertake risk analysis permits cooperation with firms possessing the 
necessary capability and information exchange for mutual benefit. For 
example, corporations possess financial management expertise of interest to
1 1 1 Q
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The secretariat co-operates with 
the private sector to efficiently and cost-effectively execute GEF projects.1119 
North American and European firms supported by the World Bank construct 
operational capacity for newly-privatised firms consistent with the 
development priorities of host States.1120 However, commercial interest is 
deterred by bureaucratic inertia and information disclosure. Thus the private 
sector role to date has been limited to public procurement and advisory 
responsibilities.1121
1115 International Maritime Organisation, Resolution on the Relationship between the HNS 
Convention and a prospective regime on liability for damage in connection with the 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes 3 5 ILM 1438 (1996).
1116 Eg OECD Council Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, 
OECD Doc C(74)223 (1974), para 2(3).
1117 Art 2, Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 30 
ILM 800 (1991); WTO, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation o f Salmon WT/DS18/AB/R 
(1998), para 129.
1118 Global Environmental Facility (GEF), The Pilot Phase and Beyond, 1992, paras 2.06, 2.33.
1119 Art 28, Instrument Establishing the GEF 33 ILM 1273 (1994).
1120 GEF, Operational Strategy, Washington DC, 1995.
1,21 GEF, Engaging the Private Sector in GEF Activities, GEF Doc GEF/C.13/Inf.5 (1999), 
paras 10-11, 15-16, 18.
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The corporate role as a medium through which States implement their treaty 
obligations is formally preconditioned by incorporating international law into 
national legislation. Implementation affords a further opportunity for 
corporate lobbying to realise commercial objectives not achieved during treaty 
negotiation.1122 Moreover, corporations can be conduits for international 
standards within non-signatory States or States which have yet to pass the 
requisite legislation. For example, airlines voluntarily applied the standards of 
the Warsaw Convention within States who had not yet ratified the 
agreement.1123 The economic benefits of uniform carriage rules outweighed 
the advantages afforded by different national regimes. Such a circumstance 
obviates the expression of State consent and processes of national lawmaking. 
Furthermore, ‘fishing entities’ can bind themselves in writing to fulfil 
conventional obligations and fishing vessel operators can choose to comply 
with the instructions of intergovernmental institutions.1124 An alternative 
arrangement is where individual corporations and trade unions conclude labour 
agreements applicable throughout the firm’s global operations which do not 
contemplate any State role.1125
States may be pushed towards adherence ‘from below’ as governments follow 
commercial practices. For example, the International Air Transport 
____________________________
1122 Colloquium, ‘A Private Sector View of International Trade Negotiations’ (1997) 91 ASIL 
Proceed 89, 91.
1123 Tombs L.C., International Organisation in European Air Transport. Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1936, 131.
1^124 Annexes 1,3, Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 40 ILM 278 (2001).
1125 The International Union of Food and Agricultural Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco 
and Allied Workers Associations (IUF)/Danone (BSN), Joint Declaration on Trade Union 
Rights, 1994.
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Association abolished liability limits in 1995 and with it trade subsidies for 
rival carriers. To encourage global uniformity the ICC supported EC 
regulation in 1998 and endorsed a draft Convention of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation.1126 Similarly, the Caux Roundtable called upon 
corporations to voluntarily apply the OECD Bribery Convention in their
1 1 77commercial practices to induce States towards ratification. Although the 
qualitative corporate role for treaty implementation is highly significant the 
paramount State role is not displaced.
Conclusions
Treaties are a prolonged evolving regulatory process involving interacting 
national and international processes, numerous actors and taking place in 
multiple fora. Distinctions between preparation, negotiation, drafting, 
ratification, implementation and enforcement become blurred. Corporations 
can exert positive and negative influences throughout the treaty-making 
process. Treaty-negotiations are competitive exercises: inter-commercial, 
between NGOs and inter-State. Furthermore, the prevailing opinion within 
industry is also subject to change: emitters attempted to block regulatory 
developments within the UNFCCC process until COP-3, the nuclear and 
renewable energy sectors then became active and the influence of oil and coal 
industries remains strong but is declining. Market leaders with establishment 
advantages can establish economic conditions for the remainder of industry by 
embedding their perspective within treaty obligations. Individual firms also
1126 ICC, ICAO’s Revision to the Warsaw Liability System, Paris, 1999.
1127 CRT, Press Release, Caux, 1999.
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bolster the negotiating position of States by submitting proposals and 
contributing resources.
Reflecting the truism that knowledge is power, States may be dependent for 
their decision-making upon the economic data and technical solutions held by 
firms. This is moreover the case where one negotiating objective is to build 
markets around regulation. Trade associations and organised business groups 
can be relied upon as interlocutors espousing common industry perspectives 
relatively unhindered by national sentiment. The proposed Business 
Consultation Mechanism is an attempt by business to enhance communication 
channels. Notwithstanding the obvious merits of unfiltered input States are 
wary of relying exclusively upon business opinion and other NGOs can 
perform a useful moderating influence during interactive panel sessions. 
Although BINGOs may pursue more favourable terms of participation they 
readily deny responsibility by affirming that treaties bind States only.
Observer status reflects a compromise between full participation and exclusion. 
The opportunity provides firms with a valuable lead time with which to 
anticipate the direction of international policy, adjust to likely regulatory 
conditions at the national level and minimise disruption to commercial 
operations. In this respect commercial practices lead regulatory developments. 
Since investment planning depends upon regulatory certainty, States will only 
identify what is capable of being achieved. Corporate participation affirms the 
importance of national processes: formulating the negotiating position of
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States, operational adaptation, implementation and the susceptibility of 
governments to local pressures.
Non-State actors are invited to make submissions on potential modalities for 
their participation in preparatory processes as well as the eventual conference. 
Their efforts contribute to the growth of common international procedural law 
by accretion. However, State consent is evident with respect to who may 
participate in negotiations, the terms of their participation and the legal status 
of the final outcome. The accreditation criteria as applied by secretariats and 
the possibility of objection by States would preclude the existence of a right 
for non-State actors to participate in international policy-making. The 
relevance and competence of non-State actors are tied to the objectives and 
subject-matter of the particular conference. The attendance of non-State actors 
and the modalities for their participation can be a major area of contention and 
are decided afresh by the designated Preparatory Committee. There is a strong 
likelihood that cross-pollination between events will simply result in these 
rules being replicated. Once admitted non-State actors have a legitimate 
expectation under prevailing State practice that the conditions of their 
participation include a core component involving oral and written statements.
Moving forward from UNCED would suggest expanding the role of non-State 
actors. Although there is a considerable degree of informal activity which 
favours the well-resourced non-State actors, opportunities for oral 
interventions and written submissions have remained constant. Modest 
procedural refinements need not translate into any substantive impact upon
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deliberations but can alleviate pressure to make lawmaking more inclusive. 
Whether proposals by non-State actors on agenda items are accepted depends 
upon States. Non-State actors can only contribute to intergovernmental 
deliberations since procedural and substantive decision-making remains 
reserved to States. Business messages expressed through these formal 
channels involve predictable commercial concerns irrespective of the subject- 
matter, thereby suggesting that industry must constantly draw economic 
considerations to the attention of States. Managed well, commercial 
contributions enrich intergovernmental deliberations. Managed poorly, States 
will be confronted with implementation failure, regulatory capture or 
avoidance and the adversarialism associated with greater enforcement, a 
subject to which I now turn.
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Chapter Four 
Corporations and International Dispute Settlement
Enforced compliance with treaty commitments such as those outlined in the 
previous Chapter is an important aspect of treaty implementation. Non-State 
actors may wish to petition international bodies to determine whether 
regulatory measures adopted by States conform to international law. 
Corporate enforcement is selective insofar as relevant considerations include 
competitor behaviour, preserving market share and asserting property rights. 
States through lawmaking create mechanisms which indicate the robustness (or 
otherwise) of their voluntarily assumed commitments. International dispute 
settlement should be subject to the rule of law and characterized by 
transparency, reasonable predictability, prompt and effective remedies and 
competent and impartial tribunals. The various models include resort to 
national courts, diplomatic protection on behalf of corporate nationals and 
arbitral procedures permitting direct corporate access. In resolving their 
disputes with commercial rivals and States, corporations are contributing to the 
corpus of international law. However, the conclusion will be made that 
corporations remain dependent upon States creating the necessary enabling 
framework for them to exercise an enforcement function. The World Trade 
Organisation illustrates how corporations contribute resources and expertise 
for the conduct of intergovernmental dispute settlement at the international 
level. Direct corporate access to the dispute settlement mechanisms attached 
to regional bodies will be illustrated by reference to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement. This Chapter also considers corporate participation within
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the operational framework o f international organisations and market-based 
techniques which seemingly lack a State role for enforcing ‘soft’ legal 
obligations. The contemporary proliferation o f international tribunals raises 
the prospect o f corporate forum shopping and curtailing governmental
<y\regulatory  flexibility.
— '-g— - y l s '
\ Y  y  ^  ^
1. The Corporate Enforcement Role: Self-interested and Selective.
States ordinarily enforce international law against other States and non-State 
actors. The effective application o f conventional obligations typically includes 
adopting appropriate enforcement measures. Compliance by non-State actors 
is ensured through the nationality and territoriality connections with States. 
However, States also possess authority to waive national law enforcement and 
suspend private rights o f action even where this may breach international 
law.1128 O f present concern is the related issue o f corporate actors inducing (or 
not inducing) State compliance. Non-compliance with international law by 
States can be a source o f commercial benefit for firms through lower 
compliance costs. Ineffective or under-enforcement constitutes an indirect 
subsidy for local corporations. States may be reluctant to enforce law against 
their corporate nationals from whom they derive economic benefits including 
taxation. Competing jurisdictional claims between States or the obstacles to 
establishing a consensual basis for international dispute settlement may mean 
that no State assumes enforcement responsibility.
1128 Eg EU-US, Memorandum o f  Understanding concerning the US Helms-Burton Act and the 
US Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 36 ILM 529 (1997).
The resulting void may be occupied by other actors.1129 A useful distinction to 
be made is between corporations having resort to enforcement mechanisms 
(including through State mediums) as dictated by self-interest and commercial 
attempts to resist the enforcement of standards against them (including using 
States as shields). Both have lawmaking impacts: the former principally 
evidenced by procedural mechanisms created at corporate insistence and the 
latter of a more substantive nature, particularly with respect to developing 
corporate legal responsibility. Rival competitors seeking to remove unfair 
sources of competitive advantage or capture markets may initiate legal action 
either individually or collectively through national courts. Intergovernmental 
disputes can result from and parallel inter-corporate efforts to establish 
competitive conditions.
For example, maritime vessel registration is determined by home States and 
regional organisations at most possess a limited supervisory role.1130 ‘Flag’ 
States assume responsibility for the conduct of maritime corporations 
registered within their jurisdiction.1131 Such ‘open’ registries are conducive to 
efficiency.1132 ‘Flags of convenience’ vessels enjoy lower operating costs 
suspected to derive from non-observance of international labour standards. 
The phenomenon engages a mix of private and pubic international legal issues. 
States and trade unions seeking to protect national shipping industries have
1129 Grabosky P., ‘Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance’ 
(1995) 8(4) Governance 527. ^
1130 Commission o f the EC v Council o f the EC [1996] 1 ECR 1469, para 50.
1131 Preamble & Art 3(1 )(a), FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 33 ILM 968 
(1994).
1132 UNCTAD, Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Economic 
Consequences of the Existence or Lack of a Genuine Link between Vessel and Flag of 
Registry, UN Doc TD/B/784 (1980).
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resorted to international standard-setting and national litigation to remedy this 
problem.1133 Maritime industries within ‘flag of convenience’ States pushed 
host governments into implementing more rigorous inspection regimes as the 
private classification societies upon which they were dependent lost their 
reputation for reliability and integrity. Improved compliance is being 
accomplished by responsible port States and the reactive or parallel efforts of 
industry leaders protecting their market share.1134
The function of enforcing international law has to some extent been privatised. *—  ^
NGOs monitor State practice and corporations experience the practical impacts 
of administrative decision-making in their routine operations at the coalface of 
international law. Through their transnational networks firms are more 
informed than home States of national legal differences and discriminatory 
practices in favour of local enterprises. Whereas NGOs may altruistically 
protect individual or public interests, firms undertake enforcement actio 
where they are directly and financially affected by State non-compliance. As 
one tool of commercial decision-making enforcement activity is selectively 
self-interested to secure or protect market share. It can pry open markets 
protected by recalcitrant States at the behest of vulnerable competitors, prompt 
State action against rivals through the home and host governmental medium, 
clarify the legal contours of permissible corporate behaviour and establish 
favourable precedents which can usefully increase bargaining power in private 
contracting with States. Symptomatic of collective action problems and
1133 ILO Convention No 147 The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention; NWL 
Ltd v Woods & Nelson (1979) ICR 867.
1134 Vorbach J., ‘The vital role of non-flag State actors in the pursuit of safer shipping’ (2001) 
32(1) Ocean Development and International Law 27.
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encouraging reciprocated non-interference, the remedial benefits of eliminating 
objectionable practices are universal whereas the financial and reputational 
costs are borne by complainants.
2. The Range of Dispute Resolution Models available to Corporations.
Non-State actors are dependent upon States to establish the necessary enabling 
framework (substantive law, procedures, institutions and trained personnel) in 
which their enforcement role is exercised at national, regional and international 
levels. States are expected to establish non-discriminatory, timely, transparent 
and effective procedures through which corporations can challenge 
government decision-making with respect to national public procurement.1135 
States delimit the degree of non-State actor activity by defining national, 
regional and international terms of access. Moreover, corporate action through 
governmental mediums enjoys greater authority, is unavoidable where direct 
action is unavailable or local remedies are futile and outweighs the costs of 
achieving equivalent outcomes within multiple national fora.
The diverse range of dispute resolution models which corporations may 
employ include resort to national courts, diplomatic protection, direct arbitral 
action, the operational framework of international organisations and market 
solutions. This section examines each in turn and analyses their respective 
merits as a modality for corporate participation within the international 
lawmaking process. This is not to suggest that each model is an independent
1135 Art XX, Agreement on Government Procurement, Uruguay Round Final Act, supra w342, 
Annex 1A.
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subsystem: indeed, the interplay between national and international 
mechanisms is a principal theme and will be noted where pertinent.
(a) Recourse to National Courts: The South African Pharmaceutical Litigation.
Firms seek remedies for damage caused by other private actors by initiating
litigation within national courts. Such machinery is utilised as and when
necessary to enforce socio-economic transactions and requires only
government oversight. Corporations engage international legal questions such
1 1as jurisdiction, State recognition or sovereign immunity for offensive or 
defensive purposes. The resulting national judicial decisions are cited as 
evidentiary material potentially binding upon States as customary international 
law.
Corporations engage in litigation through trade associations for issues affecting
industry such as property rights. For example, the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) challenged within South
African courts proposed amendments to national law which contemplated
abrogating patents upon ministerial discretion.1137 IFPMA is not opposed to
competition from quality generic products but objects to government measures
1 11 8which unfairly favour imitators over innovators. Pharmaceutical
companies had similarly lobbied Kenya against proposed legislative
1136 Eg Patrickson v Dole Food Co 251 F 3d 795 (9th Cir 2001).
1137 Medicine and Related Substances Control (Amendment) Act No 90 (1997) (Sth Africa) 
Government Gazette 18505; IFPMA, ‘Disputed South African Law will not improve access to 
medicines’, Geneva, 2001; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (SA) & Anor In re: ex 
parte application o f the President o f the Republic o f South Africa & Ors (2000) (2) SA 674 
(CC).
1138 IFPMA, The Role of Generics, Geneva, 1997,2.
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amendments.1139 The US and South African governments had previously 
reaffirmed intellectual property protection for public health issues.1140 The 
IFPMA promotes the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) Agreement and opposes price controls, compulsory licensing and 
parallel importing.1141 However, the TRIPs Agreement may impede cheaper 
medicinal access for developing countries1142 and proceedings commenced by 
them against pharmaceutical companies to enforce anti-trust law may prove 
unsuccessful.1143
The IFPMA sought to establish a legal precedent deterring other States from 
weakening national patent protection but framed the litigation in terms of a 
human rights conflict. This action coincided with proceedings brought by the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) against 
India through the US before the World Trade Organisation (WTO).1144 
Although the IFPMA threatened similar measures this might not have been 
possible as an international federation. Inter-State mechanisms would entail 
diminishing the authority of the complainant to an individual firm or national 
association and risking their reputation. Litigation by trade associations before 
national courts brings the weight of international industry to bear against
1139 Kimani D., ‘Politics derails HIV generic drugs bill’, (2001) The East African 32.
1140 US Trade Representative, Annual Report of the President of the US on the Trade 
Agreements Program, Washington DC, 1999, 291.
1141 IFPMA, ‘TRIP’S, Pharmaceuticals and Developing Countries: Implications for Health Care 
Access, Drug Quality and Drug Development’, Geneva, 2000, 17-20; IFPMA, ‘Increasing 
Access to Health Care in Developing Countries: The Need for Public-Private Partnership’, 
Geneva, 2000; IFPMA, ‘Parallel Trade: A Recipe for Reducing Patients’ Access to Innovative 
and Good Quality Medicines’, Geneva, 2000.
1142 UNDP, Human Development Report. Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, 68.
1143 Pfizer v Lord et al 14 ILM 1409 (1975) (8th Cir 1975).
1,44 Letter dated 2 May 1997 to the USTR by PhRMA, Annex 3, WTO, India-Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc WT/DS50/R 
(1997).
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individual States, retains control of proceedings in commercial hands and 
narrows objectives to industry concerns. National courts are also mindful of 
relationships with their executive branch. Recourse to intergovernmental 
dispute settlement such as the WTO by contrast requires enlisting the support 
of home States and must be brought within the scope of international trade 
agreements but enjoys the receptivity of its tribunals to trade liberalisation. 
The US government provided tacit support whereas the UK remained silent, 
thus ‘illustrating in bold relief the nexus between corporate and State interests 
in the arena of international trade’.1145 However, concerns emanated from 
diverse sources: an NGO amicus brief detailed local pricing structures and a 
European Parliament resolution called upon industry to desist. 1146 
Pharmaceutical companies responded to the former by creating more 
favourable publicity explaining their perspective and to the latter by 
concluding understandings with the EU.
The Federation tactically abandoned the litigation. The national 
pharmaceutical association secured a role in formulating a mutually-acceptable 
regulatory framework with the South African government.1147 WTO Member 
States reaffirmed that TRIPs does not prevent the adoption of protective public 
health measures.1148 To discourage amendment of that Agreement one firm 
voluntarily relinquished its patent rights over a particular HIV drug. As a
1145 Commission on Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalisation and 
its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, paras 26, 27.
1146 du Plessis E., ‘The TRIPs Agreement and South African Legislation: the case of the 
parallel importation of medicines’ (1999) 3(1) Law, Democracy and Development 62.
1147 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa/Republic of South Africa, 
‘Joint Statement of Understanding between the Republic of South Africa and the Applicants’, 
2001; IFPMA, ‘Patients are the winners through partnership-Industry welcomes today’s 
settlement of the South African court case’, Geneva, 2001.
1148 WTO, Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, Attachment to Fourth 
Ministerial Declaration, Qatar, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001).
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result of the proceedings the UK was also identified as an attractive investment 
location with a supportive regulatory framework. The UK government and the 
national pharmaceutical association subsequently institutionalised dialogue 
mechanisms and shifted intellectual property protection to a ‘strategic’ level 
with a view to jointly promoting further TRIPs implementation.1149 By 
initiating national judicial proceedings the industry achieved a platform into 
national regulatory design, exposed States as potential allies or adversaries, 
demonstrated their commitment to TRIPs above national law but misjudged 
the extent of opposition from NGOs and others.
Recourse to national courts to enforce international law against host States is 
not unlimited. In many States customary international law is automatically 
incorporated into national law such that prior legislative or judicial 
pronouncements are unnecessary before its application by national courts. 
However, customary rules must possess an identifiable content, scope and 
legal quality before they are sufficient to overcome contrary precedent.1150
In the absence of implementing legislation, judicial deference to the executive 
means that treaties can form the basis for litigation within dualist State Parties 
only where their provisions are self-executing (US parlance) or capable of 
direct effect (the European equivalent). Notwithstanding that the capacities of 
non-State actors ‘may be different from and less in number and substance than’ 
those of States, international agreements may intend to confer individual rights
1149 UK Department of Health/Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, Final Report 
of the Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force, London, 2001, Section 9.
1150 Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank o f Nigeria [1977] QB 529, 578.
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which are enforceable by national courts.1151 Although States follow different 
approaches, the UN Charter, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and TRIPs are several treaties which have been denied direct 
effect.1152 A relevant consideration is reciprocity: whether foreign competitors 
can invoke the treaty within local courts against local firms and local firms 
possess that same right against foreign firms within their national legal systems. 
The treaty terms may expressly or impliedly provide a private right of 
action.1153 Analogous to the difficulty of enforcing foreign judgments before 
local courts, GATT Panel decisions may be unenforceable against host 
States.1154 It follows that foreign corporations may be unable to institute 
proceedings before the national courts of competitors who enjoy unfair 
competitive advantages arising from that State’s non-compliance with 
international law. One alternative is challenging disputed government 
measures ‘from above’ by resort to diplomatic protection at the 
intergovernmental level.
(b) The Diplomatic Protection Model.
This section compares commercial contributions to two ostensibly 
intergovernmental means of dispute settlement. Commercial interest in 
proceedings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is informal, sporadic 
and limited to circumstances where, for example, resolving territorial disputes
1151 Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction o f the 
Courts o f Danzig (the Danzig Railway Officials case) (1928) PCIJ Ser B No 15, 17.
1152 Sei Fuji v California 19ILR 312 (1952); C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 1-4973 
para 106; C-53/96 Hermes International v FHTMarketing Choice B V [1998] 1 ECR 3603.
1,53 Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic 726 F 2d 774, 808 (DC Cir 1984).
1154 Footwear Distributors and Retailers o f America v US 852 F Supp 1078, 1096 (USCIT 
1994).
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authoritatively establishes State jurisdiction and recognisable security for 
property rights. The corporate role within the WTO is more advanced given 
relatively greater enforcement prospects and their specific interest in resolving 
inherently commercial disputes. Corporate participation includes prior 
national proceedings, private counsel, technical expertise as Panel members or 
advisers, submitting amicus briefs and resort to confidential business 
information.
(b)(i) Authoritatively establishing Property Rights through the International 
Court o f Justice.
Only States can be parties to contentious proceedings before the ICJ.1155 This
does not preclude them from consulting with companies at the core of disputes
and their home States to secure negotiated outcomes.1156 Corporations occupy
a behind-the-scenes role when States espouse diplomatic protection on their
behalf. The right to exercise diplomatic protection is limited to the State of
incorporation or where the company has its registered office or seat of 
1 1management. Although illustrating the fiction of formal national allegiance, 
this rule’s technical simplicity avoids competing diplomatic claims arising 
from cross-territorial share exchange and resulting insecurity in international 
economic relations. However, evidence of a real and substantial connection 
may be a relevant consideration for States.1158 Only exceptionally, such as 
upon the firm’s legal demise or where the State of incorporation is also the
1155 Art 34 Statute of the International Court of Justice.
1156 Electricite de Beyrouth Company Case (France v Lebanon) (1954) ICJ Rep 107.
1157 Barcelona Traction, supra n26, paras 70, 96.
1,58 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Rule IV, Rules regarding International Claims 
(1988) 3 7 ICLQ 1006.
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respondent State, can the State of nationality of the shareholders espouse a 
secondary right of diplomatic protection. The ICJ has indicated a willingness 
to relax the rules of diplomatic protection and afford foreign investors greater 
protection, particularly where corporate insolvency blurs the causal link 
between alleged expropriatory measures and corporate injuries.1159 However, 
there is little support by States for direct corporate participation within the ICJ 
such as appeals by foreign investors from national judicial decisions.1160
Contentious proceedings before the ICJ are of indirect commercial interest. 
The territorial claims of States and the authoritative exercise of national 
jurisdiction are preconditions for the prospective commercial exploitation of 
natural resources, the validity of property titles and universally recognised 
security of tenure. The origins of intergovernmental disputes are traceable to 
contested activity including petroleum exploration, ownership of natural 
resources and fishing rights.1161 Competing mineral concessions and licenses 
granted by States give rise to inter-commercial disputes, spark protests 
between neighbouring governments contesting the claims of the other and are 
finally shoehomed into an exclusively intergovernmental mould where State-
1 1 AOcentric perspectives are paramount. The commercial practices of national 
fishing industries bolster a State’s argumentative position.1163 However, 
private acts are rarely equated to exercising sovereign authority sufficient to
1159 Case concerning Electtronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (US v Italy) (1989) ICJ Rep 15, paras 101, 
119.
1160 Bowett D.W. et al, The International Court of Justice: Process. Practice and Procedure. 
The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 1997, 68, para 84.
1,61 Case concerning Delimitation o f the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf o f Maine Area (1984) 
ICJ Rep 246, paras 60-78.
1162 Eg Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria, 
Equatorial Guinea intervening) (2002) ICJ Rep 303, paras 282-3, 303-4.
1163 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (Federal Republic o f Germany, UK v Iceland) (1974) ICJ Rep 
3.
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establish valid territorial titles for States: they are ‘without any relevance in the 
eyes of international law’.1164 That said, government licenses and commercial 
infrastructure may be material evidence of sovereign authority.1165 States may 
be put upon notice from corporate reports such that subsequent maritime 
delimitations consider concession contracts. 1166 Overlapping petroleum 
concessions are generally irrelevant for delimiting the continental shelf 
between two States but alignment thereof may be taken into account for 
maritime delimitations since a de facto agreement between States is 
suggested.1167
The ICJ is willing to receive written and oral submissions from States or 
international organizations when responding to requests for advisory 
opinions.1168 ‘International organisation’ is evidently construed differently for 
procedural purposes since the ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, invited submissions from the International Organisation 
of Industrial Employers and its trade union counterpart.1169 The offer of the 
International League of the Rights of Man to make statements was accepted by 
the ICJ during the 1950 South-West Africa case but no documents were 
eventually submitted. The same NGO was refused permission during the 1950 
Asylum Case (contentious proceedings) but also in the 1971 South-West Africa
1164 Eg Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Islands (Botswana v Namibia) (1999) ICJ Rep 1045, 
para 96.
165 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, (First Stage) 40 ILM 900 
(2001), paras 315, 341, 419, 502.
1166 Ibid, paras 400, 433-4 & {Second Stage) 40 ILM 983 (2001) paras 72, 83.
1167 Meese R., ‘The relevance of the granting of oil concessions in a maritime delimitation: the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice’ (2004) 1(1) Transnational Dispute 
Management.
1168 Art 66(2) Statute o f the International Court of Justice.
1169 Competence o f the International Labour Organisation to Regulate the Personal Work o f  
Employers Case (1926) PCIJ Ser B No 13, 6; Advisory Opinion No 1 on the Workers
Netherlands Case (1922) PCIJ Ser B No 1, 9.
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advisory opinion.1170 Judges Oda and Weeramantry in their separate and 
dissenting opinions have referred to comments made by the International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.1171 Most recently, Palestine was 
permitted to submit a written statement for the Advisory Opinion on the 
Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory given its 
observer status with the General Assembly and co-sponsor of the request. The 
prospect of participation by reputable business organisations such as the ICC 
cannot be discounted if the Court is gradually becoming more receptive to 
receiving written submissions from at least some non-State actors during 
advisory proceedings. Enriching judicial deliberations would be a welcome 
development but raises concerns (considered further below) analogous to the 
receipt of amicus submissions by the WTO.
(b)(ii) Removing Impediments to Trade through the World Trade Organisation.
State compliance with their international trade obligations is bound up with 
denying market opportunities for national exporters. Formal systems at the 
national level process corporate claims and ultimately trigger WTO dispute 
settlement. For example, the EC Trade Barriers Regulation enables firms or 
industries to lodge complaints alleging violations of WTO Agreements by
1 1 7 9other States. The largest complaints category concerns the effects of
1170 Shelton D., ‘The Participation of NGOs in International Judicial Proceedings’ (1994) 88 
AJIL 611,623-4.
1171 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Use o f Nuclear Weapons (1996) ICJ Rep 66, 
per Oda J, para 8 & Weeramentry J, Part 6.
172 Council Regulation 3286/94 OJEC L349, 71 (1994) as amended by Council Regulation 
356/95 OJEC L41, 3 (1995).
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1171existing or proposed legislation upon third country markets. Petitions are 
similarly filed with the US Trade Representative by interested persons on 
industry’s behalf demonstrating a denial of US rights under trade agreements 
or that the acts or practices of another State are unjustifiable, unreasonable or 
discriminatory and burden or restrict US commerce.1174 Intellectual property 
rights are targeted as well as trade barriers which affect US exports having the 
greatest growth potential. An assurance has been given that such procedures 
will be applied consistently with WTO dispute settlement obligations.1175 An 
administrative apparatus has been established within designated US agencies
1176to attract relevant business information.
Recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism may follow resort to 
legislatively-supported national processes. First, direct civil actions between 
private parties and applicable penalties are assessable against GATT 
standards.1177 Foreign corporations enjoy identical procedural advantages as 
local enterprises within national tribunals such as the US Court of International 
Trade.1178 Second, investigations made by or on behalf of national industry 
prompt government authorities to scrutinise the commercial practices of 
rivals.1179 Natural or legal persons and associations acting on behalf of
1173 Van Eeckhaute J.C., ‘Private Complaints against Foreign Unfair Trade Practices: The EC’s 
Trade Barriers Regulation’ (1999) 33(6) J o f World Trade 199, 203, 205.
1174 Sec 301 Trade Act (1974) 19 USC s2411-2416. Protectionist relief can also be provided: 
sec 201.
1175 WTO, US-Sections 301-310 o f the Trade Act o f1974, WT/DS152/R (1999).
1176 USTR, Annual Report of the President of the US on the Trade Agreements Program, 
Washington DC, 2000.
1177 WTO, US-Anti-Dumping Act o f 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R & WT/DS162/AB/R (2000), para 
90.
1178 WTO, US-Section 337 Tariff Act, WTO Doc L/6439 (1989), para 5.18.
ul9The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) 19 USC 2411 (Sec 1337 reviews for 
telecommunications agreements and Title VII for the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement).
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Community industries may initiate anti-dumping proceedings within the 
EC.1180 Financial incentives encouraging national producers to initiate or 
support these investigations are permissible provided there is widespread 
industry concern.1181 Third, trade agreements may require States to institute 
national administrative or judicial procedures providing for direct access by 
corporate complainants.1182
Private bodies may be entrusted with administering enforcement procedures. 
For example, the Preshipment Inspection Agreement contemplates the WTO, 
ICC and the International Federation of Inspection Agencies (representing 
private pre-shipment organisations) establishing an ‘Independent Entity’ to 
oversee binding arbitration in disputes between inspection agencies and 
exporters.1183 The WTO Working Party on Preshipment Inspection held 
informal meetings with the Federation and the ICC falling outside the ambit of 
ordinary WTO-NGO relations.1184 Alternatively, corporations or consultants 
may be employed to administer local customs procedures or recruited to 
undertake investigative functions.1185 Although their objectivity may be 
queried, using industry representatives for customs clearance does not per se
1180 Art 5, Council Regulation 2423/88 OJEC L209, 1 (1988).
1181 WTO, US-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act o f 2000, WTO Doc 
WT/DS217/AB/R & WT/DS234/AB/R (2003).
1182 Arts 2-6, Subsidies Code & Arts 2-6 Anti-dumping Code, GATT, The Texts of the Tokyo 
Round Agreements. Geneva, 1986, 51, 127; Art 51, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Secretariat, Uruguay Round Final Act, supra «342, Annex 
1C.
1183 Art 4, Agreement of Preshipment Inspection, GATT Secretariat, Uruguay Round Final Act. 
supra «342, Annex 1(A) Part 10.
11 4WTO, Draft Final Report of the Working Party on Preshipment Inspection, WTO Doc 
G/PSI/WP/W/24 (1999).
1185WTO, Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, 
WT/DS60/R (1998), para 8.6.
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constitute an export restriction. 1186 Enforcement activities may entitle
• • 1187corporations to immunity under national law as an organ of State.
Consistent with the diplomatic protection model only Member States party to 
disputes or having third party interests enjoy a legal right to participate in
1 1 fifiPanel or Appellate Body proceedings. States are advocates for corporate 
claims within the intergovernmental WTO context. Corporations provide 
resources to national governments for conducting litigation including drafting 
consultation requests, preparing delegation statements, legal analysis and 
drafting written and oral submissions.1189 Industry is the best-placed to 
comment upon factual determinations. For example, the EU adopted estimates 
of economic loss provided by a pharmaceutical industry association in support 
of its claim against Canada.1190
Legal counsel from private firms are employed by States to appear on their 
behalf. Nothing under the relevant trade agreements, customary international 
law or the prevailing practice of international courts and tribunals prevents 
WTO Members from determining the composition of national delegations.1191 
States may nominate private lawyers as representatives provided they act
1186 WTO, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export o f Bovine Hides and the Import o f 
Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (2000), para 11.55.
1187 Walker e t a l v  Bank o f New York Inc (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 186, 189-91.
1188 Arts 2, 10, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU Agreement), Annex 2, GATT Secretariat, Uruguay Round Final Act, supra »342.
1189 Bello J.H., ‘Some Practical Observations about WTO Settlement of Intellectual Property 
Disputes’ (1997) 35 Va JIn t’lL  357, 360-1.
1190 WTO, Canada-Patent Protection o f Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (2000), para 
4.7.
1191 WTO, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R
(1997), paras 10, 12.
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consistently with WTO procedural rules.1192 Although appropriately qualified 
counsel can enhance participation by WTO Members, such expertise may be 
unaffordable for developing States. The conditions of private participation 
include membership of official delegations, respect for confidentiality and 
State responsibility for their conduct.1193 One proposal is to grant firms a right 
to their own legal representation independent of States.1194
Corporate officers can participate in WTO proceedings as Panel members 
given the expertise they contribute.1195 Conflicts of interest are sought to be 
prevented through self-disclosure and respect for the confidentiality of 
proceedings. Continuing commercial interests and prior association with ICC 
Committees does not disqualify individuals from participation.1196
Commercial Perspectives and the Amicus Brief Controversy.
Non-State actors do not possess the right to initiate proceedings or intervene as 
third parties. One mechanism for expressing their perspectives is submitting 
unsolicited amicus curiae briefs as ‘friends of the court’. Receiving amicus 
briefs is not explicitly contemplated by the Dispute Settlement Understanding
1192 WTO, Indonesia-Certain Measures affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (1998), para 14.1.
1193 WTO, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R (1998), para 
10.31.
1194 Agora, ‘Is the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Responsive to the Needs of Traders? 
Would a System of Direct Action by Private Parties Yield Better Results?’ (1998) 32(2) J  
World Trade L 147, 159.
1195 Art 8, DSU Agreement, supra «1188; WTO, US -Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 
WT/DS176/1 (1999).
1196 Arts 5, 7, WTO Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc WT/DSB/RC/1 (1996); WTO, US-The 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (the Helms-Burton Act), WT/DS38 (1996); ICC 
Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, ICC Statement on the Helms- 
Burton Act, Paris, 1996.
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(DSU) and may not be compatible with the character of intergovernmental 
dispute settlement. WTO Panels enjoy the ‘right to seek information and 
technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate.’1197 
Panels may ‘seek’ information from relevant sources and consult experts 
including corporate officers. 1198 Ordinarily the Panel must inform States 
before contacting bodies within their jurisdiction but cannot be prevented from 
receiving information.
The Panel in US-Import Prohibition o f Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(hereinafter Shrimp Turtle) held that it only has the initiative to request 
information and that unsolicited material must be disregarded. However, the 
Appellate Body stated that the authority to seek information does not equate to 
a prohibition on accepting unsolicited information.1199 In exercising discretion 
Panels could grant permission for an amicus to file written statements subject 
to such conditions deemed appropriate and if it did not unduly delay the 
process. Panels must consider the need for information and determine what 
weight to ascribe to it. Attaching an amicus brief to the submission of a State 
party to proceedings renders that material at least prima facie an integral part 
of that State’s position.1200
In US-Imposition o f Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the UK (hereinafter British
1197 Art 13(2), DSU supra «1188.
1,98 Ibid, Art 13 DSU; WTO, Australia-Measures affecting Importation o f Salmon, 
WT/DS18/R (1998), para 6.6.
1199 US-Import Prohibition o f Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R
(1998), paras 104, 108-10.
1200 Ibid, para 89.
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Steel), the Appellate Body confirmed that individuals and organizations not 
Members of the WTO have no right to make submissions or be heard. 
Although there is no duty to accept or consider unsolicited briefs submitted by 
such actors, the Appellate Body has legal authority under the DSU to do so 
where ‘we find it pertinent and useful’. 1201 The briefs submitted by the 
American Iron and Steel Institute and the Specialty Steel Industry of North 
America were refused by the Panel since they were untimely and by the 
Appellate Body since it was unnecessary to take them into account. The Panel 
also observed that although observers could not be admitted States could 
forego confidentiality through public disclosure.
The Appellate Body went further than its prior practice of accepting amicus 
briefs when attached to parties’ submissions or where unsolicited in EC- 
Measures affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (hereinafter 
Asbestos). To facilitate an orderly process ‘for the purposes of this appeal 
only’, it publicly invited briefs from NGOs registered with the WTO and 
issued rules on how it would process submissions. An application for leave 
to submit amicus briefs must, inter alia, disclose the entity’s nature, its interest 
in the case, whether it is financed or supported by the parties and how the 
submission would assist by going beyond arguments the parties were expected 
to make.1203 The purported legal authority for the Special Procedure stemmed
1201 US-Imposition o f Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon 
Steel Products Originating in the UK, WTO Docs WT/DS138/R (1999), paras 6.2-6.3 & 
WT/DS138/AB/R (2000), paras 39, 42.
1202 EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001), paras 50, 55-7.
1203 Communication from the Appellate Body, EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- 
Containing Products, Additional Procedure Adopted Under Rule 16(1) of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc WT/DS135/9 (2000).
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from Article 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review which 
state that in the interests of fairness and the orderly conduct of appeals a 
Division may adopt appropriate procedures for dealing with procedural 
questions provided that this is consistent with the DSU, other covered 
agreements and working procedures. In its view, the Working Procedures 
contemplate applications for receiving amicus briefs from identifiable natural 
or legal persons which enclose a statement of interests indicating how their 
brief will contribute to resolving disputes without repeating existing material. 
Once approved, such persons may submit a short written brief limited to legal 
issues and served upon parties and third parties to the dispute.
WTO Members had criticised Shrimp Turtle and British Steel on these points 
for lack of conformity with the WTO Agreements and referred to the 
intergovernmental nature of proceedings.1204 After Asbestos the WTO General 
Council convened a special session at Egypt’s request.1205 All States except 
one criticized the Appellate Body’s actions. They were concerned that i) the 
Appellate Body did not posses authority for adopting procedural rules 
governing amicus participation; ii) the participation of non-State actors within 
the WTO is a matter for States Parties to determine, not its tribunals1206; iii) 
admitting amicus briefs would alter the intergovernmental nature of the dispute 
settlement system; iv) non-State actors not party to proceedings would enjoy 
more rights than States, it being possible for the former to submit briefs during
1204 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/50 (1998); Pruzin 
D., ‘WTO Members make unfriendly noises on ‘friends of the court’ dispute briefs’, BNA 
Daily Report for Executives, 9 August 2000, Cl.
1205 WTO, Minutes of WTO General Council Meeting, WTO Doc WT/GC/M/60 (22 Nov 
2000).
1206 Art V(2), WTO Agreement supra «342.
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appellate proceedings whereas States had to first act as third parties before 
corresponding Panels; v) dispute settlement would be subject to greater 
political pressures; and vi) the workload for all would be disproportionately 
increased. Developing countries were concerned that NGO participation 
would diminish their sovereignty.1207 Notwithstanding that NGO arguments 
may support the position of developing States, their environmental agenda may 
counter the latter’s development goals. Similarly, the singular pursuit of profit 
by corporations may prompt them to eliminate trade barriers intended to 
shelter infant industries within developing countries. Whatever their 
predisposition, relatively more capable non-State actors principally from 
industrialized States could exert extraordinary influence over Panel 
deliberations.
Only the US expressed the view that the Appellate Body enjoyed authority 
under the DSU to allow amicus participation including adopting procedures 
governing such participation. Moreover, the US, New Zealand and Japan 
supported the Appellate Body’s earlier acceptance of amicus briefs. The EC 
observed the tendency of tribunals to fill gaps where legislatures fell short and 
acknowledged the need for further rule-making. The Chairperson of the 
Governing Council accordingly instructed the Appellate Body to ‘exercise 
extreme caution in future cases until Members had considered what rules were 
needed.’ In subsequently rejecting all seventeen applications for lack of 
compliance with the guidelines, in the Asbestos Case the Appellate Body 
appeared to submit to political pressure and lose judicial independence.
1207 Chamovitz S., ‘Opening the WTO to NonGovemmental Interests’ (2000) 24 Fordham Int’l 
U 173, 210-11.
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The EC subsequently proposed formal procedures to apply ‘in potentially all 
cases’.1208 Amicus briefs from non-parties to WTO proceedings should be 
‘directly relevant to the factual and legal issues under consideration by the 
Panel or the legal issues raised in the appeal’. These proposals were similar to 
the Special Procedure proposed by the Appellate Body. It is possible that 
current negotiations for the DSU review will codify that tribunal’s practice 
with respect to amicus submissions. However, the EC proposal met with 
resistance from several developing countries. Furthermore, the US does not 
consider formal DSU amendment necessary and that guidelines are 
sufficient.1209 Such developments arise within the context of efforts to 
enhance transparency and access to information.1210 In the interim, the 
Appellate Body in EC-Trade Description o f Sardines affirmed that it had 
authority to accept amicus briefs and would consider them on a case-by-case 
basis where pertinent and useful for the fair, prompt and effective resolution of 
disputes.1211 It also observed that third party intervention procedures should 
not treat Members less favourably than non-Members. WTO Members and 
non-Members may also participate as amicus curiae. On the other hand, it 
decided that the briefs from Morocco and private individuals although 
admissible were not of assistance.
1208 Contribution of the EC and its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, WTO Doc TN/DS/W/1 (2002), 7, 11-12.
1209 Further Contribution of the US to the Improvement o f the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO related to Transparency, WTO Doc TN/DS/W/46 (2003), 3.
1210 Cp WTO, Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents, Revised 
Decision adopted by the General Council, 1996, WTO Doc WT/L/160/Rev. 1.
12,1 EC-Trade Description o f Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/AB/R (2002).
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On one view, WTO dispute settlement remains a Members-driven 
intergovernmental organisation.1212 Private parties do not enjoy substantive 
rights and access is limited to submitting amicus briefs which may be 
disregarded. The status of amici precludes them from enjoying the full range 
of rights enjoyed by States party to proceedings. Amici do not enjoy 
comprehensive access to information such as relevant documentation 
(evidentiary materials, written submissions), the opportunity to make oral 
submissions or possess a right of appeal. Since working procedures provide 
that proceedings are conducted in closed session and open only to disputing 
Parties, observer participation is inconsistent with the confidential nature of 
WTO dispute settlement.1213 However, departure from this rule is possible 
with the consent of parties. For the foreseeable future, NGO participation is 
discretional: WTO Appellate Bodies and Panels possess the right, but not the 
duty, to receive unsolicited information from them. There is no right to have 
briefs considered by these tribunals and they are only accepted where helpful. 
WTO Panels have accepted briefs from trade associations but reportedly not 
taken them into consideration in rendering final decisions.1214 It is uncertain 
whether amicus briefs have decisive impacts upon the final decisions of 
national, regional or international tribunals.
1212 Howse R., ‘Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society and the Amicus Brief 
Controversy’ (2003) 9(4) European U  496; Schneider A.K., ‘Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus 
Brief Battle at the WTO’ (2001) 7 WidenerL. Symp.JSl,  95-101.
1213 Decision concerning the US Request for Participation by Observers, US-Imposition o f 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products 
originating in the UK, WTO Doc WT/DS138/R (2000), para 6.2.
1214 EC-Antidumping Duties on Imports o f Cotton-type Bed Linen from India, WTO Doc 
WT/DS141/R (2000), para 6.1.
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Particularly noteworthy is that States are prepared to re-assert their authority in 
specific cases to determine who may participate in dispute settlement. State 
positions may depend upon whether amicus briefs support their litigation 
strategy. State consent is preserved inasmuch as private sector participation 
may be tacitly authorized by applicable procedural rules or subsequently 
amended to restrict or prohibit such activity. Applications from non-State 
actors may be rejected if not filed in a timely manner or duplicate existing 
information.
It could be argued that the principal objection of States was not to NGO 
participation per se but that a judicial body had formulated the applicable rules. 
International tribunals look to their constitutive instruments, applicable 
procedural rules and inherent judicial powers to determine whether they 
possess explicit or implicit authority to enable private participation. WTO 
Panels and Appellate Bodies have differing legal authorities for doing so. 
Panels, under Article 13 of the DSU, may accept unsolicited briefs and consult 
with parties to proceedings. Appellate bodies may receive unsolicited 
submissions under Article 16(1) of its Working Procedures.1215 Tribunals 
enjoy inherent powers to control proceedings in an orderly manner provided 
due process and procedural fairness are respected. Since Article 13 of the 
DSU is intended to enable Panels to look for information beyond the pleadings,
1215 Cp Working Procedures for Appellate Review drawn up pursuant to Article 17.9 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc 
WT/AB/WP/3 (1997).
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WTO Panels should be able to invite amicus submissions provided that
191disputing Parties have the opportunity to respond.
Amicus briefs provide WTO Panels with additional expertise, insight and 
experience, afford an opportunity for other actors to present their perspectives, 
particularly where outcomes affect their interests, and access factual or legal 
issues within the amici’s knowledge. The current two-stage process -  applying 
for leave and subsequently making a submission -  may warrant 
reconsideration. Since it is difficult for Panels to accept or reject amicus briefs 
without first considering their content, the amici may have already succeeded 
since any information cannot readily be disregarded. Judges retain access even 
where briefs are rejected. Receiving amicus briefs becomes a question of 
procedure or formality. However, amicus briefs may have substantive impacts 
where ideas affect outcomes. It could therefore be argued that panels should 
address only those arguments raised by parties since to counter additional ones 
which may attract the Panel’s attention increases the burden for disputants. 
Developing countries are concerned that they may be deluged with 
submissions from northern-based NGOs. Since amicus briefs exaggerate one 
particular interest over another, developing countries do not possess the 
resources to counterbalance commercial arguments which favour developed 
States. Amici are unable to control the use of the information, are 
unaccountable for inaccuracies and are not bound by the outcome. 
Corporations may prefer less transparent and informal methods for expressing 
their perspectives insofar as amicus briefs become public documents.
1216 Mavroidis P.C., ‘Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing’, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 2/01, 2001.
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Comparative State practice with respect to amicus participation varies. 
Amicus curiae participation is explicitly contemplated for international human 
rights1217 and international criminal tribunals.1218 Persons wishing to intervene 
in proceedings of the European Court of Justice through oral and written 
statements, submitting relevant evidence and obtain access to disputing party’s 
submissions must demonstrate a direct, specific and economic interest in the 
outcome.1219 Parties are also afforded a right of reply. The relevant rules for 
amici tend to be general whereas those for standing are relatively detailed: 
some tribunals provide for significant rights, particularly human rights ones, 
whereas others are minimal or non-existent. The varying involvement of 
amicus curiae reflects historical evolution, the rights and obligations 
adjudicated upon, evidence availability, legal customs and demand. 
Considerations for NGO participation within the WTO include organisational 
attributes (degree of representivity, accountability to membership, 
demonstrable expertise), objective information, avoiding undue delay, political 
sensitivities, socio-economic importance or public interest in the case as well 
as various procedural criteria (timing of submissions, length, format and
1217 Art 25(2), 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights, OAU Doc. 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III); Art 44(1), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Rules of Procedure, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1991, OAS 
Doc.OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7 (1992), 18; Arts 34, 36(2), 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 222 & Rule 61, Rules of 
the Court, ECHR, 1998.
1218 Rules 74, Rules o f Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, UN Doc ITR/3/REV.1 (1995) & the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, UN Doc IT/32/Rev.7 (1996); Rule 103, Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the 
International Criminal Court, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/l/Add.l (2000).
1219 Art 37, Statute of the European Court o f Justice.
360
notification to the parties).1220 The institutional legitimacy of WTO dispute 
settlement requires maintaining the confidence of States without ostracising 
NGOs. Noteworthy for present purposes is that persistent effort by individuals, 
NGOs and corporations has led to emerging legal procedures governing 
amicus submissions. Since the developments to date have largely arisen on an
i 9 9 1
ad hoc basis, a ‘considered and principled approach’ would be preferable.
An Assessment of Corporate Participation within the WTO.
Firms retain significant decision-making power as illustrated by the use and 
protection of confidential business information. Self-proclaimed confidential 
business information is owned by non-Parties to the WTO, ex parte 
communications are prohibited and trade agreements may impose 
confidentiality obligations upon States. National corporations of complainant 
States, subjected to local investigation by defendant States at the insistence of
local competitors, have to waive confidentiality before information may be
1 000used by those defendants. The WTO dispute settlement system may be 
unable to function optimally if Panels can only request information from States. 
Protecting information and litigation strategy must be balanced against
reasonable access, due process and procedural fairness. Working procedures
1 000have been adopted to address these circumstances. States are also free to
1220 Marceau G. & Stilwell M., ‘Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs before WTO 
Adjudicating Bodies’ (2001) JInt Economic L 155, 178-183.
1221 Cp Chinkin C. & Mackenzie R., ‘Intergovernmental Organisations as ‘Friends of the 
Court” in Boisson de Chazoumes L. et al (Eds), International Organisations and International 
Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects. Transnational Publishers, New York, 2002, 135 at 
162.
1222 WTO, Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections o f Iron or Non- 
Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/R (2000).
1223 Arts 12(1), 18 DSU supra «1188.
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propose protective measures. 1224 Relevant procedures include holding 
information within the WTO Secretariat and Geneva diplomatic premises of 
opposing Parties and excluding corporate employees or their agents from
1225access.
WTO proceedings are properly understood as ‘sophisticated, multi-track 
political and economic battles between economic competitors over specific 
markets than as international legal disputes between sovereign nations’. 
Their origins may also be traced to national regulatory or judicial arenas such 
as the International Trade Commission or the Court of International Trade 
within the US. For example, a State enterprise from Venezuela lobbied the US 
Environmental Protection Agency to reconsider legislative amendments which 
differentiated between domestic and foreign refiners. 1227 After a local 
competitor opposing the proposed measures successfully lobbied Congress and 
blocked the revisions, the State concerned initiated proceedings.1228 Similarly, 
in conjunction with a media campaign Kodak filed petitions with the US Trade 
Representative seeking greater access to the Japanese market. Fuji discussed 
the matter with the Japanese government who refused to react. Both firms sent 
legal advisers to Geneva (the US partly adopted Kodak’s legal strategy), 
provided information and prepared oral arguments. Significantly, State
1224WTO, US-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports o f Wheat Gluten from the European 
Communities, WT/DS166/R (2000), Attachment 4.
1225 WTO, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R (1999), 
para 9.59, Annexes 1 & 2 approved in WT/DS70/AB/R (1999).
1226 Dunoff J.L., ‘The misguided debate over NGO participation at the WTO’ (1998) 1 J  Int 
Economic L 433, 451.
1227 Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990, Pub L No 101-549, Sec 219, 104 Stat 2399, 2492- 
2500.
1228 US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/R (1996),
1229 Japan-Measures affecting consumer photographic film and paper, WTO Doc WT/DS44/R 
(1995).
362
participation was critical: ‘the participation of the two companies was made 
possible only by the readiness of their governments to admit them informally 
to the proceedings’. An ostensibly intergovernmental dispute resolution 
forum is a route by which competitors redistribute market control and acquire 
concessions from States. However, the WTO indirectly protects the rights of 
traders: ‘the GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of 
which comprise both contracting parties or Members and their nationals. 
However, it would be entirely wrong to consider that the position of 
individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal matrix’.1231 A private 
right of directly initiating WTO proceedings has been proposed to make the 
system respond to its ultimate beneficiaries as much as its users.1232 However, 
NGO participation should be extended alongside corporate rights and frivolous 
or vexatious claims discouraged.
(b)(iii) Limitations o f the Diplomatic Protection Model.
Customary international law provides that exhausting local remedies by firms 
against host States is a prerequisite to exercising diplomatic protection by their 
State of nationality. Although vindicating international legal claims through 
this route depends upon State discretion, in the absence of direct State injury 
the decision to pursue diplomatic protection lies initially with firms, thereby 
turning the rule of diplomatic protection on its head. Contractual terms
1230 Reinisch A. & Irgel C., ‘The Participation of NGOs in the WTO dispute settlement system’ 
(2001) 1 Non-State Actors & International L 127, 138-9.
1231 WTO, US-Sections 301-310 o f the Trade Act o f 1974, WTO Doc WT/DS152/R (2000), 
para 7.73.
232 Lukas M., ‘The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Umguay Round 
Agreements’ (1995) 29 J  World Trade 181, 206.
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purporting to exclude international remedies (so-called 'Calvo Clauses') can be 
rendered ineffectual. 1233 By exercising diplomatic protection States are 
presumed to be asserting their own rights including respect for international 
legal rules.1234 For a considerable period the real objective has been to secure 
reparation for private claimants. Although States are responsible for 
apportioning compensation, private claimants enjoy pecuniary rights over 
those funds and are entitled to a fair distribution.1236 { i
Diplomatic protection is a problematic remedy for corporations. First, it has to 
access and persuade competent national authorities to pursue claims - an 
extremely time and resource consuming process lacking transparency and 
certainty - before control is relinquished to the State. ‘Once a State has taken 
up a case on behalf o f one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the
1 1 7 7
eyes o f the latter the State is sole claimant.’ Commercial perspectives at 
variance from home States positions warrant independent espousal. Second, 
diplomatic protection offers partial solutions inasmuch as it is only available to 
local corporations in respect of local products. Action against the home State 
is impermissible. Identifying nationality links with one State for multinational 
enterprises with transborder commercial operations is arbitrary, inaccurate and 
burdensome. Diplomatic protection is inappropriate for common industry 
issues: industry associations such as the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations have members located in several 
States. Third, exercising locus standi privileges is assessed against political
1233 El Oro Mining and Railway Case (Great Britain v Mexico) (1931) 5 UNRIAA 191.
1234 Mavrommatis Concessions Case [1924] PCIJ Ser A No 2, 12.
1235 Administrative Decision No V (US v Germany) (1924) 7 UN RJAA 119.
1236 Beaumartin v France [1994] ECHR Ser A Vol 296, 60-1.
1237 Mavrommatis Concessions Case supra «1234.
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factors extraneous to the economic concerns of the firm. States will be 
reluctant to espouse arguments which bind them in subsequent proceedings, 
undermine political negotiations or render them liable locally. The filtering 
mechanism of diplomatic protection tends towards the underenforcement of 
international law. However, diplomatic protection enables corporate 
anonymity, masks underlying economic objectives and maintains State 
responsibility. Presently noteworthy is that at direct NGO insistence the 
procedural law associated with intergovernmental dispute settlement has 
expanded to enable a degree of non-State actor participation.
It could be argued that the classical diplomatic protection model underlying 
WTO dispute settlement has since grown by accretion to represent a novel 
mode of international dispute settlement. Reference has been made above to 
encouraging resort to private legal counsel, corporate officers participating as 
Panel members or appointed as experts and formalising procedures for 
receiving amicus submissions. Proposals to refine WTO dispute settlement 
include creating a role for national courts by making Panel rulings 
justiciable.1238 The further step for non-State actors would be the right to 
directly initiate proceedings.
(c) Direct Arbitral Action against States to Protect Property Rights.
Arbitration illustrates first that exercising jurisdiction to resolve disputes does 
not require any sovereign attributes and secondly that consent underpins
1238 Petersmann E.-U., ‘The Negotiations on Improvements of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System’ (2003) 6(1) JInt Eco L 237, 241, 244.
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submission thereto by States and firms alike. Historically arbitration has been 
a prominent dispute settlement tool for States which developed international 
law.1239 However, when corporations resort to this ‘private’ method to directly 
enforce international law against States they are promoting commercial 
interests but having public effects. Arbitration is one means of enforcing the 
international minimum standard of treatment owed by States to foreign 
nationals and challenging regulatory measures which amount to expropriating 
private property rights. ‘Delocalising’ disputes promotes investor confidence 
by avoiding the deficiencies of diplomatic protection and securing outcomes 
free from parochial national law and the perceived partiality of its courts.
Inter-corporate disputes are resolved through privately-conducted 
arbitration.1240 Concession contracts between States and corporations which 
contemplate arbitration under ICC auspices invoke its reputation for 
impartiality, confidentiality and expertise.1241 However, by acting outside 
official settings claimants forego the authority of government-sponsored 
adjudicatory bodies and cannot compel witness testimony or evidence 
production.1242 State agencies which submit to ICC arbitration impliedly 
waive sovereign immunity during subsequent enforcement proceedings.1243 
Business groups have attempted to harmonise national arbitration laws within
1239 Caron D.D., ‘War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace 
Conference’ (2000) 94(1) AJIL 4.
1240 ICC, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards Vol 1 (1974-1985) ICC Pub No 433, Vol 2 (1986- 
1990) ICC Pub No 514 & Vol 3 (1991-1995) ICC Pub No 553, Paris.
1241 China-Radio Corporation o f America (1960) 54 AJIL 933.
1242 National Broadcasting Company v Bear Steams & Co 165 F 3d 184 (2nd Cir 1999).
1243 Seetransport Viking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co, Kommanditgesellschaft v 
Novimpex Centralia Novala 989 F 2d 572, 578-9 (CA 2nd Cir 1993).
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intergovernmental fora.1244 For example, by virtue of consultative status the 
ICC employed its right of initiative within ECOSOC and the resulting 
convention provides for the recognition of arbitral awards by national 
courts.1245
Ad hoc arbitral tribunals established by conventional agreement may be 
specifically charged with examining the legitimacy of governmental action. 
For example, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, a hybrid model of diplomatic 
protection which examines systematic patterns of expropriation arising from a 
specific context, has generated a considerable body of jurisprudence.1246 
Commercial law firms were retained to represent corporations in proceedings 
against Iran and the US.1247
(c)(i) Bilateral Investment Treaties and ICSID.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) frequently provide for arbitration in 
disputes between Contracting State Parties and corporations. A multitude of 
legal subsystems each containing a similar language and form are overseen by 
potentially hundreds of ad hoc arbitral tribunals. By this means the corpus of 
international law grows by sporadic accretion. 1248 However, rotating 
memberships, different legal counsel and fact-specific scenarios are not
1244 UN Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration UN Doc A/40/17 (1985) Ch 2, 5.
1245 UN, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 
330 UNTS No 4739, 3 (the ‘New York Convention’).
1246 Art II, Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the USA and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (1981) 2 0 ILM 230.
1247 Newman L.W., ‘A Personal History of Claims Arising out of the Iranian Revolution’ 
(1995) 27(3) New York UniJInt L&  Pol 631.
1248 Eg UNCTC/ICC, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, UN Doc ST/CTC/136 (1992).
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conducive to greater legal certainty and thus it is not always clear that 
arbitration is for commercial benefit.
Particularly noteworthy is the International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID).1249 
ICSID awards are enforced through national courts on a par with foreign 
national law or other national judicial decisions provided they are consistent 
inter alia with local public policy.1250 ICSID Tribunals possess jurisdiction 
over 'legal disputes arising directly out of an investment’ between Contracting 
States and nationals of other Contracting States provided there is written 
consent. They apply host State law and international law modified to the 
extent necessary to include non-State actors.1251 ‘Property’, ‘investment’ and 
‘expropriation’ have been construed broadly and market access constitutes a 
property interest entitled to protection.1252
ICSID proceedings raise interesting questions of the relationship between 
private contracts and public treaties as the disputants contest the proper 
location for dispute resolution. Article 26 of the Convention reverses the 
classical formulation by providing that States may require the exhaustion of 
local remedies as a precondition to their consent to international arbitration. 
The forum selection provisions of concession contracts can similarly compel
1249 Arts 25(1) & 42(1), 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States 575 UNTS 159 (the ‘ICSID Convention’).
1250 Ibid, Art 54.
1251 IBRD, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Washington DC, 1965, para 
40.
1252 ICSID, Fedax NV v Venezuela (Jurisdiction) Case ARB/96/3 (1997) paras 31-43.
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exclusive resort to national courts.1253 However, host States may make a 
‘generic offer’ accepted at any time to foreign investors to submit disputes to 
ICSID arbitration which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn.1254 Most favored 
nation treatment clauses apply such that investors can utilise the dispute 
settlement provisions of a BIT under which they are not a national provided 
this does not amount to ‘disruptive treaty shopping’.1255 Corporations may 
attempt to elevate contractual breaches by a State into breaches of a BIT under 
the ‘umbrella clause’ of that treaty. ICSID Tribunals have power to stay 
proceedings pending the determination by some other competent tribunal 
where that determination is a ‘factual or legal predicate’ to their own 
decision.1256 Competent forums include national courts and arbitral tribunals 
established pursuant to trade agreements. ICSID Tribunals consider how 
‘justice would be best served’.1257
To summarise thus far, the diplomatic protection model which does not 
contemplate any direct rights of access will come under pressure to open up to 
greater private participation. Legal developments in fora such as the WTO will 
be largely of a procedural character. Albeit an international agreement binding 
upon States, the ICSID Convention is noteworthy for shifting disputes between 
States and corporations away from traditional intergovernmental dispute 
settlement. Locus standi is relatively less contested within the direct arbitral 
model. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a useful
1253 ICSID, Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA & Compagnie Generale des Eaux v 
Argentine Republic, Case No ARB/97/3 (2001), para 81.
1254 ICSID, Lanco International Inc v Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) Case No ARB/97/6 
(2001), para 32.
1255 ICSID, Emilio Agustin Maffezini v Spain (Jurisdiction) Case No ARB/97/7 (2000), para 56.
1256 ICSID, SGS v Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/01/13 (2003), para 186.
1257 ICSID, SGS v Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6 (2004), para 175.
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illustration of direct corporate access to arbitral tribunals at the regional 
level.1258 NAFTA demonstrates that the impact of corporate participation on 
the evolution of substantive international legal norms will be more self-evident.
(c)(ii) The North American Free Trade Agreement.
The principal dispute settlement mechanisms under NAFTA are:
Chapter 11 (mvestor-State dispute settlement concerning property rights).
Chapter 11 may be invoked by investors of NAFTA parties who made 
investments within the territory of another and who incurred loss or damage 
resulting from measures adopted or maintained by that State in violation of that 
Chapter.1259 Investments are broadly defined to include minority interests, 
portfolio investment and real property. Although locus standi is limited to 
federal governments, States are also accountable for conduct by their state or 
provincial governments as well as State enterprises or monopolies. Chapter 11 
contains provisions with respect to national treatment (Article 1102), most 
favoured nation status (1103), minimum standards of treatment under 
international law (1105), performance requirements (1106) and compensation 
in the event of expropriation (1110). The last-mentioned provides that host 
States cannot expropriate foreign investments directly or indirectly unless 
explicitly done in a non-discriminatory fashion, in accordance with law, for a 
public purpose and accompanied by fair compensation or adopt measures
1258 NAFTA supra n416.
1259 Chapter 11 procedures also apply to Arts 1502(2) and 1502(3)(a) (State enterprises, 
monopolies and their exercise of regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority).
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‘tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’. It does not apply 
retroactively.1260 Many claims allege violations of Articles 1102 and 1105 
with ‘regulatory takings’ under Article 1110 the third most frequently cited 
breach.
1 1There are several conditions precedent to access by private parties. 
Complaining investors must be located within a NAFTA State other than the 
respondent. However, they may initiate claims on their own behalf or on 
behalf of enterprises controlled or owned by them, directly or indirectly, in 
another NAFTA State. In short, NAFTA contemplates a departure from the 
traditional rule of diplomatic protection considered above. Locus standi is 
extended to firms incorporated in (and formally nationals of) the respondent 
State and also where they are incorporated in a third NAFTA State but have 
suffered damage from NAFTA violations by the respondent. On the other 
hand, firms cannot initiate claims against their State of incorporation. Most 
significantly, there is no provision compelling exhaustion of local remedies: 
investors choose between resort to the national courts and administrative 
tribunals of host States or Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals. 1262 If the latter 
investors must consent in writing and waive their right to commence or 
continue proceedings in respect of the same claim before any administrative 
tribunal or court of any NAFTA country or under any other dispute settlement 
mechanism.1263
1260 ICSID, Feldman v Mexico (Jurisdiction) Case No ARB(AF)/99/l (2001).
1261 Arts 1116 & 1117, NAFTA, supra n476.
1262 Ibid, Art 1120.
1263 Ibid, Art 1121.
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NAFTA dispute settlement under Chapter 11 is unique in additional respects. 
Investors select those procedural aspects not already predetermined by Chapter 
11 or determined jointly. Investors choose the applicable procedural rules 
from the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the rules of the UN 
Commission for International Trade Law (the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules).1264 However, the ICSID Convention only applies where both the 
respondent State and the NAFTA State of which the investor is a national are 
Parties. Each disputant appoints one arbitrator and the third and presiding one 
is appointed by agreement. Finally, NAFTA States undertake to comply with 
and enforce final awards within national courts. Failure to do so amounts to 
breaching NAFTA obligations for which Chapter 20 measures may be initiated 
and trade benefits suspended.
However, States retain several privileges under Chapter 11. NAFTA States 
may request the Free Trade Commission to determine whether that country's 
measure, allegedly violating the NAFTA, falls within the scope of a 
reservation or exception. 1265 Interpretations of NAFTA provisions by the 
Commission are binding upon arbitral tribunals. Second, Chapter 11 
arbitration does not preclude resort to Chapter 20 procedures in respect of the 
same alleged violations and which are available to NAFTA States only.
1264 Ibid, Art 1120.
1265 Ibid, Art 1132.
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Amicus Curiae Submissions under Chapter 11.
Arbitral tribunals with the consent of disputants may appoint experts to advise 
on environmental, health, safety or other scientific matters. Moreover, 
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals have concluded that they possess implied 
authority to accept amicus briefs provided that the rights of disputants are 
unaffected.1266 Article 1120, which enable recourse to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, authorizes NAFTA Tribunals to ‘conduct the arbitration in 
such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated 
with equality and that at any stage in the proceedings each party is given a full
1 967opportunity of presenting his case’.
Particularly noteworthy is the Methanex decision where a Chapter 11 arbitral 
tribunal accepted amicus briefs from an NGO during an investor-State 
arbitration. Methanex as complainant opposed the NGO petition for reasons of 
confidentiality, that only NAFTA parties can participate, that recognising 
amici would add another party to proceedings and that protecting public 
interests was already envisaged by the right of NAFTA parties to intervene 
where they saw fit. The US argued that the flexible procedural rules permitted 
receiving amicus submissions and Canada sought greater openness and 
transparency to the arbitral process in response to domestic pressures. Mexico 
however argued that the amicus concept was not recognised under national law 
and amici would enjoy greater rights than NAFTA parties. It is noteworthy
1266 Methanex Corporation v USA, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to 
Intervene as Amicus Curiae, 2001; United Parcel Services o f America Inc. v Canada, Decision 
of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 2001, para 73.
1267 Art 15(1) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
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that by defending environmental protection laws and public health regulations 
the NGO was supporting the US position.1268
The tribunal rejected the danger of establishing an adverse precedent.1269 The 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal had previously received written submissions from 
financial institutions as non-party third persons in proceedings between States
1 9 7 0  *and non-State actors. The discretion to accept amicus submissions fell 
within the procedural powers of Chapter 11 tribunals for the orderly conduct of 
arbitrations.1271 There was no risk of unfair and unequal treatment since 
Methanex would receive all due procedural protections. That said, the tribunal 
rejected the petitioner’s request to attend oral hearings and receive copies of 
materials generated by them. The NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
subsequently formulated procedures such that Tribunals may accept 
submissions contributing relevant and unique perspectives from non-disputing 
parties having a significant presence within NAFTA States, significant interest
1 9 79in the proceedings and the arbitration raises public interest issues.
1268 Dumberry P., ‘The Admissibility of amicus curiae briefs by NGOs in investors-States 
arbitration: the precedent set by the Methanex Case in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 
proceedings’ (2002) 1 Non-State Actors & International L 201, 213.
1269 Methanex, supra nl266, paras 30, 49.
1270 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Case A/15 2 Iran-US CTR 40,43, para 32.
1271 Art 35, Additional Facility Rules & Art 44, ICSID Convention provide that procedural 
questions not covered by the rules or agreed to by Parties shall be decided by Tribunals.
1 72 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Statement, 7 October 2003, Part B, Submissions from 
Non-disputing Parties as applied in Methanex Corp v US, Procedural Decision of 30 December 
2003.
374
Chapter 19 (review of final antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations).
Chapter 19 does not impose a common template but permits States to apply 
their own national trade remedy laws. Industries may establish bi-national 
Panels to review the final determinations of national investigating authorities 
in antidumping and countervailing duty cases by way of alternative to judicial 
review by national courts.1273 Employing the standard of judicial review of the 
State where the determination was made, Chapter 19 Panels examine 
administrative records to determine whether relevant agencies applied national 
law correctly. In binding decisions Panels may uphold final determinations or 
remand them for reconsideration.
Chapter 19 dispute settlement is designed to shield States from domestic 
pressure groups for politically sensitive matters. Investors do not formally 
enjoy any role in establishing Panels and selecting arbitrators. NAFTA States 
may initiate an extraordinary challenge procedure before a Committee to 
safeguard the integrity of the review process. Furthermore, only States may 
participate in Panel reviews with respect to statutory amendments.1274 Panel 
reviews may be challenged where outcomes are materially affected by 
conflicts of interest, departure from fundamental procedural rules or exceeded 
authority. State Parties may also argue that applying another Party's 
national law interferes with the proper functioning of the Panel system.1276
1273 Art 1904, NAFTA, supra «476.
1274 Ibid, Art 1903.
1275 Ibid, Art 1904 (13).
1216 Ibid, Art 1905.
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Chapter 20 ('intergovernmental dispute settlement).
NAFTA additionally reserves particular matters to States where corporate 
participation is formally excluded, non-adversarial processes are first 
employed and outcomes need not be ‘hard’ legally-binding decisions. Chapter 
20 concerns the interpretation or application of the NAFTA, national measures 
which may be inconsistent with it and the ‘nullification or impairment’ of
1 977benefits arising thereunder. Dispute resolution enjoys a variety of means. 
Following initial ministerial consultations, Parties request a meeting of the 
NAFTA Free-Trade Commission which results in nonbinding 
recommendations on a public or confidential basis. Ultimate recourse may be 
had to a Panel of independent experts and referral to national courts or arbitral 
Panels. Panels determine whether State measures are consistent with 
obligations under the Agreement or nullifies or impairs benefits that 
complaining States could reasonably have expected. Panels offer 
recommendations only. However, they may seek information or technical 
advice from any person or body deemed appropriate subject to conditions 
determined by the disputants.1278 This includes appointing review boards to 
report on factual questions concerning environmental, health, safety or other 
scientific issues.
1277 Ibid, Art 2012. Arts 1412-1415 (financial services disputes) are resolved under Chapter 20.
1278 Ibid, Art 2014.
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The Environmental and Labor Cooperation Side Agreements.
Two side agreements were negotiated to prevent firms from gaining unfair 
competitive advantages by re-locating to NAFTA areas where environmental 
and labor standards (and compliance costs) were lower, flooding the US 
market with cheap products and causing unemployment. Environmental 
protection embraces international environmental legal standards whereas 
greater deference is given to State sovereignty and national regulation for labor 
protection. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(the Environmental Side Agreement) establishes a Commission for 
Environmental Co-operation composed of a Council, secretariat and Joint 
Public Advisory Committee. The last-mentioned consists of fifteen individuals 
advising the Council on any matter within the scope of that Agreement. State 
Parties may establish national advisory committees composed of NGOs and 
individuals providing advice on implementation.1279
Citizens or organisations may indirectly trigger inquiries through the 
secretariat alleging failure by a NAFTA State Party to effectively enforce its 
environmental laws.1280 Submitting entities must reside within a NAFTA State, 
be clearly identifiable, provide information sufficient to enable a review, 
inform the targeted NAFTA State in its own language, explain efforts to 
resolve the situation with the relevant government and aim at ‘promoting
1279 Art 17, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 3 2 ILM 1480 (1993)..
1280 Ibid, Art 14.
enforcement rather than at harassing industry’. 1281 Other considerations 
include whether harm is alleged, local remedies pursued, issues are relevant to 
the Agreement’s objectives and the media is the source of allegations. 
Submissions must focus upon the acts or omissions of State Parties and not 
non-compliance by particular companies, particularly where submitting entities 
are competitors which may benefit. Where the Council by two-thirds vote so 
determines, factual records are prepared and private parties may contribute 
information. Upon a further two-thirds vote, NAFTA States may comment 
before such records are published.
Non-State actors can prompt greater enforcement effort against firms through 
governmental mediums. However, the side Agreements do not constitute a 
dispute resolution procedure and there are no formal participatory rights. 
There is only a common commitment by States to afford protection. Of the 
twenty-eight matters submitted by NGOs by 2001, none originated from 
corporations and forty percent had been terminated by the secretariat according 
to its appreciation of a State’s ‘failure to enforce environmental law’.1282 
Although there is greater transparency in environmental decision-making, the 
principal outcome -  a factual record which does not reach legal determinations 
-  suggests the ineffectiveness of civil participation in this particular model and 
subject to the above restraints. Furthermore, double standards exist insofar as 
firms alleging expropriation can compel States to binding arbitration whereas 
NGOs under the Environmental Side Agreement must obtain prior
1281 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Resolution 99-06 (1999) Guidelines for 
Submissions on Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
1282 Fitzmaurice M., ‘Public Participation in the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 333, 349-61.
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intergovernmental approval. Although the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation establishes a similar trilateral institutional framework, 
private parties do not enjoy any right to make submissions.1283
Observations on the Corporate Role under NAFTA.
Although firms appear to exert considerable influence over the process, even 
within Chapter 11 there are significant points where States retain control. 
Corporations lobby for more favourable participatory conditions. The NAFTA 
business community supports greater transparency and limited third party 
intervention in the nature of amicus briefs provided that confidential business 
information is protected.1284 On the other hand, industry associations also 
protest against ‘judicial activism’ when NAFTA Chapter 19 Panels have 
regard to sources other than national law and prejudicial to their concerns.
Direct corporate participation is a means of expanding the content of 
substantive international law with respect to most favoured nation status, fair 
and equitable treatment and protection against direct or indirect property 
expropriation. For example, annulling concession contracts for waste 
collection and disposal is not wrongful where conducted in accordance with 
national law and without denial of justice or unlawful purpose. However, 
enforcing an ecological decree may constitute an act tantamount to
1283 Cp Art 4 North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation 3 2 ILM 1499 (1993).
1284 USCIB, Joint Business Coalition Letter on Investment Dispute Settlement, 2001; USCIB, 
Statement by representatives of US, Canadian and Mexican business on NAFTA investment 
dispute resolution, 2003.
128 ‘Coalition Letter on NAFTA Dispute Settlement’, Inside US Trade, May 1995.
1286 ICSID, Robert Azinian & Ors v United Mexican States, Case No ARB(AF)/97/2.
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expropriation after a permit to construct a waste treatment facility had been
1 9 R7issued by the federal government. NGOs protested that the Metalclad 
decision unnecessarily broadened the definition of an expropriatory ‘taking’ 
and could curtail the regulatory functions of States. Although satisfying 
international environmental obligations constitutes a legitimate public purpose, 
the character of expropriation remains unaffected. 1288 For example, 
nominating territory for world heritage listing does not by itself justify
1 9£Qexpropriatory measures nor preclude claims for compensation. Such 
precedents could be employed by firms in bilateral negotiations to ‘chill’ the 
capacity of States to make laws promoting the public welfare. Indeed, 
environmental legislation has been successfully challenged under NAFTA 
before its enactment.1290 The range of protected investors has been enlarged to 
include permanent residents and time periods are construed generously.1291 
Secret notices of intent, confidential proceedings and lobbying enable private 
interests to influence States subject to little public scrutiny.1292
Corporate participation could be benevolently characterised as responding to 
environmental protectionism rather than dismantling or deterring
1 9Q9environmental regulation. Canada breached the national treatment
obligation to protect its waste disposal industry from US competitors
1287 ICSID, Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, Case No ARB(AF)/97/l (2000), paras 70, 
103 & 111.
1288 ICSID, Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Republic o f Costa Rica, Case No 
ARB/96/1 (2000), para 71.
1289 ICSID, Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Egypt Case No ARB/84/3 (1993), 
para 154.
1290 NAFTA, Ethyl Corporation v Canada (Jurisdiction) 38 /LA/708 (1999).
1291 ICSID, Karpa v Mexico (Jurisdiction) Case No ARB(AF)/99/l (2000), paras 35, 47.
1292 Mann H., ‘Private Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAFTA’s Chapter on Investor 
Rights’, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, 2001.
129 Rugman A., Kirton J & Solo way J, Environmental Regulations and Corporate Strategy. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.
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notwithstanding arguing that environmental legislation was necessary to 
implement a multilateral agreement concerning trade in toxic waste.1294 
Similar circumstances arose in Methanex where the firm challenged a 
Californian ban first through the NAFTA Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation and then through Chapter 11. The NAFTA business community 
was disappointed when ‘fair and equitable’ treatment was redefined by States. 
This resulted from the controversial decision in Pope & Talbot where 
Canada’s method for verifying its softwood lumber quota was adjudged to be 
unreasonable.1295 Henceforth, a ‘determination that there has been a breach of 
another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, 
does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1)’.1296 In short, 
the directive lawmaking role of States was affirmed.
(d) Enforcement within the Operational Framework o f International 
Organisations.
Corporate enforcement also includes indirectly implementing Security Council 
resolutions, recourse to the UN Compensation Commission to obtain 
compensation for unlawful acts and reviewing State compliance with ratified 
labour conventions. As observed above, NGOs may make submissions to 
secretariats of international organisations, trigger public reviews, obtain 
information and prompt improved implementation of applicable legal regimes. 
NGOs or groups of individuals may also request Inspection Panels to
1294 S.D. Myers Inc v Canada (2002) 121ILR 72.
1295 NAFTA, Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada, Interim Award, 2000, paras 11, 96, 98, 101.
1296 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Interpretative Note concerning Article 1105(1) of 31 
July 2001. See further ICSID, Mondev International Ltd v US, Case No ARB(AF)/99/2 (2002).
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investigate acts or omissions of the World Bank1297 or other development 
banks. However, claims of injury must result from failure to follow stated 
operational policies or procedures with respect to the design, appraisal or 
implementation of its projects.1298 Moreover, investigations are subject to 
approval by the Bank’s Board of Directors and the Panel’s conclusions are 
only advisory.
Private parties at the regional level can seek judicial review of EC decision­
making.1299 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) may review the acts of EC 
institutions for lack of competence, infringing essential procedural 
requirements, violating the EC Treaty, any rules relating to the application of 
that Treaty, misuse of powers and failure to act. However, direct access is 
limited to annulling ‘acts of the Community’ of direct and individual concern 
to plaintiffs.1300 Corporations may request references from national courts to 
the ECJ to determine national legal consistency with the EC Treaty. 
Competitive disadvantages arise where Member States incorrectly implement 
EC law and favour local enterprises. However, individuals or groups affected 
by violations of EC law by Member States can only request the EC 
Commission to initiate infringement actions.1301 The Commission enjoys 
considerable discretion in this regard. The non-contractual liability of
1297 IBRD, Operational Directive 14.70 on Involving NGOs in Bank-Supported Activities, 
IBRD Doc GP14.70 (2000); IBRD, Resolution No 93-10 on Inspection Panel Operating 
Procedures 3 4 ILM 510 (1995); International Development Agency Resolution No 93-6.
1298 Carmody C., ‘Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic Law’ 
(2000) 15 Am. U. Int’lL. Rev. 1321, 1329.
1299 Arts 173, 175, 177, 178, 184, 215 & 230, Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (2002) OJEC C325.
1300 Case T-585/93 Greenpeace & Ors v Commission [1995] ECR 77-2205.
1301 Arts 226, 227 EC Treaty supra n\299.
1302 Hartley T.C., The Foundations of European Community Law. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 4 Ed, 1998, 302.
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States for serious breaches is established where Directives confer individual 
rights, have an identifiable content and causal links exist between 
implementation failure and consequential damage.
(d)(i) Enforcing Unilateral and Multilateral Economic Sanctions.
Corporations are conduits through which States unilaterally implement 
economic sanctions.1304 National legislation providing for rights of action 
against other private parties for their extraterritorial behaviour shifts the 
execution of foreign policy upon non-State actors.1305 Corporate coalitions 
such as USA Engage lobby in favour of commercial engagement as 
alternatives to prohibiting market access and unilateral sanctions can be lifted 
in light of their protests. The US Council for International Business also points 
to the conflicting requirements imposed upon US businesses from unilateral 
extraterritorial measures. 1306 US corporations prefer economic sanctions 
where necessary be imposed multilaterally given the profits lost to foreign 
competition from product substitution.1307 Such calls are echoed by the UN 
General Assembly which is concerned by the legitimate commercial interests 
detrimentally affected by coercive economic measures.
1303 Eg Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Federal Republic o f Germany and The Queen v Secretary o f  
State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd & Ors [1996] 1 ECR 1131.
1304 Eg The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (the 'D'Amato Act') 3 5 ILM 1273 (1996).
1305 Eg The Helms-Burton Act supra «452.
1306 USCIB, Statement o f the USCIB on Unilateral Economic Sanctions, New York, 1989.
1307 Colloqium, ‘Country Sanctions and the International Business Community’ (1997) 91 
ASIL Proceed 333, 336, 339.
1308 UNGA Resolutions 48/16 (1993), 50/10 (1995) & 53/10 (1998).
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Corporations such as commercial airlines are the targets of multilateral 
sanctions regimes imposed by the UN Security Council as well as the principal 
agents for implementation. These objectives are achieved when States 
undertake national lawmaking. For example, States are expected to adopt 
measures ensuring that corporations especially arms manufacturers do not 
engage in commercial relationships with parties to armed conflict.1309 Security 
Council resolutions are typically implemented by firms through the nationality 
and territoriality links with States although direct effect may be indicated by 
their terms. 1310 The prospects for sanctions are hamstrung by State 
recalcitrance and non-adhering corporations.1311 Furthermore, implementation 
is uneven where resolutions have an uncertain scope and do not encompass 
dual-use commodities possessing both military and civilian applications.1312 
Less reputable and more costly firms enjoying the tacit support of home States 
are also likely to exploit commercial opportunities, particularly when 
prohibiting access creates higher profits. Sanctions-avoidance practices 
include manipulating information and camouflaging trade within unrelated 
industries.
Corporations bear the commercial risks of a disrupted international legal order. 
Armed conflict, State dissolution and Security Council intervention radically 
transform obligations for States and permit the unilateral suspension of trade
1309 Eg SC Resolution 1379 (2001).
1310 Iraq v Dumez (1997) 106 ILR 284, 289-90; Smith & Hudson v Socialist Peoples Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya 886 F Supp 306, 310-12 (Dist Ct NY 1995) affirmed 101 F 3d 239 (CA 2nd 
Cir 1996); SC Resolution 748 (1992) para 4, 5.
1311 SC Resolution 1408 (2002) paras 7, 18.
1312 Case C-70/94 Werner Industrie-Ausrushungen v Germany [1995] 1 ECR 3189.
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agreements.1313 Maintaining international peace and security also enables 
States to exert greater control over trade in strategic goods.1314 Proportionate 
measures may be applied to aircraft owned by commercial enterprises of
1 o 1 c
targeted States even if operated under independent control. Similarly, 
commercial traffic entering the territorial seas of targeted States and those 
within international waters suspected to be on course thereto may be 
intercepted without distinction as to flag or ownership. Attempts to 
micromanage industries such as banking and finance to prevent the money 
laundering which finances terrorism can be intrusive. However, States 
cannot prohibit export payments which have been previously approved by UN
1 <7 1 o
Sanctions Committees and authorised by other States.
Although the Security Council seeks a more effective application of its 
sanctions regimes to maintain international peace and security, it is not 
insensitive to commercial considerations. For example, the defence of force 
majeure may be unavailable to firms to avoid contractual liability.1319 The 
Security Council is willing to extend immunity from attachment to 
corporations against claims for contractual non-performance by States.1320 
Financial institutions employ these decisions in national courts to shield them
1313 A Racke GMBH & C o v  Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] 1 ECR 3655, para 56.
13,4 Wilton Feyenoord BV v Minister for Economic Affairs (1985) 16 NYIL 528, para 4.7.
1315Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications, Ireland and the Attorney-General [1996] 1 ECR 3953, paras 12, 21, 26.
1316 Ebony Maritime SA and Loten Navigation Co Ltd v Prefetto della Provincia di Brindisi & 
Ors [1997] 1 ECR 1111, paras 17, 22-7.
1317 SC Resolution 1373 (2001), para 1.
1318 Regina v HM Treasury and the Bank o f England ex parte Cento-Com SRL [1997] 1 ECR 
81, paras 19-53.
1319 Trinh v Citibank NA 850 F 2d 1164, 1169-70 (6th Cir 1988).
1320 SC Resolution 712 (1991) para 5; SC Resolution 883 (1993) para 8.
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from an avalanche of claims after sanctions are lifted.1321 The avenues 
available to firms for recovering economic losses arising from State 
compliance with Security Council resolutions are limited. Regional 
organisations escape liability in the absence of disproportionate impacts upon 
particular economic operators or where the damage falls within a sector’s 
inherent economic risks.1322 However, States seeking to circumvent UN 
sanctions with fraudulent certificates may be contractually liable.
Recent sanctions regimes contemplate a more explicit corporate role. 
Recognising the link between illicit trades in natural resources and continuing 
armed conflict, the Security Council prohibited trade in diamonds originating 
from Angola and Sierra Leone.1324 Complying firms may supply information 
on violations by other firms.1325 States were urged to co-operate with the 
International Diamond Manufacturers Association to avoid impairing the 
diamond industry’s legitimate contribution to economic development. The 
Antwerp World Diamond Congress in parallel resolved in 2000 to create an 
International Diamond Council composed of producers, manufacturers, traders, 
States and intergovernmental organisations. One objective was to formulate 
industry standards. The resulting certificate of origin scheme may become a 
model for national law, inspire industry reform and enable the diamond
1321 SC Resolution 687 (1991), para 29; EEC Regulation No 3541/92 prohibiting to honour 
Iraqi claims with regard to contracts and transactions affected by Resolution 661(1990); 
Shaming International Ltd & Orsv Rasheed Bank & Ors [2001] UKHL 31, paras 8, 18, 26.
1322 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft MBH v Council o f the European Union and 
Commission o f the EC [1998] 2 ECR 667, paras 70-89.
1323 Consarc Corp v Iraqi Ministry 27 F 3d 695.
1324 UNGA Resolution 55/56 (2001); SC Resolution 1171 (1998), 1173 (1998), 1176 (1998) & 
1306 (2000).
1325 SC Resolution 1343 (2001), paras 16, 24.
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industry to participate in regulatory development.1326 For example, the
1099__
Diamond Council and NGOs were consulted prior to US legislation. To be 
truly effective the certification regime must apply internationally, extend to all 
firms (diamond businesses, private security firms, arms merchants, State- 
owned enterprises and transportation companies) engaged in ‘sanctions 
busting’ and identify the ‘conflict’ diamonds feeding into legitimate trade.
Corporations will increasingly resort to existing procedures (quoted in Annex 
1) to communicate their concerns during the formulation of Security Council 
resolutions.1329 This is particularly the case where the Council assumes a more 
prominent role in the post-conflict reconstruction of States. This represents a 
commercial opportunity to apply the relatively high foreign direct investment 
protection standards of industrialised States.
(d)(ii) Initiating Claims before the UN Compensation Commission.
Following armed conflict the nationals of victor States have historically been 
permitted to initiate claims within mixed arbitral tribunals and compensation 
commissions against vanquished States for damage to their property rights and 
interests.1331 Although the relevant instrument never entered into force, neutral
1326 Security Council, Letter dated 1 December 2000 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2000/1150, 6-7, 13, 16.
1327 ‘US Legislation in Support of Diamond Controls’ (2002) 96(2) AJIL 485.
1328 Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1306 (2000) para 19 in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/1195, 21.
1329 Security Council, Provisional Procedure for Dealing with Communications from Private 
Individuals and Non-Governmental Bodies, Appendix, UN Doc S/96/Rev.6 (1974).
1330 SC Resolution 1483 (year); Coalition Provisional Authority, Foreign Investment Order 39 
& 46 (2003).
1331 Eg Arts 296, 297, 304, 305, Peace Treaty of Versailles.
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individuals enjoyed the right to bring claims against States before an 
International Prize Court subject to home State approval.1332 More recently the 
Security Council established a Compensation Commission, Governing Council 
and Fund in respect of the loss, damage and injury occasioned by Iraq’s illegal 
occupation of Kuwait. The regime is monitored by commercial
mechanisms, standard industry practices and inspection and commission 
agents to minimise the burden upon commercial operations.1334 Corporate 
officers act as UN mission experts and approve Iraqi oil contracts for 
compliance with humanitarian requirements.1335 Representatives from the 
accounting, finance, engineering and petroleum industries participate in 
Commission proceedings as experts. Category E claims submitted by 
corporations, other private legal entities and public sector enterprises involve 
claims for economic loss arising from construction contracts, non-payment of 
goods and services, destroyed or seized assets and lost profits. Commercial 
claims are submitted through home States although direct access is 
exceptionally permitted for unusually large or complex matters.1336 Claims 
may be consolidated in light of national procedures or practices.1337
By pursuing compensation claims corporations are contributing legal 
developments to this field. Economic losses arising from the trade embargo,
1332 Arts 4, 5, Hague Convention XII of 1907.
1333 SC Resolutions 674 (1990) & 692 (1991).
1334 UN Compensation Commission Governing Council (UNCCGC), Decision 6: 
Arrangements for Ensuring Payments to the Compensation Fund, UN Doc S/AC.26/1991/6 
paras 14, 16.
335 Secretary-General Report pursuant to paragraph 5 of SC Resolution 706 (1991), UN Doc 
S/23006 (1991), para 26.
1336 UNCCGC, Arts 5 & 38, Rules of Procedure, Decision 10: Provisional Rules for Claims 
Procedures, UN Doc S/AC.26/1992/10.
1337 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 
687 (1991), UN Doc S/22559 (1991), para 21.
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• 1338related measures and the economic situation are not compensated.
* l noHowever, losses with parallel causes receive full compensation. Although 
‘direct loss’ is loss suffered in consequence of Iraqi occupation, the chain of 
causation is unbroken if damage has occurred from military action by the 
Allied Coalition forces.1340 The Commission has given the trade embargo full 
effect irrespective of whether States had implemented it into national law. 
This conclusion avoids considering the direct effect of Security Council 
resolutions. The Commission also determined that complete or partial claims 
for contractual performance giving rise to debts or obligations more than three 
months prior to 2 August 1990 are beyond its mandate.1341 Interest is awarded 
from the date the loss arose until date of payment at rates sufficient to 
compensate claimants for lost use of principal amounts.1342 However, 
compensation is reduced for amounts recovered elsewhere in respect of the 
same loss.1343 Special arbitral mechanisms were created to more equitably 
allocate compensation for overlapping claims such as those between 
corporations and their shareholders.1344 By doing so the Governing Council
1338 UNCCGC, Decision 9: Propositions and Conclusions on Compensation for Business 
Losses: Types of Damages and their Valuation, UN Doc S/AC.26/1992/9, para 6.
1339 UNCCGC, Decision 15: Compensation for Business Losses Resulting from Iraq’s 
Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait where the Trade Embargo and Related Measures 
were also a Cause, UN Doc S/AC.26/1992/15, para 9.
1340 UNCCGC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners appointed 
to review the Well Blowout Control Claim, UN Doc S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex, para 86; 
UNCCGC, Decision 40 concerning the Well Blowout Claim, UN Doc S/AC.26/Dec.40 (1996).
1341 UNCCGC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners 
concerning the First Installment of E2 Claims, UN Doc S/AC.26/1998, paras 90, 172.
1342 UNCCGC, Decision 16: Awards of Interest, UN Doc S/AC.26/1992/16.
1343 UNCCGC, Decision by the Governing Council not to accept further corporate and 
government claims after 1 January 1996, UN Doc S/AC.26/Dec.30 (1995); UNCCGC, 
Decision 13, Further Measures to Avoid Multiple Recovery of Compensation by Claimants, 
UN Doc S/AC.26/1992/13, para 3(b).
1344 UNCCGC, Decision concerning claims filed by individuals seeking compensation for 
direct losses sustained by Kuwaiti companies, UN Doc S/AC.26/Dec.l23 (2001).
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elucidated its understanding of concepts such as separate corporate legal 
personality, partnership and shareholder.1345
(d)(iii) Enforcing Labour and Environmental Standards.
The tenacity with which corporations enforce property rights and investment 
obligations against States contrasts with efforts in other areas. An economic 
interest in violating labour or environmental standards may deter firms from 
enforcement. Alternative explanations include preferring informal bargaining 
with States, collectively expressing business opinion, the perceived propriety 
of corporate roles, duplicating NGO activity and corporate sensitivity political 
interference allegations. However, enforcement activity is warranted against 
rival firms who enjoy unfair (unavailable) sources of competitive advantage 
and against States to preserve corporate reputations. Nonetheless, a challenge 
remains to harness the unrealised advocacy capacity of corporations.
Corporations can access procedural mechanisms for protecting and enforcing 
human rights. Corporations are not excluded from employing the institutional 
mechanisms available to persons, NGOs or groups of individuals who suffer 
human rights violations or acting on their behalf.1346 It would be ‘illogical’ if 
procedural mechanisms for protecting constitutionally-guaranteed human 
rights for the benefit of ‘persons’ were limited to natural and not legal
1345 UNCCGC, Decision 4: Business Losses of Individuals Eligible for Consideration under the 
Expedited Procedures UN Doc S/AC.26/1991/4.
134 Arts 1, 2, 5, 1966 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 999 UNTS 302; Art 44, Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 9 ILM 673 
(1970); Art 34, 1994 Protocol No 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms ETS No 155; Sec 7(7) Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
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entities.1347 State measures which infringe the ability of firms to impart 
business information have been challenged for violating freedom of 
expression.1348 The prospect of corporate law firms acting for contingency 
fees is likely where monetary awards result. Denying a judicial remedy when 
enforcing a security interest may infringe a creditor’s right to a fair trial.1349 
However, the remedies for human rights violations are typically minimal and 
for the reasons suggested above it would be inappropriate for firms to resort to 
human rights enforcement mechanisms.
As noted in Chapter One, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the 
oldest illustration of specifically incorporating employer interests within 
intergovernmental organisations. The International Organisation of Employers 
(IOE) contributes to monitoring State compliance with ratified labour 
conventions within the ILO’s formal complaints process. The IOE reviews the 
implementation of labour standards as a Member of the tripartite ILO 
Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations. Employer organisations suspecting inadequate State 
implementation may refer matters to Expert Committees.1350 Such a process 
influenced the design of human rights enforcement mechanisms.
For example, employee delegates alleged that the Myanmar government 
authorised or condoned forced labour. Analogous to South African apartheid, 
the controversy concerned a national legal system operating contrary to a
1347 Attorney-General & Anorv Antigua Times Ltd [1976] AC 16, 27-9.
1348 UN Human Rights Commission, Singer v Canada UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/455/1991, para 
11.2 .
1349 Wilson v First Country Trust Ltd (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 633.
1350 Art 24, 1948 International Labour Organisation Constitution 15 UNTS 35.
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peremptory norm of international law and commercial interests in its 
perpetuation. Employer organisations were invited to provide information. 
Individual firms made oral and written submissions arguing that States bore 
responsibility for project security or labour relations and referred to codes of 
conduct and NGO reports in support.1351 The Commission of Inquiry 
determined that the State had failed to effectively observe ILO Convention No 
29 (1930) concerning Forced Labour in law and practice. However, evidence 
of corporate complicity was lacking. Myanmar’s subsequent attempts to
• • 1IS?correct national law were adjudged inadequate. National employer 
organisations encouraged members to voluntarily comply with an ILO 
resolution on abstention from economic cooperation and the IOE called upon 
members not to perpetuate forced labour. 1353 ILO reports have become 
evidentiary materials in litigation before national courts against individual 
firms. 1354 Shareholder resolutions proposing a code of conduct, tying 
executive compensation to social performance and forcing the Myanmar 
project to be abandoned were defeated.
1351 ILO, Report of the Commission o f Inquiry appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution 
of the International Labour Organisation to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced 
Labour Convention 1930 (No 29), ILO Doc GB.273; ILO OB Vol 81 (1998) Ser B Spec Supp, 
paras 53-4, 75-6, 504-10.
1352 ILO, Second Report of the Director-General to the members of the Governing Body on 
measures taken by the Government of Myanmar following the recommendations of the 
Commission of Inquiry established to examine its observance of the Forced Labour 
Convention 1930 (No 29), ILO Doc GB.277/6 (2000).
1353 ILO, Developments concerning the question of the observance by the Government of 
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No 29), ILO Doc GB.280/6 (2001), paras 
22-31.
1354 National Coalition Gov’t o f the Union o f Burma v Unocal Inc 176 FRD 329 (CD Cal 
1997); John Doe I  v Unocal Corp 963 F. Supp 880 (D.C. Cal 1997) & 248 F 3d 915 (9th Cir 
2001).
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Legal mechanisms for enforcing environmental standards against States 
continue to emerge.1355 However, only rarely do foreign nationals enjoy 
standing within national courts to challenge host State compliance with 
international environmental law.1356 One alternative is direct access for 
individuals and corporations to international dispute settlement mechanisms 
where contemplated in related fields.1357
(e) The Prospects for Enforcement within the Private Sphere.
Chapter Two observed that ‘soft’ international legal instruments entailed 
equally ‘soft’ enforcement mechanisms such as non-adversarial proceedings, 
jointly-drafted interpretations of disputed provisions and recommended 
adherence. Options falling short of securing a binding legal judgment such as 
the threat of litigation may be sufficient to induce State compliance. Does the 
marketplace offer any possibilities for firms to resolve their inter-commercial 
disputes without recourse to State participation ?
Verifying corporate compliance with pre-defined standards can be attained 
through self-assessment or internal review systems. However, these tools 
entail increased business cost and are questionable for their veracity. The 
impartiality of independent third parties regulating commercial practices 
(auditors, accountants and certification companies) may be doubted where 
investigative subjects are also clients. Resort to accreditation agencies may
1355 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to 
Natural Resources and/or the Environment, 4 1 ILM 202 (2002).
1356 Art 3 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment 1092 UNTS 279.
1357 The Energy Charter Treaty 34 ILM 373 (1995).
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substitute for direct State oversight. For example, NGOs such as Social 
Accountability International accredits organisations including other NGOs 
against specified criteria to verify corporate compliance with human rights and 
labour standards.1358 Joint effort by corporations and NGOs (for example, 
within the International Accreditation Forum) seeks the mutual recognition of 
different certification schemes and management systems. Supply-side 
pressures emanate from insurance companies who decline coverage and 
financial institutions refusing investment capital. For example, following the 
Three Mile Island incident, US insurance firms now only cover nuclear power 
plants that are members of the national (Institute of Nuclear Power Operators) 
or international (World Association of Nuclear Operators) self-regulating
industry bodies.
Trade associations assume enforcement functions to prevent market 
undercutting through unfair competitive advantage, maintain long-term 
industry viability, protect the reputation of economic sectors and dissuade 
unfavourable regulation. Tools for exercising collective business pressure 
include moral suasion, disciplinary methods associated with membership (fines, 
penalties or suspension), surveys, referral to State agencies and expulsion. 
However, the capacity for trade associations to exercise oversight is also 
limited: exclusion is ineffective where noncompliant corporations enjoy 
market power and conflicting member opinions hamper the further 
implementation of codes of conduct.
1358 Social Accountability International (SAI), Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000), New 
York, 1997.
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Enforcement mechanisms within the marketplace and lacking significant State 
participation intend to improve corporate governance. Managerial 
performance is influenced by sharemarkets, commodity markets, capital 
markets and corporate control markets (takeovers and mergers). Additional 
tools include denying benefits, contractual clauses within purchase orders or 
letters of credit and ultimately market exclusion. Enforcement against 
downstream suppliers or subcontractors is viable through contractual 
conditionality where compliance with code of conducts is a precondition for 
continuing business relationships. However, refusing to trade presupposes 
commercial decision-making freedom, security of tenure and industry 
immobility. Enterprises cannot influence entirely independent operations 
outside their sphere of influence. Small and medium-sized enterprises are 
amenable to the horizontal compliance pull exerted by larger ones but lack 
capacity as enforcers. Moreover, surprise audits and on-site inspections 
override managerial autonomy and encourage allegations of improper market 
concentration and anti-competitive behaviour.
The privatisation of enforcement includes a role for individuals. Demand-side
pressures are manifested through shareholder activism, consumer boycotts, 
eco-labelling and portfolio divestment. However, individuals are subject to 
disincentives (such as vested self-interests including short-term profit and high 
living standards) and imperfect information (such that less visible firms are 
less amenable to public pressure). The enforcement strategies of NGOs and 
trade unions involve exercising external oversight (monitoring corporate 
compliance) or are orientated towards internal engagement (such as
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partnerships).1359 The former employs adverse publicity, is dependent upon 
resources and limited to firms with high brand recognition. The latter is 
criticised for enhancing corporate images, sacrificing NGO credibility and 
conferring legitimacy upon commercial operations. If responsibility for 
enforcement falls upon NGOs then consideration must be given to appropriate 
financial support.1360 On the other hand, the European Chemical Industry 
Council objected to EC proposals conferring locus standi upon NGO’s where 
States failed to initiate enforcement procedures.1361
It remains true that enforcement is more effective when undertaken in 
conjunction with States. States are presumed to possess greater coercive 
authority to assert effective control over the private realm. The ICC 
cooperates with State enforcement authorities via its Commercial Crime 
Service to address economic crimes and through the International Maritime 
Bureau to counter piracy. 1363 Pharmaceutical companies through the 
Pharmaceutical Security Institute interact with police, regulators, customs 
authorities and the WHO to improve intellectual property protection, establish 
private seizure rights and deter medical product counterfeiting.1364 Finally, 
self-regulatory market behaviour informs regulatory development.
1359 Fabig H. & Boele R., ‘The Changing Nature of NGO Activity in a Globalising World: 
Pushing the Corporate Responsibility Agenda’ (1999) 30(3) IDS Bulletin 58.
1360 Heyes A.G., ‘Environmental Regulation by Private Contest’ (1997) 63(3) J  o f Public 
Economics 407.
1361 EC Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by 
Waste (1989) OJEC 251, 3 as amended (1991) OJEC 192; CEFIC, CEFIC Comments on the 
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 
Bmssels, 1991.
1362 Case o f Platform Arzte fur das Leben (1988) ECHR Ser A Vol 139, para 32.
1363 ICC International Maritime Bureau, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’, Paris, 
1999.
1364 IFPMA, ‘Counterfeiting of Medicinal Products’, Geneva, 1997, 3.
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3. Corporate Forum Shopping and the Proliferation o f International Tribunals.
Corporations seek cheap, impartial and expeditious third party adjudication 
which protects confidential information and whose outcomes are credibly 
backed by the necessary authority. Just as firms are attracted to the greater 
enforcement prospects of the WTO, they do not wish it to be a magnet for 
other actors and issues. Transnational enterprises also enjoy access to fora 
including other national courts unavailable to local competitors. Resort by 
private litigants to intergovernmental dispute settlement is comparatively 
expensive, need not be cost-effective and is subject to delay. WTO remedies 
also legitimate cross-retaliation against unrelated industries and award
1 " i / r r
compensation to non-injured ones. Intergovernmental mechanisms are 
attractive when informal lobbying has failed, local remedies are exhausted or 
the industry is uniformly affected. The litigious disposition of firms is also 
influential: Japanese manufacturers for example highly regard stable trading 
relationships and there is little demand for formal mechanisms for expressing 
grievances to government.1366 As outlined above firms can resort to non-legal 
methods for protecting their interests. Informal methods such as controlled 
negotiations enable the unhindered operation of bargaining power disparities 
free from external scrutiny. Threats of strictly asserting legal rights can be 
sufficient to induce the desired changes in State behaviour. Simultaneously 
there are counter pressures for example from NGOs to publicise privately- 
resolved public controversies.
1365 Kessie E., ‘Enhancing Security and Predictability for Private Business Operators under the 
Dispute Settlement System of the WTO’ (2000) 34(6) J  World Trade 1, 17.
1366 Yamane H., ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Japanese Traders’ (1998) 1 J  
of Int’l Eco L 683, 694.
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Corporate forum shopping is less of an ogre than may be imagined. States 
enjoy the free choice of means principle in resolving their disputes. All actors 
share an interest in orderly and predictable dispute resolution within an 
international judicial order free from undue institutional competition and 
notwithstanding overlapping subject matters. Consent to jurisdiction remains 
paramount. Unilateral attempts to drag disputes towards parallel compulsory 
dispute settlement provisions within framework conventions may prove 
unsuccessful. 1367 This is akin to the position at the national level which 
requires identifying the ‘natural’ forum for dispute resolution when, for 
example, businesses apply for an anti-suit injunction restraining claimants 
from commencing proceedings within other States. ICSID tribunals as 
observed above are mindful of eliminating forum shopping and compelling 
firms to nominate their preference. Attempts to lift national legal questions to 
international tribunals to recover contractual debts may be rejected. 1369 
NAFTA tribunals lack jurisdiction where enterprises ineffectively waive their 
right to initiate local proceedings or discontinue existing ones.1370 They may 
also defer to national court determinations of contractual invalidity and void 
dispute settlement provisions.1371
Corporations are dependant upon States to create the requisite enabling 
mechanisms through which international law is enforced against governments.
1367 UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, Southern Bluejin Tuna Case (Australia & New Zealand v 
Japan) (Jurisdiction) 39 ILM 1359 (2000), para 63.
1368 Airbus Industries GIE v Patel et al 2>1 ILM 1076 (1998) (UK House of Lords).
1369 Case o f Certain Norwegian Loans (France v Norway) (1957) ICJ Rep 9.
1370 ICSID, Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States, Case No ARB(AF)/98/2 (2000).
1371 ICSID, Azinian v United Mexican States, Case No ARB(AF)/97/2 (2000), para 100.
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The process is ultimately self-regulatory for States. States consent to future 
determinations by international tribunals that their regulatory measures do or 
do not serve legitimate objectives consistent with legal commitments and 
international values. Firms use and abuse the procedural mechanisms available 
to them as springboards for further legal activity and create legal precedents 
binding upon States. However, for corporations to construct a body of 
international legal precedents which merely vindicate market ambitions may 
also impair orderly economic or political management. The magnitude of the 
commercial matter at issue frequently does not square with the procedural 
constraints of the forum: TRIPs disputes were channelled through South 
African national courts and Unocal’s complicity with Myanmar would only 
ever be ineffectively scrutinised through ILO monitoring procedures. 
Corporations raise interacting questions of public and private international law 
such as the expropriatory effects of regulatory measures and contractual 
validity in the context of Security Council sanctions.1372 The interaction 
between national, regional and international dispute settlement mechanisms is 
appreciated and exploited.
The international legal order has long been deficient in terms of lacking 
compulsory dispute settlement, self-certified State compliance and non­
specific obligations for national implementation. The chosen forum and 
applicable law for balancing fundamental issues of public international law 
against legitimate commercial aims should not be left to commercial 
expediency. For example, international trade Panels are mandated to identify
1372 Burdeau G., ‘Les effets juridiques des Resolutions du Conseil de Securite sur les contrats 
prives’ in Gowlland-Debbas V. (Ed), UN Sanctions and International Law. Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2001, 268.
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1 771disguised protectionist agendas underlying national legislative intent. Their 
natural inclination is to preserve the integrity of trade regimes, possibly at the 
expense of environmental or labour concerns which are more sensitively 
addressed elsewhere. A disparity has been observed whereby firms enjoy a 
high degree of investment protection on both substantive and procedural 
grounds whereas trade remains under stricter State control with fewer 
substantive rights conferred and limited access to dispute settlement.1374 Since 
the proliferation of international courts and tribunals has not led to any 
‘serious’ doctrinal fragmentation, ad hoc resolutions will suffice until ‘a few 
spectacular controversies...mobilise political demands for rationalisation’.1375 
In the interim it is left to international tribunals to exchange information and 
fashion responses by reference to familiar but unsatisfactory notions as judicial 
deference to the separation of powers, judicial comity, the interests of justice 
and common legal principles.1376
4. Characterising Corporate Roles: legislative dismantling, constraining 
national regulatory capacity or incidental to regulatory evolution ?
Commercial motivations for undertaking enforcement activity are firm and 
situation-specific. For example, Nestle, the ‘owners of a claim against the 
Ethiopian government’, sought compensation for expropriation as a ‘question
1373 WTO, US-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages BISD 39S/206 (1992), 276- 
77.
1374 Bruno R., Access of Private Parties to International Dispute Settlement: A Comparative 
Analysis, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 13/97 (1997).
1375 Kingsbury B., ‘Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systematic 
Problem?’ (1999) 31 NYU JIntL  & Pol 679, 684.
1376 Shany Y., The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals- Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003, 213-226.
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of principle’ notwithstanding NGO concerns that funds could be redirected to 
securing food supplies.1377 The corporate concern to avoid adverse precedents 
does not preclude adopting positions which approach double standards. For 
example, Methanex opposed the receipt of an NGO amicus brief in 
proceedings in which it was the complainant and yet the broader NAFTA 
business community supports greater procedural transparency including the 
opportunity to make such submissions where desired. The decision whether to 
initiate enforcement action is also institution-specific and involves 
consideration of locus standi requirements, procedural rules, cost, available 
remedies, receptivity to commercial interests and protection afforded to 
confidential business information. In addition to the shortfalls of diplomatic 
protection noted above, resort to this modality is contingent upon support from 
home States.
The factors which influence the extent of private sector participation within the 
WTO include ‘the way in which multilateral trade negotiations and subsequent 
deals, as well as the existing WTO rules and obligations, affect international 
trade opportunities.’1378 For example, the submission of an amicus brief to the 
WTO by the American Iron and Steel Institute referred to above ‘while quite 
parallel to that of the US government, adds additional perspective and 
expertise’.1379 The Institute ‘has developed considerable expertise in the area 
of international steel trade, the rules with which it must comply, and the
1377 The Guardian, ‘Nestle Claims $3.7m from famine-hit Ethiopia’, 19 December 2002.
1378 Mr Bernard Kuiten, Counsellor, External Relations Division, WTO Secretariat, Response 
to Questionnaire, 11 August 2004.
1379 American Iron and Steel Institute, Letter to Appellate Body Secretariat, 7 February 2000.
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enforcement of those rules’. NGO strategies are also to foster the creation of
• • 1380international law favourable to their interests.
Corporate enforcement activity may be differently characterised. First, 
corporations are holding States to their voluntarily-agreed international 
commitments. State measures which depart from previous undertakings 
disrupt commercial certainty associated with, for example, customs 
administration. 1381 However, the uniform application of international 
agreements tends towards a level competitive playing field and identical legal 
conditions for local and foreign firms. National regulatory measures to 
promote trade may confer commercial advantages upon local rivals. For 
example, compulsory export prices which lower purchase costs for local 
manufacturers to below world market levels are a subsidy when public 
accounts are charged.1382 Corporations may be able to judicially review such 
practices for consistency with a State’s international commitments in some 
jurisdictions.1383 However, as observed above treaties may not be justiciable if 
they have not been nationally implemented.1384 Inter-corporate disputes 
originating from questions of State compliance are appropriately transferred to 
intergovernmental levels to ensure respect for international legal rules.
1380 Robertson D., ‘Civil Society and the WTO’ (2000) 23 World Econ 1119, 1127.
1381 WTO, EC-Customs Classification o f Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/R, 
WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R (1998).
1382 Rocklea Spinning Mills Pty Ltd v Anti-Dumping Authority & Anor (1995) 129 ALR 401, 
414-6.
1383 R v Minister o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd & 
Ors [1994] 1 ECR 3087, para 66.
1384 R v Secretary o f State for Transport ex parte Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana (1997) 107 
ILR 481,484-8.
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Corporate roles could be alternatively perceived as dismantling protectionist 
national law. Enforcing pre-existing or newly-emergent international 
obligations may create windows of economic opportunity for dominant firms 
where they also remove regulatory barriers to competition. However, 
temporary legal uncertainty detracts from commercial predictability. Legal 
certainty requires precise legislative drafting, a foreseeable application,
i ^ Q r
appropriate publication and an ascertainable entry into force. Legislative 
reforms ordinarily incidental to regulatory evolution reflect changes to 
underlying economic conditions and the predatory ambitions or protectionist 
instincts of national producers. Firms actively dismantle intergovernmental 
agreements intended to benefit rival commercial interests. For example, in 
1984 the US-based Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) petitioned the 
US government for greater access to Japanese markets. In 1986 the two States 
concluded a Semiconductor Trade Agreement. The SIA and the Electronic 
Industry Association of Japan then managed bilateral industry trade between 
them through the World Semiconductor Council which eventually grew to 
become an umbrella organisation for other national electronic industry 
associations. However, the Japanese administrative structure was successfully
1 ISAchallenged by the EC as WTO-inconsistent. The market access objectives 
of Japanese and American semiconductor firms are now realised through 
working groups composed of producers, users and government officers and
1 1Q7subject to oversight by accounting firms.
1385 Opel Austria GMBH v Council o f the EU  [1997] 2 ECR 39.
1386 WTO, Japan-Semiconductors BISD 35S/116 (1988).
1387 Japan-US, Arrangement concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products 25 ILM 1408 (1986) 
& 31 ILM 1074 (1992), paras 5, 9.
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To similar effect persistent corporate effort produced a declaration of GATT 
inconsistency for an agreement between EC, African, Caribbean and Pacific 
States intended to benefit small businesses.1388 EC regulatory changes 
occasioned by implementation of the Lome Convention disrupted the 
competitive conditions for US corporations supplying Latin American bananas 
to European markets through German distributorships. Germany 
unsuccessfully alleged discriminatory treatment before the ECJ. The US 
corporation concerned, having facilities outside the US and employing a 
largely non-American workforce, independently instituted ECJ 
proceedings.1390 The Lome Convention was successfully challenged by Latin 
American States through the WTO.1391 The US firm and the Hawaii Banana 
Industry Association also filed petitions with the US Trade Representative. 
Retaliatory duties imposed by the US upon EU producers encouraged the latter 
to lobby against the Convention within the EU. Although the US firm 
presently benefits from reformulated EC regulations and a redrafted Lome 
Convention, small Latin American firms suffer competitive disadvantages.
Corporations are not the only actors to prompt States towards greater 
enforcement. NGOs also participate in such dynamic regulatory situations. 
NGO perspectives may coincide or conflict with commercial interests. For 
example, NGOs successfully extended the prohibition upon importing shrimp
1388 Fourth African Caribbean Pacific (ACP)/EEC Convention (the ‘Lome Convention’) 1989 
£73 96(1990).
1389 EEC Regulation No 404/93 (1993) on the common organisation of the market in bananas 
(1993) OJEC L47, 1; C-280/93 Germany v Council o f the EU[ 1994] 1 ECR4973.
1390 C-233/90 & C-353/90 Chiquita Italia SpA v Italian Ministry o f Finance [1992] ECR 1- 
3713, para 29; C-276/93 Chiquita Banana Co BV v Council o f  the EC [1993] ECR 1-3345, 
para 13; C-469/93 Italian Ministry o f Finance v Chiquita Italia SpA [1995] ECR 1-4533, paras 
29, 35.
1391 WTO, Bananas supra n\ 191; EC Commission Reg No 2362/98 (1998) OJEC L293.
1392 Humane Society o f the US v Brown 920 FSupp 178 (USCIT 1996).
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or shrimp products wherever harvested without the use of commercial fishing 
technology protecting sea turtles.1393 The US unsuccessfully defended this 
embargo within the WTO against States who had not adopted or enforced 
national law requiring turtle excluder devices (TEDs). 1394 Acting
simultaneously the US and the National Fisheries Institute successfully 
challenged the enforcement jurisdiction of the US Court of International 
Trade. 1395 The US shrimp industry was originally concerned by the 
competitive implications of locally-mandated technology requirements. It 
subsequently promoted TEDs as an environmental protection standard and 
assisted the technology transfer efforts of the US government since they 
enjoyed the advantages of prior establishment.1396 NGOs in turn successfully 
challenged US government measures allowing shrimp imports without prior 
certification.1397
This pattern of retaliatory litigation alternating between national and 
international fora was repeated with respect to dolphin-safe fishing practices. 
US tuna processing companies enjoyed a similar role in national lawmaking, 
WTO dispute settlement and prompting the negotiation of conventional
1 7Q9agreements to maintain access to South Pacific fishing grounds. States are 
receptive to the protectionist pressures of powerful national constituencies,
1393 Earth Island Institute v Christopher 19 CIT 1461, 1479 (1995).
1394 WTO, US-Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R (1998), 
para 7.502 & WT/DS58/AB/R, para 187 (1998).
1395 Earth Island Institute v Albright 147 F 3d 1352 (Fed Cir 1998); Earth Island Institute v 
Christopher 948 F Supp 1062 (CIT 1996).
1396 Inter-American Convention for the Protection for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles 37 ILM 1246 (1998).
1397 Earth Island Institute v Daley, unreported USCIT 1999 Per Aquilino J Slip Op 99-32, 38.
1398 International Dolphin Conservation Act 1992 (US) 32 ILM 539 (1993); WTO, US- 
Restrictions on Imports o f Tuna (Tuna 1) 30 ILM 1594 (1991); Agreement for the Reduction of 
Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean 33 ILM 936 (1994).
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particularly domestic producers, whose commercial arguments are fused with 
national sovereignty and economic development. Corporations derive specific 
advantages from regulatory conditions formulated in conjunction with home 
States. Multilaterally-negotiated solutions to environmental conservation 
issues secure State participation and dilute the influence of national industries. 
It is more palatable for States to point to legal compliance with international 
conventions or decisions of international tribunals when implementing 
outcomes having unfavourable national consequences for specific interest 
groups.
NGOs in particular are concerned that firms can potentially limit the regulatory 
competence of States or impair democratic lawmaking processes. For example, 
Parliamentary dissolution and the consequential lapse of the requisite 
implementing legislation constituted a breach by India of the TRIPs 
transitional arrangements.1399 Government procurement laws with respect to 
Myanmar have been successfully challenged by firms within the US as 
impermissibly encroaching upon the exercise of foreign policy by the 
executive.1400 Human rights conditions within government contracts were 
deployed against South African apartheid. The North American legislation 
was also challenged by Japan and the EC within the WTO.1401
1399 WTO, India-Patent Protection supra w 1144.
1400 Massachusetts State Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies doing Business with 
or in Burma (Myanmar) Mass Gen Laws Ch 7 s22G-22M (1996); National Foreign Trade 
Council v Baker 26 F Supp 2d 287 (D Mass 1998); National Foreign Trade Council v Natsios 
38 ILM 1237 (1999) (US CA 1st Cir) ; Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 120 S Ct 
2228 (2000).
1401 WTO, US-Measure affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS88/3 & WT/DS95/3 
(1998).
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In aspiring to universalism, international law restricts the regulatory autonomy 
of States. 1402 Regulatory measures having ostensibly meritorious 
environmental objectives can impermissibly benefit local companies or afford 
unfavourable treatment to foreign enterprises.1403 States remain free to adopt 
whatever policy measures they wish provided they are consistent with the 
covered WTO Agreements to which they are Party.1404 National law is 
ordinarily amended or repealed to direct desired commercial behaviour.1405 
The ability of firms to challenge national law ‘from above’ through overly- 
rigid adherence to internationally-agreed trade-orientated regimes can unduly 
confine the regulatory discretion of States. Although the WTO suggests an 
apparent imbalance between corporate freedoms and State constraints, 
governments must first agree to initiate proceedings. Prominent examples 
where corporations apparently circumscribe the national regulatory 
competence of States are properly appreciated as ordinarily incidental to 
further regulatory refinement in response to underlying economic conditions. 
Regulatory evolution also becomes a complex process of multiple actors 
operating at national and international levels. States are understandably 
reluctant to permit greater corporate access to intergovernmental dispute 
settlement, particularly where legal outcomes nominally bind them only.
1402 WTO, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector 38 ILM 499 (1999).
1403 WTO, USA-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R 
(1996).
1404 WTO, US-Tax Treatment o f 'Foreign Sales Corporations’, WT/DS108/AB/R (2000) para 
179.
1405 IBRD & IMF v All America Cables & Radio Inc and Other Cable Companies (1955) 22 
ILR 705.
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Conclusions
Corporate enforcement activity is self-interestedly selective: competitive 
implications for commercial rivals are as influential as strict legal compliance 
by States. The multivariate tracks include resort to home States (the 
diplomatic protection model), direct action independent of home State 
participation to protect property rights (resort to national courts, arbitration and 
inter-corporate techniques) and furthering the implementation of operational 
policies and procedures within the framework of international organisations. 
In the negotiation of treaties States may insert dispute resolution provisions 
which enable corporate access to render their commitments more credible.
The origins of inter-State disputes are not limited to inter-commercial rivalries. 
Corporations are actively contributing to normative standards which 
circumscribe the permissible boundaries of State regulation and in that sense 
are ‘making’ international law. However, commercial resort to the procedural 
mechanisms at their disposal for enforcing international legal obligations is 
only part of a complex synergy of influences within processes productive of 
international law. In particular, transnational corporations and industry 
associations are driving greater interaction between national and international 
fora. That said, State consent remains evident throughout: judges are 
government-appointed agents, tribunals are State institutions and the contested 
law is distinctly ‘national’. Although their profile may be significant, firms 
only participate with the acquiescence, support or permission of States. Their 
conditions of participation and status (party to proceedings, third party
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intervener, amicus, observer or expert adviser) are left to be determined by 
States.
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Conclusions
Only States ‘make’ international law. Non-state actors are participating in 
legal processes in a manner qualitatively and quantitatively less than States. 
The contributions made by corporations to international lawmaking through 
commercial practice and politically organised activity have benign and malign 
impacts. This Chapter draws together the principal themes of earlier ones. It 
first assesses corporate contributions to international lawmaking and outlines 
the commercial motivations for doing so. It then considers whether these 
developments evidence a qualitative transformation of the corporate role 
within the international legal order. This raises the prospect of an asserted 
participatory right for non-State actors derived from the existing ‘rules of 
engagement’. If corporate influence is indeed increasing other questions arise 
such as the democratic deficit of non-State actors, the implications for 
sovereignty, particularly for developing States, and the potential for greater 
democratisation of international decision-making. Finally, this Chapter 
examines the appropriate corporate role when States fail to exercise their right 
and responsibility to regulate. Although an explanation of the lawmaking 
process is by no means straightforward and depends upon the particular actor, 
arena and claim being made, there is a general evolutionary movement which 
validates non-State actor contributions that traditional accounts discount.
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1 An Assessment o f Corporate Contributions to International Lawmaking.
International lawmaking is a more dynamic and complex interaction than the 
classical intergovernmental model suggests. Recognising corporate 
contributions to lawmaking does not subvert State authority. International 
legal doctrine already accepts that corporations can conclude contracts with 
States and initiate enforcement proceedings against them. Commercial 
contributions to lawmaking do not require the possession of full international 
legal personality. Contractual relationships are confined bilaterally and the 
creation of precedents enforceable against others remains consistent with State 
consent as expressed through State organs. Enforcing international arbitral 
awards is preconditioned by compatibility with national public policy.
The ICC acknowledges that States and intergovernmental organisations are the 
principal rule-setters.1406 However, business reserves the right to respond to 
and influence regulation either directly or through industry associations.1407 
One self-appointed corporate function is to urge reform where regulatory 
constraints threaten competitive employment.1408 This constitutes only half the 
picture. Corporations can bypass State structures altogether through resort to 
market techniques. The ICC independently codifies best commercial practice 
for the benefit of its members with a view to facilitating exchange. Firms also 
choose to establish processes and institutions which parallel intergovernmental 
ones. By this means corporations avoid the institutional accountability
1406 ICC, The Geneva Business Declaration: Statement at the Conclusion of the Geneva 
Business Dialogue, Paris, 1998.
1407 World Economic Forum/PWBLF, Global Corporate Citizenship: The Leadership 
Challenge for CEO’s and Boards, Geneva, 2002, 6, 10.
1408 CRT, The Critical Role of the Corporation in a Global Society, Caux, 1997.
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associated with direct participation and can reject outcomes which deviate 
from preferences.
International lawmaking as a process also warrants further clarification. 
Regulation may be used in a generic sense but regulatory objectives can vary: 
for example, law can be reactive (to adverse corporate behaviour), directive 
(guiding commercial practices towards desirable results) or facilitative 
(creating a supportive environment for market operations). So too can 
corporate contributions to lawmaking be ‘law destroying’ or ‘law creating’. 
The former includes the circumstance where national law is dismantled from 
inside or outside the State (for example, through resort to national courts or 
international tribunals) or where legislative proposals are abandoned on 
account of corporate influence. The latter includes attempts to render national 
legal models universally applicable (for example, by extending the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act internationally or applying the strict intellectual property 
protection of US law through TRIPs).
States have acknowledged the substantive contributions made by non-State 
actors to international law: the procedural rules explicitly permit NGO and 
corporate participation to enrich deliberations and provide potentially useful 
information. States may also become dependent upon their expertise or 
subsequent implementing role to make admission to intergovernmental 
proceedings inevitable. The impact made by non-State actors depends upon 
reputations for reliability free from parochial concerns, reasonable demands, 
flexible compromise and credible empirical evidence. A cacophony of voices
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from equipotent but diametrically-opposed non-State actors could create a 
tendency to regulatory inertia. However, corporate participation is guided by 
self-interest and not uniformly observable across all issue areas. NGO 
participation is similarly topic-specific. Non-State actor contributions to 
improving the international lawmaking process strengthen the participatory 
claims of others and NGOs and firms take advantage of each others 
breakthroughs. Indeed the Energy and Biodiversity Initiative of Chapter Two 
illustrated that corporations and NGOs may act collaboratively through 
partnerships to influence regulatory development, market conditions and 
commercial practices. If these are several conclusions to be drawn from the 
thesis, how far should corporate participation extend ?
1.1 Refining the Arguments for and Against Corporate Inclusion.
From the perspective of States, corporate contributions can enhance regulatory 
effectiveness and minimise unintended consequences. Corporations offer 
financial resources, technical expertise, management experience and 
information concerning the production process in return for access to 
intergovernmental fora. Regulation which is unable to keep abreast of 
technological changes or market conditions (regulatory lag) risks obsolescence. 
Inclusion of commercial actors and proposals may lead to stronger 
commitments, accurate and economically-viable solutions, a greater sense of 
ownership and less expensive enforcement effort. Regulatory processes 
benefit from the information-gathering resources of non-State actors and the 
ease of dealing with fewer parties. Corporations are in a position to suggest
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economic prerequisites to cost-effective implementation. Corporations 
promote themselves as the most direct and disciplined route into the 
marketplace.1409 Information exchange minimises the likelihood of corporate- 
State conflicts or the adversarial postures associated with unilateral decision­
making. Deliberations are enriched through divergent opinions and 
experiences. Trade associations for example can provide States with a 
straightforward means of recruiting experts.1410 Consensus-building is one 
means for bridging gaps between regulation and commercial practices.1411 
Inclusion could eliminate informal attempts to influence the lawmaking 
process which currently occur without proper accountability.
On the other hand, several arguments may be marshalled from the perspective 
of States to justify continued exclusion. Participation can confuse choices, 
hamper the search for common ground, over-crowd agendas or fora and 
distract attention. Legal activity by one industrial sector engenders offsetting 
effort by others. 1412 Intergovernmental decision-making could become 
protracted, delayed or distorted. Potential breaches of confidentiality could 
inhibit the frankness of intergovernmental exchange and erode the privacy 
required for sensitive decision-making. From the commercial perspective, the 
transaction costs of participation including collecting information could be 
prohibitive, the reward may not justify the effort and informal bargaining with 
States may offer more confidentiality. An industry consensus may be difficult
1409 BIAC, Civil Society: Striking a Balance, Paris, 1999.
1410IFPMA, Registration of Medicines and Harmonisation, Geneva, 1997, 3.
1411 Wagner G.A., ‘Likes and Dislikes in International Law: The Company’ (1986) 33 NILR 
227, 228.
1412 Cohen S.D., The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles. 
Problems and Proposals for Reform. Praeger Publishers, Connecticut, 5th Ed, 2000, 132-4.
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to identify and trade organisations can limit the scope for expressing 
alternative commercial opinions. Consultation which amounts to window- 
dressing improves the economic credentials of a political decision-making 
process in which firms may have no substantive influence. It is more difficult 
for firms to distance themselves where they have participated in regulatory 
design.
Lawmaking could become an extenuated competitive exercise which 
aggravates the responsibility of States to balance disparate interests. 
Lawmaking serves an important mediating function between the different 
proposals offered by corporations for prospective adoption as law. 
Corporations espouse a narrow, self-interested vision of law. They seek 
supportive frameworks which further their market position but disadvantages 
rivals and stimulates commercial activity but preserves market privileges. 
States are expected to introduce only such regulatory controls as necessary to 
protect national welfare (including national industry) and corporations will not 
object to discriminatory treatment when they benefit from it. A State’s 
regulatory responsibilities include administering legislation in a fair, uniform 
and non-discriminatory manner. Lawmaking as a bargaining process means 
that some sought-after elements will be granted and others rejected as States 
spread gains and losses between different sectors. States will attempt to 
formulate regulatory frameworks which are beneficial (or at least not unduly 
disadvantageous) for all business enterprises.
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1.2 Commercial Practices and International Regulatory Development.
The commercial operations of transnational corporations affirm international 
law’s claim to universality. National standards are harmonised and regulatory 
discretion restrained in the elimination of transaction costs and trade barriers. 
Corporations also affirm the specificity of national law: national law may be 
the source of competitive advantage within the international marketplace or a 
protectionist shelter. Firms have constructed competitive advantages in light 
of environmental circumstances and national regulation. For example, strict 
Japanese air pollution regulation positioned Japanese firms as the global 
market leaders in this domain and the US industry’s competitiveness in 
hazardous waste is also attributed to US toxic regulations.1413 On a grander 
scale international legal regimes such as emissions trading replicate the 
national legal systems of developed States. On the other hand, regulation is a 
technical barrier to trade where States employ national law to match the 
strengths of local producers. The ICC has accordingly proposed collaborative 
arrangements in designing international trade regimes to avoid protectionist 
policies.1414
Regulation is linked with commercial practices in several ways. First, States 
exercise their right to regulate in response to commercial behaviour. 
Corporations are catalysts which spark chains of causation which culminate in
1413 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Secretariat Note on Environmental Services, WTO 
Doc S/C/W/46 (1998), paras 19, 25, 39.
1414 ICC, ‘Business and the Global Economy’, Statement on behalf of World Business to the 
Heads of State and Governments Attending the Birmingham Summit, Paris, 1998; ICC, 
‘World Business Priorities for a New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations’, Policy 
Statement for Submission to the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade 
Organisation, Paris, 1999.
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international law. Treaties can be the result of adverse activity such as 
anticompetitive behaviour. The State practice constitutive of custom is 
influenced by foreign direct investment, industry mobility and threatened 
withdrawal. States offer effective territorial control over natural resources and 
their regulatory authority to adjust labour, environmental or investment 
protection standards at the point of entry. Conversely, South African apartheid 
illustrated the difficulties of dislodging corporations at the point of exit from 
the State when national regulatory conditions offer an international competitive 
advantage, notwithstanding the violation of international human rights law.
Second, States may adopt field-tested industry standards as law. In this respect 
commercial practice leads regulatory development. Embedding the practice of 
market leaders within regulation and subsequent enforcement thereof against 
inefficient rivals contributes to corporate consolidation. This has been 
illustrated with respect to technical product standards formulated by the ISO 
and the production of alternatives to ozone-depleting substances. Increasing 
environmental regulation is moreover associated with greater merger activity 
within the waste disposal industry either as a target or acquiring firm.1415 
Third, corporations act as are normative bridges between States. Firms can be 
conduits for national standards originating within home States, internalised as 
corporate policy and transmitted through global operations. This process of 
normative decomposition, reassembling and redistribution is driven by 
economic efficiency and encounters allegations of neo-imperialism. Although 
such a ‘spill-over’ effect is evident with respect to management practices,
1415 Cooke A.W.C., ‘Merger activity in the waste diposal industry: the impact and the 
implications of the Environmental Protection Act’ (2000) 32(6) Applied Economics 749.
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accounting techniques or marketing, labour practices and possibly technology 
transfer are contrary examples where transnational corporations are prepared to 
exploit regulatory differences between States.
The eventual outcome is that production inputs (labour and natural resources) 
tend to be subject to national law whereas outputs (trade in finished goods and 
services, investment protection standards) are subject to international law. For 
example, the Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe 
(UNICE) suggests that European industrial relations regulation should promote 
best practice rather than compel harmonisation. 1416 Corporations also 
emphasise that the choice of appropriate technology (for example, to combat 
climate change) is a matter for national governments to determine. 
Commercial technology can be a regulatory driver (for example, mining the 
deep seabed, climate change or genetically modified organisms1417) as much as 
regulation can be an engine to innovative product development (for example, 
encouraging alternatives to ozone-depleting substances).
1.3 Evidence o f the Corporate Consciousness and International Lawmaking.
Industry calls upon States to establish the necessary enabling regulatory 
framework to support efficient commercial operations. The norms which 
underpin market transactions include contractual integrity (good faith 
adherence to commitments freely entered into), market contestability (freedom
1416 UNICE, Releasing Europe’s Employment Potential: Companies’ Views on European 
Social Policy Beyond 2000, Brussels, 2000, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14.
1417 Nelkin D., Sands P. & Stewart R.B., ‘The International Challenge o f Genetically Modified 
Organism Regulation’ (2000) 8 NYU Environmental LJ 523, 527-8.
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of entry and exit, the ability to trade freely) and legal certainty (adequate 
property rights protection). Intergovernmental organisations envisage legal 
systems which facilitate commercial activity by lowering transaction costs, 
reducing commercial risks and combating corruption.1418 States are expected 
to develop in consultation with industry a mix of economic instruments 
including market incentives.1419 Furthermore, market solutions apply beyond 
the point of regulation. Regulation should not proscribe a particular 
production process and technological transfer cannot be compelled. State 
intervention into the marketplace should be transparent, objective, reversible, 
non-discriminatory, proportional, flexible and technologically neutral.
Most prominent are repeated calls for a ‘level competitive playing field’ 
whereby competitive differentials between firms are limited to efficiency 
criteria. Firms advocate against ‘improper’ market practices so that no single 
firm has an opportunity to realise ‘unfair’ sources of competitive advantage 
which are denied to others operating within the same industry. Chapter One 
for example examined how the International Organisation of Employers 
encouraged States to ratify and implement the ILO Convention on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour. The level playing field concept can drag market 
leaders back to a common standard as much as lift market laggers. It can also 
mask de facto asymmetries enjoyed by well-established firms and enable 
further consolidation. Applied to lawmaking a level playing field implies 
equality of opportunity for all firms to influence regulatory development.
1418 IBRD, From Plan to Market: World Development Report, Washington DC, 1996, 86.
1419 UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), ICC/WBCSD Submission, 
Responsible Entrepreneurship, Background Paper No 1, Sixth Session, 1998.
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A typology of corporate motivations for contributing to international 
lawmaking derived from the research would be as follows. First, firms seek to 
create international business opportunities. For example, the case study on 
climate change illustrated how corporations were shaping the legal regime to 
favour their unique specialisation. Petroleum companies were attempting to 
prolong resort to fossil fuels, the renewable energy and nuclear industries were 
encouraging alternative energy sources, the forest industry was promoting the 
virtues of carbon sinks and IETA was driving the market for emissions trading. 
Regional and international trade regimes facilitate cross border exchange and 
negotiations for the law of the sea, outer space and biological diversity 
illustrated commercial interest in exploiting novel sources of natural resources. 
Second, firms seek to constrain the national regulatory competence of States 
by encouraging their submission to multilateral disciplines. Trade agreements 
for example may require regulatory administration in a uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner, prior notification of legislative changes and refraining 
from enforcement until publication.1420 Concession contracts, the multilateral 
agreement on investment or developing the law with respect to regulatory 
takings which qualify as expropriation illustrate attempts to protect 
investments and property rights. Third, corporations wish to minimise 
regulatory developments which would hold them more accountable.1421 Firms 
seek to circumscribe prospective international policy concerning corporate 
legal responsibility with respect to environmental pollution (for example, the 
question of liability and compensation for damage resulting from
1420 Art X, GATT, supra »342.
1421 Dobbin M., The Myth of the Good Citizen: Democracy under the Rule of Big Business. 
Stoddart Publishers, Toronto, 1998,43.
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transboundary movements of hazardous waste) which may constitute a 
precursor to national regulation.
International action is ultimately directed at influencing national regulation and 
market conditions. Commercial contributions are directed at domestic 
audiences since peculiarly national interests are relatively diffuse at the 
international level. Firms are more familiar with the applicable national 
processes and operational constraints such as access to resources.1422 Chapter 
Three observed that trade associations wish to enhance their prestige and 
recruit new members by promoting the extent of their influence over 
international trade negotiations. Participation provides greater assurances of a 
reasonably predictable outcome, increased certainty with respect to corporate 
rights and obligations at the national level and the business confidence to 
undertake investment activity. Legal stability need not be absolute since 
greater reward is the benefit of assuming greater risk. However, firms are 
subject to fiduciary responsibilities to avoid speculative investment. Borders 
are taken seriously since they can be subject to different jurisdictional controls 
and political risks.
Commercial enterprises choose whether, when and where to contribute to 
international lawmaking. Compliance-orientated firms seek to influence 
national regulation, strategic management firms participate in national 
policymaking and so-called sustainable development managers participate in
1422 Schmidheiny S./WBCSD, Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on 
Development and the Environment. MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1992, 24.
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international standard-setting.1423 Firms participate where States are clients, 
engaged in trade, have a long-term commercial vision or are the likely targets 
of regulatory measures. Firms can free-ride upon the contributions of others 
and refer to precedents established elsewhere in direct negotiations with States. 
Small and medium sized enterprises are more likely to coordinate action 
through a trade association. On the other hand, it is anomalous that trade 
associations should be permitted to make legal contributions given that one of 
their stated objectives is to deter unfavourable regulation.
Different techniques have also been used with varying success. The different 
modalities for corporate participation at Conferences of the Parties were 
discussed in Chapter Three. Many of these only enable the expression of 
official positions within a compressed time frame. Supporting secretariats 
enables access to those most informed about international regimes but their 
decision-making capacity may be extremely limited. Membership of or advice 
to national delegations depends on the degree of support from States: ongoing 
professional relationships at the national level and a coincidence of interests 
become relevant. Lobbying is not subject to procedural rules or transparency 
requirements. Observer status suggests the likely direction of government 
policy, ensures prior notification of intended regulatory measures and provides 
a sufficient lead-time to adjust commercial operations or undertake lobbying.
Economic information is the principal platform upon which corporations assert 
an entitlement to be included within intergovernmental decision-making.
1423 UNCTAD, Environmental Management in Transnational Corporations: Report on the 
Benchmark Corporate Environmental Survey, UN Doc ST/CTC/149 (1993), 167-77.
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While the ‘technological intelligentsia’ are assumed to inject rational scientific 
production methods they also effectively delineate the technical boundaries to 
legal agendas.1424 As observers firms can secure some national information 
which may be deployed during contractual negotiations or enforcement 
proceedings and regulatory weaknesses may be exploited in commercial 
operations. Firms also lose control over information voluntarily shared with 
States and which may be used against them by State enterprises or to perfect 
regulatory regimes. Information exchange will therefore be imperfect since 
firms will adopt measures to protect confidential business information 
including withholding its disclosure.
Of the different modalities for corporate participation the firm-specific factors 
include corporate strategy, operational specialisation, resource commitment, 
degree of control over the process, predictability of outcome, cost of 
alternatives, litigious disposition and reputational implications. Corporations 
can also choose the battleground. Institution-specific factors include 
conditions of access, participatory entitlements, transparency, receptivity of 
incumbents, time-frame for decision-making, opportunities for political 
arbitrariness, effectiveness, enforcement prospects and potential liability. The 
OECD for example is relatively corporate-friendly: the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee enjoys advisory status, there is an obligation upon the 
Council to take into account business submissions and the membership 
consists of industrialised States. Relative to other international organisations 
the OECD has been a reasonably effective platform for corporate contributions
1424 Slouka Z.J., ‘International Law-Making: A View from Technology’ in Onuf N.G. (Ed), 
Law-Making in the Global Community. Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 1982, 131, 168-9.
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to international lawmaking. On the one hand the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises partly deterred the need for the UN Code of Conduct 
for Transnational Corporations and the OECD readily espouses the merits of 
private voluntary initiatives as an alternative to formal regulation. On the other 
hand the OECD could not immunise the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
from criticism and eventual failure. The receptivity of incumbents to 
commercial considerations also explains why there is relatively less corporate 
lobbying of institutions such as the IMF or World Bank.
The ability of corporations to influence international legal outcomes varies for 
several reasons. First, the relationship between firms and States is context- 
specific and evolves over time. Regulation inevitably evolves through 
feedback loops which reflect underlying economic cycles notwithstanding 
attempts by States to maintain an acceptable degree of order and stability. 
Second, firm-specific factors influence the extent of corporate success. Each 
corporation has distinct capabilities which are manifested by different power 
positions within different markets. The relatively chaotic and sporadic 
business impact results from inter-corporate competition. Corporations 
threaten competitors and respond to threats. This competition may be elevated 
into intergovernmental conflicts for resolution by international tribunals. 
Questions of public and private international law are woven together: for 
example, authoritative determinations of territorial control are preconditions to 
the validity and recognition of fishing or petroleum concessions. It is 
inevitable in view of the international judicial infrastructure that fundamental 
issues of international law such as economic self-determination are driven by
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commercial agendas and left to be resolved in an ad hoc fashion. Legal 
precedents under international economic law are accordingly the product of 
attempts by firms to realise market ambitions and expropriate market share 
from rivals. Third, success depends upon unpredictable external factors 
(political willingness, public opinion and the reactions of NGOs and the 
media) such that there is no single causal factor and corporations may be 
uncertain whether strategies succeeded. For example, attempts to introduce the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment failed at the peak of an economic cycle 
and the chlorofluorocarbon industry was content to challenge scientific opinion 
but not consumer perceptions.
Heterogeneity explains the difficulty of identifying a uniform business opinion. 
The closest approximation to a centralised coordinator is the ICC but since its 
abilities can be hamstrung by national committees it is left to ensure that 
commercial perspectives are espoused at a level of generality. For example, 
the ICC invokes the public-private distinction to protect confidential 
information, maintain control over production processes, preserve property 
rights and ensure contractual privity. It also argues that designing regulation in 
consultation with firms enables industry to adapt to market changes and 
minimise disruption to employment, competitiveness and economic growth. 
Finally, uncertain governmental decision-making today can unsettle long-term 
investment planning. Changes of government can herald different political 
agendas which international law may be able to confine.
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2. The Position of Corporations in the International Legal Order.
Commercial actors act through, collaboratively and in competition with 
political ones. Commercial activities undermine the classical conception of the 
State, extenuate economic disparities between them or benefit from the 
dominant politico-economic order.1425 Chapter One illustrated that new forms 
of trading have consistently disturbed established political orders and novel 
political power can similarly destroy old economic orders. It also illustrated 
that commercial entities enhance the resource and knowledge base of political 
ones.
Commercial contributions to international law in the contemporary era are a 
continuation of historical developments. States continue to conclude treaties 
which provide commercial rights to corporations and firms continue to 
implement treaty provisions de facto. States have always been concerned to 
protect national industry from being undermined by rivals who have not 
invested the same effort in building the market and have no interest in orderly 
trade management. This rationale partly explains why colonial trading 
companies were afforded a monopoly and why developed States are reluctant 
to compel the transfer of technology to developing States. Legitimate firms 
rely upon States to eliminate illegitimate operators (formerly market 
‘interlopers’) and firms which are merely fronts for improper purposes (such as 
criminal activity including terrorism or smuggling in pharmaceuticals or 
ozone-depleting substances). The increasing international regulation of
1425 Gilpin R., ‘The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting 
Perspectives’ (1976) 70(1) Am Pol Sci R 184.
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transnational organised crime such as the 2000 Convention and its associated 
Protocols as well as continuing initiatives to combat corruption are part of such 
efforts.
The colonial trading companies exercised extensive lawmaking power to 
facilitate the expansion of empire. The history of the East India Company 
illustrates that firms wish to offload unduly burdensome administrative 
responsibilities to States when bureaucratic decision-making diverts resources 
away from the pursuit of profit. Public functions also entail additional 
liabilities. The State was also prepared to assume control when corporate 
policies could not prevent corruption or disorderly conduct. Historical trends 
since the eighteenth century also suggest that private participation has drawn 
backwards and the role of the State, far from receding in an era of 
‘globalisation’, continues to be asserted. This is particularly true given the 
growth of intergovernmental organisations where potential corporate impacts 
could be expected to be magnified. However, private sector activity is 
fragmented between multiple specialist fora and subject to detailed procedural 
rules or proliferating informal practices. Individual firms concentrate their 
efforts under the overall coordination of umbrella groups such as the ICC. As 
observed in Chapter One, the clearest example of corporate contributions to 
lawmaking -  the ILO -  is also the oldest. Furthermore, the International Trade 
Organisation contemplated greater corporate participation than the WTO 
(although arguably the same result has been achieved progressively) and on 
account of political differences between States the UN has taken half a century
427
to reach a level comparable to non-State actor participation at the League of 
Nations.
Agenda 21 observed that business and industry, including transnational 
corporations and their representative organisations, should be full participants 
in the implementation and evaluation of activities related to it.1426 However, 
corporations are too wedded to national legal systems to which they owe their 
existence to be ‘full participants’ within the international legal order and are 
yet to demonstrate a solidarity transcending nationalism and corporatism. The 
ICC attempts to create an international commercial perspective but as noted 
above can be hamstrung by national committees. National corporate 
champions continue to collaborate with the prevailing political elite within 
home States. Corporate sincerity can be questionable and behavioural 
modifications cosmetic. In particular, corporations do not accept standards for 
themselves which they seek from States. Participation in lawmaking is a 
narrower facet of public participation in governmental decision-making whose 
characteristic attributes include transparency, openness, disclosure, 
compromise and procedural fairness.
Nevertheless, the increasing ‘muscle flexing’ of non-State actors is challenging 
basic assumptions of the international legal order including the degree of State 
control over international lawmaking. It is increasingly difficult to justify 
exclusion from the lawmaking process simply because an entity is not a
1426 Agenda 21, para 30(1), Report of UNECD, supra «28.
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State.1427 This is especially the case where instruments such as the Kyoto 
Protocol contemplate a ‘privatisation of implementation’, such as private 
entities participating under the clean development mechanism. Other evidence 
from Chapter Four suggests that the corporate role has undergone a qualitative 
transformation. For example, the definition of expropriation was widened at 
corporate insistence in the Metalclad decision and NAFTA dispenses with the 
requirement to exhaust local remedies. Chapter One noted the recognition of 
business and industry as a ‘major group’ alongside other NGOs within the 
Commission on Sustainable Development and Chapter Three observed the 
increasing frequency with which General Assembly resolutions referred to the 
private sector during the preparatory processes for international conferences. 
Industry is also more willing to self-organise at the international level through 
politically organised business groups, trade associations and ad hoc corporate 
coalitions rather than individual firms passively channelling contributions 
through State mechanisms.
These developments are insufficient to qualify corporations as full subjects of 
international law. Corporations clearly have a degree of international legal 
personality which encompasses for example locus standi before ICSID 
Tribunals and the opportunity to submit amicus briefs to WTO Panels. 
NAFTA illustrates that even a limited procedural capacity including the right 
to independently initiate dispute settlement mechanisms can have a profound 
impact upon the substantive content of international law. On the other hand 
commercial rights continue to emanate from bilateral not multilateral legal
1427 Sands P., ‘Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law’ (2001) 33 IntL 
& Politics 527, 541-2, 547, 555.
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instruments. Corporations remain dependent upon legal mechanisms conferred 
by the will and agreement of States notwithstanding their prominence in 
international affairs. By contributing to international law the nominally 
subservient corporate legal personality of the national sphere is not aspiring to 
equality with States on the international plane.1428 Commercial contributions 
could equally be characterised as ultimately self-regulatory. If non-State actors 
are assumed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of international law then they are 
simply contributing to legal standards which they themselves expect to apply 
through governmental mediums. Alternatively, corporate contributions could 
be perceived as ultimately benefiting States. Procedural mechanisms which 
contemplate non-State actor participation are springboards for enforcing 
international law against States. Such a mechanism promotes the further 
implementation of conventions and moreover enables States to implement 
decisions unfavourable to industry shielded by the decisions of international 
tribunals.
A transformation of the corporate position within the international legal order 
is also contingent upon the assumption of proper accountability. States have 
excluded the topic of non-State actor responsibility from the International Law 
Commission’s long term programme of work on the basis of classical 
definitions of international organisation. 1429 The International Law 
Association has similarly confined its study of international organisational 
accountability to the entitlements of third parties including corporations:
1428 Cp Hofmann R. & Geissler N. (Eds), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International 
Law. Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1999.
1429 International Law Commission, First Report on Responsibility of International 
Organisations, UN Doc A/CN.4/532 (2003), paras 21-2; ILC, Report of the 55th Session, UN 
Doc A/58/10 (2003), 38-45.
430
participation in decision-making, procedural fairness, access to information or 
remedies and dispute settlement for non-State actors are several of its principal 
concerns.1430 It may be presumed that formally acknowledging corporate 
participation in international lawmaking would enhance corporate 
accountability. This has not been validated within the context of 
intergovernmental institutions.1431 For example, a corporate presence within 
the ILO encourages States to take implementation more seriously but attempts 
to shift the focus to employers are prevented by reference to organisational 
mandates. Corporations also deny the extent of their influence, characterise 
their role as advisory and point to the permissive terms of their participation.
2.1 The Terms o f Non-State Actor Participation in International Lawmaking.
The Introductory Chapter referred to contemporary developments within 
Europe seeking to improve lawmaking processes. The General Principles and 
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties with the EC are a 
political commitment to undertake best efforts at cooperation with non-State 
actors. They are constructed on the premise that formalising participatory 
conditions is desirable. The objective was to politically recognise NGO roles 
but not establish procedural rights.1432 The EC was concerned that a ‘right’ 
implies an entitlement that can be enforced. Recognising a droit
1430 International Law Association, Final Report on Accountability of International 
Organisations, Berlin, 2004.
1431 Obradovic D., ‘Accountability of Interest Groups in the Union Lawmaking Process’ in 
Craig P. & Harlow C., Lawmaking in the European Union. Kluwer Law International, London, 
1998, 354, 383.
1432 White Paper on European Governance, Handling the Process of Producing and 
Implementing Community Rules, Report of Working Group on Consultation and Participation 
of Civil Society, 2001, 5, 12-13, 17.
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participatif could open the door to judicial review in the event that the right 
had not been fulfilled or intergovememntal responses were considered 
unsatisfactory. The Commission should consult widely before proposing 
legislation and wherever appropriate publish consultation documents.1433 
‘Relevant’ parties must have the opportunity to express their opinions1434 and 
‘interested parties’ the opportunity to interact with experts.1435 The European 
Parliament observed that consultative mechanims could only ever supplement 
and never replace the procedures and decisions of legislative bodies which 
possess democratic legitimacy.1436
Politically organised buisness groups and individual firms contributed to the 
formulation of these standards. The American Chamber of Commerce 
supported greater transparency in consultative processes. 1437 The 
Confederation of British Industry called for an unambiguous commitment to 
use regulation as a last resort.1438 UNICE urged the Commission to consult 
differently depending on the subject-matter and observed that industry requires 
time to consult with members to produce consolidated contributions.1439
1433 Art 9, Protocol No 7 to the EC Treaty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.
1434 EC Communication, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue-general 
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, 
COM(2002), 704 Final, 17, 19.
1435 EC Communication, The collection and use of expertise by the Commission: Principles 
and Guidelines for improving the knowledge base for better policies, COM(2002) 713 Final, 4.
1436 European Parliament Resolution on the White Paper on Governance, A5-0399/2001.
1437 The EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce, Response to the European 
Commission Communication Consultation Document, Brussels, 2002, 1.
1438 Confederation of British Industry, Response to Commission Consultation Towards a 
Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue, 2002, para 9.
1439 UNICE, Comments on Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue, 2002, 
paras 5, 9, 16.
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With these developments in mind, how should the modalities for non-State 
actor participation be formulated at the international level ? Do they lead to 
any entitlement in terms of interaction, co-operation, consultation or merely 
attendance ? Participation may be defined as opportunities to shape decision­
making in accordance with democractic principles whereas consultation 
enables those affected by decision-making to express their opinions at the 
earliest possible stage but with no guarantee that account will be taken of the 
views expressed.1440 Should the exercise of a participatory entitlement be 
preconditioned in any way ?
The precise nature of the participatory claim sought to be asserted by non-State 
actors and accepted by States can be elusive. For example, trade agreements 
envisage opportunities for comment, access to remedies and inclusion within 
national advisory committees. 1441 Alternatively they may contemplate 
consultation with private experts at national levels.1442 The status of non-State 
actors may be consultative (ad hoc or permanent and either general or 
differentiated), advisory or observer. Permanent observer status could involve 
relatively greater recognition than consultative status. Various entitlements 
attaching to observer status include attendance at formal and occasionally 
informal meetings, making oral interventions or written submissions upon 
invitation and accessing unrestricted documentation. A right to be consulted
1440 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on Organised Civil Society and 
European Governance: the Committee’s contribution to the drafting of the White Paper, CES 
535/2001, 5.
1441 Eg Arts 1, 4, 6, 17, 38 Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Co-operation 36 ILM 
1193 (1997); Arts 3, 6, 15, 40 Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Co-operation 36 ILM 1213 
(1997).
1442 Art 11(2), Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures & Art 14, Annex 2, 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra «342.
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prior to decision-making is very different to merely observing decision-making 
as it occurs. On the other hand, the obligations for non-State actors include 
confidentiality (associated with appointment to national delegations) or 
submitting quadrennial reports to ECOSOC. These conditions may be subject 
to ‘soft’ enforcement by States: the risk of withdrawing opportunities for 
access in the event of bad faith is one means of keeping corporations in line.
It may be concluded that the terms of non-State actor participation in 
international lawmaking are formulated in several ways. First, the possibility 
of delivering opinions and receiving answers without calling into question 
decision-making powers is effectively a right to freedom of expression. For 
example, the European Parliament has emphasized ‘the importance of a 
general principle...proclaiming the right of every citizen and every 
representative organisation to draw up and promote their opinions and to 
receive replies directly or indirectly, without that right implying direct 
participation in decision-making’.1443 Second, a ‘right to participate’ could in 
practice be a right to consultation prior to decision-making. This would 
require identifying who is entitled to be consulated and in what manner. Third, 
the participatory right may amount to procedural fairness: an opportunity to 
submit views, have concerns taken into consideration or to obtain reasons for 
decisions.1444 A procedural fairness foundation entails that other entities 
should enjoy opportunities to respond to the opinions of others. The Aarhus 
Convention for example contemplates a notice-and-comment procedure.
1443 European Parliament, Resolution adopted on the basis of the report on participation of 
citizens and social players in the European Union’s institutional system, A4-0338/96.
1444 De Schutter O., ‘Europe in Search of its Civil Society’ (2002) 8(2) European L J  198, 208, 
211.
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States Parties ‘shall’ ‘to the extent possible’ ‘a) publish in advance any such 
measure that it proposes to adopt; and b) provide interested persons and Parties 
a reasonable opportunity to comment on such proposed measures.’1445
Chapter Three concluded that the privileges currently enjoyed by non-State 
actors at Conferences of the Parties as specified within the applicable 
procedural rules falls short of a right to participate per se. They also fall short 
of a right to be consulted on proposed international regimes. States continue to 
dominate procedural and substantive decision-making. Non-State actors are 
invited to participate within intergovernmental fora where as a matter of form 
they merely enjoy the opportunity to provide input into deliberations. The risk 
is that non-State actors become disillusioned and lose interest where the 
marrow of their contributions is extracted and their efforts are left 
unrecognised.
The obstacles to an emergent right involve firstly questions of admission or 
access and secondly the conditions for participation. The former includes the 
criteria for accreditation which specify desired non-State actor attributes 
(particularly the questions of relevance and competence), the fact that they 
‘may’ participate ‘as observers’ and the possibility of objection by States. 
That said, non-State actors duly accredited with ECOSOC or through 
attendance at previous intergovernmental conferences could be said to possess 
a legitimate expectation of ongoing admission. Once admitted the formal 
conditions of participation are relatively well-settled. The opportunity for non-
1445 Art 4(2), Aarhus Convention, supra n29.
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State actors to make oral and written statements at Conferences of the Parties 
and the terms thereof was found to be common to the procedural rules analysed 
in Chapter Three. The enabling framework established by States is permissive: 
it is left to non-State actors whether to resort to it. For example, corporations 
do not utilise human rights enforcement procedures although there is nothing 
which legally precludes them from doing so. Furthermore, the prospects for a 
participatory right must be diminished since there is no correlative duty upon 
States to take the suggestions of non-State actors into account.
This is not to say that non-State actors do not seek to influence the conditions 
of their participation. Non-State actors have contributed during preparatory 
processes to the formulation of procedural rules with respect to their 
participation and attendance at Special Sessions of the General Assembly, 
World Summits and international conferences. Their efforts have also 
encouraged interest in regulating the receipt of amicus submissions before the 
WTO. At the same time corporations do not agitate for change when the 
present system serves commercial interests. The limited opportunities for 
formal contributions to Conferences of the Parties encourage resort to informal 
methods (side events, exhibits, receptions) where resource disparities and 
familiarity with the system come into play. They can also prompt international 
dispute settlement without being bound by the outcome.
The procedural rules reflect the entirety of what States are formally prepared to 
grant non-State actors. However, as an essential platform for legitimate 
participation procedural rules are frequently exceeded in practice. Non-State
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actor participation is heavily dependent upon the discretion of States or State 
agents. This applies to decisions of secretariats for accreditation purposes, 
WTO Panels for the receipt of amicus briefs or the chairpersons of subsidiary 
bodies at treaty conferences. Informal and innovative processes such as panel 
discussions and roundtable sessions are inherently volatile and there is concern 
that these participatory mechanisms are reversible.1446
Structural revision should not simply afford de jure recognition to de facto 
situations. Participatory conditions are unlikely to replicate the ILO model of 
equality between States and non-State actors. The remaining approaches 
include observer status, consultation and the creation of expert groups or 
advisory committees. The modalities for non-State actor participation have to 
balance efficiency, effectiveness and transparency. Openness and 
accountability are also linked: a formal transparent framework could bring out 
into the open informal activities such as lobbying and increase organisational 
accountability. Effective decision-making is influenced by practical logistical 
considerations and managing a cumbersome number of participants. 
Additional questions requiring resolution include elite capture, corruption, 
information disclosure, impartial data, conflicts of interests, expenditure limits 
and budgetary independence.
Inter-institutional comparisons of mechanisms for engaging with non-State
actors demonstrate a wide degree of diversity. Comparisons across the human
rights monitoring committees, trade fora and environmental institutions
1446 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Public Participation in the 
International Trading System: Accreditation Schemes and Other Arrangements for Public 
Participation in International Fora, Geneva, 1999, 5.
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confirm that analysis of non-State actor contributions should proceed on a 
case-by-case basis. The modalities for participation vary significantly in each 
fora. For example, the WTO actively encourages resort to national processes, 
the UNFCCC permits access to open-ended contact groups and CITES 
contemplates the most sophisticated procedures. Furthermore, non-State actors 
have been permitted to make oral interventions in relation to specific agenda 
items in meetings of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies but not during plenary 
debates of the Conference of the Parties. Diversity also characterises the 
practice of UN secretariats and those of the Specialised Agencies.
A one-size-fits-all approach which first codifies the terms of non-State actor 
participation and then applies these modalities uniformly across a range of 
institutions is not appropriate or desirable. Indeed, such a prospect may be 
impossible given the necessity for treaty amendment. First, non-State actors 
possess different competencies or specialities and their interests are topic- 
specific. The nature of their participation ranges from policy development to 
project implementation. Participatory mechanisms would have to reflect their 
mutating nature and changing numbers of active participants as well as respect 
their wish to retain room for manoeuvre. Second, intergovernmental 
organisations have undergone different historical trajectories, utilise different 
traditions and employ variable operational requirements. The World Bank, for 
example, engages with ‘development NGOs’, a pseudonym for the private 
sector but potentially also a means of distinguishing between firms. The 
fragmented architecture and complex nature of the international system ensures 
that no single interest can routinely dominate decision-making. The
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compromise between standardising procedures across all institutions or 
tailoring them to particular organisations is to provide a basic common 
entitlement (such as opportunities for written and oral submissions) and 
systematically sharing information or experiences and promoting best practice. 
Third, once procedures are formalised they are difficult to rescind and pressure 
builds to grant additional concessions. A participatory entitlement may 
provide a position of legitimacy from which inclusion within related processes 
could be asserted. Alternatively, expanding access by simplifying 
accreditation criteria for non-State actors may inspire reduced participatory 
privileges. That said, procedural rules evolve by accretion such that an 
emergent right may eventually crystallise.
2.2 The Implications o f Non-State Actor Contributions for Democratic Theory.
States are assumed to be a more democratically accountable repository of 
power than that wielded by non-State actors. Non-State actor participation in 
international decision-making is ‘dramatically troubling for democratic theory 
because it posits interests (whether NGOs or businesses) as legitimate actors 
along with popularly-elected governments’. 1447 In discharging governance 
functions States have responsibility to balance competing public interests at the 
national level. The claims and demands of various interest groups are filtered 
in light of mandated policy objectives. This exercise is democratic even 
though the State retains the necessary control. These unitary positions are then 
reconciled with those other States. The ‘one voice’ of States is vulnerable to
1447 Bolton J.R., ‘Should we take Global Governance seriously?’ (2000) 1 Chi J  Inti L 205, 
217-8.
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being unravelled during this period of intergovernmental bargaining. Non- 
State actors enjoy ‘two bites of the apple’ or ‘double dip’ if they are able to 
lobby at both national and international levels. There is less incentive for 
States to reach an acceptable position in conjunction with national 
constituencies. It is also embarrassing for States to have their positions 
contradicted by domestic constituencies they are assumed to represent. The 
real difficulties arise if corporations bypassed States in making international 
law or where States acceded to commercial demands in a non-transparent 
manner without independently exercising their own judgement.
It may be queried whether the developments in the lawmaking process 
analysed by this thesis are symptomatic of a more general ‘participatory 
revolution’ in international law.1448 Participation in political processes such as 
lawmaking could be considered incidental to democratic participation.1449 The 
ability of important elements of public opinion to express their opinions is not 
limited to the ballot box.1450 Non-State actors including NGOs and business 
associations are entitled to participate in the economic and political life of 
democratic States.1451 Non-State actors may be unable to rely upon States to 
accurately communicate their perspective. Furthermore, they may reflect 
distinctly transnational interests which are unlikely to be wholly represented by 
any one State.
1448 Raustiala K., ‘The ‘Participatory Revolution’ in International Environmental Law (1997) 
21 Harvard EnvLR 537.
1449 Steiner H.J., ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) Harvard HR Yrbk 77.
1450 Pateman C., Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1970.
1451 Warsaw Declaration: Towards a Community of Democracies 39 ILM 1306 (2000).
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The ‘democratic deficit’ of non-State actors may be something of a red-herring. 
States need not be democratic and the notion of civic participation is weak 
within the international legal order. To the extent that non-State perspectives 
are intrinsically meritorious their lack of representivity or electoral 
unaccountability is irrelevant. If submissions are inherently attractive then 
irrespective of the status or motivations of the author they can be adopted as 
law. Democracy can be partly ensured through representivity: the capacity of 
organisations to speak for a sufficiently broad constituency in terms of 
membership and mandate. Non-State actors provide ‘intellectual competition’ 
with States by informing deliberations and generating solutions.1452 One 
theme of this thesis is that ‘intellectual competition’ also arises between non- 
State actors. The protests of Seattle for example illustrate the degree of 
contestation between corporations and NGOs. States through lawmaking 
occupy an important mediating role between these competing interests and are 
in a position to respond authoritatively to popular perceptions of unaccountable 
corporate power wielded within intergovernmental institutions. The efforts of 
special interest groups should accordingly be channelled as productive 
counterweights rather than blocked, particularly where the locus of decision­
making shifts to international fora.1453
Of greater concern is that easier access to intergovernmental institutions can 
magnify the voice of obscure, unrepresentative organisations whose 
exaggerated views have already been rejected at national levels. Only minority 
interests repeat their messages since domestic constituencies whose views are
1452 Esty D.C. & Geradin D., ‘Regulatory Co-opetition’ (2000) 3 JInt Eco L 235, 253-4.
1453 Raustiala K., ‘Sovereignty and Multilateralism’ (2000) 1 Chi J  Int L 401, 416.
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already being advocated by their national government have little incentive to 
participate. International action may be limited to well-resourced entities with 
large but docile memberships who exercise political power out of all 
proportion to their economic weight within the community. Producer groups 
are tempted to appeal for special treatment on the basis of military security or 
nationalism. A State’s productive capacity should not be organized according 
to the degree of political power mobilized by particular groups. Nor should 
lawmaking processes be limited to contributions from inefficient industries. 
States seek to insulate themselves from special interest manipulation by 
entities whose national influence may be pervasive. The economic power of 
corporations is countered by a political system constructed upon the principles 
of sovereignty and sovereign equality. WTO policymakers in particular should 
be able to negotiate global welfare solutions free from protectionist pressure. 
Excluding non-State actors does not directly address the danger but shifts the 
locus of decision-making further behind the scenes. Formal rules and 
transparent processes are one means of limiting the potential for capture.
Intergovernmental organisations need to address the extent to which they will 
foster greater participatory democracy.1454 The effective implementation of 
governmental policy at the international and national levels requires 
decentralised and participatory processes.1455 International policy programmes 
and operational activities are ‘legitimised by democratic decision-making
1454 Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights as the primary objective of international 
trade, investment and finance policy and practice, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11, paras 38, 
49.
1455 UNCSD, Secretary-General Report, Overall progress achieved since UNCED, UN Doc 
E/CN. 17/1997/2, paras 82, 132.
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procedures’.1456 For example, States are to provide interested parties including 
industry with opportunities to participate in developing, implementing and 
planning natural forest policy with a view to facilitating the forest products 
trade.1457 Environmental issues ‘are best handled with the participation of all
concerned citizens, at the relevant level’.1458
States seek to preserve their membership privileges since non-State actor 
participation could lead to a transformation in current arrangements. Non- 
State actor participation could inspire novel forms of governance. 1459 
Multilateral trade negotiations have been characterised as an exclusive ‘club’ 
where incumbents are hostile to outside involvement.1460 Only in rare cases 
does non-State actor participation involve collaborative planning and ‘there is 
little evidence that [the emergence of ‘transnational civil society’] has affected 
decision-making or accountability’. 1461 The presence of unelected 
representatives in decision-making (participatory democracy) does not 
challenge the legitmacy of elected ones (representative democracy). 
Increasing accessibility for non-State actors enhances mutual
1456 Rittberger V., ‘Democracy and International Organisation’, Paper presented at second 
meeting of the UN University Advisory Team on Peace and Global Governance, 1994, 9.
1457 UNCED, Non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus 
on the management, conservation and sustainable development o f all types of forests, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 151/6/Rev. 1 (1992), paras 2(d), 13, 14.
1458 Principle 10, Rio Declaration, supra w 120.
1459 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood. Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1995, 256.
1460 Keohane R.O. & Nye J.S., ‘The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of 
Democratic Legitimacy’ in Porter R. et al (Eds), Efficiency. Equity and Legitimacy: The 
Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium. Brookings Institution, 2001, 264.
1461 UNDP, Human Development Report 2001: making new technologies work for human 
development. Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, 108-9.
443
accountability.1462 Furthermore, a ‘right to participate’ becomes less important 
if decision-making processes are ordinarily open and transparent.
2.3 Corporate Relationships with NGOs and Developing States.
The participation of NGOs within international legal processes has been 
extensively considered in the literature. BINGO contributions are less well- 
documented but follow similar patterns. The principle of parity requires that 
identical participatory conditions apply to all non-State actors irrespective of 
orientation. Corporations and NGOs formally enjoy equality of treatment 
under the procedural rules. Use of the descriptor ‘non-governmental 
organisation’ does not exclude politically organised business groups and ‘the 
private sector’ label found in intergovernmental resolutions is yet to be 
reflected by the applicable procedural rules. Organisational specialisation 
suggests the merit of separate consultative streams and BINGOs have made 
proposals along those lines such as the Business Consultative Mechanism. 
Channels for input are partially distinct (eg separate documents, different 
briefing sessions with the secretariat) but the resulting information should be 
treated even-handedly. States prefer to engage with BINGOs in panel 
discussions where commercial opinions are ‘filtered’ by external critique. 
Informal practices such as side events and lobbying are more fluid and benefit 
the well-resourced. Greater parity can be addressed through capacity building, 
financial assistance and the use of appropriate interlocutors.
1462 Taylor C.R., ‘The Right of Participation in Development Projects’ (1994) 13 Dickenson J  
Int L 69.
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The activities of non-State actors are most influential at the periphery of 
lawmaking by initiating processes or implementing final decisions. The 
medium of the State approves drafts, distinguishes non-law from law and 
converts international into national law. Although NGOs have a prominent 
role in generating favourable publicity for the final outcome, corporations also 
mobilise support within the business community to facilitate regulatory 
acceptance.
Corporate participation is also distinguishable from that of NGOs. 
Corporations satisfy the non-profit criterion by acting collectively through 
business coalitions or trade associations. On the other hand, individual firms 
were permitted to participate at the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, thereby discrediting the necessity for non-profit status. Industry 
associations are also vehicles for initiating litigation before national courts, 
pooling the weight of industry opinion for treaty conferences and shielding the 
identity of dominant market participants. Corporate opinions carry relatively 
greater authority on economic matters. Corporations have better prospects 
than NGOs of influencing regulatory developments with respect to economic 
development, military security and financing. That said, corporations are still 
excluded from crucial meetings and drafting committees.
The relationship between corporations and developing States is a very 
particular one. Developing States are ostensibly concerned that non-State actor 
participation will diminish their sovereignty. Political entities participate on 
the international plane once they have fulfilled the criteria for statehood. It
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would be an anathema to admit non-State actors to participate on terms of 
equality once they have fulfilled the formalities for incorporation or 
registration. The nominal subservience of non-State actors within the national 
sphere should at least be transposed into the international realm. For example, 
Arabic and Asian States have objected to the admission of NGOs in the human 
rights field and developing States raised concerns to the submission of amicus 
briefs by NGOs and corporations within the WTO.
Non-State actors principally under the formal control of industrialised 
countries may further marginalise developing countries within 
intergovernmental fora. The environmental or economic perspectives of non- 
State actors may demonstrate political partisanship with home States and need 
not coincide with the agenda of developing States. Non-State actors from the 
developed world also tend to be better organised, more experienced and better 
resourced. Corporations enjoy access to advanced technology and possess the 
commercial acumen to exploit that fact. Whereas corporations may be 
motivated to establish a level playing field as between themselves, admitting 
corporations into intergovernmental decision-making processes makes the 
playing field between developed and developing States more uneven. 
Developing country concerns are justifiable insofar as participation tends to be 
limited to corporations from industrialised States who enjoy access to and 
familiarity with the international legal system and use it to their own best 
advantage. The International Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the 
Group of 77 should facilitate greater participation by firms from developing 
States. The ICC could also enhance the role of national business committees
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from developing States. Sovereign equality in lawmaking becomes more 
theoretical than real, particularly when developing States are unable to attend 
conferences of the parties or contact group meetings as a result of lack of 
resources including qualified experts and other reasons.
3. Corporate Roles and Regulatory Lacunae.
Lawmaking is a quintessential government function. However, the inability or 
unwillingness of States to regulate multinational behaviour has been the topic 
of considerable literature. State regulation may be non-existent, weak or 
ineffective on account of political differences, lack of resources, conflict of 
interest or corruption. The task for present purposes is identifying the 
derivative corporate roles and responsibilities in the regulatory field given the 
regulatory responsibility of States. »
Regulation has shifted from a State-driven system to a market-led one. States 
are attempting to construct markets around regulatory regimes. For example, 
emissions trading is a market-orientated solution to the public externality of 
pollution. Greater reliance on the private sector to achieve public objectives is 
reflected in a partial ‘privatisation’ of lawmaking. Within developed States 
regulation is tending towards a shared albeit understated effort between 
government and industry. Corporations urge prior consultation because they 
will subsequently be called upon to implement final decisions. The underlying 
threat is operational accommodation, regulatory avoidance and policy failure. 
Furthermore, international legal topics are not hermetically sealed and the
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distinctions between developing, applying and enforcing international law are 
not clear-cut.1463 Corporations serve an important corrective function by 
reminding States of positions assumed in other fora. Collaboration ensures 
economic stability and continued labour availability whereas State leadership
is only necessary for broader social objectives.1464
States may shirk their regulatory responsibilities and over-rely upon self- 
regulatory methods such as voluntary industry agreements. A one-size-fits-all 
regulatory approach is gradually being rejected in favour of tailoring 
obligations to organisational attributes and capacity.1465 Such twin-track 
regulatory strategies consider whether individual firms are willing to undertake 
self-regulation.1466 Developed States have greater resort to economic tools as 
complements or substitutes to formal regulation.1467 Command and control 
regulation is also being substituted by the notion of ‘responsible 
entrepreneurship’.1468
When measures designed to stimulate the private sector are instituted, ‘what 
often occurs is the de facto relinquishment of what were previously State
1463 Sands P., ‘The Role of NGOs in Enforcing International Environmental Law’ in Butler 
W.E. (Ed), Control over Compliance with International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1991, 61, 65.
1464 The Conference Board, The New Role of Business in Society: A Global CEO Survey, New 
York, 2002.
1465 UNCSD, Decision 6/2 on Industry and Sustainable Development, Report of the 6th Sess, 
New York, 22 December 1997 & 20 April-1 May 1998, paras 7, 15; UNCSD, Report of the 
Inter-Sessional Ad Hoc Working Group on Industry and Sustainable Development, New York, 
2-6 March 1998, paras 13, 24, 36.
1466 Gunningham N., ‘Environmental Management Systems and Community Participation: 
Rethinking Chemical Industry Regulation’ (1998) 16 J ofE n v’lL  319,417.
1467 OECD, Council Recommendation C(90)177 on the Uses of Economic Instruments in 
Environmental Policy, OECD Doc C(90) 177/Final (1991), para 1.
1468 UNCSD, UNEP Submission, Responsible Entrepreneurship, Background Paper No 4, 
Sixth Session, 20 April-1 May 1998.
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responsibilities’. 1469 Business cannot be expected to author their own 
regulation since ‘this is the job of good governance’.1470 States which fail to 
map out long-term policy objectives will ultimately implement de facto 
market-orientated ones. In this way commercial practices ‘bind’ non-Parties to 
treaties and shape State practice ‘from below’. Corporations influence the law 
‘from above’ by preparing draft conventions or pursuing commercial practices 
which are prohibitively expensive to reverse, thereby narrowing the range of 
choice for States.
Corporations respond to regulatory lacunae by either attempting to fill the gap 
or exploiting it. Codes of conduct as an illustration of the former are 
commercial attempts to delimit self-perceived corporate roles from State 
responsibilities. Such voluntary corporate initiatives do not depend upon legal 
authority for their effectiveness. Technical standard-setting can also elicit 
behavioural alterations without formal recognition as law by influencing 
market conditions and the terms of participation for other participants. 
Corporations emphasise their voluntary nature and do not intend to incur legal 
obligations. However, declarations giving rise to expectations of future 
commercial conduct do not eliminate accountability. Corporate codes may 
encourage the transition to State regulation since it is difficult for corporations 
to enforce voluntarily assumed standards. NGOs and trade unions are sceptical 
of voluntary corporate initiatives and call for stronger regulation.1471 The
1469 Commission on Human Rights, Second progress report prepared by Mr Danilo Turk, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/17, para 186.
14 °UN Research Institute for Social Development, States of Disarray: The Social Effects of 
Globalization, Geneva, 1995, 19.
1471UNCSD, NGO Steering Committee, Responsible Entrepreneurship: NGO Perspectives and 
Recommendations, Background Paper No 3, Sixth Session, 20 April-1 May 1998, para 37.
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coercive authority of States is ultimately required for the effectiveness of codes 
of conduct.1472 At best voluntary corporate initiatives complement rather than 
replace government measures and suggest consultation between State and 
industry.
Where States do not provide legislative guidance or direction then firms enjoy 
greater freedom of action. Within unregulated space or when confronted by 
normative conflicts corporations will refer to economic and efficiency criteria. 
Rational corporate decision-making weighs the likelihood of enforcement by 
States (efficient compliance) against the commercial reasons for deliberate 
violation (efficient breach).1473 For example, the growth in international trade 
in hazardous waste began with the introduction of stricter waste laws within 
North America and Europe. Corporations found it cheaper to transfer waste to 
Latin America or Africa where environmental law was lax or absent until an 
international treaty was concluded on the topic. Corporations also draw upon 
norms such as non-intervention in the internal affairs of States to justify 
corporate complacency and absolve themselves of responsibility. Corporations 
argue that their only duty is to follow national law and policy as determined by 
States. National law is presumed to reflect local community expectations and 
thresholds for acceptable commercial practices. Supererogatory behaviour or 
acting ‘beyond legal compliance’ is undertaken on an uncertain footing and 
entails the voluntary assumption of liability in isolation from local firms.
1472 UNCSD, Chairman’s summary of the Multistakeholder dialogue segment on Industry at 
CSD-6, 6th Session, New York, 21-22 April 1998, para 12.
1473 Williams C.A., ‘Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency’ (1998) 76(4) 
North Carolina LR 1265.
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Indeed, corporations potentially obviate national lawmaking in vertical and 
horizontal ways. Through codes of conduct corporations draw down 
international standards ordinarily applicable to States, tailor them to their 
particular specialisation or operational capacity and implement the resulting 
standards in commercial operations. As conduits for transnational standards 
corporations can make territorially-defined State less important. Occasionally 
home States seek to apply national law extraterritorially through corporate 
vehicles and effect political change within host States. On the other hand, 
national law classically remains the dominant source of authority for 
corporations. The legality of the acts of subsidiaries are ordinarily assessable 
against the standards of the host State.1474 However, transnational corporations 
are increasingly being adjudged against international standards as a result of 
regulatory lacunae at national levels. Corporations are called upon to defer to 
national law while also observing relevant international standards. 1475 
Corporations were tacitly encouraged to defy national law where it was 
employed as an instrument of repression amounting to a contravention of a 
peremptory norm of international law (for example, South African apartheid 
considered in Chapter Two and Myanmar’s forced labour in Chapter Four).
An alternative for States when unable to make international law is resort to 
non-legally binding instruments. The emergence of guidelines and 
intergovernmental codes of conduct is also noteworthy for enabling 
participation by non-State actors. Such instruments permit explicit 
contributions from entities which do not possess any formal lawmaking
1474 American Banana Co v United Fruit Co 213 US 347 (1909).
1475 Para 12(e), Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development supra n510.
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authority. The emphasis upon ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ techniques suggests a 
potential weakening of international law’s authority. The consequences for 
firms include voluntariness rather than compulsion, social rather than legal 
responsibility and ‘ineligibility’ for partnership rather than public censure. 
Legal compliance becomes ‘continuous improvement’ and agreed 
interpretations substituted for declared breaches. That said, the constant threat 
of regulation encourages corporate adherence.
States are also free to delegate their right to regulate. Entities may be 
empowered to exercise governmental authority1476 and act under ‘colour of 
law’.1477 There is nothing which precludes States from expressly granting 
functional responsibility for lawmaking to private actors.1478 Legislatively 
defined objectives can be entrusted to parties having recognised competence in 
their field. Corporations are familiar with standard-setting techniques of a dry, 
technical nature such as product standards and performance management 
benchmarks. So-called ‘industry corporations’ can act pursuant to delegated 
authority to regulate particular fields. 1479 They are governmental 
instrumentalities notwithstanding that they enjoy independent decision-making 
and pursue private marketing objectives.1480 Similarly, codes of conduct 
overseen by industry councils who receive administrative guidance from the
1476 Art 5, UNGA Resolution 56/83 (2001) on the Draft Articles on responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts.
1477 George v Pacific-CSC Work Furlough 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir 1996).
1478 Allott P., ‘The Concept of International Law’ in Byers M. (Ed), The Role of Law in
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law. Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2000, 69, paras 38, 39.
1479 WTO, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation o f Milk and the Exportation o f Dairy 
Products, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R (1999), para 7.78 & WT/DS103/AB/R, 
WT/DS113/AB/R (1999), paras 100-1.
1480 Cp In re Air Crash Disaster near Roselawn Ind 96 F 3d 932, 939-41 (7th Cir 1996); Gates 
& Ors v Victor Fine Foods & Ors 54 F 3d 1457, 1460-63 (9th Cir 1995).
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State may amount to deputising private actors as enforcement surrogates.1481 
When corporations assist enforcement authorities they are entitled to immunity 
as an organ of State.1482 Significantly, the exercise of public power (including 
lawmaking) remains attributable to the State.1483
States are prepared to affirm their regulatory authority where considered 
desirable. For example, the preamble to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services recognises ‘the right of Members to regulate and to introduce new 
regulations on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet 
national policy objectives.’ Developing States have also reaffirmed their 
sovereign right to draft and implement national law with respect to natural 
resources.1484 Chapter Four detailed how the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
affirmed the right to adopt protective public health measures following the 
South African pharmaceutical litigation, the interpretative note of the NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission refined investment treatment standards following 
Pope & Talbot and States responded to the receipt of amicus curiae briefs by 
WTO Panels.
Final Remarks
State consent is affirmed as the underlying basis for international law. States 
are at liberty to determine its mode of creation: they are free to adopt or reject
1481 WTO, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and 
Alcoholic Beverages BISD 34S/83 (1987), para 2.7; WTO, Japan-Measures Affecting 
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (1998), para 10.299.
1482 Walker v Bank o f New York supra nl 187, 189-91.
1483 Petrolane Inc v Government o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran (1991) 27 Iran-US CTR 64.
1484 Preamble, Yaounde Declaration, Summit of Central African Heads of State on the 
Conservation and Sustainable Management of Tropical Forests 38 ILM 783 (1999).
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proposals or delegate functional responsibility for lawmaking to other entities. 
More importantly, States calculate where their interests lie. Opinions differ for 
example on the influence exerted by the European Roundtable of Industrialists 
in creating the European single market.1485 The prospect also enjoyed 
government support and would have eventuated if States had been left to their 
own devices. However, it is simplistic to credit States for making international 
law if they merely sign-off on proposals prepared by others.
The corporate role is more than of mere explanatory value accounting for the
historical origins of international law. The regulatory demands made by
corporations can be overbearing. States are to afford opportunities for
corporate input, craft national law in the commercial interest, assume
responsibility for decision-making and provide mechanisms for challenging the
final outcome. Engaging with business also proves challenging: corporations
do not share homogenous views, possess different organisational capacity and
are reluctant to disclose the nature of relationships with States. Not all
corporations wish to participate: profit-making rather than lawmaking remains
their raison d’etre. Those which do need not express majority business
opinion: inefficient industries seeking exemptions, the targets of proposed
regulatory measures or Western corporations seeking further business
opportunities. The current solution involves resort to commercial interlocutors
although they are only mandated to express majority business opinion. States
must be able to weigh up competing public interests and freely exercise their
right to regulate in achieving social welfare objectives. It is the prospect that
1485 Cp Greenwood J., Interest Representation in the European Union. Palgrave MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, 2003; Cowles M.G., ‘Setting the agenda for a new Europe: the ERT and EC 
1992’ (1995) 33(4) J  Common Market Stud 501.
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States can perform important filtering functions which justifies the State- 
centric fiction of international lawmaking.
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Annex 1
Rules of Procedure 
For Intergovernmental Organizations established by Treaty1486
United Nations Organs.
1.1 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 (25 July 1996) on consultative relationship 
between the UN and NGOs, Part VII: Participation of Non-governmental 
Organisations in International Conferences convened by the United Nations 
and their Preparatory Process (extracts).
41. Where non-governmental organizations have been invited to participate in 
an international conference convened by the United Nations, their 
accreditation is the prerogative o f Member States, exercised through the 
respective preparatory committee...
42. Non-governmental organizations in general consultative status, special 
consultative status and on the Roster, that express their wish to attend the 
relevant international conferences convened by the United Nations and the 
meetings o f the preparatory bodies o f the said conferences shall as a rule be 
accredited for participation. Other non-governmental organizations wishing to 
be accredited may apply to the secretariat o f the conference for this purpose in 
accordance with the following requirements.
45. In the evaluation o f the relevance o f applications o f non-governmental 
organizations for accreditation to the conference and its preparatory process, 
it is agreed that a determination shall be made based on their background and 
involvement in the subject areas o f the conference.
46...Member States may submit comments on any o f the applications on the list 
14 days from receipt o f the above-mentioned list by Member States. The 
comments o f Member States shall be communicated to the non-governmental 
organization concerned, which shall have the opportunity to respond.
47...1n cases where the secretariat does not recommend the granting o f 
accreditation, it shall make available to the preparatory committee its reasons 
for not doing so...The secretariat must notify such applicants o f the reasons for 
non-recommendation and provide an opportunity to respond to objections and 
furnish additional information as may be required.
49. A non-governmental organization that has been granted accreditation to 
attend a session o f the preparatory committee, including related preparatory 
meetings o f regional commissions, may attend all its future sessions, as well as 
the conference itself.
50. In recognition o f the intergovernmental nature o f the conference and its 
preparatory process, active participation o f non-governmental organizations 
therein, while welcome, does not entail a negotiating role.
51. The non-governmental organizations accredited to the international 
conference may be given, in accordance with established United Nations 
practice and at the discretion o f the chairperson and the consent o f the body 
concerned, an opportunity to briefly address the preparatory committee and 
the conference in plenary meetings and their subsidiary bodies.
1486 The procedural rules applicable to UN Specialised Agencies are omitted -  see text infra.
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52. Non-governmental organizations accredited to the conference may make 
written presentations during the preparatory process in the official languages 
o f the United Nations as they deem appropriate. Those written presentations 
shall not be issued as official documents except in accordance with United 
Nations rules o f procedure.
53...Recognizing the importance o f the participation o f non-governmental 
organizations that attend a conference in the follow-up process, the Committee 
on Non-Governmental Organizations, in considering their application, shall 
draw upon the documents already submitted by that organization for 
accreditation to the conference and any additional information submitted by 
the non-governmental organization supporting its interest, relevance and 
capacity to contribute to the implementation phase...
1.2 Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. UN Doc A/520/Rev.l5 
(1985).
Rule 25: Composition [of Delegations].
The delegation o f a Member shall consist o f not more than five representatives 
and five alternate representatives and as many advisers, technical advisers, 
experts and persons o f similar status as may be required by the delegation.
Rule 60: General Principles [for public and private meetings o f the General 
Assembly, its Committees and its Subcommittees].
The meetings o f the General Assembly and its Main Committees shall be held 
in public unless the organ concerned decides that exceptional circumstances 
require that the meeting be held in private. Meetings o f other committees and 
subcommittees shall also be held in public unless the organ concerned decides 
otherwise.
Rule 100: Representation o f Members [on Committees o f the General 
Assembly].
Each Member may be represented by one person on each main Committee and 
on any other committee that may be established upon which all Members have 
the right to be represented. It may also assign to these committees advisers, 
technical advisers, experts or persons o f similar status.
Rule 101.
Upon designation by the chairman o f the delegation, advisers, technical 
advisers, experts or persons o f similar status may act as members o f 
committees. Persons o f this status shall not, however, unless designated as 
alternate representatives, be eligible for election as Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen 
or Rapporteurs o f committees or for seats in the General Assembly.
1.3 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. UN Doc 
S/96/Rev.7 (1983).
Rule 39.
The Security Council may invite members o f the Secretariat or other persons, 
whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or 
to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.
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Appendix: Provisional Procedure for Dealing with Communications from 
Private Individuals and Non-governmental Bodies.
A. A list o f all communications from private individuals and non-governmental 
bodies relating to matters o f which the Security Council is seized shall be 
circulated to all representatives on the Security Council.
B. A copy o f any communication on the list shall be given by the Secretariat to 
any representative on the Security Council at his request.
1.4 Rules of Procedure for UN Human Rights Institutions.
i) The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Rule 69: Submission o f information, documentation and written statements.
1. Non-governmental organisations in consultative status with the Council may 
submit to the Committee written statements that might contribute to full and 
universal recognition and realization o f the rights contained in the Covenant.
2. In addition to the receipt o f written information, a short period o f time will 
be made available at the beginning o f each session o f the Committee’s pre- 
sessional working group to provide NGOs with an opportunity to submit 
relevant oral information to the members o f the working group.
3. Furthermore, the Committee will set aside part o f the first part o f the first 
afternoon at each o f its sessions to enable it to receive oral information 
provided by NGOs. Such information should: a) focus specifically on the 
provisions o f the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; b) be o f 
direct relevance to matters under consideration by the Committee ; c) be 
reliable and d) not be abusive. The relevant meeting will be open and will be 
provided with interpretation services, but will not be covered by summary 
records.
ii) The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
Rule 47: Non-governmental Organisations.
Representatives o f non-governmental organisations may be invited by the 
Committee to make oral or written statements and to provide information or 
documentation relevant to the Committee’s activities under the Convention to 
meetings o f the Committee or to its pre-sessional working group.
Rule 83: Examination o f information.
2. The Committee shall take into account any observations that may have been 
submitted by the State party concerned, as well as any other relevant 
information.
3. The Committee may decide to obtain additional information from the 
following:
(c) Non-governmental organisations;
(d) Individuals.
4. The Committee shall decide the form and manner in which such additional 
information will be obtained.
iii) The Committee against Torture.
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Rule 62: Submission o f information, documentation and written statements.
1. The Committee may invite specialized agencies, United Nations bodies 
concerned, regional intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental 
organisations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council to 
submit to it information, documentation and written statements, as appropriate, 
relevant to the Committee s activities under the Convention.
2. The Committee shall determine the form and the manner in which such 
information, documentation and written statements may be made available to 
members o f the Committee.
Rule 76: Examination o f the information.
4. The Committee may decide, i f  it deems it appropriate, to obtain from the 
representatives o f the State party concerned, governmental and non­
governmental organisations, as well as individuals, additional information or 
answers to questions relating to the information under examination.
5. The Committee shall decide, on its initiative and on the basis o f its rules o f 
procedure, the form and manner in which such additional information may be 
obtained.
UN Secretariat, Compilation of Rules of Procedure adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, UN Doc HRI/GEN/3/Rev.l (2003).
1.5 Illustration of a Consultative Conference under the auspices of a Human 
Rights Body conducting a General Debate.
Rule 10.
1. Representatives o f non-governmental organisations as well as experts whose 
field o f activity relates to the aim and objective o f the Conference may be 
invited to participate in the Conference.
Rule 18.
Written statements submitted in advance to the Secretariat by the participants 
shall be distributed to all participants in the language and number o f copies in 
which the statements are made available to it at the site o f the conference, 
provided that the statements submitted are related to, and compatible with, the 
aim and objective o f the Conference.
Rule 21: Conduct o f Debates.
1. The Conference shall devote the first part o f its work to a general debate on 
school education and the promotion o f tolerance and non-discrimination based 
on religion or belief...
2 ...
Rule 22.
1. With the consent o f the Conference, the Bureau may limit the time allowed 
for speakers, the number o f times participants may speak on a question and 
establish the list o f speakers.
2. The President shall ensure the smooth proceeding o f the debates and a good 
use o f time.
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Rules of Procedure, UN Commission on Human Rights, International 
Consultative Conference on School Education in relation with Freedom of 
Religion and Belief, Tolerance and Non-discrimination, Madrid, 2001.
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Annex 2
Accreditation Procedures to UN Conferences
NGOs in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, accredited 
to previous events or accredited to the intergovernmental organization 
concerned that express the wish to attend UN Conferences, Summits or Special 
Sessions of the UN General Assembly will be accredited for participation 
when they register. Others not in consultative status but wishing to participate 
must first apply to the secretariat responsible for the receipt and preliminary 
evaluation of NGO requests. The guidelines for their accreditation and 
modalities for their participation within the preparatory process and the 
Conference/Summit itself, as decided by the Preparatory Committee, typically 
provide that:
2. All such applications must be accompanied by information on the 
organization's competence and relevance to the work o f the Preparatory 
Committee, indicating the particular areas o f the Conference preparations 
which such competence and relevance pertains and which could include, inter 
alia, the following information:
(a) The purposes o f the organization;
(b) Information as to the programmes and activities o f the organization in 
areas relevant to the Conference and its preparatory process, and in which 
country(ies) they are carried out;
(c) Copies o f its annual reports with financial statements, and a listing o f 
governing body members and their country nationality;
(d) In respect o f membership organizations, a description o f its membership, 
indicating total numbers and their geographical distribution;
(e) Non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic 
and Social Council shall be deemed to have satisfied these requirements to the 
extent that they have already provided such information to the United Nations.
3. In cases where the Conference secretariat believes, on the basis o f the 
information provided in accordance with paragraph 2 above, that the 
organization has established its competence and relevance to the work o f the 
Preparatory Committee, it will recommend to the Preparatory Committee that 
the organization be accredited. In cases where the Conference secretariat does 
not recommend the granting o f accreditation, it will make available to the 
Preparatory Committee the reasons for not doing so. The Conference 
secretariat should make its recommendations available to the Preparatory 
Committee at the start o f the session.
4. The Preparatory Committee will decide on all cases within 24 hours o f the 
Conference secretariat's recommendations having been made available to its 
members. In the event o f a decision not being taken within this time-frame, 
interim accreditations shall be accorded until such time as a decision is taken.
• Procedure for determining non-governmental organizations'
competence and relevance to the work of the Preparatory Committee to 
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Second 
Organisational Session, UN Doc A/46/48 (1991), Annex I, Decision 
2/ 1.
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Additional Accreditation Information
As indicated in the table included within the text, paragraph 2 has since grown 
by accretion. The formulation has subsequently been added to or modified as 
follows:
Include, inter alia, the following information:
Confirmation o f its activities at the national and/or the international level;
• 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development at its 
organizational session, UN Doc A/48/24 (1993), Annex n, Preparatory 
Committee Decision 2 concerning the participation of non­
governmental organizations in the World Summit for Social 
Development and its preparatory process.
This was again further added to or modified as follows:
Include, inter alia, the following information:
Copies o f annual or other reports o f the organization, with financial 
statements and a list o f financial sources and contributions, including 
governmental contributions;
A description o f the membership o f the organization, indicating the total 
number o f members, the names o f organizations that are members and 
their geographical distribution;
A copy o f the constitution and/or by-laws o f the organization;
• Special Session of the General Assembly entitled ‘Women 2000: 
gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century’, 
Commission on the Status of Women acting as the Preparatory 
Committee at its Third Organisational Session, UN Doc A/S-23/2 
(2000), Chapter V, Section A, Draft Decision 2 on Arrangements 
regarding accreditation of NGOs;
• Special Session of the General Assembly on the implementation of the 
outcome of the World Summit for Social Development and Further 
Initiatives, Commission for Social Development acting as the 
Preparatory Committee at its resumed first organisational session, UN 
Doc A/54/45/Add.l (1999), Chapter II, Section B, Decision 5 on the 
accreditation of NGOs;
• Special Session of the General Assembly for an Overall Review and 
Appraisal of the Implementation of the Outcome of the UN Conference 
on Human Settlements (Istanbul + 5), New York, 2001, General 
Assembly Resolution 55/194 (2000) on Arrangements regarding 
accreditation of Habitat Agenda partners.
• Note that these arrangements were codified by ECOSOC Resolution 
1996/31 on consultative relationship between the UN and NGOs, para 
44.
This was again further added to as follows:
Include, inter alia, the following information:
Name o f the organization and pertinent contact information, including 
address and main contact;
A completed pre-registration form prepared by the World Summit 
secretariat.
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• 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, CSD 
Decision 2001/PC/3 on Arrangements for accreditation and 
participation in the preparatory process and in the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development of relevant non-governmental organizations 
and other major groups, UNGAOR 56th Session, Supp No 19, UN Doc 
A/56/19, Chap 8, SectB;
• 2002 International Conference for the Financing for Development, 
Report of the Bureau, UN Doc A/AC.257/6 (2000).
Additional Details for Processing NGO Requests
Paragraphs 3-4 of the template above have subsequently been modified with
the following illustrative formulations:
i) Confirming an interest in the Summit.
(c) In the evaluation o f the relevance o f non-governmental organizations 
applying for accreditation to the Summit and its preparatory process, it is 
agreed that the background o f those organizations and their involvement in 
social development issues, including core issues as defined in paragraph 6 
o f General Assembly resolution 47/92 o f 16 December 1992, will 
determine such relevance;
(d) Non-governmental organizations seeking accreditation will be asked to 
confirm their interest in the goals and objectives o f the Summit;
• 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development at its 
organizational session, UN Doc A/48/24 (1993), Annex II, Preparatory 
Committee Decision 2 concerning the participation of non­
governmental organizations in the World Summit for Social 
Development and its preparatory process;
• 1995 Copenhagen Fourth World Conference on Women: UN General 
Assembly Resolution 48/108 (1993), para 30 & Annex;
• 1996 UN Conference on Human Settlements: Report of the First 
Organisational Session of the Preparatory Committee, UN Doc A/48/37 
(1994), para 13 & Annex;
Note that paragraph (c) above varied with the topic under consideration.
ii) NGOs possessing a ‘special interest’.
(b) Also decides that, in addition, other non-governmental organizations 
that are not accredited either to the Economic and Social Council or to 
UNICEF but that have a collaborative relationship and partnership with 
UNICEF pursuant to its mandate to obtain from non-governmental 
organizations having a special interest in child and family welfare the 
advice and technical assistance which it may require for the 
implementation o f its programmes, will also be invited to participate in the 
meetings o f the Preparatory Committee...
• Special Session of the General Assembly on Children, New York, 2001, 
Report of the Open-Ended Preparatory Committee at its organisational 
session, UN Doc A/55/43 (2000), Part One, Decision 2 on the 
Participation of NGOs.
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iii) The Equitable Participation o f NGOs and their implementation role.
3. The secretariat, with support from United Nations Nongovernmental 
Liaison Service and relevant others, as appropriate, will review the 
relevance o f the work o f the applicants on the basis o f their background 
and involvement in sustainable development issues, particularly in the 
follow-up process to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development.
• 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, CSD 
Decision 2001/PC/3 on Arrangements for accreditation and 
participation in the preparatory process and in the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development of relevant non-governmental organizations 
and other major groups, UNGAOR 56th Session, Supp No 19, UN Doc 
A/56/19, Chap 8, Sect B.
(c) Decides that those non-governmental organizations whose application 
for consultative status with the Economic and Social Council was rejected 
or whose consultative status with the Council was withdrawn or suspended 
shall not be accredited to the special session;
(d) Urges, in recognition o f the importance o f equitable geographical 
participation o f non-governmental organizations in the special session, 
relevant United Nations bodies to assist those non-governmental 
organizations that do not have resources, in particular non-governmental 
organizations from developing countries and countries with economies in 
transition, in participating in the special session;
(f) Decides that the above arrangements concerning accreditation o f non­
governmental organizations to the special session o f the General Assembly 
will in no way create a precedent for other special sessions o f the Assembly.
• Special Session of the General Assembly entitled ‘Women 2000: 
gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century’, 
Commission on the Status of Women acting as the Preparatory 
Committee at its Third Organisational Session, UN Doc A/S-23/2 
(2000), Chapter V, Section A, Draft Decision 2 on Arrangements 
regarding accreditation of NGOs.
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Annex 3
Procedural Rules for Conferences of the Parties (COP)
And Other Governing Bodies for International Environmental Treaties
1. Basic Template.
1. [The Secretariat shall notify] Any body or agency, [whether national or 
international], governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in 
[matters covered by the Convention/fields relating to the...] and which has 
informed the [Permanent] Secretariat o f its wish to be represented [at a 
session/of meetings] o f the Conference o f the Parties [so that they may be 
represented] as [an] observer[s] [may be so admitted] unless at least one third 
o f the Parties present at the [session/meeting] object.
2. Such observers may, upon invitation o f the President, participate without the 
right to vote in the proceedings o f any [session/meeting] in matters o f direct S  
concern to the body or agency they represent, unless at least one third o f the 
Parties present at the [session/meeting] object.
This basic formulation (with minor modifications as indicated) appears in:
• Rule 7(2), Rules of Procedure of the COP, UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification in Countries experiencing serious drought and/or 
desertification, particularly in Africa, UN Doc ICCD/COP(l)/l 1/Add. 1 
(1997) adopted at COP-1, Rome, Decision 1. See also Decision 
18/COP-1 (1997) on procedures for the establishment and maintenance 
of a roster of independent experts, Decision 26/COP-1 (1997) 
accreditation of non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations 
and Decision 27/COP-1 (1997) on inclusion of activities of NGOs 
within the official programme of work of future sessions of the 
Conference of the Parties.
[Primary enabling treaty provision: Art 22(7), 1994 Convention to 
Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious 
Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa]
• Rule 2(2), Rules of Procedure of the COP, Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species on Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
CITES Doc. 11.1 (Rev.l), Strategic and Administrative Matters, 2000. 
[Primary enabling treaty provision: Art 11, Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species on Wild Fauna and Flora (1974) 993 
UNTS 243]
• Rule 7, Rules of Procedure for the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 
UNEP/FAO/RC/COP. 1/2 (2004).
[Primary enabling treaty provision: Art 18, Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade (1998) 38IL M 1]
• ‘qualified in fields relating to the conservation and sustainable use o f 
biological diversity '
Rule 7(2), Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the COP, Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Decision LT, UNEP/CBD/COP/1/2 (1994).
[Primary enabling treaty provision: Art 23(5), 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity]
• ‘qualified in fields relating to the transboundary movement o f 
hazardous wastes as well as their management and disposal ’
‘subject to the condition that their admission to the meeting is not 
objected to by at least one third o f the Parties present at the meeting ’ 
Rule 7(2), Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the COP, Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, adopted at COP-1, UN Doc 
UNEP/CHW.1/24 (1992), Annex 3.
[Primary enabling treaty provision: Art 15(6), 1989 Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal]
• ‘qualified in fields relating to the protection o f the ozone layer ’
Rule 7(2), Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the COP, Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5 (1989) & Rule 7(2), Rules of Procedure for 
Meetings of the Parties, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/3 (1989).
[Primary enabling treaty provisions: Art 6(5), 1985 Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer & Art 11(5), 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer]
2. Procedural Rules which reflect this basic template but with minor variations 
include:
Rule 18: Participation o f Observers.
5. Non-governmental organisations recognised by the Economic and Social 
Council whose fields o f competence are relevant to the law o f the sea and 
other non-governmental organisations invited by the Meeting o f States Parties 
which have demonstrated their interest in matters under the consideration o f 
the Meeting may also participate as observers.
8. Observers referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 o f this rule may designate 
representatives to sit at public meetings o f the Meetings o f States Parties and, 
upon invitation by the President and subject to the approval by the Meeting, 
may make oral statements and submit written statements on questions within 
the scope o f their activities.
Rules of Procedure for Meetings of States Parties, UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, UN Doc SPLOS/2/Rev.3 (1995).
3. Illustrative procedural rules which reflect this template but add further 
details include:
i) NGOs with Special Qualifications.
Rule 7.
1. The Secretariat shall notify international non-governmental organisations 
that have special qualifications with regard to matters relating to the 
Convention and have informed the secretariat o f their wish to participate o f 
any meeting held in public, so that they may be represented as observers.
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2. The Conference o f the Parties may approve the admission o f representatives 
o f international non-governmental organisations that have special 
qualifications with regard to matters relating to the Convention as observers 
to its meetings held in private. It may similarly terminate any such approval. 
Rule 8.
Such observers may participate in the meetings without the right to make 
decisions or to vote.
Rules of Procedure for the Meetings of the COP, Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents adopted at COP-1 (2000), 
Brussels, Economic Commission for Europe ECE/CP.TEIA/3 (2001).
ii) NGO Proposals and Logistical Considerations.
1. Any body or agency, national or international, whether governmental or 
non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to the conservation and 
sustainable use o f wetlands, which has informed the Bureau o f its wish...
2. Bodies or agencies desiring to be represented at the meeting by observers 
shall submit the names o f these observers to the Convention bureau at least 
one month prior to the opening o f the meeting.
2. Such observers may, upon the invitation o f the President, participate without 
the right to vote in the proceedings o f any meeting unless at least one third o f 
the Parties present at the meeting object.
4. Proposals made by observers may be put to the vote i f  sponsored by a Party.
5. Seating limitations may require that no more than two observers from any 
State not a Party, body or agency be present at a meeting. The Bureau shall 
notify those concerned o f any such limitations in advance o f the meeting.
Rule 7, Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the COP, Convention on Wetlands 
of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat adopted at COP-7, 
San Jose, 1999.
4. The Rules of Procedure for the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, CITES Doc. 11.1 (Rev. 1) 
(2000) partly extracted below provide the most detailed provisions.
Rule 2 -  Observers
2. Any body or agency technically qualified in protection, conservation or 
management o f wild fauna and flora which is either:
a) an international agency or body, either governmental or non-governmental, 
or a national governmental agency or body; or
b) a national non-governmental agency or body which has been approved for 
this purpose by the State in which it is located; and which has informed the 
Secretariat o f the Convention o f its desire to be represented at the meeting by 
observers, shall be permitted to be so represented in the plenary sessions and 
sessions o f Committees I  and II and the Budget Committee unless one-third o f 
the Representatives present and voting object. Once admitted, these observers 
shall have the right to participate but not to vote.
Rule 11 -  Seating
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4. Observers shall be seated in one or more designated areas within the 
meeting room. They may enter an area designated for delegations only when 
invited to do so by a delegate.
Rule 17 -  Right to speak
1. The Presiding Officer shall call upon speakers in the order in which they 
signify their desire to speak and shall give precedence to the delegates. 
Amongst observers, precedence shall be given to non-Party States, 
intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, in this 
order.
2. A delegate or observer shall speak only i f  called upon by the Presiding 
Officer, who may call a speaker to order i f  his/her remarks are not relevant to 
the subject under discussion...
Rule 28 -  Submission o f informative documents and exhibitions
1. Informative documents on the conservation and utilization o f natural 
resources may be submitted for the attention o f the participants to the meeting 
by:
b) any observer representing any other organization.
2. Such documents shall clearly identify the delegation or observer presenting 
them.
3. Where such documents are to be distributed by the Secretariat, they shall be 
provided in sufficient numbers for distribution. Documents from organizations 
referred to in paragraph lb) o f this Rule shall be subject to approval by the 
Secretariat, in consultation with the Bureau i f  necessary, before distribution.
4. Where such documents are not to be distributed by the Secretariat, they 
shall not be subject to prior approval. However, any Representative may 
complain to the Bureau if  a document is considered offensive.
5. Apart from an exhibition from the host country, where applicable, to show 
how it conserves nature and implements the Convention, no exhibition is 
authorized in the immediate vicinity o f meeting rooms. Exhibitions set up in a 
specific exhibition area, at the cost o f the exhibitors, may be subject to the 
approval o f the Bureau, which may withdraw such permission at any time.
Rule 29 -  Complaints
1. A complaint may be addressed to the Bureau pursuant to Rule 28, 
paragraph 4, or by any participant who has been subject to abuse by another.
2. When it receives a complaint, the Bureau shall obtain information necessary 
to consider the validity o f the complaint, bearing in mind that legitimate 
differences o f opinion may exist.
3. In the case o f a complaint received pursuant to Rule 28, paragraph 4, it 
shall consider whether the document concerned abuses or vilifies a Party, or 
brings the Convention into disrepute.
4. The Bureau shall decide on appropriate action, which may, as a last resort, 
include withdrawal o f the right o f admission o f an organization to the meeting, 
or a formal complaint to a Party.
Decisions of the Conference of the Parties to CITES in effect after the 12th 
meeting:
Registration o f observers at meetings o f the Conference o f the Parties
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11.125
Any body or agency that informs the Secretariat o f its desire to be represented 
at a meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties and that wishes to be considered 
as an international agency or body in accordance with Article XI, paragraph 7
(a), should be registered by the Secretariat only i f  it demonstrates, to the 
satisfaction o f the Secretariat that it is:
a) qualified in protection, conservation or management o f wild fauna and 
flora: and
b) an organization in its own right, with a legal persona and an international 
character, remit and programme o f activities.
Contributions by observers at meetings o f the Conference o f the Parties
11.14
In selecting venues for future meetings o f the Conference o f the Parties, the 
Parties should make every effort to ensure that the venues selected have space 
for observers on the floors o f the halls for the plenary sessions, Committee I  
and Committee II.
11.70
The Presiding Officers at plenary sessions, and sessions o f Committee I  and 
Committee 112 should make every effort to allow observers time in the sessions 
to speak on issues (make interventions).
11.71
Recognizing that conservation o f time, in order to complete the agenda for a 
meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties in the two-week period, is a valid 
concern, Presiding Officers should give observers a time limit for speaking if  
necessary and encourage observers not to be redundant in speaking on a 
particular issue.
11.73
When possible, Presiding Officers should invite knowledgeable observers to 
participate in working groups o f Committee I  and Committee II.
11.127
The Secretariat and the host country o f each meeting o f the Conference o f the 
Parties should make every effort to ensure that each approved observer is 
provided with at least one seat on the floor in the meeting rooms o f the plenary 
sessions, Committee I  and Committee II, unless one-third o f the Party 
representatives present and voting object.
11.128
The Secretariat should make every effort to ensure that informative documents 
on the conservation and utilization o f natural resources, prepared by 
observers for distribution at a meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties and 
approved by the Secretariat, are distributed to the participants in the meeting.
5. Illustration of Procedural Rules for a CITES Committee.
Rule 6.
The Chairman may invite any other person or a representative o f any country 
or organisation to participate in meetings o f the Committee as an observer 
without the right to vote.
Rule 16.
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Non-governmental organisations may provide documents through the CITES 
Authorities o f the Party where they are located. However, international non­
governmental organisations, as recognised under the provisions as applied at 
the meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties, may send documents to the 
CITES Secretariat. In both cases the decision to distribute these documents 
shall be taken by the Secretariat in consultation with the Chairman. These 
documents shall also be submitted to the Chairman and the Regional 
Representative(s) o f the Party concerned where applicable.
Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Plants Committee of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora adopted at 
the 12th meeting, Leiden, 2002.
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Annex 4
Comparative Rules of Procedure defining the Modalities 
for NGO Participation at UN Conferences. World Summits 
and UN General Assembly Special Sessions
1. Participation and Oral Statements
Representatives o f non-governmental organizations:
1. Non-governmental organizations [invited/accredited] [to participate in/to] 
the Conference may designate representatives to sit as observers at public 
meetings o f the Conference and[its/ the] Main Committee [s].
2. Upon the invitation o f the [presiding officer/President/chairman] o f the 
[conference] body concerned and subject to the approval o f that body, such 
observers may make oral statements on questions in which they have special 
competence.
This formulation appears in:
• Rule 63, Rules of Procedure, Third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, UN Doc A/CONF.62/30 (1974) but with the substitution of ‘may 
make oral statements on questions within the scope o f their activities 
Rule 59, Rules of Procedure, Second UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, UN Doc A/CONF.19/7 (1960) did not envisage NGO 
participation: only Specialized Agencies and intergovernmental bodies 
could participate in deliberations as observers without the right to vote 
and to submit written statements.
• Rule 65, Rules of Procedure, UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED/Earth Summit), Rio de Janeiro, 1992, UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/2 (1992);
• Rule 67, Rules of Procedure, Global Conference on the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States, Barbados, 1994, UN 
Doc A/CONF. 167/2 (1994).
This formulation is repeated in the following rules of procedure but modified 
as indicated:
• ‘...to sit as observers at public meetings o f the Conference and its 
Committee o f the Whole ’
Rule 64, Rules of Procedure, Third UN Conference on the Least 
Developed Countries, Brussels, 2001, UN Doc A/CONF. 191/IPC/L.2 
(2001).
The principal template above is repeated in the following procedural rules with 
the addition to paragraph 2 of:
‘I f  the number o f requests to speak is too large, the non-governmental 
organizations shall be requested to form themselves into constituencies, such 
constituencies to speak through spokespersons. ’
• Rule 65, Rules of Procedure, International Conference on Population 
and Development, Cairo, 1994, UN Doc A/CONF.171/2 (1994);
• Rule 62, Rules of Procedure, World Summit for Social Development, 
Copenhagen, 1995, UN Doc A/CONF.166/2 (1995);
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• Rule 65, Rules of Procedure, Fourth World Conference on Women: 
Action for Equality, Development and Peace, Beijing, 1995, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 177/22 (1995);
• Rule 63, Rules of Procedure, UN Conference on Human Settlements 
(Habitat II), Istanbul, 1996, UN Doc A/CONF.165/2 (1996);
• Rule 62, Rules of Procedure, UN Special Session of the General 
Assembly for an Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation 
of the Outcome of the UN Conference on Human Settlements, (Istanbul 
+ 5), New York, 2001, UN Doc HS/C/PC.OS/2 (2001).
This expanded formulation is repeated in the following rules of procedure but 
further modified as indicated:
• ‘...designate representatives to participate as observers in the 
Conference, any Committee and any committee or working group on 
questions within the scope o f their activities. ’
Rule 66, Rules of Procedure, World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, 2001, 
UN Doc A/CONF. 189/PC. 1/21 (2001).
• 7. invited to the Summit...on questions within the scope o f their 
activities.
2. The Chairman shall invite such non-governmental organisations to 
form themselves into a limited number o f constituencies. Upon the 
invitation o f the Chairman, and subject to its approval, such 
constituencies may, through spokespersons, make oral statements on 
questions within the scope o f their activities. ’
Rule 53, Rules of Procedure, World Food Summit, FAO Doc WFS 
96/2 (1996).
• Tt is recalled that paragraph 23.3 o f Agenda 21 provides that ‘any 
policies, definitions or rules affecting access to and participation by 
non-governmental organizations in the work o f the United Nations 
institutions or agencies associated with the implementation o f Agenda 
21 must apply equally to all major groups'. Agenda 21 defines major 
groups as comprising women, children and youth, indigenous people, 
non-governmental organizations, local authorities, workers and their 
trade unions, business and industry, the scientific and technological 
community and farmers. Therefore, based on Agenda 21, rule 64 shall 
apply equally to non-governmental organizations and other major 
groups. ’
Footnote to Rule 64, Rules of Procedure, World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Johannesburg, 2002, UN Doc A/CONF. 199/2 (2002).
Unique procedural rules concerning participation include:
i) Identifying Specific Meetings.
• Non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council and with competence in the field of 
human rights, and other non-governmental organizations which 
participated in the work o f the Preparatory Committee (or the regional 
meetings) may designate representatives properly accredited by them
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to participate as observers in the Conference, its Main Committees and, 
as appropriate, any o f the committees or working groups, on questions 
within the scope o f their activities.
Rule 66, Rules of Procedure, World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna, 1993, UN Doc A/CONF. 157/PC/l/Add.l (1992).
ii) Specific Terms of Participation.
• Representatives o f non-governmental organisations.
Non-governmental organisations invited to the Conference may 
participate in the Conference through their designated representatives 
as follows:
a) By attending plenary meetings o f the Conference and, unless 
otherwise decided by the Conference in specific situations, formal 
meetings o f the Committee o f the whole and o f subsidiary bodies 
established under rule 50;
b) by receiving copies o f official documents;
c) upon the invitation o f the President and subject to the approval o f  
the Conference, by making, through a limited number o f their 
representatives, oral statements to the opening and closing sessions o f  
the Conference, as appropriate.
Rule 63, Rules of Procedure, UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 183/2/Add.2 (1998).
1.1 Specifically-requested Attendees
Rules of Procedure may identify particular groups and specifically provide for 
their participation. For example:
Representatives o f local authorities.
Representatives o f local authorities, designated by accredited international 
associations o f local authorities in consultation with national associations o f  
local authorities, invited to the Conference may participate, without the right 
to vote, in the deliberations o f the Conference, its Main Committees and, as 
appropriate, any other committee or working group, on questions within the 
scope o f their activities. Every effort shall be made to make the representation 
o f local authorities balanced in terms o f region, size and type o f local 
authorities.
• Rule 62, Rules of Procedure, UN Conference on Human Settlements 
(Habitat II), Istanbul, 1996, UN Doc A/CONF.165/2 (1996);
• Rule 61, Rules of Procedure, UN Special Session of the General 
Assembly for an Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation 
of the Outcome of the UN Conference on Human Settlements, (Istanbul 
+ 5), New York, 2001, UN Doc HS/C/PC.OS/2 (2001).
Representatives o f national human rights institutions.
Representatives designated by national institutions for the protection and 
promotion o f human rights may participate as observers in the deliberations o f
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the Conference, any [Main] Committee and, as appropriate, any other 
committee or working group on questions within the scope o f their activities.
• Rule 64, Rules of Procedure, World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna, 1993, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/l/Add.l (1992).
• Rule 65, Rules of Procedure, World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, 2001, 
UN Doc A/CONF. 189/PC. 1/21 (2001) removes ‘as appropriate' and 
adds a further paragraph where States do not have national human 
rights institutions.
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2. Written Statements
Written statements submitted by the designated representatives referred to in 
rules .. to .. shall be distributed by the secretariat to all delegations in the 
quantities and in the language in which the statements are made available to it 
at the site o f the [Conference/Summit], provided that a statement submitted on 
behalf o f a non-governmental organization is related to the work o f the 
Conference and is on a subject in which the organization has a special 
competence.
This formulation appears in:
• Rule 63, Rules of Procedure, Third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, UN Doc A/CONF.62/30 (1974) (albeit reordered);
• Rule 66, Rules of Procedure, UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED/Earth Summit), Rio de Janeiro, 1992, UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/2 (1992);
• Rule 67, Rules of Procedure, World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna, 1993, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/l/Add.l (1992);
• Rule 68, Rules of Procedure, Global Conference on the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States, Barbados, 1994, UN 
Doc A/CONF. 167/2 (1994);
• Rule 67, Rules of Procedure, World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, 2001, 
UN Doc A/CONF. 189/PC. 1/21 (2001);
• Rule 66, Rules of Procedure, World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Johannesburg, 2002, UN Doc A/CONF. 199/2 (2002).
This formulation is repeated in the following rules of procedure but modified 
as indicated:
• '...statements are made available to the secretariat for distribution, 
provided that a statement... ’
Rule 65, Rules of Procedure, Third UN Conference on the Least
Developed Countries, Brussels, 2001, UN Doc A/CONF. 191/IPC/L.2
(2001).
• ‘shall be made available by the Secretariat' (and two specified 
conditions in reverse order).
Rule 54(2), Rules of Procedure, World Food Summit, FAO Doc WFS 96/2
(1996).
The principal template above is repeated in the following procedural rules with 
the addition of:
' Written statements shall not be [made/issued] at United Nations expense and 
shall not be issued as official documents. '
• Rule 66, Rules of Procedure, International Conference on Population 
and Development, Cairo, 1994, UN Doc A/CONF.171/2 (1994);
• Rule 63, Rules of Procedure, World Summit for Social Development, 
Copenhagen, 1995, UN Doc A/CONF.166/2 (1995);
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• Rule 66, Rules of Procedure, Fourth World Conference on Women: 
Action for Equality, Development and Peace, Beijing, 1995, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 177/22 (1995);
• Rule 64, Rules of Procedure, UN Conference on Human Settlements 
(Habitat II), Istanbul, 1996, UN Doc A/CONF.165/2 (1996);
• Rule 63, Rules of Procedure, UN Special Session of the General 
Assembly for an Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation 
of the Outcome of the UN Conference on Human Settlements, (Istanbul 
+ 5), New York, 2001, UN Doc HS/C/PC.OS/2 (2001);
• Rule 64, Rules of Procedure, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 2001, 
UN Doc A/CONF. 192/L.l (2001);
• Rule 64, Rules of Procedure, UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee, UN Doc 
A/CONF. 183/2/Add.2 (1998).
3. Other Participatory Arrangements
UN Conferences and Special Sessions of the General Assembly contemplate 
additional opportunities for NGOs to participate, particularly on an oral basis. 
All of the following provide that:
Arrangements concerning the [accreditation and attendance/participation] of 
non-governmental organizations [at the Preparatory Committee and the 
Conference/in the special session] [will/shall] in no way create a precedent for 
other [United Nations conferences/special sessions o f the General Assembly].
3.1 Attendance at Meetings and the Distribution of Documents at the 
Conference.
The Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects decides that, with 
respect to the attendance o f non-governmental organizations at the 
Preparatory Committee and the Conference, attendance will be open to:
(c) Non-governmental organizations accredited through the process specified 
above may attend meetings o f the Preparatory Committee and the Conference, 
other than those designated as closed;
(d) Representatives o f accredited non-governmental organizations will be 
allowed to address the Preparatory Committee and the Conference during one 
meeting specifically allocated for this purpose. These meetings will not 
coincide with other meetings o f the Preparatory Committee and the 
Conference;
(e) Accredited non-governmental organizations will be provided, upon request, 
with documents related to the Preparatory Committee and to the Conference, 
and they may, at their own expense, provide material to the delegations, 
outside the conference room, in the area o f the Preparatory Committee and the 
Conference;
UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
its Aspects, New York, 2001, UN Doc A/CONF. 192/L.l (2001).
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3.2 NGO Statements during Plenary Debates.
The General Assembly:
(a) Decides that representatives from non-governmental organizations may 
make statements in the Ad Hoc Committee o f the Whole o f the special session;
(b) Decides that given the availability o f time, a limited number o f non­
governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council may also make statements in the debate in the plenary o f the 
special session. The President o f the General Assembly is requested to present 
the list o f selected non-governmental organizations to the Member States in a 
timely manner for approval. The President o f the General Assembly is also 
requested to ensure that such selection is made on an equal and transparent 
basis, taking into account the geographical representation and diversity o f 
non-governmental organizations;
This formulation appears in:
• Special Session of the General Assembly World Summit for Social 
Development and Beyond: Achieving Social Development for all in a 
Globalising World, New York, 2000, UN Doc A/54/45/Add.l (2000), 
Chapter II, Section A;
• Special Session of the General Assembly on Children, New York, 2001, 
UN Doc A/S-27/2 (2001), chapter VI, section A;
• Commission on the Status of Women acting as the Preparatory 
Committee at its Third Organisational Session, Arrangements regarding 
participation of NGOs at the Special Session of the General Assembly 
entitled ‘Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the 
twenty-first century’, UN Doc A/S-23/2 (2000), Chapter V, Draft 
decision I but modified as follows:
‘(b) ...make statements in the debate in the plenary o f the special session 
provided neither that their application for consultative status with the Council 
has been rejected nor that their consultative status with the Council has been 
withdrawn or suspended, and that non-governmental organizations should be 
requested to select spokespersons among themselves and provide the list 
thereof to the President o f the General Assembly through the Secretariat;... ’
3.3 Thematic Presentations.
7. Agrees that the special session should concentrate, among other matters, on 
presentations, including thematic presentations, on the implementation o f the 
Habitat Agenda by a range o f Habitat partners, including representatives o f 
local authorities, civil society, the private sector as well as the United Nations, 
the Bretton Woods organizations and other multilateral organizations, 
focusing on experiences and lessons learned since Istanbul;
Commission on Human Settlements acting as the Preparatory Committee at its 
first session, UN Doc A/55/212 (2000), Decision 2 on the structure of the 
Special Session of the General Assembly for an overall review and appraisal of 
the implementation of the Habitat Agenda, New York, 2001.
3.4 NGO Statements in Thematic Committees.
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1. Decides that representatives o f local authorities, non-governmental 
organizations and other Habitat Agenda partners may make statements in the 
Ad Hoc Committee o f the Whole and in the thematic committee o f the special 
session for an overall review and appraisal o f the implementation o f the 
outcome o f the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II); 
General Assembly Resolution 55/194 (2000) on arrangements regarding 
participation of Habitat Agenda partners and observers in the Special Session 
of the General Assembly for an overall review and appraisal of the 
implementation of the Habitat Agenda, New York, 2001.
3.5 Roundtable Sessions.
16. Given the availability o f time, a limited number o f accredited civil society 
actors may make statements in the debate in plenary. The President o f the 
General Assembly is requested, following the appropriate consultation with 
Member States, to present a list o f selected accredited civil society actors to 
Member States for consideration on the non-objection basis for the final 
decision by the Assembly. The President is also requested that such selection is 
made on an equal and transparent basis, taking into account the equitable 
geographical representation, relevant expertise and wide variety o f 
perspectives.
20. The round tables shall be open to Member States, observers, as well as 
entities o f the United Nations system and accredited civil society actors.
21. In order to ensure interactive and substantive discussions o f high quality, 
participation in each round table shall be limited to a maximum o f 65 
participants, o f which at least 48 will be representatives o f Member States. In 
addition, each round table shall include a maximum o f 17 participants, 
representing observers, entities o f the United Nations system and accredited 
civil society actors.
30. Accredited civil society actors with specific expertise in areas related to 
the themes o f the round tables will also be invited to the round tables. The 
President o f the General Assembly is requested to conduct appropriate 
consultations with Member States, and also with accredited civil society actors, 
before representing a list o f selected accredited civil society actors that may 
participate in each round table to Member States, in the last week o f May 2001, 
for consideration on the non-objection basis for the final decision by General 
Assembly. When selecting civil society actors, due consideration shall be given 
to the principles o f equitable geographical representation and gender, as well 
as an adequate mix o f national, regional and international civil society actors, 
and to the need to ensure that a variety o f perspectives are represented.
Special Session of the General Assembly on Review of the Problem of 
HIV/AIDS in All its Aspects, New York, 2001, General Assembly Resolution 
55/242 (2001).
3.6 Multistakeholder Dialogue Sessions. Side Events. Partnership Events and 
Funding for NGOs.
6. Based on the practices o f the Commission on Sustainable Development, a 
number o f multi-stakeholder dialogue segments will be organized as part o f
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the preparatory committee meetings. Dialogue starter papers from major 
groups will be requested in the form o f reviews o f progress and future action 
necessary under the relevant major group chapters o f Agenda 21. The planned 
multi-stakeholder dialogues include:
(a) In the early part o f the second preparatory committee meeting, a two-day 
multi stakeholder dialogue with representatives from all nine major groups 
will be organized. The focus o f the dialogue will be aligned with the issues on 
the agenda o f the preparatory meeting, that is, a comprehensive review and 
assessment o f progress achieved in implementation o f Agenda 21 and the 
Programme for the Further Implementation o f Agenda 21. The purpose o f the 
dialogue will be to provide an opportunity to representatives o f major groups 
to share their views on the progress achieved. The outcome o f this dialogue 
will be a Chair’s summary, which will be submitted to the preparatory 
committee and incorporated into its records;
(b) In the early part o f the fourth meeting o f the preparatory committee, a two- 
day multi-stakeholder dialogue with representatives from all nine major 
groups will be organized. The focus o f this dialogue will be aligned with the 
issues that are on the agenda o f this meeting, that is,.... The purpose o f this 
second dialogue will be to provide opportunities to representatives o f major 
groups to contribute their views on future actions and priorities. The outcome 
o f this dialogue will be a Chair’s summary, which will be submitted to the 
preparatory committee and incorporated into its records.
7. As in the meetings o f the Commission, major group organizations will have 
an opportunity to organize various informal side events and briefings to 
exchange views with Governments. The Secretariat will facilitate and 
coordinate these activities under the guidance o f the Bureau o f the preparatory 
committee.
9. Recognizing the limited time available, a small but representative number o f 
individuals from accredited non-governmental organizations and other major 
groups will be invited to address the plenary part o f the Summit after the 
statements made by governmental representatives. The individual speakers will 
be identified through the self-organized mechanisms o f the major groups, in 
coordination with the President o f the Summit, through the Secretariat.
10. A short multi-stakeholder event is planned for the World Summit. This 
event will be designed to involve the highest level o f representation from both 
major groups and Governments. Selection o f the participants in the multi­
stakeholder event other than the governmental representatives should be from 
the non-governmental organizations and other major groups accredited to the 
Summit. The focus would be for Governments and major groups to exchange 
and publicly announce the specific commitments they have made for the next 
phase o f work in the field o f sustainable development. In the case o f major 
groups, commitments and targets are expected to emerge from national, 
regional and international consultations o f major group organizations. A 
record o f the commitments announced and shared would be made and released 
as part o f the Summit outcome.
11. In addition, plenary sessions during the first week o f the World Summit will 
be organized as a series o f partnership events with accredited non­
governmental organizations and other major groups. These could be in the 
form o f dialogues and may include those o f a multi-stakeholder nature. The
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details and topics o f these dialogues will be recommended by the Bureau o f the 
preparatory committee.
12. Other stakeholder events and activities are also expected to take place 
such as informal round tables with major groups and Governments on specific 
issues, parallel events and various side events.
13. The secretariat o f the World Summit will facilitate the funding o f 
participants from major groups from developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition in the multi-stakeholder dialogues during the 
preparatory meetings and the Summit.
14. Interested donor Governments and other donors are encouraged to provide 
voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund in support o f this process.
CSD Decision 2001/PC/3 on Arrangements for accreditation and participation 
in the preparatory process and in the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development of relevant non-governmental organizations and other major 
groups, UNGAOR 56th Session, Supp No 19, UN Doc A/56/19, Chap 8, Sect B.
3.7 Membership of National Delegations
(d) Encourages Governments to include representatives o f civil society in their 
national preparatory process, as well as in their delegations to the 
Preparatory Committee and the special session;
Commission for Social Development acting as the Preparatory Committee at 
its first organisational session, UN Doc A/53/45 (1998), Chapter VI, Section 
B, Decision 7 on the participation of NGOs at the Special Session of the 
General Assembly World Summit for Social Development and Beyond: 
Achieving Social Development for all in a Globalizing World, New York, 
2000.
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Annex 5
Modalities for NGO Participation in the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
1) Primary Enabling Treaty Provision 
Article 7: Conference o f the Parties.
(2) The Conference o f the Parties, as the supreme body o f this Convention, 
shall...
(I) seek and utilise, where appropriate, the services and co-operation o f and 
information provided by, competent international organisations and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and...
(6) The UN, its specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not Party to 
the Convention, may be represented at sessions o f the Conference o f the 
Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, 
governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by 
the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat o f its wish to be 
represented at a session o f the Conference o f the Parties as an observer, may 
be so admitted unless at least one-third o f the Parties present object. The 
admission and participation o f observers shall be subject to the rules o f 
procedure adopted by the Conference o f the Parties.
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 31 ILM 848 (1992).
2) Relevant Rules of Procedure 
Rule 7:
1. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or 
non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention 
and which has informed the secretariat o f its wish to be represented at a 
session o f the Conference o f the Parties as an observer may be so admitted 
unless at least one third o f the Parties present at the session object.
2. Such observers may, upon invitation o f the President, participate without the 
right to vote in the proceedings o f any session in matters o f direct concern to 
the body or agency they represent, unless at least one third o f the Parties 
present at the session object.
Rule 8:
The Secretariat shall notify these entitled to be observers pursuant to Rules 6 
and 7 above o f the date and venue o f any session scheduled by the Conference 
o f the Parties so that they may be represented by observers.
Rule 17:
Each Party participating in a session shall be represented by a delegation 
consisting o f a head o f delegation and such other accredited representatives, 
alternate representatives and advisers as it may require.
Rule 18:
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An alternate representative or an adviser may act as a representative upon 
designation by the head o f delegation.
Rule 27:
1. These rules shall apply mutatis mutandis to the proceedings o f the 
subsidiary bodies.
2 ...
Rule 30:
1. Meetings o f the Conference o f the Parties shall be held in public, unless the 
Conference o f the Parties decides otherwise.
2. Meetings o f the subsidiary bodies shall be held in private unless the 
Conference o f the Parties decides otherwise.
A footnote to Rule 30 provides that:
Paragraph 106(c) o f the Report o f the Committee on its eighth session 
(A/AC.237/41) states: ‘Consistent with the Rules o f Procedure o f the Basel 
Convention on the Control o f Transboundary Movements o f Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal, upon which the draft rules were largely based, Rule 30 o f 
the draft rules o f procedure would be interpreted as permitting duly accredited 
observers to participate in ‘private ’ meetings. '
Rule 32:
1. No one may speak at a meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties without 
having previously obtained the permission o f the President...
Rule 36:
Proposals and amendments to proposals shall normally be introduced in 
writing by the Parties and handed to the Secretariat, which shall circulate 
copies to delegations...
The Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties and its 
Subsidiary Bodies to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN 
Doc FCCC/CP/1996/2.
3) Decisions of the Conference of the Parties
The Conference o f the Parties,
Affirming that negotiations under the Convention are a matter for the Parties,
1. Decides that the presiding officers o f Convention bodies may invite 
representatives o f intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations to 
attend as observers any open-ended contact group established under the 
Convention process, unless at least one third o f the Parties present at the 
session o f the Convention body setting up that contact group object, and on the 
understanding that the presiding officers o f such contact groups may 
determine at any time during their proceedings that they should be closed to 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.
2. Invites the presiding officers o f Convention bodies, at the time o f their 
establishment o f such a contact group, to ascertain i f  there are objections from 
Parties to attendance by intergovernmental and non-governmental
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organisations at that contact group under the conditions set out in paragraph 
1 above.
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, Buenos Aires, 
1998, Addendum: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Fourth 
Session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add. 1 (1999), Decision 18/CP.4 (1998) 
on the attendance of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations at 
contact groups.
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Annex 6
Proposal by business for a Business Consultative Mechanism 
A business consultative mechanism should:
1. Provide business with a convenient, direct and effective additional 
channel o f communication.
2. Further enable business to both volunteer information to, and respond 
to questions from all o f the bodies established under the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in a timely manner.
3. Further enable business to provide information to all o f the parties and 
to the intergovernmental organisations participating in the FCCC 
process.
4. Further enable business to provide its views on the full range (policy, 
socio-economic, technological etc) o f issues being addressed under the 
FCCC.
5. Be open to all business NGOs accredited by the FCCC process who 
wish to participate.
6. Be able to convey the full range o f business positions on an unfiltered 
basis.
7. Not be a process for negotiation o f commitments from business or for 
the selection o f technology ‘winners and losers ’.
8. Be an addition to, not a replacement for, existing or new business 
consultation at the national and international level.
9. Be treated by the FCCC process in a manner comparable to other 
NGO consultative mechanisms in terms o f access and administrative 
support, including funding for participants from developing nations.
10. Be subject to and consistent with national and regional anti-trust and 
competition laws and regulations.
Principles of Business Consultation with the Bodies established under the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bernstein L.S on behalf of the 
Business Groups participating in the Workshop on Consultative Mechanisms 
for NGO Inputs into the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva, 
1996, extracted in UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Secretariat 
Note, Mechanisms for Consultation with NGOs, Compilation of Submissions, 
UN Doc FCCC/SBI/1997/MISC.7, 11.
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Annex 7
List of Individuals Contributing to the Case Study 
on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Chapter Three draws upon statements made during presentations, informal 
discussions and formal interviews with the individuals listed below as a result 
of attendance at the two-week session of the Ninth Conference of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC in Milan, Italy, 1-12 December 2003 (see further the 
methodology section in the Introduction). Permission has been granted for 
quotation and errors or omissions remain those of the author. Records of 
conversations are retained on file.
1) Corporate officers, trade association representatives, corporate coalition 
members and other individuals:
Mr Machua Acharya, World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
Mr Kevin Baumert, World Resources Institute.
Mr Alex Beckitt, Executive Officer, Renewable Energy Generators Australia 
Ltd.
Mr Leonard Bernstein, The Global Climate Coalition.
Adam Bumpus, Programme Coordinator, Responding to Climate Change.
Mr Nick Campbell, Chairman, Task Force on Climate Change, International 
Chamber of Commerce Environment and Energy Commission.
Mr Daniel Chartier, President, Emissions Marketing Association.
Mr Neil Cohn, Senior Director, Natsource LLC.
Mr Stephen Dahl, Environmental Planner, Norske Skog.
Mr Robert Domau, International Emissions Trading Association.
Mr David Feldner, Chief Accounting Executive, Emissions Marketing 
Association.
Dr Brian Flannery, Manager, Science, Strategy and Programs (Safety, Health 
and the Environment), Exxon Mobil Corporation.
Mr Oliver Haugen, World Economic Forum.
Mr David Hone, Vice President Climate Change, Shell.
Ms Marian Hopkins, The Business Roundtable.
Ms Lisa Jacobson, Business Council for Sustainable Energy.
Ms Norine Kennedy, Vice President, Environmental Affairs, United States 
Council for International Business.
Mr Manabu Kubota, Federation of Electric Power Companies.
Mr Julio Lambing, European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy 
Future (e5).
Andrei Marcu, President and CEO, International Emissions Trading 
Association.
Nick Marshall, Global Product Manager, British Standards Institute.
Mr Charles Nicholson, Senior Adviser, British Petroleum.
Ms Robyn Priddle, Executive Director, Australian Industry Greenhouse 
Network.
Mr James Ramsey, Managing Director, Entico Corporation Limited.
Mr Masayuki Sasanouchi, Project General Manager-Environment, Toyota.
Mr Simon Schmitz, World Business Council for Sustainable Development.
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Dr Syd Shea, Chairman and Managing Director, The Oil Mallee Company of 
Australia Ltd.
Mr Bjom Stigson, President, World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development.
Mr Tim Stileman, International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association.
Mr David Stirpe, Executive Director, The Alliance for Responsible 
Atmospheric Policy.
Mr Peter Storm, International Gas Union.
Mr Richard Taylor, International Hydropower Association.
Mr Eli Turk, Vice President, Government Relations, Canadian Electricity 
Association.
Mr Christiaan Vrolijk, IT Power.
Mr Jack Whelan, Secretary, Task Force on Climate Change, International 
Chamber of Commerce Environment and Energy Commission and designated 
BINGO contact person at COP 9.
2) Other Individuals.
Ms Barbara Black, NGO Liaison Officer, UNFCCC Secretariat.
Ms Laura Campbell, President, Climate Change Legal Foundation.
Mr Justin Portelli, Director, Carbon Management Group, CSIRO.
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Annex 8 
UN Secretariat Questionnaire
Chapter One draws upon the opinions of several secretariat officials to 
examine the contemporary practice of the UN’s engagement with the private 
sector. These individuals are the designated NGO focal points, public relations 
officers or officers responsible for private sector relations within the UN 
secretariat, UN Agencies or UN Programmes. Their responses to the 
questionnaire are reproduced in full below.
• Mr Bernard Kuiten, Counsellor, External Relations Division, WTO 
Secretariat.
• Mr Philipp Muller-Wirth, Specialist for Cooperation with the Private 
Sector, Sector for External Relations and Cooperation, UNESCO.
• Mr Arthur H. V. Nogueira, Principal Officer, Implementation and 
Outreach Programme, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD).
• Ms Federica Pietracci, Major Groups Programme Coordinator, UN 
Division for Sustainable Development (DivSusDev)
• Ms Aysen Tanyeri-Abur, Senior Officer (Private Sector), Resources 
and Strategic Partnerships Unit, FAO.
• Mr Krishnan Sharma, Designated Focal Point for Private Sector 
Engagement, Financing for Development Office (FinDevOffice).
One secretariat official was also interviewed over the telephone and her 
comments appear in Chapter One (notes held on file).
• Mrs Gillian Murray, Officer in Charge, Co-Financing Section, Public 
Affairs and Inter-Agency Branch, UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
A ) T he  P riva te Sec to r a n d  N o n -g o vern m en ta l O rganiza tions (NG O s).
1. How does the secretariat generally assess
a) the competence; and
b) the relevance
o f an NGO to participate in activities organized by the secretariat ?
SCBD: the Secretariat has no accreditation procedure or selection criteria for 
identifying and discriminating among NGOs. The Convention’s activities are 
chiefly meetings among Parties or among experts appointed by the Parties. The 
former are open, public meetings, and any individual or organization may join 
after filling the appropriate application form; the latter are mostly closed 
meetings for Government appointees only. The Secretariat does not have 
implementation programmes to which an NGO could be a partner. For these 
reasons, the Secretariat does not assess competence nor relevance of NGOs.
DivSusDev: The competence and relevance of an NGO wishing to participate 
in the CSD process are both assessed when the NGO applies for accreditation. 
All NGOs must be accredited in order to participate in official CSD activities. 
Detailed information on accreditation can be found on our website at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/mgrouns/csd 12/qa registration.htm
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FAO: For private sector (PS) (including NGO’s composed of PS members, 
there is a screening committee (composed of audit, legal and procurement, and 
technical cooperation senior officers) in house that screens all potential 
partners. To assess the competence (if needed) the relevant technical division 
provides an assessement..
FinDevOffice: We interact with a group of business interlocutors whom we 
have appointed (comprising major business associations from around the 
world) and liaise with them as to the appropriate business entity to invite to 
speak on a particular issue.
UNESCO: UNESCO has a long tradition of relations with NGOs. These 
relations are intense at both the policy and operational levels. At policy level, a 
large number of NGOs are formally affiliated with UNESCO and take part, 
through permanent liaison with governing bodies, in the Organization’s policy 
& programme definition and monitoring. At operational level, programme 
sectors and field offices select, on an ad hoc basis, various NGOs (international, 
national and local) for the implementation of their projects.
WTO: Due to the absence of a permanent or institutionalized registration or 
accreditation mechanism for NGOs at WTO, no detailed assessment procedure 
exists. Only at WTO Ministerial Conferences, which take place every two 
years, NGOs can be formally accredited for the duration of the Conference. 
Whether or not a NGO requesting registration would qualify depends on:
- it's not-for-profit and non-governmental nature;
- the fulfillment of the criteria as described in WTO art. V:2, i.e. NGOs that are 
"concerned with matters related to those of the WTO".
During all other WTO events which are open to public and therefore NGO 
participation, no specific assessment is applied or required.
2. In your dealings with NGOs, is a distinction made between the private 
sector and other NGOs ? I f  so, how (eg constituency system, adoption o f the 
‘major groups ’ concept from the Commission on Sustainable Development) ?
SCBD: no. Both types participate as observers at the Convention’s meetings.
DivSusDev: The private sector is included in the major group known as the 
business and industry group. We make no distinction between this and other 
major groups.
FAO: Yes, NGO’s that are composed of PS members are treated as PS.
FinDevOffice: We have different people dealing with private sector and 
NGOs.
UNESCO: Private sector groups (with the exception of a few corporate 
foundations) are not (yet) involved in policy decisions / governing bodies. 
Whereas UNESCO’s relations with NGOs are traditionally governed by 
detailed guidelines, procedures and structures, relations with private sector
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partners take, so far, place in the framework of general guidelines and specific 
contractual arrangements.
WTO: The WTO does not make a distinction between private and "public" 
sector NGOs. Please note that when referring to private sector NGOs, what is 
meant are business associations etc. and not individual companies. This also 
applies to the answers given below, except when indicated otherwise.
Please also note that the WTO Secretariat has a limited mandate to deal with 
NGOs and has no right of initiative or independent decision-making powers.
3. Is the private sector treated any differently from other NGOs in its dealings 
with the secretariat ? I f  so, in what ways ?
SCBD: no. The Secretariat has no standard procedures for dealing with NGOs 
in particular, nor with the private sector in particular.
DivSusDev: The private sector is treated differently from other NGOs in its 
eligibility for funding its participants. The business and industry major group 
does not receive any financial support from the Secretariat.
FAO: Yes, with much more caution to avoid image risk and conflicts of 
interest.
FinDevOffice: The private sector and NGOS are treated the same.
UNESCO: Within UNESCO’s Secretariat (Sector for External Relations, 
Headquarters), relations with NGOs and with the private sector are handled by 
two different divisions. At national levels, National Commissions for 
UNESCO (national entities established in each of UNESCO’s 190 Member 
States) are responsible for both mobilizing civil society partners (including 
NGOs and the private sector) and for facilitating / monitoring the Secretariat’s 
relations with these partners in Member States. Contractual arrangements with 
private sector partners tend to be more detailed with respect to provisions for 
the use of UNESCO’s name and emblem. Often relations with NGOs have a 
more specific substantive focus on one of UNESCO’s programme sectors, 
whereas relations with international private sector partners often concern 
different programme sectors.
WTO: See answer 2; no distinction is made.
B ) C haracteristics o f  th e  P riva te  Sector.
4. What are the typical characteristics o f organizations from the private sector 
which contact the secretariat (eg the geographical origins/nature o f 
business/size etc o f firms, trade associations, business groups) ?
SCBD: Given the scope of the Convention and the mandate of the Secretariat, 
the SCBD usually deals with two groups of NGOs: (a) the large, general 
purpose, well-known NGOs (Greenpeace, WWF, IUCN, Nature Conservancy 
etc.); and (b) a number of specific NGOs more closely related with the
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activities being undertaken under the Convention, such as organizations 
promoting indigenous issues, or the interests of the oil and mining industry, 
pharmaceutical companies and the agricultural sector.
DivSusDev: Generally, the private sector contacts us through representative 
organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce or the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development. Occasionally, businesses 
involved in some aspect of sustainable development will contact us directly to 
inquire about how they can participate. We then refer them to the appropriate 
representative organization, as the United Nations does not grant accreditation 
status to private companies.
FAO: Mostly multinationals, and local (Italian) PS
FinDevOffice: We interact with private sector companies and associations 
across all major sectors and around the world. Whom we invite to a particular 
meeting depends upon the issue being discussed in that meeting.
UNESCO:
• rather from developed countries (North America, Europe, Japan)
• increasingly from “emerging” countries (eg. India, Brazil)
• rather large, transnational corporations
• increasingly intn’l business federations and associations (ICC, WBCSD,
WEF, Rotary etc.)
WTO: The majority of the contacts are with major international business 
groups and associations from around the world and to a lesser extent with 
national associations or national Chambers of Commerce. The latter 
nevertheless depends on the size of the country or economy. Due to the wide 
coverage of the WTO agreements in terms of goods and services, it is 
impossible to indicate the nature of business.
C) P riva te S ec to r  P articipation in  Secretaria t Activities.
5. What are the motivations and/or needs o f the private sector (or your 
perception o f those commercial intentions) for initially contacting the 
secretariat (eg requesting information, information sharing, seeking access to 
officials, attempting to participate in policy or decision-making) ?
SCBD: The private sector has not been a close partner in the workings of the 
Convention so far, although nothing would prevent them for doing so in the 
future. Actually a number of decisions from the Conference of the Parties, the 
central legislative body of the Convention, recommend closer and more 
constructive relationship with the private sector. The fairly limited contacts 
between the private sector and the Secretariat seem to revolve around the 
following: (a) requesting information, in particular on policy trends; (b) 
requesting clarification on decisions already taken; (c) attempting to participate 
in policy making; (d) attempting to avoid decisions that may have adverse 
impacts on the operations of a particular sector.
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DivSusDev: We are contacted by private sector representatives who are 
motivated to contribute to the implementation of sustainable development as 
outlined in Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. They 
generally inquire about participating in CSD meetings or request information 
on partnership initiatives.
FAO: [No response]
FinDevOffice: They would like to liaise with policy makers and make 
proposals on issues relevant to their business operations.
UNESCO:
• Interest in specific opportunities of cooperation
• Access to governmental decision maker in emerging countries
• Access to local communities
• Policy orientation with respect to certain development issues
• Legitimacy of social investments
WTO: Private sector groups contact the WTO Secretariat for information 
purposes only.
6. What kinds o f activities organized by the secretariat does the private sector 
wish to become involved in ?
For example,
- Information gathering (eg attendance at conference o f the Parties) ;
- Information distribution (eg management consultancy) ;
- Participation in decision-making (eg appointment o f corporate 
representatives to a roster o f experts, membership o f technical committees) ;
- Operational delivery (eg programme design and implementation) ;
- Partnerships (eg joint research, training or education on scientific issues) ;
- Promotional activity (advocacy, outreach, awareness raising/education).
SCBD: As explained above, by its nature, the Secretariat does not prepare or 
deliver implementation projects. This is the privilege of the Parties. In their 
relationship with the Secretariat, therefore, the private sector may only wish to 
attend the public meetings of the Convention, which they are free to do. 
Consultancy contracts are very specific, limited in scope and more often than 
not require a high degree of expertise. As a result, such needs are usually 
fulfilled by an individual with an academic background.
DivSusDev: -Participation in CSD sessions, particularly major groups 
activities such as interactive dialogues designed to contribute to policy 
discussions and help shape decisions made by the Commission.
-Partnership initiatives.
-Information distribution on various sustainable development issues (e.g. to 
contribute case studies and inputs to the Secretary-General’s reports).
FAO: - Information gathering (eg attendance at conference of the Parties); yes
- Information distribution (eg management consultancy) ; yes
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- Participation in decision-making (eg appointment of corporate representatives 
to a roster of experts, membership of technical committees) ; yes
- Operational delivery (eg programme design and implementation) ; no - 
Partnerships (eg joint research, training or education on scientific issues) ; 
somewhat
- Promotional activity (advocacy, outreach, awareness raising/education) yes.
FinDevOffice: They participate in our meetings and present proposals and 
projects on issues relevant to the private sector. The purpose would be to then 
discuss further with relevant policy makers in governments and multilateral 
organizations the implementation of their proposals and projects.
UNESCO:
- Information gathering (eg attendance at conference of the Parties) ++;
- Information distribution (eg management consultancy) +;
- Participation in decision-making (eg appointment of corporate representatives 
to a roster of experts, membership of technical committees) +;
- Operational delivery (eg programme design and implementation) +;
- Partnerships (eg joint research, training or education on scientific issues) ++;
- Promotional activity (advocacy, outreach, awareness raising/education) ++. 
(++: very relevant; +: relevant)
WTO:
- Information gathering (eg attendance at conference of the Parties) ; YES
- Information distribution (eg management consultancy); YES, but not in 
relation to consultancy or advisory functions
- Participation in decision-making (eg appointment of corporate representatives 
to a roster of experts, membership of technical committees); NO
- Operational delivery (eg programme design and implementation); NO
- Partnerships (eg joint research, training or education on scientific issues) ; 
NO
- Promotional activity (advocacy, outreach, awareness raising/education). NO
7. What is the most and least popular o f the activities listed in your response to 
question 6 as evidenced by the degree o f private sector participation ?
SCBD: The private sector usually participates in CBD meetings (most popular) 
and rarely, if ever, participates in promotional activities (least popular).
DivSusDev: They are listed above in order of popularity.
FAO: Least popular is the willingness to provide financial/technical support to 
projects. Most popular is to add the UN name and blessing to their projects or 
initiatives and for attendance in policy meetings.
FinDevOffice: [No response]
UNESCO: Most popular : partnerships + information gathering (the latter 
including access to governmental and non-governmental decision makers)
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WTO: Not relevant
8. Through what mechanisms does the private sector participate in policy- 
formation or decision-making within the organization (eg workshops, 
roundtables, membership o f technical committees, written submissions, 
observers o f executive body meetings, independent or government-appointed 
experts) ?
SCBD: The CBD is an agreement among sovereign States, and governments’ 
representatives are the only ones allowed to debate and eventually adopt 
legally-biding decisions. Observers such as international organizations, NGOs, 
individuals, academia etc. are invited to attend the public meetings and are 
usually allowed to express their views during plenary sessions. The same 
applies to the private sector. The plenary session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) and the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific, 
Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), as well as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol (COP-MOP) are the institutional mechanisms 
for participation by the private sector. Individual companies or their 
associations also seek to participate through the organization of side-events 
and workshops during, and at the margins of, the Convention’s major meetings. 
Such activities are part of the official calendar of the meeting, are announced 
in the Secretariat’s web site, and enjoy the free support of the SCBD staff as 
far as basic procurements are concerned: room, projectors, daily
announcements, and other facilities. The private sector may wish, of course, to 
influence particular delegations in an informal way, and they may also be 
allowed to participate in policy building activities at the national level in 
preparation for an international meeting. However, these initiatives do not 
constitute a formal mechanism within the Convention.
DivSusDev: Interactive dialogues, roundtables, expert panel speakers, written 
inputs
FAO: Membership oof technical committees (eg. Codex) and also as observers 
in meetings
FinDevOffice: Workshops, roundtables and written submissions have been the 
main form of participation. However, the World Economic Forum will be 
organizing some multi-stakeholder consultations on some specific financing 
for development issues later in the year.
UNESCO: Foundations (see point 2 above) can be admitted to formal 
relations with UNESCO including participation in policy development. More 
recently, private sector representatives participated in several high level panels 
and advisory groups for specific programmes.
WTO: No direct involvement or participation in decision-making at WTO- 
level. Public workshops and seminars do show private sector participation but 
this is not considered as decision-making.
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9. What factors influence the extent ofprivate sector participation ?
SCBD: Possibly their specific interests are the only limiting factor in their 
participation.
DivSusDev: The extent of all major group participation is determined by 
decisions taken by the CSD Bureau and Secretariat on which formats should be 
used, and also by the time allocated to such formats.
FAO: [No response]
FinDevOffice: Attendance of relevant policy makers from governments and 
multilateral organizations is key.
UNESCO:
• Top level support within private sector company
• Medium/long term convergence of strategic objectives
• Resources made available by private sector partner for management of 
partnership within UNESCO
• Possibility of involving specific capacities of ps partner (know-how,
equipment, staff, regional branch offices) in joint projects
WTO: The way in which multilateral trade negotiations and subsequent deals, 
as well as the existing WTO rules and obligations, affect international trade 
opportunities. In other words, what effect does WTO have on the trade 
interests of the business community.
10. What efforts are made by the private sector to influence the extent and/or 
the conditions o f their participation ?
SCBD: The private sector is in no way different from other interest groups, 
such as NGOs, academia, IGOs etc., all of which are grouped under an 
observer status. Rules of procedure adopted by the UN, as well as the specific 
rules of procedure for meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD 
adopted as an annex to decision 1/1 and decision V/20 (rules 6 and 7) establish 
the modalities of participation for observers, who are expected to abide by 
them.
DivSusDev: Requests to the Secretariat from individual organizations.
FAO: [No response]
FinDevOffice: [No response]
UNESCO:
• Either: normal process of (contractual) negotiations with respect of 
respective constraints
• Or: Sponsoring rationale -  emphasis on image / funding ratio
WTO: None at the level of the WTO Secretariat.
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D) Secretariat Practice.
11. How frequent is contact between the secretariat and the private sector (eg 
sporadic, ad hoc, frequently, routine/daily) ?
SCBD: Ad hoc. The private sector, as well as other interest groups, usually 
takes the initiative to contact the Secretariat.
DivSusDev: We communicate on a regular basis with “organizing partners” of 
the private sector and other major groups, who represent their constituencies. 
We also frequently handle communications from other private sector entities.
FAO: ad hoc
FinDevOffice: Frequent.
UNESCO: Considering that a large number of about 2500 staff in over 50 
field offices, 5 programme sectors and various central services increasingly 
consider the opportunities of private sector partnerships: routine/ daily
WTO: Between ad hoc and frequently, depending on the relevance of ongoing 
activities
12. Has the degree ofprivate sector participation changed over time and i f  so, 
how ?
SCBD: There is no discernible pattern or evolution at this stage.
DivSusDev: Participation by the private sector, as well as by other major 
groups, has increased over time.
FAO: Not much except for more interest in the UN system 
FinDevOffice: It has evolved and broadened.
UNESCO: It has constantly increased
Change from a pure fund-raising rationale (“we do, they fund”) towards a 
partnership rationale (“they do -  we help”)
WTO: Not necessarily; see also answer to Q11
13. What initiatives i f  any have recently been adopted by the secretariat to 
increase private sector participation ?
SCBD: Articles 10(e) and 16(4) of the Convention and many decisions 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties refer either directly to the private 
sector, or to the private sector as a potential partner among others. Such 
involvement, however, has not taken place in any significant manner until this
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date. It is expected that this situation should change in the coming years and be 
addressed in a more substantive way at COP VIII, in 2006.
DivSusDev: Partnership initiatives have recently provided a new way in which 
the private sector can contribute to sustainable development implementation.
FAO: None
FinDevOffice: Working closely with a group of business interlocutors who 
cover businesses from across sectors and geographical regions.
UNESCO:
• Various internal training sessions on private sector mobilization
• Establishment of advisory groups with ps participation (see point 8. 
above)
• Elaboration of strategies for flagship programmes (UN Decades of 
Education for Sustainable Development; for Literacy, for Water, 
Education for All, Global Alliance for Cultural Diversity; Management 
of Social Transformation, World Heritage, Intangible Heritage, etc.) 
which anticipate the involvement of the private sector
• Several research and strategy documents and publication were prepared 
in close co-operation with private sector partners
• Continuous liaison with UN structures and programmes in charge of 
private sector (UN Global Compact, UNFIP)
• Development of a specific web-site and data base
WTO: None.
14. What effort has been made i f  any to encourage greater participation by:
a) small and medium sized enterprises ; and
b) corporations from developing States ?
SCBD: Please see previous answer.
DivSusDev: None.
FAO: None additional effort made at secretarial level but FAO does work 
with local private sector through its projects- a survey to assess the extent of 
local private sector involvement and promotion of greater participation will be 
conducted in the next month or so.
FinDevOffice: Considerable effort -  especially to involve corporations from 
developing countries (through working with our interlocutors).
UNESCO:
• Formal relations with the World Association of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (WASME)
• Regional training seminars for UNESCO National Commissions with 
participation of regional representatives (of international, regional and 
national) business groups
496
• Specific initiatives for regional/small scale partnerships (eg. Global 
Alliance for Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Co-Action programme)
• Conception of global partnerships which benefit developing countries 
and their non-governmental stakeholders
WTO: None specifically; here an important role exists for the WTO Member 
countries.
15. What advantages does participation by the private sector offer to the 
secretariat (eg additional resources (supplement in-house technical expertise, 
personnel secondment, additional funding), outsourcing (contracted or 
recruited for procurement), knowledge transfer (management systems design, 
building organizational capacity)) ?
SCBD: As of this date there is no experience resulting from private sector 
participation in the workings of the Secretariat. Modalities for such will have 
to be considered and proposed by the Secretariat, and approved by the Parties, 
if such is the wish of the latter. None of the above is excluded in the future.
DivSusDev: Their contributions often provide technical expertise and 
knowledge that enables more informed decision-making by the Commission
FAO: Additional resources, human and financial as well as exchange of 
information.
FinDevOffice: The purpose of involving the private sector is to hear their 
views and facilitate a discussion between them and policy makers on critical 
issues.
UNESCO:
All of the above
+ improved outreach to new target groups / visibility 
+ enhanced advocacy for strategic and programmatic objectives 
+ resource mobilization for decentralized networks (field offices, national 
commissions, world heritage sites, biospheres, chairs, associated schools, etc.)
WTO: Except for public conference, there are no specific arrangements which 
identify private sector participation. In any case, in order to safeguard the 
Secretariat's neutrality, it is not in a position to accept funds, resources or 
knowledge from private sector sources.
16. How does the secretariat select private sector organizations for admission 
as observers to Conferences o f the Parties ?
SCBD: Please see answer to question # 1.
DivSusDev: We do not select organizations—they are welcome to participate 
if they are accredited.
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FAO: The interested orgaqnization sends a request with its statutes -  this is 
reviewed by legal office and assessed by the technical division. The 
organization needs to have international representation, (at least in 3 countries)
FinDevOffice: [No response]
UNESCO:
On an ad hoc basis, in close consultation with the partners
Increasingly in co-operation with international business networks (eg World
Economic Forum)
WTO: Not applicable.
17. Does the secretariat assess the representatives nominated by the private 
sector for appointment as observers or experts ?
SCBD: Answer to question # 1 still applies.
DivSusDev: No. We generally rely on our organizing partners to assess their 
own nominees.
FAO: The most frequent case where this happens is for Codex in which case 
the decision is jointly made by WHO and FAO through a joint assessment
FinDevOffice: Yes we do carefully assess the suitability of private sector 
representatives participating in our meetings.
UNESCO: Ad-hoc, in close consultation with government authorities 
(National Commissions and Permanent Delegations)
WTO: Not applicable
18. What has been the impact i f  any o f participation by the private sector upon 
the practices o f the secretariat (eg need to streamline NGO participation, 
greater preference for organized business groups) ?
SCBD: Please see answer to question #15.
DivSusDev: With increased overall participation by major groups, and given 
the current focus on implementation in the post-WSSD era, the Secretariat 
encourages private sector involvement in partnerships with other civil society 
organizations and Governments at the regional, national and local levels. We 
also recognize the need to compile and analyze data pertaining to participating 
organizations.
FAO: Not much
FinDevOffice: No impact. Interaction with private sector has evolved with 
improved understanding of their views.
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UNESCO: On-going process including the two above indicated tendencies 
Increased awareness of relevance of private sector to UNESCO’s activities
WTO: None specifically, as we are already have relations with organized 
groups and not at individual companies.
19. What is the nature i f  any o f problems or difficulties which the secretariat 
has encountered in its dealings with the private sector (eg potential conflicts o f  
interest, opposition from States Parties, protection o f commercial information) 
?
SCBD: Please see answer to question #15.
DivSusDev: General suspicion on the part of civil society that Governments 
will abdicate their responsibilities to the private sector, questions regarding the 
relevance of involvement by certain companies, opposing points of view than 
other NGOs on certain issues (i.e. water privatization).
FAO: Not much because the assessment procedure is pretty strict to avoid 
problems.
FinDevOffice: No problems.
UNESCO:
• Lack of proper resources to develop and implement partnerships
• Incompatibility of marketing and policy rationales (necessity of 
coherent framework vs. flexibility)
• Lack of strategic co-ordination of increasing number of joint activities 
with the private” sector
WTO: None specifically
20. Please provide any other comments or thoughts on the nature and/or extent 
o f private sector participation in activities organized by the secretariat.
SCBD: None.
DivSusDev: You may also wish to look at:
UN System and Civil Society - An Inventory and Analysis of Practices 
Background Paper for the Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons on 
United Nations Relations with Civil Society, (May 2003) available at: 
http ://www. un.org/reform/pdfs/hln9 .htm 
AND
Commission on the Private Sector and Development available at: 
http ://www.undp .org/cpsd/
FAO: [No response]
FinDevOffice: [No response]
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UNESCO: To the extend to which the interest of private sector partners in co­
operating with UNESCO seems to be continuously increasing, the 
enhancement of the Organization’s proper capacities for such co-operation will 
be increasingly important.
WTO: [No response]
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Annex 9
Questionnaire for the Energy and Biodiversity Initiative
The Energy and Biodiversity Initiative (EBI) is a partnership between four 
energy corporations (ChevronTexaco, StatOil, Shell and BP) and five 
environmental NGOs seeking to integrate biodiversity considerations into oil 
and gas operations. Chapter Two draws upon the views of the following 
corporations who replied to a questionnaire and whose full responses are 
reproduced below:
Ms Kit Armstrong & Mr Patrick O’Brien, ChevronTexaco (C).
Mr Sachin Kapila, Shell (S).
1. How important were existing regulatory requirements/expectations as 
an original impetus to you joining the EBI partnership?
the most important consideration, 
as important as other considerations.
C,S not important.
2. How important were existing regulatory requirements/expectations in 
formulating the EBI products?
the most important points of reference.
S as important as other considerations.
C not important.
3. Which regulatory requirements/expectations were important?
S UNESCO World Heritage Listing.
C,S Convention on Biological Diversity.
S RAMSAR protected wetlands.
Johannesburg Type 2 partnership initiatives.
C Environmental Impact Assessment regulation -  national and/or EC.
S EC Habitats Directive and national implementation.
1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information and Public 
Participation in Decisionmaking.
1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context.
S IUCN 2000 Amman Resolution on protected areas.
ILO Convention No. 169 (1989) concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries.
Prospective environmental liability under national law.
Other:
4. What core competencies (skills and knowledge) do you consider you
contributed to the EBI?
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C biodiversity science.
S social sciences.
S environmental management expertise.
S best commercial practice in oil/gas.
C knowledge of government (national, intergovernmental)
Other:
5. What was your original intent for joining the EBI partnership and what 
did you hope to get from your investment in the process?
C,S [improved] expanded relationships with firms/NGOs.
better understanding of biodiversity issues.
C,S formulate operational guidelines.
S update environmental management systems.
Other:
6. Were your objectives realized?
Fully.
C,S Partly.
Not at all.
7. Do you consider there to have been proper accountability o f each o f
the partners to the group?
S Yes, because
No, because 
Yes and No, because
S: each organization is very well known in its own field, and is in itself
accountable either to its members or shareholders
C: We do not view accountability of partners as particularly relevant Each
partner contributed to the effort
8. Were there any conflicts o f interest or agenda?
C Yes; if so, how were they identified and resolved?
There were clearly diverging views both within and between the 
NGO/energy sectors about the significance of various issues -  
protected areas, secondary impacts. Probably the largest philosophical 
difference was that for the energy companies, biodiversity is one of 
suite of risk management issues that need attention for any new 
development or ongoing operation , while for the NGOs at the table, it 
is their central issue and primary area of focus. This fact gives rise to a 
natural difference in perspective on the significance of the biodiversity 
issue as it relates to energy operations.. The substantive issues, 
especially the question of operating in or near protected areas was 
resolved through much discussion, review of sequential draft 
documents and negotiation about what the various parties could live 
with.
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S: Yes. When dealing with the subject of biodiversity (conservation,
science, politics) and the extractive industry, ofcourse, there are going 
to some areas which cause increased tension/conflict. The single 
biggest and most crucial area for us to get right and to get consensus on 
as a group was that of site selection. All of the NGOs as part of EBI 
are members of IUCN and IUCN had in 2000, passed the Amman 
Recommendation -  this was forefront of people's discussion -  wanting 
to see at first, the establishment of industry no-go areas -  the site 
selection decision-making framework was a breakthrough piece of 
work as it provided a rationale and logical approach to dealing with this 
contentious issue -  and it was developed in such a way as to obtain 
agreement from all 9 organisations. The conflict was resolved through 
dialogue and debate.
9. Was there equality between the partners in terms o f participating in 
discussion, formulating the EBI products and decision-making?
C,S Yes
No
S: although there were some more vocal organizations (individuals than
others).
10. What were some o f the difficulties encountered during the course o f the 
partnership and how were they overcome?
C Sources of funding: energy companies kicked in a “surcharge” to
compensate for loss of Enron
S Sources of Funding: Some of the NGOs wanted to be paid for their
time but this was soon resolved by giving each NGO a stipend
C Trust: Initial barrier that broke down as people got to know one another.
First two meetings were largely posturing with little accomplished.
C Impasse on key issues: agreed not to engage on the issue of relationship
of biodiversity to climate change. Stated reason why WWF chose not 
to join the EBI
S Impasse on key issues: see above on issue related to site selection and
no-go areas.
C Maintaining continuity/progress/commitment: lack of defined project
manager at outset needed to be corrected because of lack of insurance 
that commitments were indeed commitments and lack of follow 
through
S Personalities: I wouldn't call this a difficulty but more of an interesting
issue -  something that had to be handled given that the team was about 
20 in total.
C Information: Could have used more information and examples of where
mitigation of secondary impacts was/was not successful
C Time Difficulties for all partners devoting time necessary to plan and
produce EBI products in addition to other primary work obligations. 
Delays in producing products and quality of writing necessitated hiring 
consultants to do substantial amounts of writing
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S Other: Equitable sharing of workload. There were some organisations
working a lot harder than others -  this issue was never really discussed 
but as an underlying issue for some
11. How were resource needs (financial, human) identified and met?
Self-identified and self-satisfied.
Self-identified and mutually satisfied!
Mutually identified and mutually satisfied.
S Mutually identified and self-satisfied.
C: Not sure any of the above choices apply. Companies and NGOs each
committed two persons to the effort who attended most meetings.
Companies each committed about $80m to support staffwork and NGO
travel.
12. On the whole, were you satisfied with the following decision-making 
aspects o f the partnership?
Transparency S, C Yes No
Disclosure of information S, C Yes No
Freedom to acquire information S, C Yes No
Frankness of exchange S, C Yes & C No
Voting/Decision taking S, C Yes No
13. Was the absence o f any identifiable party listed below an obstacle to 
progress and to the quality o f the final products? I f  so, how did the 
group attempt to overcome this shortcoming?
S government: through trialing of EBI products during a second phase,
consumers 
trade unions
S indigenous communities: through some local stakeholder consultation
efforts during a trial second phase period.
S local NGO’s: see above,
financial institutions
secretariat of an international convention
academic
public opinion
Other
C: Any of these interests could have added valuable perspective. The
most lacking was local NGO representation, people who could 
effectively represent government views and practices, and a national oil 
company, which doesn’t appear on the above list. We just decided to 
forge on without additional members after some initial effort to screen 
for interest/availability among additional groups. There was a general 
feeling, especially once trust started to build, that more members would 
have hindered progress in generating products
14. Was the partnership effective in building trust?
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C, S Yes.
No.
Mixed success.
15. Were you satisfied with the level o f commitment and contribution from 
the partners over the 2‘A year period o f the EBI?
C Yes.
S No.
S: I feel that some organizations/individuals worked a lot harder and put
in much more effort than others.
16. In what ways did you benefit from the partnership?
C, S building constructive relationships for the future
S further developing environmental management systems
C enabling the completion of environmental impact statements
C, S information exchange
C, S understanding the motivations/behaviour of other organizations 
capacity building 
developing expertise
C reputational enhancement
Other
C: Participation helped keep the discussion focused on areas of interest to
our company without letting it spin out of control. We made a 
judgment that it would be better to participate in order to help shape the 
discussion and products that we expect would set standards for industry 
behavior and performance.
17. Were the benefits o f participating shared equally among the partners?
S Yes
No
C: Don’t know -  can’t speak for them
18. In what ways were you disappointed with the partnership?
unresolved issues
S lack of time
lack of resources 
unenviable compromises 
one-way information flows 
curtailed freedom of action 
Other:
C: Concern that the products haven’t pushed the boundaries around the
issues as far as they might have been. Leads to some level of concern 
about their credibility among NGOs who weren’t at the table.
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19. Are you satisfied with the monitoring arrangements established for 
Phase 2 (ie testing o f the EBI products in the field by firms) in terms o f 
‘enforcing ’ what was agreed during the partnership and independently 
verifying compliance?
Yes.
Appropriately balanced.
S No....................................... .................................................
C: The use of the words “enforce” and “compliance” misrepresents the
intent of Phase 2 testing. Anything that gets done by individual 
companies in the field will be voluntary with each company having 
different needs and priorities as well as organizational structures and 
philosophies (central control/decentralized authority and decision 
making). The word “enforce” implies a legal compliance obligation, 
which doesn’t exist. Each of the organizations has made voluntary 
commitments to undertake testing and use of the EBI products in ways 
most appropriate for them.
20. Do you envisage using the EBI products in your subsequent 
relationships with any o f the following parties and if  so, how?
C, S government: part of permit negotiations
consumers 
trade unions
S indigenous communities
S: or local communities.
C, S local NGO’s.. .part of permit negotiations and community engagement
commitments.
C, S financial institutions.. .showing commitment to biodiversity values
secretariat of an international convention.
C academic... - seminars.
public opinion: Communication through corporate responsibility report 
and other communications mechanisms.
C Other: operating organizations within our own corporation.
21. How likely is it that the practices o f and relationships between each
NGO and the corporate members o f the EBI will change as a result o f 
the EBI?
Likely that all practices and relationships will change.
Improve Deteriorate
Likely that commercial practices will change.
Improve Deteriorate
C, S Likely that NGO-business relationships will change.
C Improve Deteriorate
C, S Unlikely that commercial practices will change.
Unlikely that NGO-business relationships will change.
Unlikely that anything will change
506
C: We’re not clear what is meant by “commercial practices”. If this
means environmental management practices implemented for oil and 
gas projects, then we would expect use of EBI products will potentially 
produce incremental improvements in how we focus on biodiversity in 
some specific relevant areas above our already good practice.
22. In the past, operational guidelines for environmental management have 
been developed by companies or industry groups and NGOs acting 
unilaterally. What value did the EBI add in bringing NGOs and 
companies together to develop tools for integrating biodiversity into oil 
and gas development?
C: For the energy companies, it puts the stamp of approval by 5 highly
recognized, international NGOs on the products. This gives them 
another layer of legitimacy.
S: The fact that each product produced by EBI has had the signature of 9
organisations. This gives whatever was produced some weight and 
credibility, albeit recognizing that if one was to work on these products 
one could possibly have progressed further. But from the industry's 
standpoint, to have agreed working documents that might influence the 
industry with the aide of conservation organizations was a very 
powerful mechanism.
23. O f the objectives and structure o f the EBI partnership what changed 
over the two-year period and what did not change?
C: Enron dropped out. Objectives stayed the same, but vision of products
changed.
S: The objective(s) never changed -  we always remain focused on
achieving our ultimate goal and in fact, quite a lot of work had to be 
done to 'educate' the NGOs about the need to really focus and deliver 
what we said we would deliver. The structure changed slightly from 10 
to nine organizations which caused some in balance -  we had 4 
working groups each with 2 organisations -  this left the business 
working group without a corporate partner when Enron fell out. This 
was slightly problematic and unfair.
24. Would you have done anything differently?
C: Project manager from the outset
S: Brought in an editor right from the start -  it is one thing getting an
initiative like this off the ground but quite another, having to do all the 
work ourselves. When we finally agreed to bring in a consultant, the 
quality of the products improved exponentially and he managed to 
really pull everything together. We also had an editor writing the high 
level summary document -  again very valuable. Second, if we had 
more time and budget, I would have held more consultative working 
workshops with selected Government departments and other 
stakeholders (e.g. other NGOs, financial community etc)
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25. Any additional comments/thoughts on your experience in the EBI to
date?
C: Generally positive experience for all the reasons listed above
S: A very valuable experience -  possibly a model for joint collaboration.
I think the key thing is to be realistic about one's expectations -  not to 
be too grand in one's vision. It is much better to go for small steps and 
achieve them really well, than to have grand visions and fail.
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